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When ideas and discussions chain together, with one idea leading to studies and then
additional discussion and more new ideas, it is difficult to pinpoint the origins of the
discussion thread. That is the case with this book. In the ‘post-IMT’ world of the late 1990s,
questions arose about relationships between newly independent Water User Associations
(WUAs) and the national water agencies that spawned them. While the WUAs needed to
gain experience with independent operation, national water agencies recognized that they
must continue to support the new WUAs with training, advice and other assistance if they
were to make the transition to independent operation successfully and permanently. This
led to IWMI research on support services required by fledgling WUAs. Of course, this
line of inquiry itself grew directly out of the experience earlier in the decade with the
challenges of establishing and empowering the WUAs in the first place.
In addition, concern arose over the relationship between the irrigation commands
managed by the new WUAs and the hydrology of the basins in which they were situated.
More specifically, questions concerned the impact that water scarcity and competition
in the basin would have on WUAs operating within the basin. No longer wards of the state,
irrigation systems, and their WUA managers, were now more vulnerable to the competitive
pressures affectingwateruseinthebasin.Inadditiontomanagingtheirowninternalaffairs,
WUAsalsohadtobeconcernedwiththesecurityoftheirwatersupplyandtheimpactsofthe
actions of other water users in the basin on its quality and availability.
These concerns led, in 1999, to discussions among Doug Merrey, Tushaar Shah, Martin
Burton,HammondMurray-Rust, DavidMolden and myselfaboutthepossibilityofdevelop-
ing a methodology to assess basins simultaneously in terms of their hydrology and their
institutional make-up. The feeling was that there were important connections between the
two that could be elaborated. At the time, we called this exercise ‘hydro-institutional map-
ping’. This led to the commissioning of several case studies on river basin management and
to several conceptual papers such as Tushaar Shah’s stimulating ‘Limits to Leapfrogging’.
It also led to a matrix template, which allowed the mapping of essential basin functions on
to basin actors in order to examine, in a structure way, who was doing what in a basin.
IWMI research on this whole set of issues had been funded by the German government
forseveralyears,andthisworkculminatedinaworkshopon‘IntegratedWaterManagement
in Water-stressed River Basins in Developing Countries’, held at Loskop Dam in South
Africa in October of 2000. This workshop focused primarily on river basin management
institutions and organizations under conditions of water scarcity, but the concern with the
implications of scarcity for WUAs was always in the background. This bookis an outgrowth
of that workshop.
xi
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comprise three of the book’s thematic papers and four of the case studies. Most were
extensively modified following the workshop before being included in the book. To supple-
ment the three thematic chapters, I worked with Flip Wester and François Molle to write a
conceptual paper on river basin institutions to complement the Molden et al. chapter on
basin closure. I also asked Martin Burton to develop a chapter on the role of information
in basin management, information being nearly as important a resource as water itself in
managingabasin.Tofilloutthesetofcasestudies,MarnadeLangeetal.preparedastudyon
South Africa’s experience with establishing a representative Catchment Management
Agency in the Olifants Basin, and I contributed a case study on Vietnam’s Dong Nai River
Basin to add a Southeast Asian dimension. The Vietnam case was originally developed for
the International Food Policy Research Institute with support from the Asian Development
Bank.
Because the earlier discussions on ‘hydro-institutional mapping’ had involved many of
the case study authors, there was a good deal of consistency in the way the authors
approached the case studies, which was enhanced further during the interactive editing
process. As one result, all of the studies employed the ‘essential functions’ matrix as a
heuristic device and all focused, at least in part, on critically important basin governance
issues. This lent a coherence to the cases that facilitated a cross-cutting look at them, a look
which took the form of a pair of analyses – one focusing on basin management itself and
the other looking at implications of basin closure for small-scale irrigators. These analyses




and, sometimes, international experience which shape them. The thematic chapters in the
firstpartofthebookdeveloptheconceptsusedintheremainderofthebook,particularlythe
ideas relating to closing basins and institutional governance, and offer suggestions, insights
and qualifications related to those concepts. The case studies then describe some of the
sharply differing forms that basin management institutions have taken in response to the
influences mentioned above. The two analytic chapters attempt to understand what drives
the creation of basin management institutions, describe how they differ from each other
along key dimensions, and why, in some cases, they have taken the shape they have. We
hope you, readers, will find these chapters interesting and useful.
I must first and foremost thank the 19 chapter authors, who of course made the book
possible.Theirbiosketchesareincludedinthelistofcontributors.DougMerreyandTushaar
Shah were originally to edit this volume with me, but graciously turned the project over to
me when I turned out to be the least busy of us. Our discussions during the book’s formative
moments were invaluable. Michael Devlin and Nimal Fernando of the IWMI publications
office took my edited manuscripts and worked with the publisher to transform them into a
bookand, in addition, were verypatient with me and my sometimes elastic timetable. Many
other people were also involved in one way oranother whom I will refrain fromtrying to list
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees1 Managing River Basins: an Institutional
Perspective
Mark Svendsen, Philippus Wester and François Molle
1.1 Introduction
Up until the beginning of the 19th century,
human water use was largely confined to
streamside uses for drinking, stock watering
and water-powered mills, as well as in-
stream use for navigation. There were
exceptions in the ancient hydraulic
civilizations in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China,
India and a few other locations, which
abstracted large volumes of water from
major rivers to irrigate extensive tracts of
riparian floodplain. However, whereas the
local impacts of these abstractions were
significant, on a global scale, river flow
regimes were still largely dictated by
natural features and forces, and water users
were primarily natural biota.
Astheworldpopulationgrew,fromless
than 1 billion (109) in 1800, to 1.7 billion in
1900, to more than 6 billion today, human
demands for water also expanded. Growing
urban concentrations, often along rivers, led
to significant abstractions of water from
rivers for these settlements and to negative
impacts on water quality. At the same time,
the industrial revolution created new
demands for water, and new technology and
the growing demand for food gave rise to an
expanding irrigated agriculture throughout
the world.
The latter half of the 19th century saw
great strides in the development of hydrau-
lic technology for controlling major rivers
and transporting water over long distances
for irrigation and domestic purposes. Many
of these developments took place in the
Asian subcontinent, and engineers from
the USA and other countries pilgrimaged to
British India to learn this new technology
(e.g. Wilson, 1891). The following century
witnessed a great remaking of river systems
across the world, as humans manipulated
the natural hydrology to meet the domestic
supply, sanitation, food, fibre and industrial
needs of growing populations and rising
standards of living. During much of the 20th
century, expanding water supply was the
easiest and least costly way of satisfying
these demands, since water was relatively
abundant and the harmful impacts on the
environment were incremental, individually
modest and at first little noticed.
From a situation of limited, low-impact
and largely riparian uses of water, we have
now reached a point where, in many
parts of the world, cumulative uses of river
resources have not just local but basin-wide
and regional impacts. The result is that
water resources in many river basins are
fully or almost fully committed to a variety
of purposes, both in-stream and remote;
water quality is degraded; river-dependent
ecosystems are threatened; and still-
expanding demand is leading to intense
competition and, at times, to strife. In
response, there is growing interest in man-
agement systems that can bring together
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
(ed. M. Svendsen) 1
13 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:34:27 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesfragmented water uses, and water users, into
an integrated planning, allocation and man-
agement framework. A common element of
these approaches is that they do not just
covera single water use or an administrative
jurisdiction, but deal with an entire river
basinorsub-basin,suchastheColombia,the
Indus or the Limpopo.
Integrated management frameworks
promises a number of important benefits:
• Greater utility from a given amount of
water through adjusted allocations;
• Reduced groundwater mining through
conjunctive management of ground
and surface water;
• More intensive reuse of water through
planned sequencing of uses;
• Improved water quality through more
comprehensive data collection, moni-
toring and enforcement;
• Incorporation of current social and
environmental values into water alloca-
tion and management decision making;
• Inclusion of a wider range of basin
stakeholders into decision making;
• Reduced conflict among users.
Despite this promise, and although highly
fashionable of late in policy circles,
integrated river basin management (RBM)
is rather rare in practice. Reasons for this
include the following:
• It requires genuine collaboration
among administrative and sectoral
units;
• It usually involves reductions in dis-
cretionary authority on the part of
existing managing agencies;
• Managers who would gain influence
over basin decision making may cur-
rently be bureaucratically and politi-
cally weaker than current managers;
• Its costs can be significant;
• It creates uncertainty for present
resource users;
• It makes planning and decision making
more complex.
Given these potentially inhibiting factors, it
is not so surprising that there are not more
practising examples of integrated manage-
ment of water resources at the basin level.
In order to hurdle these constraints, dissat-
isfaction with the current situation must
be intense, and the prospective benefits
of a new management regime significant. It
is these conditions that we explore in this
chapter.
This chapter defines the basic elements
and concepts comprising integrated basin
management and other key concepts and
then focuses on the process of analysing
institutional arrangements for RBM to
further our understanding of institutional
design. To do this, we first discuss institu-
tions, organizations and policies in relation
to water management. We then outline an
essential functions and enabling conditions
framework for analysing basin management
regimes and discuss possible institutional
arrangementsforRBMthatmeettheneedsof
locally managed irrigation.
1.2 Terms and Concepts
1.2.1 River basin water resource
management
There are a number of terms used to des-
cribe an integrated process of assessing and
managing water resources at the basin level.
Most are variations on the terms integrated
water resource management or river basin
management (RBM).
Integrated water resource management
(IWRM)isanewertermandisdefinedbythe
Global Water Partnership (TAC, 2000) in the
following way:
IWRM is a process which promotes the
co-ordinated development and management
of water, land and related resources, in
order to maximize the resultant economic
and social welfare in an equitable manner
without compromising the sustainability of
vital ecosystems.
IWRM tends to have a strong normative
content, often referring to the Dublin
Principles and emphasizing such values
as economic benefit, equity, sustainability
and public participation. It is implicitly
suggested that all these values can be
made commensurate and compatible, but in
2 M. Svendsen et al.
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them, particularly between equity and eco-
nomic efficiency, and between economic
welfare and sustainability.
RBM is a more traditional term and has
more recently broadened its meaning to
encompass many of the same features and
values which characterize IWRM. RBM is
defined by Mostert et al. (2000) as follows:
RBM is the management of water systems as
part of the broader natural environment and
in relation to their socio-economic
environment.
This definition is simpler and less overtly
value-laden than the previous one. Both
definitions encompass both planning
and management of water resources, even
though the planning element is implicit. A
key element of both concepts is that plan-
ning and management units almost always
cut across other divisions more tradition-
ally used to manage resources, such as
sectors, provinces or even nations, and
herein lies both their great strength and
their challenge. Some divisions across
which the approach we are discussing
extends are shown in Box 1.1.
Typically, the boundaries of the man-
agement unit are defined hydrologically, as
a basin or a sub-basin, defined by Mostert
et al. (2000) as follows:
A river basin is the geographical area deter-
mined by the watershed limits of a system
of waters, both ground and surface, flowing
to a common terminus.
In a few areas, concepts do diverge some-
what. Basin management can readily be
extended to management of other related
resources in a basin, especially land
resources. IWRM focuses more tightly
on the water resource. At times RBM
also extends into the realm of river basin
development, in which case project-based
development of new basin infrastructure
often acquires a dominant position in the
paradigm. Millington (2000) notes that pro-
ject design or evaluation, construction and
operation is still a very strong role of
many river basin organizations. Experience
has shown that where project-based design
and construction is a major activity,
resource management functions tend to
receive low priority. IWRM grows out of a
‘post-construction’ milieu, where basins are
closing (Chapter 2) and new construction
tends not to be the dominant activity.
One important caveat to all this is
that integrated basin management does
not imply or require a single basin manage-
ment organization. There is an unfortunate
tendency in some quarters to equate basin
management with a unitary basin manage-
ment organization and to assume that in the
absence of such an organization, effective
integrated management is not possible. This
is most certainly an incorrect assumption,
as experience in the western USA demon-
strates, and, in general, monolithic manage-
ment organizations are the exception rather
than the rule. The prototype for such
thinking is probably the American Tennes-
see Valley Authority (TVA), which was,
in its original form, an integrated basin
development authority established during
the economic depression of the 1930s to
work in a very underdeveloped region of
the country.1 The TVA took on a wide range
of development functions, including water
resource development, in an area in which
therewasadearthofeffectiveorganizational
coveragebyotherpublicentities.Thefailure
Managing River Basins 3
Box 1.1. Integrated basin management.
Although the term integrated most commonly
refers to integration across use sectors, such
as agriculture and urban water supply, it can
also encompass a number of other divisions,
including the following:
• Administrative jurisdictions
• Ground and surface water
• Upstream and downstream reaches
• Environmental and human uses
• Supply and demand management
• Water quantity and quality
• Land and water use
• Trans-boundary uses
1 The TVA has since evolved into an energy production and management agency.
15 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:34:27 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesof most other attempts patterned on the
TVA, such as the Damodar Valley Authority
in India in the 1950s, suggests the unique-
ness of this model. More common among
effective basin management set-ups is a
coordinated model in which the efforts of a
number of different entities are articulated
(see Section 1.3.4).
1.2.2 Institutional arrangements
How water is used in a river basin is deter-
mined by the interactions between water
users, technology and water availability,
and hence is a sociotechnical process
(Mollinga, 1998). Water management orga-
nizations and institutions structure and
mediate these interactions, and in turn are
reshaped by water use in practice.
The terms ‘institutions’ and ‘organiza-
tions’ are often used interchangeably, but
it is useful to distinguish between them.
In mainstream institutional theory, institu-
tions are understood to be ‘the humanly
devised constraints that shape human inter-
action’ (North, 1990, p. 3), and consist of
complexes of norms, values and behaviours
that persist over time and inform action
(Uphoff, 1986). In this view, institutions
provide structure and regularity to everyday
life by reducing uncertainty and providing a
guide to human interaction. They are what
Sir V.S. Naipaul calls ‘the contract between
man and man’. A central tenet of this view is
that institutions work to reduce transaction
costs by reducing the costs of monitoring
and responding to the behaviour of others.
Organizations, on the other hand, are
defined as ‘groups of individuals bound by
some common purpose to achieve objec-
tives’ (North, 1990, p. 5). Other definitions
highlight the importance of seeing organiza-
tions as ‘structures of recognized and
accepted roles’ instead of only groups of
individuals, yielding a more realistic and
accurate definition (Uphoff, 1986). Organi-
zations are created intentionally within an
existing web of institutions. Hence, what
types of organizations exist and how they
evolve are fundamentally influenced by the
broader network of institutions in which
they are embedded. Organizations, in turn,
influence how institutions evolve over
time. Organizations constitute a subset
of institutions, which are distinguished by
their purposive origin and maintenance and
their hierarchically organized roles.
In this book, the combination of
the institutions and organizations involved
in water management is termed the institu-
tional arrangements for water manage-
ment. Institutional arrangements for water
management thus include the following:
• The established policy and legal envi-
ronment (policies, laws, rules, rights,
regulations, conventions, and customs,
both formal and informal);
• Water management organizations with
responsibilities in water management;
• Processes, mechanisms and procedures
for decision making, coordination,
negotiation and planning.
At this point, a chasm opens, which must
be carefully negotiated. Policies, rules and
regulations, as specified by public authori-
ties, may differ substantially from the appli-
cation of those rules in practice. Moreover,
local rules, such as those governing the
allocation of water, for example, may
be quite different from the formal set of
rules promulgated by state authorities. The
student of institutional arrangements must
thus be aware of both the formal rules, and
the set of rules-in-use, which operate on the
ground. The importance of the differences
that often exist between the two has led one
prominent analyst to define institutions
explicitly as rules-in-use, rather than
simply as rules (Ostrom, 1992).
To this point, we have treated
institutional arrangements as fixed and pre-
existing. To animate this static view, it
is necessary to consider how institutions
emerge and how changes in them take
place. Alternative approaches to the study
of institutions, grounded in anthropology
and sociology,argue that institutions are not
only ‘the rules of the game’ or ‘sets of work-
ing rules or rules-in-use’ (cf. North, 1990;
Ostrom, 1990) but are reproduced, trans-
formed and subverted through interactions
4 M. Svendsen et al.
16 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:34:28 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesand negotiations between actors (Mosse,
1997;Cleaver,1999;Mehtaetal.,1999).This
approach suggests that institutions emerge
historically from interactions, negotiations
and contests between heterogeneous actors
having diversegoals, and that theyonlycon-
tinue to exist if they are invested in or prac-
tised.Thus,institutionscannotbeseenapart
from what people do, and are constantly
made and remade through people’s prac-
tices (Mehta et al., 1999). Cleaver suggests
that, ‘[t]he institutions for the management
ofwater...aresociallylocatedandcritically
depend on the maintenance of a number of
gray areas and ambiguity regarding rights
of access, compliance and rules, [and] on a
continuous process of negotiation between
all users’ (1999, p. 602). Such a notion of
institutions opens avenues to analyse how
power pervades institutional arrangements
and gives rise to differentiated access to and
control over water, and, more importantly,
how to design processes to redress
inequities.
Because water is essential to life and
livelihood security and has multiple uses
and users, water management readily gives
rise to intractable or ‘wicked’ problems,
especially where competition for water
is acute. Wicked problems are clusters of
interrelated problems characterized by high
levels of uncertainty and a diversity of com-
peting values and decision stakes (Ackoff,
1974; Rittel and Webber, 1973). The set of
problems constituting a wicked problem
cannot be solved in isolation from one
another and are intractable since what con-
stitutes a solution for one group of individu-
als entails the generation of a new problem
for another. As wicked problems are charac-
terized by competing perceptions and
values, and often also involve power
disparities, they enter the realm of politics,
understood here broadly as the forum for
choosing among values and the process
through which relations of power are consti-
tuted, negotiated, reproduced or otherwise
shaped (cf. Mollinga, 2001). Water is
frequently a politically contested resource:
a contest with unpredictable and unstable
outcomes and diverging pathways to alter-
nativefutures(cf.Mosse,1997;Mehta,2000;
Mollinga, 2001). Likewise, water manage-
mentinstitutionsandpoliciesarefrequently
contested and the outcomes of political
practices.
1.2.3 Institutional effectiveness
From the brief discussion of institutions
and organizations above, it is apparent that
studying effective institutional arrange-
ments for water management is conceptu-
ally challenging. If institutions differ in
principle and in practice, are contested,
beset with ambiguities and the outcomes
of political practices, it follows that what
is defined as ‘effective’ by some will be
deemed ineffective by others. Nonetheless,
at an intuitive level, it is clear that the
strong connection between institutions and
how water is managed is indisputable.
Heathcote (1998, p. 7) suggests that institu-
tional arrangements for water management
may be considered effective if they:
1. Allow an adequate supply of water that
is sustainable over many years and provide
equity in access to this water.
2. Maintain water quality at levels that
meet government standards and other
societal water quality objectives.
3. Allow sustained economic develop-
ment over the short and long term.2
Thus, institutional arrangements for RBM
are effective if they promote and achieve
sustainable water management. Sustain-
ability can broadly be defined as a condi-
tion in which natural and social systems
survive and thrive together indefinitely
(Euston and Gibson, 1995).
To be sustainable, water management
must protect and restore natural systems,
enhance the well-being of people and
Managing River Basins 5
2 A fourth condition relatingto maintaining ecologicalsystems could be added here, but in our treatmentis
covered by an expanded definition of sustainability.
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objectives are often mutually exclusive, as
the partial attainment of one has negative
effects for attaining the others. This con-
tested nature of water makes the institu-
tional arrangements for water management
of paramount importance, but also highly
problematic. If institutions are viewed in
managerial or interventionist terms, effec-
tive institutions are seen as those that
contribute to attaining sustainable water
management by reducing transaction costs,
enhancing collective action and increasing
certainty. If a more process-oriented and
dynamic view of institutions is adopted,
emphasis is placed on how institutions are
embedded in power relations, and equity,
and not economic efficiency, is a central
concern.
1.2.4 Policy
Although established policies are included
under our definition of institutional
arrangements, they are often treated sepa-
rately in discussions of ‘policy and institu-
tional arrangements’. One reason for this
is that new policies not yet fully imple-
mented do not necessarily rise to the level
of ‘institutions’, as they have not demon-
strated an ability to persist. Consequently,
they are discussed separately here.
Policies provide a direction and suggest
a course of action intended to influence
decisions and actions in a particular realm
of interest. Water resource policy thus
gives overall guidance and direction to
decisions and actions that determine the
uses, protections and costs of water, and
the subsidies and prohibitions related to
its use. In the face of changing conditions,
needs, priorities and values, policies and
resulting actions must also change. Policies
areimportanttowaterresourcemanagement
because they can serve as important entry
points into the established cycle of water
management practices.
An instrumentalist view of government
conceptualizes policy as a tool to regulate
a population from the top down, through
incentives and sanctions. Shore and Wright
(1997, p. 5) summarize the conventional
definition of policy as ‘an intrinsically tech-
nical, rational, action-oriented instrument
that decision makers use to solve problems
and affect change’. Although many would
agree that policies frequently fail to function
as intended, there is a shared understanding
that a good policy is one that adheres to
the standard of rationality contained in the
above definition.
However, conceiving of policy develop-
ment and application as an unproblematic
linear process that progresses from formula-
tion to implementation to expected out-
comes is dangerous, as it obscures how
policies are produced through decidedly
non-linear and non-rational means, through
public and privatenegotiations, log-rolling,3
political pressure, media manipulation,
legal action and other processes involving a
rangeofactorswithin and outside ofgovern-
ment circles. Moreover, there is seldom a
simpleprogressionfrompolicyformulation,
to legislation, to framing regulations, to exe-
cution. The real process is much less tidy,
withiterations,falsestartsandbacktracking,
where the lead role alternates between
policy formulation and application.
An alternative perspective on analysing
how policies lead to changes in water
management practices conceives of policy
formulationandimplementationaspolitical
processes in which many interests are at
stake. Premised on the notion that water
management is a politically contested
terrain (Mosse, 1997; Mollinga, 1998, 2001;
Mehta et al., 1999), the ‘policy as process’
approach attempts to understand how water
policies are ‘produced’ by the interactions
between water users, dominant paradigms
and the institutional arrangements that
mediate water control. Through these
interactions, the content and composition
of policies are redefined and transformed,
frequently leading to very different results
6 M. Svendsen et al.
3 A process in which legislators trade concessions and support for sometimes unrelated objectives.
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informed analysis of policy processes helps
to understand how policies work in practice
to change control over water and water
management, thereby giving insight into
who gains and who loses.
1.2.5 Roles and actors
Individuals and organizations take action,
and it is useful to define two other com-
monly used descriptive terms. Roles are
sets of expectations and tasks associated
with a particular function (Coward, 1980).
As such, roles can be played by individuals
or by organizations. Actors are those indi-
viduals or organizations who take actions
in a particular context, and thus play
roles. Actors can play a number of roles
simultaneously, and roles can be split
among different actors. Often actors, such
as a government ministry, will play roles
that relate to water resource management
while playing other non-water-related roles
at the same time. Stakeholders are individu-
als or groups which have a legitimate inter-
est in the management of water resources in
a basin but which may or may not play an
active role in basin planning and manage-
ment processes. Actors are thus included in
the set of basin stakeholders, but do not
comprise the entire set.
1.3. Basin Management
1.3.1 Context
1.3.1.1 Phases of basin closure
In Chapter 2, Molden et al. posit that river
basins pass through three phases as more
water is withdrawn by humans (develop-
ment, utilization and reallocation), and
argue the valid point that that institutions
need to have the ability to adapt to changes.
Keller et al. (1998) proposed a linear three-
phase model of river basin maturation,
with phases of exploitation, conservation
and augmentation. In this model, the final
phase is a search for new water sources –
from distant basins, or by desalinating
seawater, rather than reallocation.
Turton and Ohlsson (2000), expand
this general argument positing that water
scarcity per se is not the key issue, but
rather whether a society has the adaptive
capacity to cope with the challenges that
waterscarcityposes.Theyarguethatinstitu-
tional transitions need to occur in the water
sector as water becomes scarcer, the first
when water abundance turns to water
shortage and the second when water
shortage turns to water over-exploitation.
In their argument, the ‘ability to cope’ with
shortage is a critical societal attribute deter-
miningthe‘pain’asocietywillfeelasabasin
closes.
These models are inductive, attempting
to draw out an explanatory thread from a
bodyofexperience.Assuch,theyareheuris-
tic rather than predictive in particular cases.
Keller et al. (1998) emphasize the economic
logicofthe sequence ofdevelopment.In this
framework,atanypoint in timethe cheapest
solutions are selected, from simple flow
diversion on to desalinization. Molden et al.
constrain the impulse to continuously
develop new sources of supply and instead
suggest that attention will shift to reallocat-
ing an ultimately fixed supply. In Turton
and Ohlsson’s approach, the logic of the
succession is based onascale ofcomplexity,
with the solution of water scarcity problems
demanding ever-increasing levels of social
resources. This approach assumes that
hydraulic development is the easiest
response, and that its exhaustion leads
to conservation efforts, later followed by
adjustments in allocations. The latter are
regarded as much more sensitive and likely
to generate social conflicts. These three
analytical grids are useful in making
connections between the degree of water
exploitation and types of human responses
– responses that are clearly related to the
degree of stress on the resource as well as
other factors. At the same time, they cannot
capture important nuances found in varied
concrete situations. A number of interesting
illustrations of this complexity are shown
below (Molle, 2003).
Managing River Basins 7
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compared five basins said to be at dif-
ferent stages of exploitation and have
found that the problems faced by these
basins were different. However, several
of the problems encountered were not
those that would be typical of the phase
in which each basin was classified. For
example, East Rapti basin in Nepal is
an open basin, with only 5% of water
resources being used by agriculture. In
spite of this, water pollution from
industries and ‘intense competition’
for river water during the dry season
among wildlife sanctuaries, tourist
requirements, ecological requirements
and human use already appear as
severe problems that ‘need immediate
action’, although they are normally
associated with later phases of devel-
opment. In the Singkarak-Ombilin
basin, Sumatra, considered to be at
the beginning of the utilization/conser-
vation phase, water allocated to non-
agricultural activities and trans-basin
diversion threatens to throw the basin
directly into the last phase, where
water rights need to be more formally
specified and water reallocation
becomes paramount.
• Problems of pollution are generally
associated with late phases in which
the scarcity of the resource does not
allow adequate mitigation by dilution,
but it may also happen very early if
there are significant pollution point
sources with little regulated water to
ensure dilution as with gold mines in
South Africa.
• The need to design more complex
and integrated forms of organization at
the basin level is associated with an
ultimate phase of reallocation of very
scarce water resources. However, in the
case of France in the 1960s, it was
the problem of water quality and not
quantity that was the driving force,
despite both aspects being interlinked.
• Trans-basin diversion is considered in
trajectory models as a way to ‘reopen’
the basin after it has closed, but this
option is sometimes observed at much
earlier stages of development, espe-
cially in small and medium basins.
In Sri Lanka, this was commonly
achieved as early as the 5th century
(Mendis, 1993) and has remained a
basic feature of water resource develop-
ment ever since. Such transfers are
also typical of irrigation of mountain-
ous interfluves, where irrigated areas
straddle the boundary of two adjacent
basins.
• In the later phases of basin closure, a
wide range of measures are sometimes
undertaken to relieve pressure, and not
simply the reallocation strategy hypo-
thesized. The case of California, as des-
cribed by Turral (1998), clearly shows
not only that both efficiency and reallo-
cative measures are sought in parallel,
but that the gains they provide are
more limited than commonly believed
and need to be accompanied with a
substantial amount of supply augmen-
tation. Closure does not conclude
with reallocation but, rather, elicits
continuous improvements on all three
fronts (conservation, reallocation and
supply).
• Not all trajectories are upward. Histori-
cal examples of civilizations that have
not successfully maintained their
resource base and have collapsed
can easily be found. In Sri Lanka,
for example, aerial photographs reveal
a high density of abandoned, silted and
destroyed small tanks in some basins.
A classic case is that of ancient
Mesopotamia in the 9th century (cf.
Pointing, 1991).
It seems clear that decisions must be
understood also in terms of their political
economy. That is, decisions must be under-
stood not only on the basis of their actual
costs and social ‘pain’, but also in terms
of the identity of the beneficiaries and
the increased power or financial gain that
accrues to different actors as a result of
the decision taken. Costly solutions, such
as desalination, are sometimes justified and
implemented in lieu of less expensive
demand-management solutions because
8 M. Svendsen et al.
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accommodated under the existing logic of
pork-barrel politics.
Thedifficultyofreformingmanagement
varies, depending on many cultural, social
and politicalfactors,butitis recognizedthat
‘regional politicians have a powerful intu-
ition that economic principles and the allo-
cative measures which follow logically from
them must be avoided at all costs’ (Allan,
1999). This largely explains the persistent
gap between consultant’s rationality and the
actual shape that policy measures take in
the real world. It also suggests why strict
economic analysis is not always the best
framework to use to understand the succes-
sion of state investments and responses.
Resource capture can occur at any time,
depending on the power balance within the
society, and is perhaps more frequent than
rational allocation.
The basin closure models are useful
in outlining hydrologic changes which tend
to take place in a generalized basin as
its water resources are utilized ever more
intensively and the response strategies
which tend to occupy the minds of basin
managers as this unfolds. In practice,
institutionalresponsesarehighlyvariedand
functions of a diverse range of forces and
influences.
1.3.1.2 The governance context
One of the most important, and least stud-
ied, aspects of the environment controlling
institutional change is the context of gover-
nance in which water resource organiza-
tions operate. Governance is defined as
the exercise of authority through formal
and informal traditions and institutions for
the common good. Governance includes:
(i) the process by which those in authority
are selected, monitored and replaced;
(ii) the capacity of the government to effec-
tively manage its resources and implement
sound policies; and (iii) the respect of
citizens and the State for the institutions
that govern economic and social inter-
actions among them (Kaufmann, 2000). In
Kaufmann’s framework, good governance
consists of six interlinked components:
• Voice and accountability;
• Political stability;
• Government effectiveness;
• Lack of regulatory burden;
• Rule of law;
• Control of corruption.
Problems stemming from poor governance
are numerous, well known and routinely
given a blind eye. Examples include
favouritism in granting water use permits,
kickbacks on construction and procurement
contracts, biased and inaccessible court
systems, withholding of data and sale of
public data for personal profit, promotion
of risk-averse bureaucrats and firing
of innovators, flaunting of water-quality
regulations by well-connected industries,
and bureaucratic red tape which strangles
local initiative. Quality of governance
pervades public decision making relating
to policy formulation, resource allocation,
legislation, rule enforcement and adjudica-
tion, making it the most important
single influence on the shape and pace
of institutional change in the water sector.
While difficult to change, improving the
quality of governance is not impossible,
and a variety of tools have recently been
developed to support such change, many
involving voice, transparency, information
and participation. Several specific ele-
ments, which can support improved
governance and promote institutional
change, are discussed in a subsequent
section.
1.3.2 Functions and actors
To analyse the institutional arrangements
for water management in a river basin
we propose a framework of essential
functions and enabling conditions. The
groundwork for this framework is provided
by drawing up a water account of a basin
as well as a basin profile that provides an
analytically rich description of the basin as
a sociotechnical system. The next step is to
identify the water management actors in a
river basin and the essential functions they
execute.
Managing River Basins 9
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To portray the multitude of water manage-
ment stakeholders in a river basin, it is use-
ful to distinguish between the various water
use sectors and the types of organizations
involved in water resource management.
Combining sectors with actors yields a
matrix of key organizations and stake-
holders involved in water management
in a basin (Table 1.1). This matrix, after
individual actors are identified under each
category, provides a basis for identifying
key actors in a particular basin.
1.3.2.2 Essential functions
To analyse basin governance, it is necessary
to focus on the roles and functions of the
various actors engaged in water manage-
ment in the basin, asking who does what,
where, to what end and how well. To
guide the analysis, a set of essential
functions for RBM has been identified
(Burton, 1999; Svendsen et al., 2001). These
are defined in Table 1.2. How well func-
tions are carried out, from whose perspec-
tive and for whose benefit are empirical
questions.
It is possible to construct alternative
lists of basin functions. This one was
empirically and inductively developed
from experience in a number of basins.
Its functions subsume supporting functions
such as data collection and resource
mobilization, which are not ends in them-
selves, but rather facilitate the higher-level
functions listed.
10 M. Svendsen et al.
Sector






Note that government agencies may include national, sub-national and local entities, while private firms
can include both multinationals and local firms as well as regulated for-profit utilities. The list of sectors is
far from exhaustive and could also include fisheries, navigation, recreation, amenity value and others,
depending on local importance.





4. Monitor water quality
5. Enforce water quality





The formulation of medium to long-term plans for the management and
development of water resources in the basin, by which the water demands of
different sectors are brought in line with water supply.
The mechanisms and criteria by which bulk water is apportioned among the
different use sectors.
The activities executed to ensure that allocated water reaches its point of use.
The activities executed to monitor water pollution and salinity levels.
The activities executed to ensure that water pollution and salinity levels
remain below accepted standards.
Activities executed concerning flood and drought warning, prevention of
floods, emergency works and drought preparedness.
Actions undertaken to protect associated ecosystems.
Activities executed for the design and construction of hydraulic infrastructure.
Activities executed to maintain the serviceability of the hydraulic infrastructure
in the basin.
Table 1.2. Essential functions for river basin management.
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Functions that should be performed in a
closing water basin for effective manage-
ment may or may not be performed, in
fact. Moreover, some may be performed
incompletely and some may even receive
more attention than they require. Since
many organizations and stakeholders are
involved with water management in a
river basin, a number that generally grows
with closure, more than one organization
will frequently be involved in performing
a particular function. To structure and
clarify the resulting patterns of activity,
the essential functions of basin manage-
ment can be crossed with key water man-
agement actors as illustrated in Table 1.3.
The essential functions are replicated, as
appropriate, across three broad categories –
surface water, groundwater and derivative
water. Because the perspective is basin-
wide, functions are not separated by sector,
e.g. irrigation or environment. Thus, the
category derivative water includes irriga-
tion return flows as well as municipal
wastewater and industrial discharges. Cells
in the resulting matrix are coded to show
whether the actor is judged to play a major
or a minor role. One of the case studies
in this volume (Chapter 9) adds another
dimension to the table and endeavours
to indicate the type of activity performed
by an actor in addressing a particular
function.
It is important to note that the matrix
depicts actual activity in practice and not
nominal responsibilities according to legal
frameworks or normative prescriptions
defining what should be done. The matrix,
together with description of the key actors,
gives an indication of which essential
functions are being addressed and who is
involved in their execution. The matrix
exercise can shed light on a number of
important questions:
• The functions covered and a rough
indication of the adequacy of coverage;
• The functions not covered;
• The number of actors involved in each
function and the need for coordination;
• The stakeholders represented in per-
forming particular functions, which
leads to conclusions about the repre-
sentativeness of the basin governance.
Perhaps more importantly, the process is
heuristic in that it produces insights and
questions that can be used to probe more
deeply into issues of functional perfor-
mance, relationships among actors, and the
political dynamics of basin governance and
management.
The actors/functions matrix can also
be used comparatively within a basin to
examine changes over time, the nature of a
transition to a desired future state, or nomi-
nal versus actual functional performance.
Furthermore, it can be applied compara-
tively to look for patterns among different
basins and national contexts. This is done in
Chapter 13 of this volume for several of the
case studies presented.
The matrixcan be generated in different
ways. It can be filled in by expert observers
after study of a basin, as in the Turkey case
study. It can be created on the basis of
questionnaire survey results combined with
expert observation as was done in the
Mexico case, or it can result from focus
group interactions of knowledgeable per-
sons, as happened for the South African
case. Although used here as a research tool,
matrixgenerationcanalsobeausefulunder-
standingandconsensusbuildingtoolamong
the involved parties when used in focus
groups made up of key basin stakeholders.
1.3.3 Enabling conditions
Describing who executes the essential func-
tions in a river basin and how effectively,
while useful, does not constitute a suffi-
cient methodology for understanding and
diagnosing problems affecting basin gover-
nance. The essential functions and actors’
roles depicted in Table 1.3 provide a static
view of responsibilities. Additional attrib-
utes of well-functioning basin governance
systems relate to its dynamics.
In order for societies to reach decisions
consistent with the public interest, several
Managing River Basins 11
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these attributes enabling conditions (Box
1.2). Enabling conditions are features of the
institutional environment at the basin level
that must be present, in some measure, to
achieve good governance and management
of the basin. These attributes are not specific
to any one actor, but apply to all actors and
their interactions and comprise necessary
(but not sufficient) normative conditions
for good basin management. Most of them
contribute to good governance, as discussed
in an earlier section. Some basic enabling
conditionsareshowninBox1.2.Athorough
analysis of these factors is well beyond the
scope of this chapter, but a number of them
are described briefly.
1.3.3.1 Political attributes
An important political attribute is the repre-
sentation of interests. In most river basins,
some water users will be well represented,
while others will not, and in the arena of
political give-and-take, those without repre-
sentation become losers. Industrialists and
commercial farmers, for example, typically
have ample financial resources, are well
organized and have ready access to political
decision makers. Poorer irrigators, on
the other hand, are likely to be less well
organized and consequently will be weakly
represented. Their interests are often rather
fragile. Water users associations (WUAs)
are likely to be intermediate, particularly
if they are connected to the local political
establishment and collaborate informally,
sharing information and coordinating activ-
ities. Many times WUAs would benefit by
establishing more formal linkages among
themselves to allow a single spokesperson
to represent them collectively in discussions
over basin water allocation, water quality
standards, potential irrigation return flow
restrictions, and so on.
A serious failure of representation
will frequently exist for the environment.
Experience has shown that strong non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) rooted
in civilsocietyareessential components ofa
politicalsystemmakingsociallyresponsible
choices about environmental issues. NGOs
can serve as advocates for environmental
values and forunrepresented future generat-
ions. At the same time, fund raising
requirements may lead such mass-based
organizations to take extreme and uncom-
promising positions on issues that must
then be moderated in the give-and-take of
political debate and decision making.
Hence, fully as important as the exis-
tence of representational bodies is the need
for a rough balance of political power and
influence among various interests. When
power is one-sided, issues are not aired
adequatelyanddecisionsarealsoone-sided.
A key to the evolution of a suitable and
balanced governance regime is maturation
of non-government organizations and asso-
ciations based in civil society, which can
advocate for particular interests, coupled
with the informational attributes described
below.
1.3.3.2 Informational attributes
An essential enabling condition is the
presence in the public domain of accurate
and up-to-date descriptive information on
water-related issues in the basin. Another
is open public transactions, related to
policies, plans, regulations, violations and
sanctions. The first of these stipulations
require that information on basin water
allocations, reservoir positions, ground-
water elevations, water-quality conditions,
Managing River Basins 13
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Composite  Default screenavailable resources, and so on be a part
of the public record. Information collected
with public funds should be available
to the general public at little or no charge
in the interest of sound and democratic
public decision making. This disclosure
condition applies to intra- and inter-
departmental information relationships,
as well as to those with the general pub-
lic. The second stipulation, transparency
of public proceedings, is similarly essential
to fair democratic processes. Rent-seeking
behaviour requires darkness and privacy
to thrive, and conducting regulatory
processes in full view of the public and




requires suitable legal authority. This
authority includes the right to exist, the
right to a legal personality and suitable elec-
toral procedures to ensure representative
leadership of the organization. A legal
personality usually includes the right to
handle money and keep a bank account,
enter into contracts, access the legal system
and represent the membership in dealings
with governmental agencies.
In some cases, existing legislation has
been adapted to allow new water-related
organizations to be established. The forma-
tion of Irrigation Associations in Turkey
took this route. In other cases such as
Mexico, new legislation has been written at
the outset to facilitate establishment of new
organizations and relationships.
1.3.3.4 Resources
Clearly, all four types of resources listed
in Box 1.2 are needed for effective imple-
mentation of basin management activities.
A potential problem is scattering of human
and financial resources among a number of
organizations, where each lacks a critical
mass to be effective. In a context of coopera-
tion, it is not necessary that resources be
consolidated under a single administrative
structure for effective implementation.
However, cooperation and coordination
must be effective if a decentralized strategy
is to work.
1.3.4 Organizational configurations
The choice of a river basin as a unit of man-
agement is based on a certain hydrologic
imperative, controlled by gravity and topog-
raphy. However, establishing basin bound-
aries is by no means automatic. There
are choices involved in subdividing large
basins into management units, in grouping
small basins, and in deciding which natural
basins and sub-basins are to receive priority
attention. Moreover, there are often differ-
ences between surface water and ground-
water divides and basins, where choices
have to be made, and where water is
imported from neighbouring basins, contro-
versies have arisen over whether to include
the watershed of the transferred water in
the basin definition. Making such choices
has an important bearing on basin manage-
ment, as different boundaries imply differ-
ent decision makers and possibly different
decision outcomes. However, whether
defining boundaries is straightforward or
contentious, the defined basin becomes a
political unit as well as a hydrologic one
and questions immediately arise as to who
will make decisions, and how (cf. Wester
and Warner, 2002).
Mostertetal.(2000)positthreedifferent
types of organizational configurations for
basin management. One is an authoritarian
model, in which management is organized
on hydrologic boundaries and a single orga-
nization makes basin decisions. The second
is a coordinative model, in which the basin
as a hydrologic unit is recognized, but many
functions remain in the hands of traditional
governmental units, and work is coordi-
nated among these units. The third is man-
agement by existing organizations without
coordination. The third model is, in reality,
not a model of basin management at all
but rather the business-as-usual backdrop
against which the two other models can be
contrasted.
14 M. Svendsen et al.
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patterns for basin governance.4 The first is
the centralized (unicentric) model, in which
a single unified public organization is
empowered to make decisions regarding
management of the basin. This centralized
organization is not necessarily ‘authoritar-
ian’, but does centralize authority under a
governance process that may be more or less
democratic. The second is the decentralized
(polycentric, coordinative) model, in which
the actions of existing organizations, layers
of government and initiatives are coordi-
nated to cover an entire river basin or sub-
basin. While new structures may be created,
the bulk of routine work is done by existing
organizations that are not specific to the
basin. Although both models are character-
ized by separations among the three basic
roles of management, regulation and service
provision, the firewalls between them are
typically stronger in the coordinative model
where separate organizations are involved.
In the real world, RBM structures are
usually hybrids, relying to some extent on
existing government structures to provide
policy and direction, and perhaps execute
particular management functions, and
basin-specific organizations to collect data,
and make certain circumscribed decisions.
We describe the two hypothetical models
briefly to illustrate the two poles of the
continuum.
1.3.4.1 Centralized (unicentric) RBMs
A strength of the centralized model is that
its operational span of control coincides
with the boundaries of the basin. This
internalizes upstream/downstream and
other conflicts, making them easier to deal
with, and it concentrates the decision-
making authority needed to resolve
disagreements. Disadvantages of the cen-
tralized model include the following: (i) as
the organization will generally deal only
with water, water will be isolated from
other relevant policy sectors such as
agriculture, environment and the economy;
(ii) establishing a strong unified central
authority presents a more challenging
political problem than securing agreement
for a coordinative body. The challenge here
will be even greater for international river
basins; and (iii) governance of a centralized
organization raises challenging questions
of broad stakeholder representation and
accountability.
The most prominent examples of
authorities are those having the develop-
ment of a river basin as a primary mandate.
The classic example is the TVA, which was
created during the economic depression of
the 1930s to address problems of poverty
and unemployment in a particular region of
the USA. Other examples are the Rio São
Francisco Development Agency in Brazil
and the Mahaweli Development Authority
in Sri Lanka. When their primary develop-
ment tasks are finished, these authorities
often try, with varying degrees of success, to
assumeabroaderresourcemanagementrole.
1.3.4.2 Decentralized (polycentric) RBMs
The decentralized model addresses some
of the weaknesses of the centralized model
but contains others. On the plus side, it pro-
vides for a strong political base for action,
since coordination involves voluntary
agreement among participating jurisdic-
tions. The coordinative process also leads
to a more responsive governance process.
Intersectoral linkages remain intact, as
coordination is among individual states,
nations or other jurisdictions responsible
for a range of policy sectors, and such a
set-up provides a natural base for decentral-
ization of responsibilities. On the other
hand, decision making can be cumber-
some, coordinating costs may be high and
political changes in participating jurisdic-
tions can upset agreements.
These two models represent polar
extremes, and actual arrangements are often
blends of the two. In the Murray–Darling
Managing River Basins 15
4 We focus here on organizations and governance and not on the way in which particular functions are
executed. There are a range of options within each governance structure for providing services and executing
other functions.
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Council, made up of representatives of the
four involved states and the federal govern-
ment, sets policy while under it an author-
ity-like Commission supports the Council
and executes its decisions. A similar set-up
exists in France, where a River Commission
made up of local and national government
representatives and users sets water policy,
which is implemented by an associated
Water Agency. Publicly held companies
manage the distribution infrastructure
and make bulk water deliveries to user
associations. In the USA, formal bodies for
managing river basins are rare, allowing
some exceptions such as the TVA and the
DelawareBasinCommission.Policy-making
authority is distributed among a variety of
federal and state agencies and departments.
Coordination is achieved through a plethora
of committees and working groups linking
stakeholders into discussion and decision-
making forums. Legislation and negotiated
legally binding agreements are important
instruments for establishing policy and
practices, and the court system is routinely
invoked to resolve disagreements and dis-
putes. In California, a state water plan,
updated every 5 years, provides a rolling
framework for managing the state’s water
resources.
1.4. Basin Management and Irrigation
As basins close, irrigation systems within
the basin are confronted with both internal
and external challenges. Internal challenges
require them to do more with less water,
whereas the external ones require them to
organize and act effectively to protect their
interests. Dealing with both at the same
time is difficult, and systems which address
the internal challenges successfully before
having to tackle the external ones will
generally be better off.
Closing basins, by definition, are
becoming water scarce, and newer rapidly
growing sectors, typically urban and indus-
trialusersandtheenvironment,willusually
demand that irrigated agriculture, as the
largest traditional user, use less water to
free more of it for their growing needs. This
puts pressure on irrigators to use water more
efficiently, and may lead to retirement of
less productive irrigated lands and transfer
of their water rights to other users, as is
presently happening in California’s Central
Valley. The cost of water will generally
increase to reflect its growing scarcity, lead-
ing to pressure to grow higher-value crops to
coverthese costs. Moreefficient use ofwater
requires that irrigation systems acquire new
measurement and control technology, and
more professional management.
These same pressures may emerge as
challenges to agriculture’s right to use basin
water resources at all in legislative and legal
arenas. Often agriculture began using water
atatimewhenrightswerenotformallyspec-
ified, which can make them less secure than
the formalized rights allocated to industries
and larger corporate irrigators which came
later. Where water rights are merely implicit
in the allocation priorities of a large public
irrigation agency, risks also arise. Regula-
tion, service provision and other functions
of unitary public water agencies tend to
be split up among several new agencies
or departments as basins mature, giving
basin managers a broader constituency
and weakening their ability to defend their
former clients. Basin-level decision-making
forums will tend to include more actors and
cover a broader range of issues, requiring
that irrigators mobilize to represent their
own interests vigorously and become con-
versantwithabroaderrangeofwater-related
considerations.
Irrigators located downstream of major
population centres and industries will also
need to seek protection for the quality of
the water they receive. Urban concentra-
tions with inland locations, such as Cairo or
New Delhi, degrade significantly the quality
of water reaching downstream irrigators,
with impacts on human health and contami-
nation of produce and soil. Individually,
irrigators and small systems will have little
or no ability to apply pressure for reduced
pollutant loadings in their water supplies.
Organized into a larger network, they can
have influence.
16 M. Svendsen et al.
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees2 Phases of River Basin Development:
the Need for Adaptive Institutions
David Molden, R. Sakthivadivel, M. Samad and Martin Burton
2.1 Introduction
The last 50 years have witnessed enormous
changes in the way people use water
for productive and economic purposes.
Between 1950 and 2000, the world’s popu-
lation increased from 2.5 to 6.0 billion (109).
Concurrently, there was a tenfold increase
in the number of large dams, from 4270
dams to over 47,000 (ICOLD, 1998). Water
withdrawals have jumped from 1360
to 4000 km3 (Shiklomanov, 2000). Agri-
cultural withdrawals have increased from
1080 to 2600 km3 (Shiklomanov, 2000),
whereas cultivated land expansion has
increased at a much slower rate from 1063
million ha to 1360 million ha. This clearly
demonstrates the important role additional
water has played in agricultural produc-
tion. Water resources development has not
only led to significant changes in land and
water systems, but also in the institutions
required to manage these resources.
Our working hypothesis is that chang-
ing patterns of water use require adaptive
institutions for sustainable, equitable and
productive management of the water
resource basin wide. Institutional arrange-
ments that are able to manage the present
situation adequately are not likely to meet
futureneedsunlesstheycanadapttochange
rapidly.Thischapterpresentshydraulicand
institutional arguments to develop the con-
cept of phases of river development. It uses
this concept to show why adaptive institu-
tions are necessary, what issues may arise
during various phases and what the key
areasofinstitutionalfocusareasriverbasins
develop.
2.2 Hydraulic and Hydrologic Responses
to Water Resources Development
To understand how institutions can more
effectively manage water, it is essential
to understand how the physical water
resource base responds to interventions that
serve human needs. River basins provide a
logical unit of analysis because water flows
starting from precipitation can be traced
to understand the impact of these inter-
ventions. A water accounting framework is
used to understand changes of water use
within a basin context (Boxes 2.1 and 2.2).
With the development of hydraulic
infrastructure, whether a large dam, water-
harvesting structure or pump, the aim is
to redirect water from its natural course to
household, agricultural, industrial or other
cultural use. Similarly, changes in land-
scapes such as from forests to farmland alter
the natural hydrologic condition and redi-
rect water flow paths. Some uses deplete
water – they render it unavailable for down-
stream use – either by conversion of water to
evaporation,orbythe direction offlows into
asinksuchasaseaorsalineaquifer.Flowing
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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power, in-stream fisheries and agriculture –
and create considerable value before it is
finally depleted.
Relative to other uses, food production
depletes huge quantities of water. To feed
one person requires that between 2000 and
5000 l of liquid water each day be converted
tovapourthroughthebiophysicalprocessof
evapotranspiration. In contrast, drinking
water needs range from 2 to 5 l, and house-
hold requirementsrange from20to500 lper
person per day. As a result, food production
for a growing population has significantly
altered the hydrologic characteristics of
many basins. Irrigation depletes water
through either evapotranspiration or direct-
ing drainage flows to the sea. Rainfed agri-
culture depletes water that would have
supported other ecosystems. Thus, there is
a clear need to focus on water use in agricul-
ture as it is a major factor in water resource
and land management.
2.3 Phases of River Basin Development
Changes in water use can be illustrated by
conceptualizing phases of river basin devel-
opment (see Keller et al., 1998; Ohlsson and
Turton, 2000; Allan 2002; Molle, 2003, for
similar discussions). In its most basic form,
water scarcity is a situation where people
have difficulties accessing water for drink-
ing or growing crops. As a reaction to water
scarcity, people tap basin water resources.
Hydraulic structures, ranging from simple
stone and wood diversion structures to
complex dam and canal systems supply
water from streamflow for drinking and
industrial supplies, and for agriculture.
Rainfed agriculture converts land use from
its previous cover (forest, grassland) to
cropland, impacting the previous hydro-
logic regime and ecosystems dependent
on that regime.
At any particular time, the available
water supply is limited by the installed
20 D. Molden et al.
Box 2.1. Definitions.
• Water balance and water accounting: Water accounting relies on water balance studies for a domain
bounded in space and by time. For example, we may include a portion of a basin over a year’s time,
bounded spatially so that runoff is captured by the sub-basin, and vertically to include the bottom of the
aquifer up to the top of the vegetation canopy. A water balance analysis quantifies water flows across
the boundaries including rain, evaporation, surface and subsurface inflows and outflow. Changes in
storage internal to the water balance domain, such as changes in reservoir levels or groundwater levels
must be considered. Essentially, water accounting divides hydrological variables of discharge, rain and
evaporation into water accounting categories of process (i.e. crop evapotranspiration, domestic and
industrial depletion), and non-process (evaporation and and evapotranspiration from non-agricultural
land cover, committed and uncommitted outflow, and utilizable and non-utilizable outflow).
• Diversions, depletions and recycling: Water is diverted to various uses. Water is depleted when it is
rendered unavailable for further downstream use – either through evaporation or by directing the water
to sinks. Since not all water diverted to a use is depleted, some remains within the basin and is available
for further use. Water recycling or reuse is prevalent in water resource systems. City effluents discharged
back into river systems are often used again downstream. It is common to underestimate how much
reuse exists in river systems, especially in those that are highly stressed.
• Accounting for precipitation: In many analyses of water resources, only the ‘developed’ or ‘blue’ water
supply is considered – supplies tapped from rivers by diversion structures. In IWMI’s water accounting
framework, rain is considered a supply.
• Water commitments: All uses of water in a basin could be captured if the boundaries of a basin were
defined to extend to an ideal salt–freshwater interface. Most often it is practical and useful to consider
only part of a basin, but when we do this we have to make sure and define commitments of water to
downstream uses to meet ecological or other human requirements downstream.
• Open and closed basins: When all available water has been allocated to various uses, we consider the
basin closed. When there is water remaining in the basin to develop and allocate, we say the basin is
open. In many basins, there is ample water during part of a year, and at other parts it is dry. We consider
these basins to be seasonally closed.
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cultivation. When demand exceeds this
available supply, one response is to provide
more supply either by expanding hydraulic
infrastructure or by expanding rainfed agri-
culture. This supply approach is ultimately
limited by the amount of land and water
resources within a basin, the technical and
economic limits we have in abstracting this
supply (it would be difficult to divert the
entire Amazon), ecological thresholds
beyond which ecosystems cannot sustain
land and water use practices, and societal
demands. The latter changes over time due
tothestateofacountry’ssocialdevelopment
and economy.
Figure 2.1 represents a typical progres-
sion of river basin development over time
with the original runoff and rainwater
sourcesshownonthey-axis,andtimeonthe
x-axis. Over time, more water is made avail-
able for human uses from stream flow or
groundwater by building structures (dams,
diversions, groundwater pumps) yielding a
stair-step pattern. Larger dam or diversion
structures would yield a sudden jump in the
amount of water made available. Smaller
structures like pumps or water-harvesting
devices also add more available water but in
less dramaticsteps. Afteranew damis built,
it takes time to deplete all available water by
converting it into evaporation. Populations
Phases of River Basin Development 21
Box 2.2. Water accounting categories.
• Gross inflow is the total amount of water flowing into the water balance domain from precipitation,
surface, and subsurface sources.
• Net inflow is the gross inflow plus any changes in storage.
• Water depletion is a use or removal of water from a water basin that renders it unavailable for further
use. Water depletion is a key concept for water accounting because of the interest in increasing the
derived benefits per unit of water depleted. It is extremely important to distinguish water depletion from
water diverted to a service or use as not all water diverted to a use is depleted. Water is depleted by four
generic processes:
• Evaporation: water is vaporized from surfaces or transpired by plants.
• Flows to sinks: water flows into a sea, saline groundwater, or other location where it is not readily or
economically recovered for reuse.
• Pollution: water quality gets degraded to an extent that it is unfit for certain uses.
• Incorporation into a product: through an industrial, or agricultural process such as bottling water, or
incorporation of irrigation water into plant tissues.
• Process consumption is that amount of water diverted and depleted to produce a human intended
product.
• Non-process depletion occurs when water is depleted, but not by the process for which it was intended.
Non-process depletion can be either beneficial or non-beneficial.
• Committed water is that part of outflow from the water balance domain that is required by other uses
such as downstream environmental requirements or downstream water rights.
• Uncommitted outflow is water that is not depleted or committed and is therefore available for a use
within the domain, but flows out of the basin due to lack of storage or sufficient operational measures.
Uncommitted outflow can be classified as utilizable or non-utilizable. Outflow is utilizable if by
improved management of existing facilities it could be consumptively used. Non-utilizable uncommit-
ted outflow exists when the facilities are not sufficient to capture the otherwise utilizable outflow.
• Available water is the net inflow minus both the amount of water set aside for committed uses and the
non-utilizable uncommitted outflow. It represents the amount of water available for use at the basin,
service or use levels. Available water includes process and non-process depletion, plus utilizable
outflows.
• A closed basin is one where all available water is depleted. An open basin is one where there is still
some uncommitted utilizable outflow.
• In a fully committed basin, there are no uncommitted outflows. All inflowing water is committed to
various uses.
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untildepletionreachestheavailablesupply,
when possibly another structure is built.
Similarly, conversion of land to rainfed
agriculture yields more water (directly from
rain) foragriculture. Rainfed expansion con-
tinues until a limit is reached. Figure 2.1
graphically illustrates three important
phases of river basin development implicit
in the above discussion. The progression
continues until the threshold is reached.
The three phases are:
1. Development. In this phase, the amount
of naturally occurring water is not a con-
straint. Rather, expansion in demand drives
the construction of new infrastructure and
expansion of agricultural land. Institutions
are primarily engaged in expanding facili-
ties for human use.
2. Utilization. Significant construction
has taken place, and now the goal is to make
themostoutofthesefacilities.Watersavings
and improvedmanagement ofwater deliver-
ies are important objectives. A common
phenomenonduringthisphaseisthegrowth
in the amount of reuse through drains,
downstream diversions or groundwater
pumps, which ultimately deplete more
of the available supplies. Institutions tend
to be concerned with sectoral issues such
as managing irrigation water or managing
drinking water supplies. The creation of the
International Irrigation Management Insti-
tute, for instance, was in response to the
perceived need to improve management of
irrigation systems, especially new ones that
were constructed in the 1950s to the 1980s.
3. Reallocation. When depletion
approaches the potential utilizable water,
there is limited scope for further develop-
ment. We refer to this as a ‘closed basin’
(Seckler, 1996). Efforts are placed on increas-
ingtheproductivityorvalueofeverydropof
water. An important means of accomplish-
ing this is to reallocate water from lower to
‘higher-value’ uses. Reallocation of water
to achieve both sustainability and equity
amongcompetingdemandsbecomesamajor
issue. Institutions are primarily involved in
reallocation, conflict resolution and regula-
tion.When resourcedepletion outstrips sus-
tainable limits, environmental restoration
becomes an important agenda item.
22 D. Molden et al.
Fig. 2.1. Phases of river basin development.
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water for human needs over time. Precipita-
tion, the ultimate source, either contributes
to runoff or groundwater, or is available
for transpiration or evaporation providing
water for life support in landscapes (rainfed
sources). Over time, people tend to deplete
more water by making more water available
through hydraulic structures (illustrated by
the stair-step patterns) and using water for
agriculture, municipal or industrial uses as
illustrated by the upper curve. On land-
scapes, evaporative water use changes by
changing landscapes such as expanding
rainfed agriculture as illustrated by the
lower curve. The dashed lines represent
thresholds, utilizable amounts that cannot
be exceeded over long periods. As human
depletion increases, river basins pass
through phases of development, utilization
and reallocation (Box 2.1).
In many closed or closing basins,
supply side responses prevail, and water
depletion exceeds the potentially available
resource – in the long run, a non-sustainable
situation. For example, in the North China
Plains (CCAP and CAAS, 2000; Kendy et al.,
2003) and in northwest India (Molden et al.,
2001), intensive groundwater use is lower-
ing aquifers to unsustainable levels. As
another example, people will ‘mine water’
from important environmental reserves by
destroying wetlands, or depleting water
before it reaches its destination such as Lake
Chapala (Wester, this volume) or the Aral
Sea.
In the case of closed or closing basins,
inter-basin transfers can provide relief. A
south to north diversion of water from the
Yangtze to the Yellow river basin could pro-
vide some relief to the highly stressed North
China Plains. The final step of the stair-step
pattern on the available resource and utiliz-
able resource lines in Fig. 2.1 represents
an inter-basin transfer. There are other
responses though – such as limiting or man-
aging demand forwater, orreducing agricul-
tural use of water. National policy responses
include providing other non-agricultural
employment or importing ‘virtual’ water
(Allan, 1998) in the form of trade in
commodities into the basin. How societies
respond to the crisis of overexploited
resourcesisoneofthecriticalwaterresource
management questions of our times.
In overly stressed basins, restoration
and sustainable use of river systems
becomes a key agenda item. In the western
USA, for example, dams are being disman-
tled and an increasing amount of the avail-
able supply is allocated to environmental
uses. In California, 46.5% of supplies were
allocated to environmental uses compared
to 11%forurban uses and 42.5%foragricul-
tural uses in 1995 (Svendsen, this volume).
In Australia, the Government of New South
Wales recently reduced allocations to irriga-
tion by 10% so that allocations to the
environment could be increased (Hatton
MacDonald and Young, 2000). In other situ-
ations, such as Pakistan or the North China
Plains, concerns over water-based food
security and rural employment would make
a reallocation of water out of agriculture a
very difficult political choice. The danger
though is that the ecosystems that support
agriculture may collapse through saliniza-
tion, loss of soil fertility or groundwater
depletion before other rural income
generating and food security solutions are
found.
Pathways of basin development vary
from basin to basin. For example, available
supplies may actually decline over time,
intersectoral reallocation may come into
play early or interbasin transfers may occur
early in the development phase. Therefore,
it should not be construed that following the
pathway of Fig. 2.1 is ideal, or that a basin in
the reallocation phase is better than one
in the development stage. To understand
basin dynamics and response options for
the future, it is important to understand
development pathways.
Similarly to river basins, locally man-
aged irrigation has its own development
life cycle, which has to adjust to the
external environment within which it is
set. Irrigation schemes that are transferred
while the river basin is in an early develop-
ment stage have fewer external issues to
deal with. By contrast, those transferred in
a latter stage of river basin development
need to focus both internally on the use of
Phases of River Basin Development 23
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nally to ensure a continued share of the
available scarce water resource. The manner
in which these locally managed organiza-
tions react under these different conditions
is dealt with in Chapter 13. Nine essential
supporting tasks are identified to support
locally managed irrigation (see Chapter 1).
The following is a discussion of how these
essential tasks take shape and gain or lose
importance according to the phase of river
basin development.
2.4 Different Phases – Different Needs
Institutional concerns differ depending
on the phase of basin development. These
concerns may exist at all times, but their
importance or emphasis may change over
time as illustrated in Table 2.1. Institutions
have to adapt to meet these changing con-
cerns. For example, interest may shift from
constructing facilities to provide supply
to better management of supplies. As basin
closure approaches, however, demand
management becomes a critical concern.
At any phase, though, there could be over-
lap. For example, even in the development
phase, managing demand could be a con-
cern especially when depletion approaches
available supplies. The following sections
describe how essential institutional tasks
vary as per phases of development.
2.5 Essential Institutional Tasks
2.5.1 Planning, construction and
maintenance
In the development phase, planning for and
implementing infrastructure construction
plays a dominant role. In modern times,
organizations such as the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, the Mahaweli
Authority and the DSI in Turkey were set
up to build major dams, canals and, some-
times, drinking water treatment and waste-
water plants. Initially, these agencies were
dominated by civil engineers who had the
important job of getting high-quality work
done quickly. These tasks are most easily
carried out by single organizations instead
of several organizations because of prob-
lems of coordination and high transaction
costs if many are involved.
During the utilization phase, a different
set of construction and maintenance activi-
tiesgainprominence.Maintenancebecomes
a concern to keep facilities in operating
order, and rehabilitation is warranted to
bring systems back to operating order. Mea-
surement and regulation structures are often
24 D. Molden et al.
















































Loss of access to water
by poor
Table 2.1. Various dominant characteristics and concerns at different phases of river basin
development.
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Modernization is often pursued to meet the
changing expectations of users or societies.
During the reallocation phase, restora-
tion of environmental damage, clean-up of
pollution, or placing procedures to limit
or reduce demand tend to capture the
attention of planners. Large and complex
infrastructuredevelopmentprojects,suchas
inter-basin water transfers, are often sought
to solve water problems. Decentralized con-
struction efforts such as the installation of
pumps, small reservoirs or water-harvesting
structures play a significant role in the
development and management of water
resources throughout all the phases of
development. Often these are not centrally
planned but individual or community
responses to water scarcity, with private or
community investments. One small struc-
ture maynot impact much on otheruses, but
the cumulative sum of thousands of such
small works can quickly push a basin up the
development curve. In China and India, for
example, the amount of area served by
groundwater irrigation has surpassed the
land irrigated by large-scale surface
schemes. Therefore, an institutional chal-
lenge is to incorporate these efforts into
broader basin management schemes while
recognizing the value of these locally driven
initiatives.
2.5.2 Water allocation and distribution
Important allocation decisions are made
right at the development phase. The
decision of where to place a reservoir or
who gets subsidized support for pumps is
basically a water allocation decision. Some
people will benefit, whereas others will be
excluded from access to water.
The utilization phase is characterized
by operationalizing within-system alloca-
tion and distribution procedures. Often
these procedures are ill-conceived during
planning and construction, or the institu-
tions meant to carry out these tasks are ill-
equipped to do so. Allocation and operating
distribution systems takes a different set of
skills than building large infrastructure, yet
it is often the same people initially in charge
of construction who make these operational
decisions.
In the reallocation phase, cross-sector
andbetween-systemallocationandrealloca-
tion become increasingly dominant con-
cerns. For example, now a major concern
of Turkey’s DSI is formally to allocate and
distribute bulk supplies of water across uses
and sectors.
2.5.3 Monitoring and enforcing water quality
and protecting the environment
During the development phase, the devel-
opment of water infrastructure and rain-
fed land significantly change landscapes,
affecting the environment. The changes are
often large and detrimental and include
changing the hydrologic regime of rivers,
impounding large bodies of water and
drying up wetlands. During the utilization
phase, water use and depletion intensify
further, removing water that may have
environmental functions. Throughout the
early phases of development, dilution can
be sufficient to solve pollution problems.
During reallocation phases, dilution is not
an option, because there simply is not
enough water. Clean-up at the source
becomes increasingly critical. In the devel-
opment phase, institutions initially must be
concerned with the impact of large infra-
structure development such as relocating
people, or removing large areas of habitat.
Later, in utilization and reallocation phases,
problems of pollution, salinization or over-
withdrawal of resources become more
important.
2.5.4 Protecting against water disasters
Floods and droughts are key trigger
mechanisms in changing the development
pathways of river basins. While long-term
planning and overall economic develop-
ment of countries play an important role
in determining the path of river basin
Phases of River Basin Development 25
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important role in shaping water develop-
ment trajectories. For example, a devastat-
ing flood or drought can provide enough
political backing for the construction of
a new reservoir. Protecting against these
disasters is important at all phases of
development, but takes on different forms.
Initially, people construct storage facilities.
Later operation becomes more critical, and
more sophisticated early-warning systems
and operational systems developed. Some-
times, droughts spur the development of
more groundwater resources, pushing water
resource use beyond sustainable limits.
2.6 The Outcomes: Water Scarcity,
Value of Water and Poverty
2.6.1 Water scarcity
Scarcity takes on different characteristics
during various phases of development. Peo-
ple feel water scarcity if they cannot obtain
water, even though it may be plentiful in
nature. Construction of facilities provides
access to water, and relieves water scarcity.
In the development phase, economic water
scarcity (IWMI 2000) is common. This is
a condition where financial or human
resources limit access to water.
However,evenwithfacilitiestoprovide
access, scarcity can exist. A condition of
institutional water scarcity1 exists when
laws, customs, traditions and other social
barriers, or organizations deny certain
groups of people easy access to water or
prevent the equal distribution water to all,
leaving some people water scarce. A persist-
inghead–tailproblemwhereoverallwateris
adequate in an irrigation system is an exam-
ple of this type of scarcity. Another example
is when customs or laws restrict access by a
certain group of people who are deemed to
beinthelowerstrataofthesocialhierarchy.
During the reallocation phase, the
absolute supply of the physical resource is
limited.Thisisaconditionofphysicalwater
scarcity. In many closed or closing basins,
such as those in the North China Plains, the
Gediz basin or the Colorado River, physical
scarcity limits the supply of additional
water. It is important to note that even with
physical scarcity, it is possible to manage
institutions so that individuals do not suffer
from lack of access of adequate or good-
quality water, though changes in water use,
or even livelihoods, may be required.
2.6.2 The value of water
The value of water tends to increase
through the different phases of develop-
ment. Early, when water is plentiful, water
has a relatively low value, but when a basin
closes and demands for a scarce resource
intensify, the value of water can rise dra-
matically. Accordingly, in the early phases
of development, concerns are centred on
developing a supply of low-valued water,
while later in the development process,
managing demand prevails. Agriculture
and environmental uses are commonly per-
ceived as low-valued uses, while industry,
hydropower and domestic uses have a
higher economic value. A common phe-
nomenon is the initial reallocation of
water from environmental uses to agri-
culture, then from agriculture to cities.
Often wealthier countries place increasing
value of water in environmental uses, and
reallocate water back to these uses in the
reallocation phase. When low-valued water
is plentiful, conflicts can be mitigated
with more supplies. As supplies become
limiting, the potential for conflict increases.
2.6.3 Water and poverty
In each phase of development, water
scarcity has important implications for
poverty (van Koppen, 2000). During the
development phase, a key water and pov-
erty concern is to target the poor in water
26 D. Molden et al.
1 First described by M. Samad.
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eration is to identify the beneficiaries. Will
infrastructure benefit poor people? Will
more powerful people capture the benefits?
Providing water to a limited number of
people in a society with pronounced social
differentiation will aggravate inequities.
Poverty can be exacerbated or relieved
depending on the planning decision made.
During the utilization phase, having a
voice in allocation and receiving a fair share
is a problem of the poor. Even though
conveyance structures exist, the way water
is managed may not meet the needs of the
poor. If the rich or upstream users are able to
capture water more readily than tail-enders
or the poor, the poor suffer. For example,
in Kathmandu, homeowners often pump
water from city pipelines sucking out cheap
supplies, and forcing the less fortunate to
purchase high-priced tanker water.
During the reallocation phase, water
is reallocated amongst sectors and people.
Maintainingaccesstowaterisakeyproblem
for the poor during this phase. People with
financial or political power tend to receive
more benefits from water. If water moves
away from agriculture to higher-valued
cities and industries, will the poor and less
powerful be able to maintain their right or
access to water, or will they find employ-
ment in other sectors? Will poor people be
able to capture the economic gains when
water moves to higher-valued uses?
2.7 Adaptive Institutions
If, early in the development phase, attempts
are made to design an institutional frame-
work that deals with all these issues –
pollution, poverty, allocation, regulation,
construction – it is not likely that success
would be achieved across the board. At cer-
tain phases of development, some of these
concerns take precedence over others. Well-
functioning construction agencies have an
important role in safe and sound construc-
tion, but using an institutional set-up
designed to manage construction and also
to manage water delivery is not likely to be
effective. Different sets of rules and skills
are required. Similarly, those who manage
service delivery are probably not equipped
to regulate allocation and pollution of
resources when these problems emerge.
The implication is that water resource
managementinstitutionsmustadapttomeet
different challenges as patterns of water use
change. Common water problems are seen
because agencies do not change fast enough
to adapt to changing needs. Institutional
set-ups then must have the means to recog-
nize when important changes take place,
and the means to adapt when necessary.
2.8 Development Pathways
At early phases of development, future
choices about water are many more than
when a basin is at the reallocation phase.
Near basin closure, many difficult-to-
reverse decisions about allocation and infra-
structure development have already been
made. The agenda is to solve complex prob-
lems of reallocation and degradation. Eco-
system restoration is an important agenda
in some locations with controlled water
being reallocated back to natural uses.
In other basins, with high rural
populations and few off-farm employment
opportunities, maintaining intensive use of
water in agriculture seems the only option
until further alternative economic develop-
ment takes place. A solution for the problem
of groundwater depletion in the North
China Plains would be simply to curtail the
amountofagriculture.Atthemoment,thisis
almost unthinkable as possibly millions of
people dependent on agriculture would lose
an important means of livelihood and food
security. However, unless solutions in other
economic sectors or within the water and
agriculture sector can be found, the use of
water for agriculture may cease to be an
option because of its unsustainable use. The
impact on livelihoods would be the same.
Fortunately, at early phases, several key
choices remain: how much more rainfed
and irrigated agriculture; how should this
be done through dams, groundwater, water
Phases of River Basin Development 27
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patterns and what are associated water con-
sequences; how can additional water sup-
plies be allocated to the rural poor; and how
much water to commit to ecological uses.
Societies may choose a path of intensive
agricultural development in the hope of eco-
nomic development and later restoration.
The risk of this approach is ecological col-
lapse, or very high costs due to poor health,
and clean-up of degraded environment.
Lundqvist (1998) refers to this situation as
‘hydrocide’. Another development pathway
would rely on using less water, particularly
in agriculture, and increasing the value or
productivity from each drop used. The asso-
ciated risk is not using water to enhance
income and food security for local poor
populations.
All too often decisions are made in
response to a natural or political crisis with-
out consideration of long-term goals. The
available choices at early phases of develop-
ment are not very well thought out. A ques-
tion is whether institutional arrangements
can evolve and have the resilience to
solve short-term problems, in light of key
long-term growth and sustainability goals.
2.9 Summary and Conclusions
The growing recognition of a river basin as
the most appropriate unit for the develop-
ment and management of water resources
has prompted the search for appropriate
institutional arrangements for river basin
management. This chapter has argued that
institutional requirements differ with the
different phases of development of the river
basin. Institutional designs must be set up
to adapt to these changes. Thus, an under-
standing of basin development pathways
is crucial in understanding or formulating
institutional arrangements for river basin
management. This chapter has outlined
a framework to chart phases of river
basin development based on hydraulic and
hydrologic changes.
We demonstrated that as a river basin
progresses from an ‘open’ to a ‘closed’ basin,
three idealized phases can be distinguished:
development, utilization and reallocation.
These are not mutually exclusive and some
overlap of functions may occur. At the early
stagesofdevelopment,institutionalarrange-
ments focus on a single or very limited set of
objectives, typically involving developing
infrastructure to supply water. Later, more
concern is placed on managing water within
various sectors. When demand outstrips
supplies because of more utilization,
competition increases, the value of water
increases, and a host of other issues includ-
ing environmental concerns, pollution and
groundwater overdraft may arise. Over time,
there is an increasing need to deal with
multiple functions that require complex
institutional arrangements that involve
several organizations, and that function in
the realm of a broader and often conflicting
set of national objectives. Thus, institutions
should be conceived as dynamic entities
that need to cater to different management
demands as water use changes over time. A
key feature of an effective institution will be
its ability to adapt to changing needs.
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3.1 Backdrop
Management becomes important as a
productive resource becomes scarce, and
there is hardly a situation in which this is
truer than in the case of the water resource.
For a long time now, water policies of
many emerging nations have been focused
on developing the resource, and optimizing
was directed at the efficiency of water
infrastructure rather than water itself. As
water has become increasingly scarce,
optimizing is now being increasingly
directed to improving the productivity
of water. Increasingly, the river basin is
emerging as the unit of management of
land, water and other natural resources
in an integrated fashion. Many developed
countries such as the USA, France and
Australia have evolved highly advanced
and resilient institutional regimes for
integrated river basin management (IRBM);
but this has taken decades – in Europe and
the USA, centuries – of gradual change to
evolve. An issue that has held great appeal
to policy makers and social researchers
is this. Is it necessary that developing
countries in Asia and Africa take all that
long in crafting such institutional regimes?
Or might it be possible for them to do
an ‘institutional leap-frog’, as it were, to
a stage at which developed-country basin
institutions are today?
A textbook case of institutional reform
for IRBM in recent times has been the
Murray–Darling basin in Australia, where
sweeping changes have been made and
enforced since 1990, and transferring
the lessons of success in IRBM – from
Murray–Darling to Mahaweli and Mekong
– has emerged as a growth industry.
This chapter attempts a broad-brush
approach to understanding the material
differences between the contexts of the
developed-country river basins from where
institutional models emerge and the devel-
oping-country river basins in which these
are applied. The idea is not to undermine
the significance of the lessons from success
but to emphasize the need for sagacity
and critical analysis in assessing what will
work and what will not, given the differ-
ences in context. The phrase ‘institutional
change’ is used to describe how communi-
ties, government and society change recur-
rent patterns of behaviour and interactions
in coping with water scarcity and its socio-
ecologicalill-effects.Itinvolvesunderstand-
ing laws and rule making, roles, policies
and institutional arrangements at different
levels. The overarching premise is that the
effectiveness of a pattern of institutional
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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realities of a river basin: hydrogeology,
demography, socioeconomics and the orga-
nization of the water sector. By implication,
institutional arrangements that have proved
effectivewithinonesetoftheserealitiesmay
requiremajoradaptationbeforetheybecome
appropriate to the needs of a river basin
context defined by an alternative set of
realities.
IRBM is a powerful idiom, and will
increasingly dominate natural resource
management discussion in the developed as
well as developing world. In its broadest
sense, a basin or catchment is visualized as
an inter-connected machine or system
which transforms natural inputs of solar
energy, atmospheric precipitation, nutrients
and other environmental factors, along
with man-made inputs of labour, capital,
materials and energy, into output products
such as food, fibre, timber, building materi-
als, fuels, minerals, natural vegetation
and wildlife, recreational and aesthetic
amenities, buildings and development
sites, as well as water in desirable quality
and quantity. (Burton, 1986, cited in Hu,
1999, p. 324)
River basin management (RBM) as a notion
goes far beyond traditional land and water
management and
includes significant parts of land-use
planning, agricultural policy and erosion
control, environment management and
other policy areas. It covers all human
activities that use or affect fresh water
systems. To put it briefly, RBM is the
management of water systems as part of
the broader natural environment and in
relation to their socioeconomic environ-
ment. (Mostert et al., 1999, p. 3)
Institutional discussions on IRBM have
tended invariably – and probably errone-
ously – to gravitate around three models of
strategic organizations for managing river
basins:
• The hydrological model, in which a
river basin organization/authority, cut-
ting across administrative boundaries,
takes over all charge of water resource
management;
• The administrative model, prevailing
in many developing countries, in
which water management is the
responsibility of territorial organiza-
tions unrelated to hydrological
boundaries; and
• Coordinating mechanisms superim-
posed on the administrative organiza-
tions to achieve basin management
goals.
Each has advantages and disadvantages.
The hydrological model effectively deals
with upstream–downstream issues that
the administrative organization is generally
unable to deal with. However, hydrological
organizations tend typically to focus on
water and overlook land management
issues. River basin commissions, as a
hybrid, might combine the advantages of
both, but at least in the developing-country
context, they often command little author-
ity, and are therefore confined to lowest-
common-denominator solutions (Mostert
et al., 1999). In many developing countries
today, institutional reform for RBM is
confined almost wholly to the creation of
the basin-level organization – the implicit
assumption being that mere formation of
the appropriate organization will result in
IRBM, an assumption whose validity has
been repeatedly refuted.
In the developed world, the discussion
has been much broader and has veered
around initiatives in four aspects of natural
resource governance:
1. Some mechanism for basin level
negotiation and coordination fortified with
adequate authority and resources, and a
broad mandate considered appropriate to
the basin’s context;
2. Legal and regulatory reform;
3. Redesigning economic instruments of
policy (transfer prices, taxes, subsidies) in
harmony with national policy goals;
4. Redesign of economic institutions
(including utilities, service providers,
property rights; water markets, irrigation
managementtransfertouserorganizations).
Countries like the USA have achieved, over
long periods, high levels of integration even
32 T. Shah et al.
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3.2 Applying the Lessons of the Murray–
Darling to the Developing World
The Murray–Darling River system, as a
recent case of accelerated institutional
reform, has emerged as a model of institu-
tional structure for IRBM. The basin encom-
passes over 75% of the state of New South
Wales, 56% of the state of Victoria, all of
the Australian Capital Territory, and small
parts of Queensland and South Australia, a
vast region of the southeastern part of the
continent. Already, several case studies of
the Murray–Darling are available, and it is
not our intention to review these. In brief,
the institutional innovations of the Murray–
Darling basin management regime include
the following:
1. The Murray–Darling Ministerial Coun-
cil as the top-level policy-making and
coordinating mechanism, the Murray–
Darling Basin Commission as the operat-
ing organization, and several Catchment
Management Agencies that are responsible
for day-to-day management of water;
2. A system of permits for diversions that
encompasses all uses except the water
needed for domestic use, livestock produc-
tion and irrigation of up to 2 ha which are
recognized as prior rights (MacDonald and
Young, 2000, p. 10), and exempted from
legal as well as permit systems;
3. An effective cap on water diversions at
1993–1994 levels of development to ensure
adequate environmentalsupplies, accompa-
nied by a system of volumetric licensing to
users that raises the scope for large-scale
water trade across states and sectors;
4. Consumption based, full-cost-recovery
pricing (MacDonald and Young, 2000,
p. 14);
5. A system of ‘salinity credits’ that
permits trade in salinity;
6. Explicit mechanisms for water alloca-
tion for environmental needs;
7. A legal regime that separates water
rights from land rights;
8. Privatization of service providers such
as Murray Irrigation Ltd and Victoria’s Rural
Water Corporation (Malano et al., 1999).
The Murray–Darling RBM regime clearly
represents a highly evolved form of
institutional arrangement and effectively
addresses all major problems that a mature
river basin would face. As alluded to ear-
lier, exploring whether developed-country
basin institutions – particularly, Murray–
Darling experience – can be replicated in a
developing-country context has fascinated
many researchers in recent years. An entire
issue of Water International (vol. 24, no. 4,
1999) was devoted to it in 1999. The results
of these investigations have not been very
encouraging. For example, Hu explored the
applicability of Murray–Darling experience
in the Chinese context and concluded nega-
tively because of: (i) difficulty of coordi-
nating authorities at different levels; (ii)
unclear ownership of resources; (iii) small
farming scales; and (iv) poor education of
resource users (Hu, 1999, p. 323).
In a similar vein, Malano et al. (1999)
ask: ‘Can Australian experiences be trans-
ferred to Vietnam?’ Their conclusion is less
emphatic than Hu’s, but all their evidence
suggests that it will be long before Vietnam
becomesreallyreadyfortheMurray–Darling
prescription, and that ‘context, hydrological
and socioeconomic, defines the detail and
balancethatisrequired...’(p.313).Thenew
water law of Vietnam contains provisions to
adopt an integrated river basin approach.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development, which is at present in charge
ofwater,does notrelish the responsibility of
IRBM. The progress in stakeholder partici-
pation, another Murray–Darling prescrip-
tion, has been slow to say the least. Farmers
view irrigation provision as a government
responsibility; even so, irrigation charges in
Vietnam are high by Asian standards. Yet,
presumably under donor pressure, the
government tried to eliminate irrigation
subsidies, but this was followed by massive
popular unrest in 1998, whereupon, the
Government had to restore the subsidies.
Can the Australian success in enforcing
the‘userpays’principlebetransferredtothe
River Basin Management in the Developing World 33
45 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:34:40 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesSolomon Islands? Hunt explored this issue
in a recent study and concluded that such
transfer ‘is not sustainably viable’ on
account of huge differences in political
structures, national priorities, living stan-
dards,culturaltraits,technologicaldevelop-
ment, literacy levels, financial and infra-
structure growth, and change-management
competency. All these differences result in
the absence of what Hunt calls a ‘contextual
fit’ between the policy development and the
respective policy application environment
(Hunt, 1999, p. 302).
‘If there is any conclusion that springs
from a comparative study of river systems,
it is that no two are the same’ (Gilbert
White, cited in Jacobs, 1999). Each river
basin must differ from any other in a
thousand respects, but that does not
mean that lessons of success in one are
of no value to another. It does mean
though that uncritical ‘copycat’ replication
ofsuccessfulinstitutionalmodels–eitherby
enthusiastic national governments or at the
behest of enthusiastic donors – is a sure for-
mula for failure. The history of institutional
reform in developing-country water sectors
is dotted with failures of such copycat
reform.
IRBM is not a new idea, even in
developing countries. India tried to trans-
pose the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority)
model tried in the USA by constituting
the Damodar Valley Authority, which was a
resounding failure. Catchment management
committees were established in China way
back in the 1950s in some of the major
river basins such as the Yangtse and Yellow
River, to plan and exploit water resources,
generate electricity, mitigate flood damage
and provide facilities for navigation (Hu,
1999,p.327).However,alltheseinstitutions
shedtheirbroadagendaandendedupfocus-
ing on irrigation, the purpose that was most
central to their domains at those times.
In Sri Lanka, a Water Resources Board
was established as early as 1964 to promote
integrated water resources planning, river
basin and trans-basin development and to
tackle water pollution. However, the Board
never worked on its broad mandate and,
instead, took to hydrological investigations
and drilling tubewells.1 Such examples can
be multiplied easily. The point is, in taking
usefullessonsfromsuccesscasesformaking
meaningful reform in developing countries,
it is important to understand critical differ-
ences between the two worlds that affect
what will work and what will not. We
propose that, in assessing the applicability
of institutional innovations, it is critical
to take into account four types of material
differences between the developed- and
developing-country realities:
1. Hydrology and climate;
2. Demographics;
3. Organization of the water sector;
4. Socioeconomics.
We briefly outline these material differ-
ences in the following sections.
3.3 Hydrology
Historically, agriculture advanced early in
arid climates such as those of Egypt and
Iraq, but industrial development began
early in the temperate and humid climates
of Europe, North America and Japan. Arid
areas where significant wealth creation and
accumulation has occurred, such as in West
Asia, are typically rich in mineral and oil
resources. As of today, however, the bulk of
the developing world, where rainfall tends
to be low and water scarcity is a major
emerging constraint to progress, is in
the arid or semiarid2 parts of the world.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, showing the global
distributions of mean annual rainfall and
34 T. Shah et al.
1 Another round of reform has just begun in Sri Lanka. In 1990, a draft law made provision for bulk water
allocationandtheestablishmentof aNationalWaterResourcesCouncilto do whattheWaterResourcesBoard
couldnot.However,thelawcouldbesubmittedtotheParliamentonlyin1995forthelackofconsensuswithin
the cabinet as well as amongst the myriad agencies dealing with water (Birch and Taylor, 1999, p. 331).
2 ReferringtoregionslikeIndiaandWestAfrica,whicharehumid forasmallpartoftheyearbutaridduring
the rest of the year.
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trate some major climatic differences
between developed countries (mostly in
the temperate latitudes) and developing
countries (mostly in the tropical and
subtropical regions).
Sutcliffe (1995) pointed out that devel-
opingcountriesalsohappentobeconcentra-
ted in parts of the world with more extreme
climates when compared to the regions
occupied by today’s developed countries.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the variation in annual
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Fig. 3.1. Global distribution of mean annual rainfall.
Fig. 3.2. Global distribution of mean annual potential evapotranspiration.
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all of its annual rainfall in less than 100 h of
torrential downpours during June–October,
and its challenge is to save enough of it from
evapotranspirationtolastfromOctoberuntil
April–May, the months that mark the period
ofhighestwaterstress.Botswanareceivesall
ofits 350–500 mmofrainfallduring Novem-
ber–March, the period which also coincides
with the highest evaporation, resulting in
little or no runoff (Sutcliffe, 1995, p. 69).
Humid areas typically have higher
stream densities than are found in the arid
and semiarid areas, which means that,
ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of pre-
cipitationinthearidandsemiaridareasruns
offinsheetflowbeforeformingintostreams,
and is thereby subject to higher evapotrans-
piration losses (Fig. 3.2). Other things also
arenotquitethe same. The tropicaldevelop-
ingworld–especially,SouthAsiaandmuch
of Africa – has higher mean temperatures for
more of the year than the developed world,
and, for equivalent levels of precipitation,
runoff and the need for irrigation tend to be
greater in arid and semiarid areas than in
humid areas (Sutcliffe, 1995, p. 64).
Climate and hydrological conditions,
combined with demography (discussed in
the following section), explain why decen-
tralized institutions for water management
have historically evolved in many parts
of the developing world. The profusion of
small tanks in India’s southern peninsula
and Sri Lanka can be viewed as the response
of communities in the catchment areas to
staketheirclaimonrainfall. Even today,one
collective maintenance task carried out by
manySouthIndiantankcommunitiesbefore
the start of the monsoon is cleaning and
deepening the channels that feed rainwater
runoff to their tanks. Village people here
recognize that if they do not capture runoff
in artificial streams, most of it will be lost
before it reaches their tanks.
3.4 Demographics
Many parts of the developed world have
extreme climates too; however, over time,
population and urbanization in these parts
have tended to concentrate in wet areas
or on downstream reaches of rivers near
coastal areas, where water can be supplied
through large-scale diversion structures. As
Fig. 3.3 shows, except in Europe, most of
36 T. Shah et al.
Fig. 3.3. Global distribution of population density.
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tion densities throughout, with urban
agglomerations near the coasts and rural
population along rivers or irrigation
systems. Here, the competition is for
large accumulated bodies of ‘diverted
water’. Since catchment areas have rela-
tively sparse populations, the downstream
water-harvesting structures have large
catchment areas that are virtually free from
competition.
However, this is not the case in some
of the most densely populated regions of
the world. In India, for instance, population
density is high – approaching 600 persons
per km2 in the water-rich Ganga basin, and
seldom less than 350–400 even in semiarid
Western India and hard-rock peninsular
India. Population density is high both
upstream and downstream of dams. The
same is true for much of China. The North
China plains have much less water than
South China, but their population density
is around the same. One might argue that
the cause of intensive groundwater develop-
ment in South Asia and China is that most
people here cannot be downstream of
large dams. By sinking tubewells, people
upstream are, in a sense, challenging the
basic inequity inherent in the pattern of
large irrigation projects that usurp the
rainfall precipitation of populous upstream
catchment areas to bequeath it to a small
number of canal irrigators.
All these factors have had implications
for the kind of water institutions that have
evolved historically in the developed and
developing world. For example, the system
of rights based on riparian doctrine and on
thedoctrineofpriorappropriationisaliento
the cultures of many developing countries
because the largest majority, by far, depend
uponrainfallandlocalwater-harvestingand
storage structures. Riparian rights or prior
allocation become operative only along
the streams and rivers, where the bulk
of the irrigators and water users tend to be
concentrated in countries like the USA
or Australia, but these make no sense,
for example, for some 20 million persons
pumping groundwater in South Asia, or the
communities that use over 300,000 tanks in
South India or 7 million ponds in China.
Because large proportions of the popu-
lation in the developing world depend upon
rain and on local storage, the people’s
notions of ownership and rights relate more
easily to precipitation than large-scale pub-
licdiversions.Egyptgetslessthan10%ofits
water from rainfall, yet Egyptians consider
the rainwater to be truly their own. In Asia,
where population densities are commonly
ashigh inthecatchmentareasofthebasinas
along the stream and river channels, the
implicitprimacyoftherightofcommunities
over precipitation rather than over diver-
sions is widely accepted. Indeed, in recent
years, a popular slogan in Western India is
‘rain on your roof, stays in your house; rain
on your field stays in your field; and rain in
your village stays in your village’. In the
Western countries, upstream–downstream
conflicts are important because most water
users think of users upstream as their rivals.
In the World Water Forum that met at The
Hague in March 2000, the slogan that the
Delhi-based CentreforScience and Environ-
ment popularized was ‘everyone lives
downstream’, which is eminently sensible if
all or a majority of people in a basin depend
for their water needs directly upon rainfall.
The IRBM discussion talks very little of the
enormous amount of work on farming in
the semiarid tropics done by national and
international centres such as ICRISAT.3 As
the Global Water Partnership (2000, p. 25)
notes, ‘Most water management, including
the literature on IWRM, tends to focus on
the ‘blue water’,4 thus neglecting rain and
soil-water management. Management of
‘green water’ flows holds significant poten-
tial for water savings.’ This is because there
is little real ‘dryland farming’ of the Indian
and West African variety in the developed
River Basin Management in the Developing World 37
3 International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics.
4 ‘Blue water’ is water existing in bodies such as rivers or lakes, or pumped from aquifers. ‘Green water’ is
soil water extracted and transpired by plants.
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moisture is a critical issue in many African
and Asian countries. Europe, Canada, New
Zealand and the USA do have rainfed
farming; but this is not quite the same as
dry farming in western Rajasthan or sub-
Saharan Africa; in many of these countries,
favourable rainfall and climate conditions
result in favourable soil-moisture regimes
that make irrigation unnecessary for
growing good crops.
The conventional notion of irrigation
is one of controlled supply of water to meet
the full scientific requirements of plants
precisely when needed, but the irrigation
that is most widely practised in South Asia
and amongst smallholder farmers in Africa
is supplemental irrigation designed to
increase the productivity of ‘green water’.
Green water is the precipitation used
directly for crop production and thus ‘lost’
in evaporation; blue water pumped out from
wells is as important in South Asia and
North China as the part that flows into rivers
and canal systems.5 This is quite unlike the
situation in many developed-country river
basins. In these, the bulk of economic water
demands have been met from development
of blue surface water and where, with the
closure of these basins, the focus of basin
managementisonraisingtheproductivityof
blue surface water, largely without regard to
green water.
Uniformly high population density,
combined with unhelpful climate and
hydrology, has a profound impact on the
objectives of water management in develop-
ing-country river basins. In recent years,
IWMI’s water accounting work (Molden and
Sakthivadivel, 1999, pp. 58–60) has made
much contribution to understanding water
productivity in the basin context.6 Although
IWMI’s focus has been on productivity of
water in agriculture, the framework can be
easily generalized to develop a notion of
basin-level water productivity in terms of a
social welfare function for all stakeholders
in a river basin constituting a basin commu-
nity. Under this broad concept:
Basin welfare productivity of water = Basin
welfare/Available water.
Water productivity understood thus could
be enhanced by:
1. Enhancing productivity in each use;
and
2. Constantly reallocating water amongst
alternative uses – irrigation, domestic,
industrial and environmental – so that the
marginal contribution to overall welfare by
water allocated to all uses remains equal.
Using the IWMI water accounting frame-
work, this welfare productivity measure
can be written in several alternative ways to
highlight the importance of different water
use strategies,7 but for highlighting the dif-
ference between developed and developing
world, a useful way to write the welfare
productivity ratio is:
Basin welfare/Available water = [Basin
welfare/Diversions] × [Diversions/Available
water].
In relatively water-abundant humid
regions, with low population density in the
catchment areas and dense human settle-
ments near the coasts and along rivers, RBM
seeks to maximize basin welfare productiv-
ity by increasing the term [Basin welfare/
Diversions]. Allocation of diverted water
amongst alternative uses is a crucial func-
tion in basin-level water management in
such conditions. Here, reservoirs have large
free catchments, and evapotranspiration in
catchment areas is often not high; therefore,
the need for active human intervention to
maximize [Diversions/Available water] is
not great.
38 T. Shah et al.
5 This distinction between green and blue water is extremely important for developing countries in the
semiarid tropics. Terrestrial ecosystems are green-water dependent; aquatic ecosystems are blue-water
dependent (GWP, 2000, p. 24).
6 StandarddefinitionsusedinIWMIwateraccountingworkarefoundinMoldenandSakthivadivel(1999).
7 For example, by writing [Basin welfare/Available water] = [Basin welfare/Total depletion] × [Total
depletion/Total diversion] × [Total diversion/Water available], we can signify alternative routes to water
productivity.
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high population density everywhere, as in
South Asia and China, maximizing basin
welfare involves working on both the
components. Increasing the productivity of
diverted water is certainly important; but
equally important is the need to maximize
the proportion of precipitation and inflows
into a basin that can be diverted before they
are lost to non-beneficial depletion.
It is against this backdrop that we need
to consider the growing mass movement
for rainwater harvesting and groundwater
recharge in western India (Shah, 2000). The
region has amongst the highest wind speeds
encountered anywhere in the world, it
has high mean temperatures for 9 months,
rainfall varies between 300 and 800 mm/
year, and population density is 300–500
persons per km2 in the catchment areas
as well as in the downstream areas. The
greatest challenge for rural communities is
surviving the annual pre-monsoon drought
in April and May, which is made infinitely
moredauntingbyregularfailureofmonsoon
rains. During the pre-monsoon months,
leave-alone growing crops, ensuring ade-
quate drinking water for humans and cattle
is the great challenge, especially in the
catchment areas of river basins. While
government investment programmes con-
centrated on building largereservoirsdown-
stream to support irrigation and municipal
water supplies to towns, the problems of
the people living in the catchment areas
remained unaddressed.
Disenchanted with government and
publicsystems,non-governmentalorganiza-
tions (NGOs) and communities are finding
their own solutions. The past decade has
witnessed a massive popular awakening as
the result of the efforts of NGOs like Tarun
Bharat Sangh, Pradan, and religious organi-
zations such as the Swadhyaya Pariwar.
This has taken the form of rainwater conser-
vation and groundwater recharge work on a
scale that governments or public agencies
wouldnotbeabletomanage.Thebasicmoti-
vation that has been driving the movement
is to ensure availability of domestic water
supply for 2 months before the monsoon
and for one or two crop-saving waterings
from wells; there are indications that the
movement may well meet this challenge.
Government agencies and scientists
(hydrologists in particular) have been dubi-
ous about this mass movement. Their argu-
ment is that rainwater-harvesting structures
upstream merely transfer water, reducing
the input into the reservoirs downstream,
thereby reducing their productivity. How-
ever, this argument does not resonate with
thecommunities,especiallyintheupstream
areas, which fail to see why they cannot
meet their basic water domestic needs
instead of feeding reservoirs to irrigate
relatively small areas of paddy or cotton.
In defence of this popular movement, the
Delhi-based CentreforScience and Environ-
ment has asked: what does India need more
– irrigation or drought proofing? In reply,
it has suggested that by a total rethink on
‘appropriate’ RBM, India can trade drought
proofing over vast areas by sacrificing
irrigation of small areas.
It has also adduced evidence to show
that diverting rainwater in a large number of
small water-harvesting structures in a catch-
ment captures and stores more of the scarce
precipitation, closer to the communities,
than having a large reservoir downstream
(Agarwal, 2000). This is because water
collectedoverlargerwatersheds willhaveto
flow over a larger area before it is collected
and a large part will be lost in small puddles
and depressions, as soil moisture and
evaporation.
For instance, Agarwal cites evidence
from the Negev desert in Israel to show that
3000 micro-catchments of 0.1 ha capture
five times more water than a single catch-
ment of 300 ha, and this multiple increases
in a drought period (p. 9). He also cites
results by Michael Evanari, an Israeli scien-
tistthatshowthat‘Whilea1 hawatershedin
the Negev yielded as much as 95 m3 of water
per ha per year, a 345 ha watershed yielded
only24 m3/ha/year.In otherwords, as much
as 75% of the water that could be collected
was lost. This loss was even higher in
a drought year.’ Agarwal cites Evenari:
‘. . . during drought years with less than
50 mm of rainfall, watersheds larger than
50 ha will not produce any appreciable
River Basin Management in the Developing World 39
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sheds will yield 20–40 m3/ha, and micro-
catchments (smaller than 0.1 ha) as much as
80–100 m3/ha.’
Before irrigated crop production,
semiarid India needs drinking water for its
dispersed rural population during the 9
months without rainfall. Many Indian
observers think that the answer is not piped
water supply schemes but decentralized
rainwater harvesting.8
3.5 Organization of the Water Sector
Developed-country water sectors, which
have evolved over decades of public inter-
vention, tend to be highly organized and
formalized, with most of the water deliv-
ered – and most of the users served – by
service providers in the organized sector.
In low-income countries, a vast majority of
water users – the poorest ones – get their
water directly from rain and from local
private or community storage without any
significant mediation from public agencies
or organized service providers. The notion
of professional water service providers is
alien to a majority of rural South Asians and
Africans.
As a society evolves and its economy,
as well as its water sector, matures, the bulk
of the water delivered to ultimate users
is produced, developed, planned and allo-
cated – in general, managed – by formal
organizations, businesses or utilities. In
Israel, for example, 70% of the water supply
in the country is managed by Mekorot, a
State-owned water company that operates
the National Water Carrier, the pipeline
system that moves water from Lake Galilee
to the Negev Desert, and is in urban water
retail, desalination and sewerage treatment
businesses (Saleth and Dinar, 2000, p. 185).
When the bulk of the users and uses are
served through the formal sector, resource
governance becomes feasible, even simple.
If a basin management regime wants to
increase the water price to domestic users
by 5%, or make a law intended to change
the way business is done, it can do so with
the confidence that it will stick. However,
this is not true when the bulk of the water
users and uses are served by an informal
sector where service providers are not even
registered.
In comparing the Australian success
with containing agricultural pollution of
water with the Chinese situation, Hu (1999,
p. 327) laments that while the small number
of large Australian farmers are served by a
range of local organizations, such as sugar,
rice and cattle associations, which serve as
vehicles not only for new knowledge and
technical advice but also for implementing
new rules and laws, in China, ‘given the
small scale of farming units and the large
number of farmers, it is difficult to control
chemicalandpesticideapplication,removal
of vegetation, erosion and water resource
exploitation.’ In South Africa, over 90% of
water is managed by formal organizations
but 90% of rural people, the black irrigators
in former homelands, are almost wholly in
theinformalsector,faroutofthereachofthe
organized systems.
Ignoring the complexity of dealing with
the informal water sectors in the developing
world can lead to misleading analyses. In
the perspective of Saleth and Dinar (2000,
p. 186),for example, the institutional reform
challenge in South Africa ‘lies in translating
the provision of its water law and water
policy without creating much uncertainty
among private investors.’ In our view, these
are easily done. The real challenge with
which the government of South Africa is
struggling is in reaching the reform to the
black communities in the former home-
lands, who operate in the informal water
sector. As hard as the government is trying,
this is not proving to be easy. About the
process of Catchment Management Agency
40 T. Shah et al.
8 The Centre for Science and Environment has estimated the average area needed per village to capture
sufficient water to meet every household’s drinking and cooking water requirement in various regions with
varyingclimate,precipitationand demographicconditions. The averagefor India as a whole was all of 1.14 ha
per village in a normal year and 2.28 ha per village in a drought year.
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Merrey (2000, p. 9) writes:
rural communities were unaware of the
provisions of the new water law and the
CMA process, despite the efforts to inform
people and offer them opportunities to
express their views. Small-scale farmers
had not heard about the CMA . . . [But] the
Irrigation Boards providing water to large
commercial farmers were participating
actively in the process . . .
A small number of large stakeholders is
easy to work with. The ballgame changes
fundamentally once we have to deal with a
huge number of tiny stakeholders.
One way the informal sector can be
‘formalized’ is through grassroots user orga-
nizations, and the global irrigation manage-
ment transfer (IMT) initiatives to organize
irrigators into water users associations is
partly motivated by the need to bring them
intotheformalsector.Inthistoo,smallnum-
bers of large users in the developed world
have an advantage over large numbers
of small users in the developing world.
All manner of user associations form
spontaneously in countries like the USA
and Australia. These institutional models
are constantly being tried out in developing
countries but, here, these generally break
down when faced with large numbers of
small stakeholders who face such diverse
constraints in their livelihood systems that
they are at best apathetic towards each of
them.
Thus, for example, IMT to water
user organizations has unambiguously
succeeded in the USA, New Zealand,
Colombia,TurkeyandMexico,allsituations
of medium to large commercial or export
farmers who run their farms as wealth-
creating enterprises. In contrast, nowhere in
low-income Asia, barring a few ‘islands of
excellence’, including the much-researched
Philippines,hasIMTheldoutthepromiseof
long-term sustainability. White commercial
farmers in South Africa took to Irrigation
Boards like ducks to water. In African small-
holderblackirrigationschemes, thereseems
little chance that IMT will take off at all
unless it is preceded by a wide-ranging
intervention to make smallholder farming
itself viable (e.g. Shah et al., 2000).
One standard refrain of institutional
discussions in the water sector is get water
lawandgetit‘right’.Itisoftenthecase,how-
ever, that the problem is not passing a law
but in enforcing it in a society with a large
number of tiny stakeholders operating in the
informal sector with little or no linkage with
meso- and macro-level resource governance
structures. This is why many governments
in Asia readily pass Acts but spend years
before converting these into implementable
laws and regulations.
There are also cases of countries that
have passed laws which have come totally
unstuck.SriLankahasbeendebatingawater
law – which has ‘all the right ingredients’
(Saleth and Dinar, 2000) – since the early
1980s, but is yet to enact it. This is
presumably because it is difficult to figure
how to make all the ‘right ingredients’ –
water permit systems, full-cost pricing,
water courts and explicit water policy
statement – actually work in ways that make
a significant difference to the management
of water resources in a country where
50–70% of the rural people acquire their
water not through water supply service
utilities/companies but straight from nature
or from local storage in small community
tanks.
India adopted a water policy in 1987,
but nothing changed as a consequence, and
itisnowworkingonanewone.ManyIndian
states have likewise been debating ground-
water laws for 30 years and a dozen or so
drafts are in circulation. The legislative
assembly of Gujarat, a state with severe
groundwater overdraft problems, passed
a bill as far back as in 1974, but the Chief
Minister refused to make it into a law. His
reasons were convincing. First, he was
unable to see how the law could be effec-
tively enforced on a million small private
pumpers scattered throughout a huge coun-
tryside, and second, he was certain that
it would become one more instrument of
rent-seeking for the local bureaucracy
(Shah, 1993).
‘Get the price right’ is another old pre-
scription to make water an economic good.
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world is real, it would be naïve to question
thevalueofpricing,notsomuchforrevenue
collection but to signal the scarcity value
of water to users. There can be no serious
debate on whether the view of water as
a ‘scarce but free’ resource is tenable in
today’s context. The real issue is making the
price of water stick in a situation where a
majority of users are in the informal sector
and do not gotoanyone except the rain-gods
for getting their water.
Even in canal irrigation systems in
South Asia, which are in the formal sector,
many political leaders and senior adminis-
trators would become open to volumetric
pricing of water to promote efficient use, if
only the logistics of doing so were simple
and cost-effective, what with the large num-
ber of small irrigators in the commands of




Nepal. Most people would avoid paying the
full-cost price if not paying were an option,
as is the case in many developing-country
water sectors.
The high transaction cost of monitoring
water use and collecting water charge is the
centralissueinwaterpricing,ratherthanthe
politicians’ propensity towards giving away
largesse. This will soon be evident in South
Africa, where a new water pricing policy
will be easy to enforce on large commercial
farmers,sincetransactioncostofmonitoring
and collection will be low, but very difficult
to apply in areas of black irrigation, domi-
nated as they are by large numbers of small
users.
Developed-country institutions have
not solved the problem of serving or regulat-
ing large numbers of small users. Indeed,
they have not yet found satisfactory ways
of dealing with moderate numbers of large
users. In New South Wales, Queensland and
Victoria, the existing law confers on every
occupier of land the right to take and use
water for domestic consumptive purposes,
watering stock, irrigating home gardens and
non-commercial crops on a maximum of
2 ha (MacDonald and Young, 2000, p. 24).
If this exemption were applied to India, it
would cover over 80% of all land and over
90% of all people. In South Africa, it would
cover 90% of all users though only 10% of
land and water. In South Asia, South-East
Asia and North China, groundwater is
the most valuable and threatened resource,
and protecting groundwater from over-
development is probably among the top
three priorities in this region. Yet doing so is
proving to be a challenge precisely because
groundwater is in the informal sector.
In the question of how best to deal with
South Asia’s 20 million tubewell owners
in the informal sector, the experiences of
Murray–Darling or Mississippi do not have
many practical lessons to offer. Even in
‘highly evolved’ river basins, sustainable
management of groundwater is at best prob-
lematic, and at worst, as hopeless as in
India and Pakistan. Murray–Darling has
tried groundwater regulation but it is not
certain if it has worked. Access to ground-
water in New South Wales is regulated by
licences under the Water Administration
Act of 1986. However,
over much of New South Wales, undevel-
oped licences were not cancelled. In retro-
spect, this has proved an administrative
disaster as, in a number of areas, the total
volume of licences issued is well in excess
of estimated sustained yield. (MacDonald
and Young, 2000, p. 23)
In California’s Central Valley, groundwater
over-exploitation is a 60-year-old problem,
yet in his case study of basin management,
Svendsen (2000) concludes that:
Groundwater is the most lightly planned
and regulated segment of the state’s water
resources. There is little control over
abstractions and, on average, the state is
in a serious overdraft situation.
Even in middle-income countries, where
major institutional reforms have been
initiated in recent years, groundwater over-
exploitation has defied solution. Spain, one
of the European countries that suffer agri-
cultural over-exploitation of groundwater,
has instituted sweeping reforms that will
affect surface water but have little to do
with groundwater (Saleth and Dinar, 2000).
42 T. Shah et al.
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over-developed. IWMI researchers based in
Guanajuato state, one of Mexico’s agricul-
turally dynamic regions, found water tables
in ten aquifers they studied declining at
average annual rates of 1.79–3.3 m/year
during recent years (Wester et al., 1999, p.
9). An institutional solution is being tried
here through the establishment of Aquifer
Management Councils called COTAS
(Consejos Técnicos de Aguas). IWMI
researchers in Guanajuato are, however,
sceptical: ‘. . . several factors bode ill
for their (COTAS’) future effectiveness in
arresting groundwater depletion . . .’.
Finally, for top echelons of national
decision makers, it is always easy to take
hard decisions, which do not affect a large
proportion of a nation’s population in a seri-
ously adverse manner. Political leaders and
water-sector leaders in emerging economies
constantly face pressures to be myopic and
adoptposturesthatareatoddswiththeideal
ofIRBM.Themostpowerfulandcompelling
pressures emerge from their own internal
social realities. In low-income agrarian
societies like in South Asia and much of
Africa, food security and poverty alleviation
will continue to remain prime concerns for
decades to come.
When several poor states are involved
in a basin – such as India, Nepal and Bangla-
desh in the Ganga–Meghana–Brahmaputra
basin, or the Central Asian states in the
Aral Sea – coordinating mechanisms tend
to operate at suboptimal levels because
national leaders are under pressure to
maximize their national interests. It has
been argued that the Aral Sea crisis is
the outcome of the compelling need of
the political leaders in the Central Asian
states to ensure food security as well
as water-intensive cotton cultivation for
export,bothatonce.Amajormovetoreverse
the desiccation of the Aral Sea, the Amu
Darya and the Syr Darya will have to wait
until something changes the dominant
perception of the political leadership
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that
cessation of cotton monoculture will
have politically and socially destabilizing
consequences.
3.6 Stage of Socioeconomic
Development
What factors might influence the pace of
institutional change in developing-country
water sectors? Saleth and Dinar (2000)
suggest that as water scarcity intensifies,
opportunity costs imposed by missing or
malfunctioning institutions will increase
and transaction costs of institutional
change will decline, which together will
determine the pace of institutional change
in developing countries. A competing
hypothesis is offered by the application of
Kuznets’ curve to natural resource manage-
ment by societies. Recently, there have been
attempts to fit an environmental Kuznets
curve to deforestation using cross-country
data (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2000).
The environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) poses an inverted U relationship
between economic growth and environ-
mental degradation (Fig. 3.4). The core
hypothesis is that, as economies grow,
they use natural resources as a factor
of wealth creation, but as per capita real
income grows, demand for environmental
amenity grows and there is greater demand
and support for environmental protection.
Although the empirical results of some
of this econometric work are far from con-
clusive, intuitively, it seems compelling
to suppose that the income elasticity of
demand for environmental amenities is
lower at low per capita incomes (as in
Bangladesh and Burkina Faso) than at high
percapitaincomes.Itfollows,therefore,that
highly evolved economies of the Western
world would have greater demand, capacity
and collective will to fix the environmental
problems resulting from natural resource
mismanagement than low-income emerging
economies. In many Western countries,
where per capita income growth to present
levels took 200 years or more, the EKC effect
also took centuries to work out. Historical
evidence suggests deforestation in Europe
was at its peak at the time of the Industrial
Revolution, and the area under forests began
to increase long after economic prosperity
ensued (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2000).
River Basin Management in the Developing World 43
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hold in the case of water resource manage-
ment. Countries with highly developed
water institutions are also those that have
evolved industrially. In contrast, it is diffi-
cult to find a low-income agrarian society
that has highly developed water institu-
tions. Interestingly, some sketchy evidence
suggests that the period of decline followed
by upswing gets telescoped in economies
like Japan and Taiwan that have grown their
industrial output and employment rapidly
over a relatively short period.
In Table 3.1, we present the data set for
57 countries organized around their per
capita water and arable land availability.
The figures alongside the country names are
their respective per capita CO2 emissions,
whichisoneofthebestcorrelatesofGDPper
capita as well as the Human Development
Index. Mean per capita availability of water
and arable land, along with CO2 emission,
are used to divide the countries into eight
categories.
CountriesincategoriesB1,C1andD1are
poor in water and/or arable land resources;
butthesearerapidlybecomingpost-agrarian
societies where pressure on water and land
fromirrigated farming will rapidly ease. The
social and economic costs of fixing water
mismanagement in these countries already
areorwillsoonbewithinacceptablelimits.
It is notable that A1 represents the cate-
goryofcountriesfromwhichmostmodelsof
effective water institutions emerge, and
these are offered to countries in D2 category
which have the least water, land and CO2
emissions. Countries in A1 are amongst the
bestendowedwithbothwaterandland.Asa
result, despite being highly industrialized
(as indicated by their high CO2 emissions),
these still have large, wealth-creating agri-
culture and agroindustry sectors that absorb
averysmallproportionoftheirpopulations.
In the D2 category, poor land and water
resource endowments combine with high
population pressure, but ironically, their
most critical problem is their low CO2 emis-
sion. Industrial growth, urbanization and
transfer of people from agricultural to
off-farm livelihoods seems the only way
pressure on land and water will ease. Many
of these countries will, over the coming
decades, more likely take the Kuznets-curve
route that Japan and Taiwan took than the
one that Australia and the USA took.
In Taiwan, where rapid industrial
growth and urbanization have resulted in a
40% decline in irrigated areas over recent
decades, the popular outlook towards
water management issues has undergone a
fundamental transformation. Over 90% of
Taiwan’s irrigators have become part-time
farmers, and income from industrial
employment far outweighs agricultural
incomes. There have been major increases
in demand for environmental amenities
and the touristic value of former irrigation
44 T. Shah et al.
Fig. 3.4. Relationship between level of economic growth and natural resource degradation.
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substantial private investments in improv-
ing water quality and aquatic ecology.
Taiwan has amongst the highest population
densities wefind anywhereintheworld,yet
its water institutions will soon approach
those in high-income Western countries
rather than low-income Asian countries,
which share high population density with
Taiwan.
The Kuznets curve hypothesis looks
at the relationship only from the angle of
demand for environmental amenities, but
there is also the supply side to it. More
and higher-quality resources are applied
to natural resource management in high-
income countries than in low-income
countries. Consider the budget of the
water departments. The California State
Department of Water Resources has
2000 employees, mostly professionals, who
operate an annual budget of US$1 billion
(Svendsen, 2000). The Gujarat Department
of Water Resources probably employs as
many engineers but operates a budget of
less than US$10 million. The upshot of this
discussionisthat,overadecadaltimeframe,
economic growth is probably both the cause
of and the needed response to the problem
of natural resource mismanagement, and, if
the experience of Japan and Taiwan is any
guide, the period over which the interaction
between the two plays out need not run into
centuries as it did in the case of Europe,
but it can be telescoped from centuries to
decades.
River Basin Management in the Developing World 45
Per capita water > mean (10,460 m3);
values of CO2 emissions/capita, countries
classified as high (1) or low (2)
Per capita water < mean (10,460 m3);
values of CO2 emissions/capita, countries

























































































































Source: Engelman et al. (2000).
Table 3.1. Natural resource availability and economic growth.
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In this chapter, we have made an
attempt to explore why efforts to transfer the
institutionalmodelsofRBMfromdeveloped
countries to developing ones have not met
with the desired success. The contexts in
which reforms are tried in developing
countries are vastly different – in their
hydrologic and climatic conditions, in their
demographics, in their socioeconomic con-
ditionsandinthewaytheirwatersectorsare
currentlyorganized –fromthe contextofthe
countries in which the models first suc-
ceeded. Successful institutional reforms in
the water sector worldwide have tended to
have common over-arching patterns – they
have focused largely on management of sur-
facewaterbodies,theyhaveaimedatimprov-
ing the productivity of publicly diverted
largewaterbodies,theyhavelargelyignored
groundwater, and have not had to contend
with sizeable informal water sectors, and
they have focused on blue-water productiv-
ity and largely ignored green water.
The problems that successful institu-
tional models have resolved – poor water
quality, degraded wet lands, maintaining
navigation and dealing with occasional
floods – are often not of paramount interest
in developing-country contexts. The prob-
lems that developing countries find critical
and insurmountable either have remained
unresolved in developed-country river bas-
ins, e.g. groundwater over-exploitation, or
arerenderedirrelevantbytheirevolutionary
process, as with using irrigation as a means
to provide poor people with livelihoods and
food security. This does not by any means
imply that developed-country experience
has no lessons to offer to the developing
world. Drawing such a conclusion would be
naïve in the extreme. What it does mean,
however, is that imposing institutional
models uncritically in vastlydifferent socio-
ecological contexts can be dysfunctional
and even counter-productive.
What it also means is that we need to
take a broader view of institutional change.
An extraordinary aspect of the institutional
discussion in the global water sector is how
very narrowly it has focused on things that
governments can do: make laws, set up
regulatoryorganizations,turnoverirrigation
systems, specify property rights. A recent
review of institutional changes in the global
water sector in 11 countries by Saleth and
Dinar (2000), for example, treats water law,
water policy and water administration as
the three pillars of institutional analysis.
This makes water purely the government’s
business, quite contrary to the slogan popu-
larized by the World Water Council to ‘make
water everyone’s business’. If institutional
change is about how societies adapt to new
demands, its study has to deal with more
than what just the governments do. People,
businesses, exchangeinstitutions, civilsoci-
ety institutions, religions and movements
– all these must be covered in the ambit
of institutional analysis (e.g. Mestre, 1997,
cited in Merrey, 2000, p. 5).
Which elements of the Murray–Darling
experience can besensibly applied in which
developing-country context is certainly an
important and interesting analytical enter-
prise, but equally, or even more important is
the need to listen to voices from the grass-
roots. If people living, for example, in the
Deduru Oya basin in Sri Lanka are facing
water scarcity, they are going to begin to do
something about it. Likewise, if the govern-
ment of South Africa withdraws from the
management of smallholder irrigation
schemes in the Olifants basin, the small-
holders will soon respond in some way.
What institutional reform makes best sense
in Deduru Oya or Olifants should best
emerge from understanding the respective
realities of these basins. A broad under-
standing of what has worked elsewhere
including in the developed world might
offer a good backdrop to the design of
institutional interventions, but it might be
unrealistic to expect much more. Copycat
institutional reform would be outright
disastrous.
In understanding how societies adapt
their institutions to changing demands,
Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson (1999)
suggeststhecriticalityoffourlevelsofsocial
analysis as outlined in Fig. 3.5.The toplevel
is referred to as the social embeddedness
level where customs, traditions, mores and
46 T. Shah et al.
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change very slowly because of the spontane-
ous origin of these practices in which
‘deliberative choice of a calculative kind is
minimallyimplicated’.Atthesecondlevel–
where the institutional environment of a
society is involved – evolutionary processes
play a big role; but opportunities for design
present themselves through formal rules,
constitutions, laws, property rights. The
challenge here is getting the rules of the
game right. The definition and enforcement
of property rights and contract law are
critical features here. Also critical is under-
standing how things actually work, ‘warts
and all’, in some settings but not in others.
However, it is one thing to get the rules
of the game (institutional environment)
right. It is quite another to get the play of
thegame(enforcementofcontracts/property
rights) right. Which leads to the third level
of institutional analysis: transaction costs
of enforcement of contracts and property
rights, and the governance structures
through which this is done. Governance –
through markets, hybrids, firms, bureaus
– is an effort to craft order, thereby to
mitigate conflict and realize mutual
gains; good governance structures craft
order by reshaping incentives, which leads
to the fourth level of social analysis – getting
the incentives right.


























Get the prices right
F1: Social theory
F2: Economics of property rights and positive political theory
F3: Transaction cost economics
F4: Neo-classical economics, principal/agent theory
Source: Oliver E Willamson. 1999.  The new Institutional Economics: Taking
Stock/Looking Ahead , Business and Public Policy Working paper BPP-76, University of
California, Berkeley.
Fig. 3.5. Four levels of institutional change that explain how societies adapt to new demands.
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tions in the developing-country context has
focused a great deal on levels 2, 3 and 4
and little on level 1. More, it has tended to
underplay the interactions between levels.
Many populous developing countries will
feel a lot wiser about IRBM if we learn more
about how level 1 operates in their respec-
tive contexts and how the interaction
between 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 can work
better. How to create property rights that
affect users’ behaviour is more important
than exhortations that clear property rights
be created. Understanding how to enforce a
groundwater law meaningfully on 20 mil-
lion private pumpers scattered throughout
the South Asian countryside is more helpful
than pushing a groundwater law. How to
monitor water use and collect canal irriga-
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees4 Making Sound Decisions: Information
Needs for Basin Water Management
Martin Burton and David Molden
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis of infor-
mation needs in water-scarce river basins
from two perspectives – those of the basin
manager and of the manager of a locally
controlled irrigation system (LCIS). Infor-
mation is central to planning and managing
the water resource within a river basin.
Information requirements develop and
grow over time as pressure on the water
resource increases with demographic and
economic changes (see Chapters 1 and 2).
Information plays a crucial role in quantify-
ing the abundance and quality of the avail-
able resource and the demands placed on it,
and is central to decision making on water
allocation at both scheme and river basin
level, and to formulation of policies and
strategies for river basin development.
As water becomes scarcer, data and
information become increasingly important
for irrigation system managers, since the
need grows to make the most productive use
of available supplies. In addition to looking
attheinternalallocationandmanagementof
the available water, managers of irrigation
systems must also look externally to ensure
that their systems acquire and retain their
share of the available resource. As irrigation
is often the largest consumptive user of
water in a river basin, irrigation managers
must often justify the use, efficiency and
productivity of water in competition and
comparison with other uses and users. In
this context, data and information play a
central role.
4.2 Use and Users of Information
There is a wide variety of uses and users of
information related to water resources
within a river basin (Table 4.1). The river
basin can be divided into water uses related
to watershed land use, in-stream water use,
extractive water use and environmental
water use. The in-stream uses are those
wherein the water is used without being
removed from the river, such as hydro-
power or recreation. They generally result
in minimal depletion of available water.
Extractive uses such as irrigation, on the
other hand, involve removing water from a
river or aquifer, and generally result in larger
depletion of the resource from the basin
through evapotranspiration. Removal of
water from a river or aquifer is not absolute,
however. For example, most of the water
used for domestic and industrial purposes
is available for reuse, either after treatment
or through dilution in fresh water.
Information uses are many and varied,
and can be categorized into development
and master planning, operational manage-
ment, water sharing and allocation, and
research. Data collected for one purpose,
such as operational management, may be of
use forotherpurposes, such as development
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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• Potable water (surface/groundwater)
• Industrial water, including mining (surface/groundwater)
• Aquatic, wetlands and floodplain environment and ecology
• Drainage disposal
• Waste dilution and disposal










• Planning and forecasting
• Decision making in relation to resource development and protection
• Resource management and allocation
• Allocation of water rights
• Rule formulation
• Pricing
• Dialogue with, and amongst, users
• Flow control and regulation
• Flood control, protection and warning
• Effluent control
• Monitoring and evaluation (abstractions, effluent levels, environment, etc.)
• Infrastructure asset management
• Conflict resolution









• Ministries of: Water Resources, Irrigation, Agriculture and Livestock,
Energy, Hydrology and Meteorology, Health, Environment and Natural
Resources, Fisheries, Forestry, Navigation and Marine Transport,
Planning and Development
• Legislatures
• State, regional or local government
• Municipalities
• River boards, river basin councils, drainage boards
• Regulatory bodies (rivers, groundwater, environment, etc.)
• Courts
• Industry (manufacturing, services, mines, forestry, etc.)
• Associations (irrigation, rural water supply, environmental lobbies, etc.)
• Universities, research centres and training centres
• Development agencies and agents
• Non-governmental organizations




Table 4.1. Typical water uses, information uses and users within a river basin.
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requirements in different applications differ
enough that data collected for one purpose
are not usable in another.
Information users can be subdivided
into government ministries and agencies,
authorities,groupsofindividuals(suchasin
a company or an association) and individu-
als. The relationships that exist with a given
river basin between government agencies,
groups and individuals are a function of the
institutional framework that has evolved
over time. The nature of these relationships
governsthemannerinwhichdataareshared
and used.
Data needs evolve over time to suit the
changing needs of a developing basin. The
drivers for change (population growth,
agricultural and industrial development,
concern for the environment, increasing
democratization, etc.) lead to changes in
water use, water quality and institutions,
which in turn govern the type and extent
of data collected, processed, analysed and
disseminated, with new needs building on
existing practices. As a democratic society
matures, power and decision making are
transferred to a wider community. Informa-
tionprocessesbecomemoredemanddriven,
with those responsible for collecting and
processing data having to become more
responsive to the data users. The nature of
thetransactionbetweentheproviderandthe
data user may be hierarchical, commercial,
informalorstatutory,oritmaynotbeclearly
defined. As time passes, these relationships
need to become more clearly and closely
defined if the best use is to be made of the
available resource.
4.3 Information System Tasks
Information system tasks range from data
collection, through processing and analysis,
to storage and retention (Fig. 4.1). A further
stage, which is becoming increasingly
important, and which is relevant to LCISs,
is that of disseminating both data and the
findings arising from that data. In some
countries, this stage has been reached. In
others, data are not widely disseminated
outside the agency that collects and pro-
cesses the data. In these latter instances,
access to data by third parties is sometimes
impaired.
The following sections provide a brief
overview of the information system tasks
necessary for both river basin management
and managing LCISs. A distinction is made
between data and information, with data
being a series of observations or measure-
ments, and information being the results
derived from processing the data. Thus, the
samedatacanbeprocessedindifferentways
to provide information for different uses or
users.
4.3.1 Formulation of an information strategy
and management information system
It is essential for managers of any system, be
it a river basin or an irrigation scheme, to
formulate a management information strat-
egy and from that to develop a management
information system. The information strat-
egy is the pattern or plan that integrates
the organization’s information needs into a
cohesive whole to meet the organization’s
management requirements. It deals with
the information needs, and the resources
required for their collection, processing
and use. The system is the collection of
procedures that implement this strategy.
The strategy and associated management
information system should address the
following questions:
• What are the key management
processes?
• What data and information are needed
for managing these processes?
• What are the key external factors affect-
ing the enterprise, and what data need
to be collected to monitor these over
time?
• How, and by whom, will data be col-
lected, processed, analysed and used?
Information Needs for Basin Water Management 53
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processing, analysis and dissemination
cost?
• What quality control measures will be
required and used?
• How transparent will the information
system be?
• To whom will data be disseminated,
what data will they require and in what
form?
Key management processes in a river basin
grow directly from the functions performed.
Chapter 1 presented a set of generic river
basin management functions and a method-
ology for analysing their performance,
which can be used to guide a detailing
of key management processes. Information
needs for management will depend on such
factors as the size of the basin, its stage of
development, the diversity of water users
and prevailing institutional arrangements.
An important potential external factor is a
political demand to transfer water outside
the basin or to develop particular uses, such
as expanded irrigated agriculture, within
the basin. The management information
system developed will depend, among
other things, on whether there is one river
basin management authority, or several
separate agencies with responsibility for
the management/oversight of the water
54 M. Burton and D. Molden
Fig. 4.1. Structure of a management information system.
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associated management information system
are dynamic and must change over time
to match social and political changes
within society (hence the question ‘Is the
information system adequate?’ in Fig. 4.1).
For LCISs, the management processes
are relatively straightforward, with data
being required in relation to water demands,
croppedareasandirrigationfeespaid.These
data are generally fairly easy to collect and
are limited in geographical extent, com-
pared with data for the basin as a whole.
External data required relate to rainfall
and river flows elsewhere in the river
basin, and water abstractions by other
users, especially those upstream. Such data
may be collected by a government agency
or by other irrigation scheme managers.
However, gaining access to these data by
LCIS managers may be difficult.
Information needs will vary with the
stage of development of the water resource,
and reflect the level of technology and
expertiseavailable.Itiscrucialthattheman-
agement information system ‘fits together’
from start (purpose) to finish (decision mak-
ing), with systems designed to be congruent
with local capabilities and resources at all
stages. It is preferable to establish a system
thatisrobustandprovidesrelativelysimple,
but useful, information, than to establish
an ‘ideal’ one which is over-ambitious and
unsustainable. The focus needs to be on
the data and information needs of all the
actors involved in irrigation system or river
basin management, leading to a demand-led
information system.
4.3.2 Data collection
Once data needs have been determined dur-
ing the strategy formulation, attention shifts
to data collection. The two key dimensions
are time and space, and data collection
need to be distributed throughout both
dimensions. Decisions on where to measure
and the duration and frequency of measure-
ment should be established when designing
the management information system.
Data-collection programmes can be
regular, periodic or one-off depending
on needs. Regular data collection generally
includes riverflows,rainfallandwaterqual-
ity measurements. Periodic data collection
might include peak or low flow measure-
ments, whilst one-off data collection might
relate to a time-bound project where infor-
mation is required to make decisions for the
project. Data-collection procedures can be
different in these cases. One feature of a
regular data-collection programme is that
standard pro forma are used to record the
data. Different degrees of certainty can be
attached to these different types of data.
Measured data are often more reliable
than reported or estimated data, while
observed data may be more dependent on
the bias of the observer.
Types of data to be collected comprise
the following:
• Measured – data obtained from direct
measurements, e.g. discharge from
depth gauge readings at a measuring
structure;
• Observed – information used in a
qualitative mode based on field
observations, such as canal condition,
activities of organizations, etc.;
• Estimated – data used in a quantitative
mode which are derived indirectly
by calculation using combinations of
measured variables (such as potential
evapotranspiration using the Penman–
Monteith equation), or which are esti-
mated without direct measurement;
• Reported – data obtained from second-
ary sources, using other peoples’
observed, estimated or measured data.
Two major concerns in data collection are
reliability and accuracy. The reliability of
the data relates to the degree of assurance
that the data are measured and not made
up. The accuracy relates to how close mea-
sured data are to the ‘true’ value of the
parameter. If data are to be used for manage-
ment and decision making, it is imperative
that the data be reliable. Data collection can
be a tedious and time-consuming task for
those collecting the data, and checks have
to be made to ensure that personnel
Information Needs for Basin Water Management 55
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reliably. It is not uncommon for data to be
made up by data collectors to avoid the
chore of travelling to a recording site. Accu-
racy of data collection can be enhanced
through trained personnel periodically
checking measuring sites (river gauges,
rainfall stations, climate stations, etc.) to
ensure that they are functioning correctly,
and that data are being collected in the cor-
rect manner, or by improved measurement
technology. Generally, increased accuracy
is associated with increased costs.
4.3.3 Storage, retention and retrieval of data
Often overlooked until data are required
and found to be lost or missing are proce-
dures for storage, retention and retrieval of
data. The management information system
should clearly indicate which data should
be stored, in what format and for how long.
At higher management levels, summaries of
the data can be stored, whilst at lower levels
the complete data should be retained.
Data storage should be systematic and
files clearly labelled. The data may be in the
formofsheetsofpaper,inwhichcaseitmust
be kept in a secure, dry location. Computer
data must always be backed up on floppy
disk or CD, and the disks kept in a secure
location separate from the computer.
Geographical information systems
(GISs) are a valuable way of both present-
ing and storing data, with the significant
advantage that the data can be retrieved
in different combinations or formats
depending on the need.
4.3.4 Data processing and analysis
The procedures for data processing and
analysis should be identified as part of the
information strategy. It is the use to which
the data will be put that drives the data-
collection exercise; thus, how the data
will be processed and analysed should be
established at the outset. For regular data
collection of river flows, rainfall, water
quality and the like, data processing and
analysis procedures are well established.
For other processes, such as performance
assessment, procedures are still evolving.
The widespread availability of power-
ful small computers and software packages
has transformed data handling, processing
and analysis. Using spreadsheet programs,
one is able, relatively simply, to set up pro-
cedures for recording, storing, processing
and presenting data. Particularly useful is
the ability to represent data graphically
to show events, trends and relationships.
Statistical analysis packages such as SPSS
can often access data stored in spreadsheet
format and process it to present information
on trends and relationships among data.
An example of the value of trend analy-
sis using data collected over several years is
discussed in Chapter 8, drawn from study of
the Lerma–Chapala river basin, showing the
level of Lake Chapala, the receiving body at
the tail of this basin. As a consequence of
an extensive network of data-collection
stations throughout this basin, an important
long-term set of data is available for analysis
and presentation, leading tobetter-informed
decision making related to the management
and development of the basin. The role and
importanceofthesedatahasincreasedasthe
available water resource has become fully
utilized.
4.3.5 Reporting and dissemination of data
The reporting and use of data should be
identified as part of the information strat-
egy, and tailored to the target audience. For
water resources specialists, tables and fig-
ures of river discharges and rainfall patterns
will be of interest. Politicians, on the other
hand, will want summaries and a discus-
sion of the implications of the data, with
key issues highlighted.
With the advent of computers and
the Internet, wider dissemination of data
becomes possible, even with limited bud-
gets. Data can be held on a central computer
and accessed through the Internet, with
passwords allowing different levels of
56 M. Burton and D. Molden
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Atlas is an example of such an Internet-
based system (http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/
WAtlas/atlas.htm). In addition, the ability
to copy data on to CDs, which can then be
distributed to interested parties, means that
cheapaccesstodataispossibleforthosethat
do not have ready access to the Internet.
There is an old adage that knowledge
is power, and in many countries, access to
dataisstillrestricted,eitherasagovernment
policy, or as an organizational or individual
practice. In some locations, data are col-
lectedbygovernmentagenciesandthensold
to other users. This selling of data can be
official, with clearly spelt out policies and
prices, or unofficial with individuals using
their position to gain additional income.
4.3.6 Data quality control
Quality control on water resource data
is often undervalued and inadequately
implemented. Quality control checks can
and should be built into data-collection,
processing, analysis and reporting pro-
cesses, and personnel responsible for these
processes trained in monitoring quality and
identifying suspect data. As mentioned
previously, supervision of data collection
is important, as is explanation to data-
collection personnel of the importance of
accurate and reliable data, and the use to
which the data will be put.
4.4 Basin Stages and Changing
Information Needs
In tandem with the development of a
river basin, the collection and use of data
changes. Figure 4.2 depicts the changing
focus for data and information needs as
basins mature.
As time passes, quality and regulatory
issues come to the fore, and information is
required by a wider audience. The data set
required for river basin management
becomes both more extensive and more
detailed, with increased needs for support-
ing processes, procedures, personnel and
Information Needs for Basin Water Management 57
Quantify how much water is available  
Identify how the water resource can be used  
Quantify how the water resource is being used  
Allocate available resources between competing users/uses  
Ascertain the quality and sources of degradation  
Model and manage water at the basin level  
Regulate use and prosecute over-abstraction and/or pollution













































































Resolve conflicts over allocation and use  
Form basin-wide consensus and agreement on allocation and use  
Reallocate water amongst (established) users  
Fig. 4.2. Changing focus for data and information over time within a river basin.
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information is collected and used formodel-
ling – initially of the hydrological and
hydraulic processes and later for environ-
mental and ecological processes. With
increasing water scarcity, conflicts over
wateruseincrease,anddataareincreasingly
employed in the resolution of conflicts.
With increasing incidence or scale of
conflict, there comes a time when steps are
required at the basin level to form a consen-
sus on individual, corporate, societal and
environmental rights to access and use the
water resource, following which there may
be a need for reallocation of water amongst
uses and users.
As discussed in Chapter 2, three phases
can be identified in the development
and growth of a river basin: development,
utilization and reallocation. Information
and data requirements in each phase vary,
and are summarized in Table 4.2. The
table shows information needs, provides
examples of the data required and shows
the developments that typically take place
in information processes during each phase
in response to developments within the
river basin.
In the early development stages, much
of the data collection is project based, with
each project establishing data-collection
systems to suit its particular needs. The
data-collection needs will follow the needs
of the project cycle: planning, design,
construction, management, operation and
maintenance, and possibly later, rehabilita-
tion. At this stage, there is relatively limited
human control over the natural environ-
ment, with modest physical infrastructure
and localized agreements on flood control
and water use.
As time passes, these data systems
are integrated by one or another of the
government agencies, and the data network
becomes more systematized. At this stage,
data collection and processing may be
driven by established routines and not
necessarily by needs. As pressure on the
available water resource increases, the need
for data grows, and the data system becomes
more refined with more data-collection
points being established and the data
collection, processing and analysis of
the data becoming more sophisticated.
Hydrologistsdevelopcomputer-basedwater
resource models, which, in turn, begin to
drive data collection so that the predictive
capabilities of the models can be fully
utilized.
Overtime,thefocusshiftsfromattempt-
ing to supply water to match increasing
demandtodemandmanagement.Duringthe
development, utilization and reallocation
phases, the approach to data changes, from
one in which the data are collected, pro-
cessed and used by single agencies for their
own purposes to a situation where the data
are disseminated and made available to a
wide range of stakeholders. The power that
data ownership holds is shared amongst the
various stakeholders to achieve the wider
objective of consensus and buy-in to water
resources development and management.
During the reallocation phase, the focus is
on ensuring that the various users limit their
abstractions to the quantities licensed, and
maintain their effluent discharges within
the specified water quality standards.
Potential interventions to address
increasing water shortage vary according
to the development stage of the river basin.
At each stage, the solution revolves around
information, as shown in Fig. 4.3. For each
problem situation, the nature of the problem
is formulated, and data collected and ana-
lysed. Solutions can take many forms,
involving alternatively, or in combination,
construction, legislation, enforcement of
existing legislation, improved management
or empowerment of organizations or
individuals.
4.5 Basin Level Information Needs
The types of basin level information
required change both with the phase of
development and with the perception of
what river basin management comprises.
Early guidelines on river basin management
tend to emphasize the collection of techni-
cal data (climate, river flow, catchment
area, land use, etc.), whereas more recent
58 M. Burton and D. Molden
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tion of data encompassing economic,
institutional, social and environmental
features of the basin and society in general.
An example is found in the guidelines
developed by the Asian Development
Bank following an extended process of
consultation and discussion (ADB, 1996).
The guidelines list seven key strategies for
improving water resources management.
• Prepare and adapt a national water
policy and action programme;
• Invest to manage the country’s priority
river basins;
• Increase the autonomy and account-
ability of service providers;
• Develop incentives, regulation and
awareness for sustainable water use;
• Manage the use of shared water
resources and develop cooperation;
• Enhance water information, consulta-
tion and partnerships;
• Invest in capacity building, monitoring
and learning.
These seven strategies are clearly informa-
tion and data intensive. A key process is
compiling National Water Sector Profiles.
The broad content of these profiles is pre-
sented in Box 4.1, and encompasses a range
of items from general development goals
and water resources policy statements, to
legal framework, to the physical resource
base, demonstrating the holistic approach
that is a central feature of integrated water
resources management. Whilst the ADB’s
water sector profiles are country based,
many of the profile categories and data
requirements are relevant at the river basin
level as well.
Some key data requirements for river
basin management are presented in Box 4.2.
A list of leading indicators for describing
riverbasinsispresentedinTable4.3.Collec-
tion and presentation of these data allow
comparative assessment of different river
basins, enabling the relative level of devel-
opment to be assessed. As can be seen from
the data presented in Table 4.3, the three
basinsareatdifferentstagesofdevelopment.
Information Needs for Basin Water Management 61
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Fig. 4.3. Role of information in formulating solutions to increasing water scarcity.
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The heart of any basin management
exercise is a water budget for the basin
(Molden, 1997). A water budget requires
time series data on water entering, being
utilized and leaving the basin, as well as
information on storage and storage losses.
The budget must include both ground-
and surface water. Preparing a basin water
budget requires physical data from a
network of hydrologic, meteorological and
groundwater stations within the basin.
These networks often take years to establish,
and a number of years of data are required to
achieve a minimum level of reliability in the
results. In some cases, these networks will
have been established through externally
funded projects, and finding adequate funds
to maintain the networks may have been a
problem. Whilst it takes time and effort to
establish these systems, particularly the
training of staff to collect, process and
analyse data, they can deteriorate relatively
quickly if funding is inadequate or if sound
management is lacking.
Remote sensing is increasingly being
used for river basin management. Kite and
Droogers (2000) used remotely sensed data
to construct an integrated river basin model
for the Gediz river basin in western Turkey.
For this study, they compiled models at
three scales: the field scale, the irrigation
scheme scale and the basin scale. Using
public domain datasets as well as local
area datasets, they constructed these models
based on two categories of data – areal and
point data. Areal data include topography,
land cover, leaf area index (LAI) and soil
characteristics. Point data include climate,
streamflow and operational rules for dams
and regulators. Kite and Droogers point out
that two changes in methods of data access
anddatacollectioncanbeobservedinrecent
years. First, data are increasingly available
from global datasets, and second, more and
more data are collected by remote sensing
(RS) instead of conventional ground-based
techniques (Fig. 4.4).
For their model, Kite and Droogers
collected and used data as summarized in
Table 4.4.
Through the modelling, a wide range of
information was presented:
• Distribution of land cover;
• Basin-wide soil water-holding capacity;
• Annual basin-wide evapotranspiration;
• Simulated streamflows at specified
locations within the basin;
62 M. Burton and D. Molden
Box 4.1. Main sections of a national water
sector profile (ADB, 1996).
Section 1 Country overview
Section 2 National policy environment
2.1 National development goals
2.2 Water resources policy
2.3 Transnational and subnational relations





3.4 Training and human resources development
Section 4 Water resources status
4.1 Water resources and watersheds: the physical
base
4.2 Uses of water
4.3 Community values of water
4.4 Supply, demand and sustainability
4.5 Summary: status and trends
Section 5 Financial resources
5.1 Annual expenditure and revenues
5.2 Return on investment
Section 6 Appraisal
6.1 Water sector institutions
6.2 Water resources and watersheds
6.3 Uses of water
6.4 Community values of water
6.5 Sustainability of water resources and use
6.6 Financial performance
6.7 Consistency with external support agency
objectives
Section 7 Agenda for action
1 Appendices
2 References
3 Completed and current water-related projects
4 Summary of lessons learnt from completed
projects
5 Contact persons
6 Maps of priority river basins
Data Appendices
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ion and soil evaporation in irrigated
areas;
• Simulated crop yields for actual sea-
sonal climatic conditions in dry and
wet years.
The model was used to analyse and assess
the current management of the water
resource within the basin and to assess the
impact, especially on crop production, of
possible changes, such as a change in
climate.
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• River channel length
• River slopes
• Land use types and areas
• Land slopes and areas
• Soil types and areas
• Aquifers (numbers and areas)
Demographic data
• Total population (past, present
and projected)
• Population densities
• Population by location
(urban/rural)
• Population by work type
• Attainment levels for educa-












• Regional or basin GNP
• Average basin per capita GNP
Hydrometric data
• River discharges
• River water levels
• River flood peak discharges
• River base flows
• River sediment load
• River water quality
• Lake/reservoir water levels
• Lake/reservoir volumes



















• Aquifer yields and quality






• Irrigation water abstractions
(surface/groundwater)
• Drainage return flows –
quantity
• Drainage return flows – quality
• Number of landholders
• Population dependent on
irrigated agriculture
• Value of irrigated agricultural
production
Potable and wastewater
• Abstraction quantity (surface/
groundwater)
• Abstraction quality
• Return flow – quantity
• Return flow – quality
• Number of people supplied
Industrial
• Abstraction quantity (surface/
groundwater)
• Abstraction quality
• Return flow – quantity
• Return flow – quality
• Number of people employed
Navigation
• River water levels
• River discharges
• River channels and depths
Hydroelectric power
• Generation capacity







• Minimum flow requirements
• Critical flow periods and
demands
• Protected areas and water
demands
• Required water quality
standards
Recreational
• Minimum flow requirements
• Critical flow periods and
demands
• Protected areas and water
demands
• Required water quality
standards
Tourism
• Minimum flow requirements
• Critical flow periods and
demands
• Protected areas and water
demands
• Required water quality
standards
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for analysing the institutional arrangements
governing the river basin can only be
collected ‘on the ground’. Timelines and
responsibility charts are useful analytical
tools in this context. Timelines chart
the development of water resource-related
events within the river basin. These events
are both physical, such as floods, droughts,
disease outbreaks, etc., and institutional,
such as enactment of water laws, establish-
ment of water users associations, public
outcries, etc. The case studies presented in
Chapters 6–11 offer examples of timelines
showing how physical changes within the
river basin over time have been met with
institutional changes to help manage and
alleviate the problems encountered.
Functionalresponsibilitycharts,asdes-
cribed in Chapter 1, can be used to identify
keyactorsinthewaterresourcesectorandto
assess their role in relation to the nine key
basin management functions. These charts
can beused tostructure an assessment ofthe
data and information processes within the
riverbasinbyaskingthefollowingquestions
related to each function:
• What data does each organization
collect?
• What processing and analysis is done
on the data collected?

















Fig. 4.4. Data required for integrated basin hydrological modelling as a function of availability and
method of observation (Kite and Droogers, 2000).










Downloaded from the Internet a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) from the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) dataset; calculated streamflow travel distances
using the TOPAZ (Topographic PArameteriZation) programme
Base data of Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) images taken from the
NOAA-AVHRR satellite sensor at 1-km resolution
Derived from NDVI data for land cover classification
Used a locally available soil map (1 : 200,000) scale as the FAO world soil map is
too coarse at 1:500,000 scale
Used local climate station and global datasets.
Used local river gauging station data
Used records of actual system regulation rules
Table 4.4. Summary of data sources for Gediz river basin model.
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• What reporting and dissemination is
carried out?
• Who uses the data?
• What action and decisions are made
using the data?
As with the institutional processes outlined
in Chapter 1, this analysis helps to identify
gaps, both in the data collected, processed
and analysed, and in its use and dissemina-
tion. As will be seen in the case studies,
there are significant differences in the effi-
cacy of the data and information processes
in the six river basins studied.
4.6 Irrigation System Level Information
Needs
Data are required by the managers of the
irrigation system to facilitate management,
operation and maintenance of the system.
Table 4.5 identifies some illustrative data
requirements and their use for LCIS in their
early growth stages.
Data may also be required by external
organizations, typically a government
agency, which has the responsibility of
monitoring the performance of the LCIS.
This monitoring can be for three reasons:
1. To collect data for regional and/or
national level statistics;
2. To ensure that the association is being
correctly managed financially;
3. To ensure that the irrigation and drain-
age system is being adequately maintained.
In the initial stages of irrigation manage-
ment transfer (IMT), LCISs are often
required to continue previous government
agency practices of reporting cropped areas,
yields and other data for preparation of
regional and/or national statistics. In addi-
tion, the government has a duty of care to
the farmers to ensure that their systems are
properly managed, and that the fees they
pay are correctly used. For this purpose, the
government will usually carry out annual
audits of the organization’s accounts. An
additional exercise that is not yet well
established is the periodic auditing of the
maintenance of the system’s assets – the
canals, drains and structures. In many cases,
even following IMT, the infrastructure
still belongs to government. Procedures are
therefore required to ensure that this infra-
structure is not allowed to deteriorate to a
level where the system becomes unusable.
The extent and nature of the data col-
lected will vary from scheme to scheme,
depending on the general level of literacy,
technical development of the irrigation sys-
tems,andtechnologicalcapacityofthefarm-
ing community. Farmer-managed schemes
in Nepal, for example, generally have little
formal data collection, with an equitable
supply-orientated water allocation system
being controlled through the use of propor-
tional dividers. In locally controlled, profes-
sionally managed systems in Turkey, on the
other hand, where water is allocated on
demand and flow adjustments made
using undershot sluice gates, relatively
sophisticated data-collection and process-
ing systems are required. In the Nepal case,
the irrigation service fee is associated with
the irrigable area, whereas in Turkey the fee
is associated with the area actually irrigated
and the crop type.
As pressure on the water resource
increases, measurement of performance
becomes increasingly important. A popular
version of performance assessment
currently is benchmarking, whereby the
performance of different schemes is
compared, and internal performance over
time monitored. Table 4.6 presents perfor-
mance indicators proposed by Malano and
Burton (2001) to facilitate performance
benchmarking, enabling managers to com-
pare the performance of their system with
that of other systems, in particular those
that are performing well.1 By tracking these
Information Needs for Basin Water Management 67
1 Systemsthatareidentifiedasperformingwellinrelationtokeyindicatorscanbestudiedandthepractices
and procedures contributing to this performance identified. These ‘best practice’ activities can then be
replicated by other systems in order to raise their level of performance.
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lected) over time, it is also possible to assess
theperformanceofasinglesystemovertime.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 present data collected
from 46 irrigation schemes in Australia,
showing the range of values of water
delivered and costs recovered. Both types
of comparisons give system managers the
information (and incentives) they need to
raise their performance.
4.7 Issues
Some of the most important issues related
to the collection, processing, analysis and
68 M. Burton and D. Molden
Data Purpose/use
Management
Number of farmers in
command area






Indicates the maximum potential number of members in the LCIS
organization. Not all farmers will necessarily be members
Basic data for organization membership
Includes revenue from each member and non-members, plus other
sources of income (rents, hire out of equipment, etc.)
Costs associated with running the association – salaries of office or
administrative staff, office rental, equipment purchase or hire,
stationery, etc.
Potential area that can be irrigated. Provides base for analysis of
performance (i.e. yield, kg/ha; fee recovery rates, $/ha; water
delivery, m3/ha)
Operation
Total seasonal or annual
volume of water received
Total seasonal or annual
volume of water delivered
Operating costs
Total seasonal or annual volume of water received by the organization,
based on daily measurements at the intake(s) to the irrigation system
Total seasonal or annual volume delivered by the organization based
on measurement of discharge at delivery points or estimates of
volume delivered. Should correspond with irrigation service fees
recovered if fees are levied based on volume delivered. Relatively
few LCIS have measurement at delivery points
Costs associated with operation – fees for water (from bulk seller),
operation equipment (motorbikes, bicycles), salaries for water
masters, electricity costs for pumping, etc.
Maintenance




Inventory of all irrigation and drainage infrastructure and its condition.
The inventory can be presented in the form of tables and schematic
diagrams
Periodic or annual inspection of the irrigation and drainage system to
identify the maintenance needs, costs and priorities
Costs associated with maintenance – maintenance staff wages,
maintenance contract costs, equipment hire or purchase, etc.
Production
Seasonal and annual area
irrigated, by crop
Total value of crop
production
Basic indicator of performance. If the area irrigated is low there may be
potential for increasing the area irrigated and thus the fee recovery.
Shows performance over time
Useful indicator to assess the cost of irrigation relative to the production
benefits
LCIS, locally controlled irrigation system.
Table 4.5. Typical data needs for locally managed irrigation systems.
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context are summarized below.
4.7.1 Issues at river basin level
1. Coordination and sharing of data.
As basins develop, different agencies
become involved to different degrees in
water resource data collection, processing
and analysis. There is often a lack of
coordination, cooperation and sharing of
data between these agencies. As the
pressure on the available water resources
increases, improved cooperation and data
sharing is needed between these agencies,
and between collecting agencies and
interested third parties such as farmer
organizations. Measures to enhance co-
ordination and sharing can include the
formation of river basin councils, and the
creation of national data banks for water
resources.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 4.6. Example of comparative plot of cost recovery ratios (ANCID, 2000).
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ment organizations can be slow to adapt to
a changing environment and to changing
needs. Change is often prompted by crisis
events, but managers should be alert to the
needforchangebeforeacrisisoccurs.Rising
levels of pollution in rivers and falling
groundwater table levels in river basins are
two areas where, typically, action is not
taken in good time to alleviate looming
crisis. In these circumstances, it is the
responsibility of managers to gather, present
and disseminate data to highlight the issue
and stimulate a response.
3. Computers, remote sensing and GISs.
Thereisincreasinguseofcomputersfordata
storage, processing, analysis and presenta-
tion. They have a valuable role to play in
presenting data in ways that make them
meaningful to non-professionals, and a
central role in processing and analysing
complex data, as in water resources model-
ling. GISs are now widely used to store and
present data, and such uses can be expected
to expand. Increasingly computers are being
used in association with remotely sensed
images to analyse and present complex
relationships, allowing analysis in forms
hitherto not possible.
4. Water rights. When water supplies are
abundant, it may not be necessary to specify
water rights or licences for specific uses. As
water becomes increasingly scarce, society
has to decide who should have access to the
available water and in what quantity and
quality. Users must be assigned water rights
so that they can plan for the future, particu-
larly in relation to making investments.
Information on water resource use and
availability over time is vital in allocating
water rights and in determining procedures
for real-time allocation of water in times
of shortage. Water right allocation and
reallocation can be politically contentious,
but become increasingly necessary as basins
mature and close.
5. Pollution. Significant pollution is often
a feature of river basins in the middle stages
of their development, as water resources
are taken up and begin to become scarce.
Pollution is not only hazardous to human
health and the natural ecology; it requires
large amounts of water to dilute it. Many
river systems have had to die before
adequate action has been taken to remedy
lethal levels of pollution. The River Thames
flowing through London was at one time so
polluted that the Members in the adjacent
Houses of Parliament had to recess during
the summer months to avoid the stench.
Control of point and non-point sources of
pollution requires legislation, funding, and
political and social will to achieve.
6. Over-abstraction of groundwater. A
feature of the latter stages of river basin
development, over-abstraction of ground-
water, appears to be one of the most
difficult issues for societies to address. In
the case of the Lerma–Chapala (Chapter 8)
and California’s Central Valley (Chapter 7),
both well-developed river basins, over-
exploitationofgroundwaterremainsamajor
unresolved issue. It is a classic ‘tragedy of
the commons’ scenario, on which society
has to form a consensus to legislate and
abide by.
7. Enforcement. Data and information are
the basis for establishing and enforcing
regulations and standards related to water
resources management. In some societies,
despite adequate legislation and data, there
is a lack of political or social will to enforce
the legislation. In such contexts, informa-
tion and its wide dissemination are key
factors in raising awareness of the problems
and building the political and social constit-
uencies to support legal enforcement.
4.7.2 Issues at LCIS level
1. How much data to collect. The type and
quantity of data collected will vary widely
among countries and with size and type of
irrigation system. There is often a noticeable
difference between the kind and amount
of data that water resources and irrigation
professionals think is required for manage-
ment purposes and that which farmers see
as being necessary. Systems large enough
to employ professional managers, as is
72 M. Burton and D. Molden
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Turkey, for example, will generally have
more comprehensive management informa-
tion systems than schemes that are managed
by farmers without professional training in
water resources or irrigation management.
Generally, larger schemes, especially those
growing principally for a market, require
more comprehensive quantitative informa-
tionsystemsthansmaller,simplerschemes.
2. Discharge measurement. Whether dis-
charges are measured and the data used or
not marks a major divide among irrigation
schemes.Forsmallersimplerschemes,there
will not be significant benefit to the addi-
tional work involved in measuring and
using discharge data, while in schemes
where water is scarce and returns to irriga-
tion are high, significant benefits can arise
through improved management based on
discharge measurement. On large irrigation
schemes, measurement becomes essential
if water is to be distributed equitably. A
reliable discharge measuring system is not
easy to establish and sustain, requiring
measuring equipment or structures, calibra-
tion,maintenance, regulardataretrievaland
processing, and trained staff.
3. Dataprocessing and analysis. There is a
marked difference between data processing
and analysis with and without a computer.
Where LCIS managers do not have a
computer, data processing will necessarily
be more basic. Nevertheless, useful informa-
tion can be generated from simple process-
ing of the available data using a hand
calculator. Once, again, the size of the
scheme, the value of its output, and the
presence of professional managers will
determine whether computer-based data
processing is appropriate.
4. Transparency. Access to information
about system operations is essential for
good governance and management. When
farmers’ access to information about water
availability, rules, deliveries and finances is
obstructed, corruption and misuse of funds
and resources becomes easier and more
likely. To ensure transparency, clear
requirements for information sharing need
tobeincludedinwaterlegislationgoverning
LCISs. All farmers should be aware of their
right to inspect the association’s account
books, and information on the scheme’s
physical and financial performance should
be presented and discussed at the associa-
tion’s annual general meeting. Government
regulatory authorities should ensure that:
(i) farmers are aware of their rights; (ii)
annual financial audits are conducted; and
(iii) the LCIS managers organize annual or
semi-annual general meetings and present
the requisite performance information to
farmers.
5. Access to external data. LCIS have an
important role to play in the management of
the larger basin, defending irrigators’ inter-
ests and reaching agreements with other
water users over water sharing and water
quality issues. To play this role effectively,
LCIS managers need access to basin-level
data collected by government agencies and
others, and the ability to use and interpret
that data. This requires guarantees of access
to information, and the professional skills
to understand, discuss and debate that
information. Here a federation of LCIS in a
particular basin can be extremely valuable
in pooling resources needed for effective
representation.
6. Training for LCIS personnel. Training is
a crucial and underemphasized part of the
turnover process. In project-funded transfer
programmes, training is often a part of the
assistance package provided. Seldom, how-
ever, do project sponsors or governments
establish an on-going training capability for
LCIS following IMT. As elected leaders and
managers rotate following elections, skills
from a one-off training effort are lost and
management quality degrades. Here too, a
federation of LCIS can be important in pool-
ing resources to support a national training
programme for member organizations.
4.8 Conclusions
Data and information are fundamental to
the good governance and management of
a river basin. In keeping with changes in
Information Needs for Basin Water Management 73
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basins is increasingly being devolved
downwards from national to state or
regional governments and local stake-
holders. Associated with this trend is an
increasing awareness amongst the general
public of water-related issues, and their
rights and responsibilities in relation to the
use and management of increasingly scarce
water resources. Experience in many coun-
tries is showing how the sharing of data and
information by government agencies with
the wider public enables management to
move on to higher performance levels
through enlisting support and collaboration
from water users. Societies and government
organizations that seek to hold on to power
through restricting the sharing and access to
water resources data and information will
find that they are limiting their capability
to make the most productive use of the
available water resources.
In water-scarce situations, accountabil-
ity and transparency through provision of
data and information at both the river basin
and irrigation scheme level enable manage-
ment to gain the consensus and support
required from water users to address issues
related to scarcity. Formulation, agreement,
compliance and enforcement of measures to
manage within the context of scarcity are
empowered by the acquisition and sharing
of data and information between stake-
holders. For LCISs, the acquisition and
sharing of data become central to their
need to manage their external environment
to secure their water rights and gain a fair
share of the available resource. Within their
irrigationschemes,improveddataandinfor-
mation processes are required as part of the
pressure placed on the irrigation sector to
improve management and justify its share of
the water resource.
Data and information needs change
over time, and those responsible for the
collection, processing and analysis of data
need to review their information strategies
and information systems to reflect the
dynamic environment in which they oper-
ate. As river basins develop, data and infor-
mation needs both broaden (to encompass
more diverse requirements) and deepen (to
enable more detailed resource assessment,
allocation and monitoring). The availability
of microcomputers and associated software
are dramatically changing the possibilities
for river basin managers, allowing them to
access and process data to a level hitherto
only possible in research establishments or
national headquarters offices. Spatial repre-
sentation systems, such as remote sensing
and GISs, are becoming standard tools for
system analysis, allowing more precision
in the analytical processes associated with
river basin management.
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Charles L. Abernethy
5.1 Introduction: Uses and Demands
for Water
It has become quite widely accepted
that countries should be aiming towards
comprehensive management of water
resources through organizations based
on river basins or aquifers. This chapter
addresses the situation where a country has
already decided that it wants to assign an
organization for this management purpose.
In most cases, this will mean establishing
a new organization, rather than extending
the functions of an existing organization.
Such organizations will not develop effec-
tively unless they can be provided with
adequate financial resources. The questions
considered here relate to the ways of
supplying these financial resources, and
the impacts that these financing processes
may have on the behaviour and effective-
ness of the organization, and on the people
who are supposed to be helped by its
existence.
In this respect, the experiences of the
richer countries may not offer much useful
guidance to the developing countries, espe-
cially the poorest ones. Their patterns of
water use are radically different. Table 5.1
shows the breakdown at the broadest level,
among the three biggest user sectors. The
data for this table are drawn mainly from the
World Bank’s ‘World Development Report’
for 1998–1999. The data on the broad
sectoral distribution of water uses (among
agricultural, domestic, and industrial uses)
are not up to date, since most of the informa-
tion about this in the global reference
literature dates from 1987; however, these
numbers are adequate to illustrate some
general patterns.
The boundaries defining the four
wealth classes in Table 5.1 have been set
at the following levels (1998 data): $2375,
$5750 and $12,500. These are in terms of
gross national product per person per year,
expressed in equivalent US dollars, at PPP
(purchasing power parity).
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
(ed. M. Svendsen) 75


















Source: Adapted from World Bank (1999).
Table 5.1. Sectoral use of water. Units: % of annual freshwater abstractions.
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predominate. In the poorest countries, the
industrial category is not yet very signifi-
cant, whereas as much as 89% of all the
water abstracted is used for agriculture.
These patterns of use illustrate two
obvious factors that have great influence
on the financing situation. First, in a basin
where the majority of users are small
agriculturists, they are usually extremely
numerous, forming a large majority of the
people in the poorest countries. Secondly,
the productivity of water used in agriculture
is usually very much lower than that of
water used in industry. So when we deal
with industry we are usually dealing with a
relatively small number of people who are
engaged in relatively profitable activities,
while when we deal with agricultural users
(in developing countries), we are probably
dealing with large numbers of people whose
financial resources are very meagre.
We can also note (although it is far
beyond the scope of this chapter) that the
low productivity of irrigated agriculture
has well-known links with the agricultural
production and market-access policies of
rich countries, and other issues of global
scale which no developing country can
modify much by its own choice of policies.
Domestic water supply is different
again. We cannot compare it with other
types of use on the basis of productivity.
Domestic use is essential for human health
and indeed survival. So we supply water for
social objectives as well as for productive
objectives, and these are not really compara-
ble in a financial sense.
That distinction between social and
productive objectives is not as clear as we
might like. The four basic human needs
for water – drinking, washing, cooking
and sanitation – are certainly essential, but
domestic uses of water can include many
non-essential uses. When we compare the
consumption patterns of the rich and poor
countries, this becomes very evident. As
Table 5.2 shows, in the rich countries the
amount of domestic water used per person
is very much higher than in the poorest
countries. Also, within each country there
are similar variations of consumption,
related to poverty or affluence.
In Table 5.2, we see that in the poorest
countries the abstractions for personal use
are minimal. We may estimate the basic
needs at about 30 m3/person/year1, so the
figure of 16.4 indicates that many people are
obliged to satisfy those needs in ways that
do not reach the formal statistical system.
These are people who have to bathe in open
bodies of water, carry household water from
local streams, and in other such ways are
omitted from the data.
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Source: Adapted from World Bank (1999).
Table 5.2. Abstractions per person. Units: m3/person/year abstracted from the natural systems.
1 Thisisofcourseanapproximation,dependentonmanycircumstances.Variousauthorsquotenumbersin
the general range 20–35 m3/person/year. See for example Seckler et al. (1996: 236), citing Gleick (1996) for a
figure of 20 m3/person/year, or Clarke (1993: 20), estimating 35 m3/person/year. The World Bank (1992: 99)
notes,inregardtohealthandthefourthcomponentofbasicneeds,sanitation,that‘theuseofwaterforpersonal
hygieneusuallyincreasesonlywhenavailabilityrisestoabout50litres/person/day’(18 m3/person/year),which
seems to imply that something less than this is the amount neededfor the first threebasicneeds. The most basic
need of all, drinking, has an extremely small impact on demand, accounting for some 0.4–0.7 m3/person/year
depending on location.
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world, the gross amounts of water extracted
for agriculture are quite similar. Here again
we see that, although irrigated agriculture is
often blamed for water scarcity in develop-
ing countries, the amounts used for agricul-
ture in poor countries are lower than in rich
ones. The differences are small, and proba-
bly not meaningful in view of the general
doubts about data validity; but, as far as the
datago,theydonotindicatethatagricultural
users are more wasteful of water in poor
countries than in rich ones.
We can also relate these figures to basic
human needs. At the minimal nutritional
levels required for sustaining human health,
in a society where the basic food is a cereal
crop such as rice or wheat or maize, it takes
a quantity of water in the order of 300 m3/
person/year to grow that food, if the water is
applied very efficiently.
Of course that figure does not reflect
directly the abstractions from the natural
river systems, since much of the crop water
requirement is supplied by rain, and also
most of the irrigation water is not applied
at highest efficiency; nevertheless, the need
to satisfy a certain basic food requirement
applies to us all, and it is useful to note that
this need is in the order of ten times bigger
than our basic need for domestic water, and
in the order of 500 times bigger than our
need for water to drink.
Thesewidelydifferingpatternsofwater
abstraction and use have various implica-
tions for the effectiveness of financial poli-
cies as instruments for influencing water
uses and demands. In the affluent countries,
where personal domestic consumption is
very much more than the amount required
forsatisfyingthefourbasicneeds,acharging
policy may have significant impacts on
consumption. A high charge may make
people reduce frivolous or non-essential
uses of water, or may just make them more
conscious of water costs, and therefore
induce them to change their behaviour, in
ways such as becoming quicker to attend to
leakages.
But in countries, or families, where
domestic consumption consists simply of
satisfying basic needs, a charging policy
is not so likely to have those impacts.
Supplying a basic need such as drinking is
not something about which the ‘user’ can
exercise much choice. If the cost increases,
the basic consumption will have to stay
roughly the same. Any financial effect
on that user will appear in some other
direction, by not spending on some other
item that must appear as less vital.
The nearer a country, or a village com-
munity, is to poverty or to an elementary
subsistence level, the more this argument
will apply to the case of agriculture. People
will not feel that they have the option
to reduce their consumption, since food
is a basic need to just the same degree as
drinkingwater.So,whilethepotentialeffect
of water charges in constraining consump-
tion may be quite large in rich countries,
it may be very small in poor countries.
5.2 Financial Productivity of Water
When we look at the productive applica-
tions of water, we can find many illustra-
tions of the relatively low financial
productivity of agricultural water. For
example, Schiffler and others (1994)
analysed the economics of water uses in
Jordan, a country with one of the world’s
lowest levels of water resources per person.
They reported that the average productivity
of water in industry was 11.2 dinars/m3
(about US$16.8/m3 at the bank exchange
rate then) whereas the average productivity
of water in agriculture was 0.28 dinars/m3,
or 2.5% of the industrial level.
Within the agricultural sector, there
are further huge variations of productivity.
The productivity of basic cereal crops in the
developing countries is usually around the
equivalentofafewUScentspercubicmetre,
while fruit and vegetable crops, especially
those for export, may show productivity as
much as 100 times greater than the cereals.
In the Jordan case, Schiffler et al. (1994)
found that the productivity of grapes was
130 times more than that of wheat.
So here again we have the problem
of basic needs. In the poorer countries, or
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these low-productivity cereal crops – rice,
wheat and maize especially – dominate the
agricultural scene, and are not necessarily
grownforthe market.In studies offive small
irrigation systems reported by PMI-Burkina
Faso (1997),itwas found that the proportion
of products marketed was 25.6%. In the sys-
tem with least road access, this fell as low as
5.3%.Therestwashouseholdconsumption.
To the users in those villages, the
financialproductivityofwatermustseeman
utterly irrelevant concept. The idea makes
sense (to the user of water) only in the con-
text of marketable alternatives. Of course
there is a governmental or ‘public interest’
viewpoint that may suggest something else,
concerning optimal uses of a scarce national
resource. But if we feel that we may be
moving towards any kind of user-based
financing system, it seems that we have to
try to understand how these things seem
from the users’ perspective.
Briscoe (1997: 341–342) has emphasized
particularly the idea that there can be a
high opportunity cost associated with agri-
cultural uses of water. The nub of this argu-
ment is that, where water is not abundant,
low-productivity applications of it, for
example to grow cereal crops, deny that
water to higher-value potential users. He
points out that prices charged to agricultural
users are, typically, around 10% of those
charged to urban and industrial users for
comparable volumes delivered.
This is an argument that is easier to
act upon in a mixed agricultural/industrial
economy (or ‘middle-income’ economy),
such as some of those in South America; but
it seems to carry less weight in countries
where 89% of the utilization is agricultural
and the opportunities for transfers of use
are correspondingly few. The concept of
opportunity cost depends on the existence
of such opportunities.
On the other hand, it is not safe for
poor countries to treat the opportunity cost
argument as irrelevant to their situation.
In recent times, several countries in east
and South-east Asia (Thailand is an exam-
ple) experienced rapid economic growth,
continuous over more than a decade. A
consequence of this was the arrival of
many new investment opportunities, some
of which would depend on transferring
water from a traditional low-productivity
use into one of the new uses where its value
(in economic productivity terms) would
be some orders of magnitude more. In the
absence of sound institutional mechanisms
for responding to these opportunities
through orderly, voluntary transfers and
compensation of the prior users, these
changes have occurred, but sometimes at
high social cost.
Perhaps the productivity dimension
can be summed up somewhat as follows
(referring in particular to countries in the
lower parts of the national wealth tables):
people are not ready to treat the major uses
of water – domestic, agricultural, industrial
– on a basis of simple financial equivalence.
There is a quite widespread view that
agricultural and (especially) domestic uses
should not be compared against industrial
uses in revenue-per-cubic-metre terms.
Even if there is acceptance that agricultural
water is often distributed and applied
inefficiently, the idea that water used agri-
culturally should be transferable to indus-
trial use, just through market pressures,
does not seem to be generally acceptable at
thistime.Politicalresistancetointroduction
of agricultural water charges, in democratic
developing countries such as Sri Lanka and
Thailand has provided evidence of this in
recent years. On the other hand, as agricul-
ture moves from subsistence to commercial
modes of production, this attitude will no
doubt undergo some change.
5.3 Components of Costs
The financing question, for river-basin
organizations, depends of course on the
tasks that each country may decide its
river-basin organizations should perform.
The scope of basin organizations falls into
three broad categories, which may overlap
in some countries:
• Regulatory organizations: organizations
which supervise, regulate access and
78 C.L. Abernethy
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make rules which service-providing
organizations have to follow, but have
no direct role in service provision;
• Infrastructure managers: organizations
which own the principal structures and
facilities for water supply, and invest
in new ones, but do not provide water
supply services directly;
• Service providers: organizations which
deliver water supply services directly
to users or customers.
It may appear that the first of these, regula-
tion only, is a relatively cheap alternative. If
we adopt that kind of organization, it may
seem that the budgetary issue will be small
and easily manageable. But that is not
the case. If regulation is to be done well,
it needs a significant amount of finance.
A short list of the primary regulatory
functions would include:
• monitoring of the quantity and quality
of water in all rivers and other natural
water bodies in the basin;
• conserving and protecting the
watershed;
• making rules about abstraction, uses,
disposal and pollution;
• supervising the application of a system
of water abstraction rights or licences;
• ensuring compliance with rules
through monitoring of activities,
public information programmes, court
processes, etc.; and
• conducting transparency and account-
ability programmes, to ensure wide and
continuous understanding, acceptance
and support of basin management
principles.
These tasks amount to a quite formidable
financial commitment. They are most
urgent in basins where water resources per
person are already low. On the other hand,
an organization that has no service delivery
function does not have a direct customer
base from which a proportion of funds can
be sought. These considerations show that
the design of basin organizations cannot be
separated from the question of how they
will be financed, at a level sufficient for
them to discharge the tasks that are
assigned to them.
The movement towards establishing
river-basin management organizations is
coming at a time when governments, in both
rich and poor countries, have been trying to
reduce the amounts they budget for provid-
ing water services; so the idea that these
organizations might be funded from the
budgetofacentralgovernmentministrymay
not be received well in many countries. In
the developing countries, the main feature
of this trend has been the numerous pro-
grammes of irrigation management transfer,
which began in a few countries such as the
Philippines and Colombia in the middle
1970s and have since become very general,
indicating a widespread perception that
central subsidizing of water services is
difficult to sustain.
The experience of irrigation manage-
ment transfers in the past 20 years has
however shown some of the difficulties
that can occur when governments try to
transfer the responsibility for certain tasks
and their related expenditures from a
service-providing organization (such as a
government irrigation department) to an
organization of service-receivers.
We can distinguish four kinds of costs
that are faced by water organizations which
are service providers:
• capital investment (constructing facili-
ties for capture, conveyance and distri-
bution of water; purchasing equipment;
providing the buildings and other hard-
ware of the management systems);
• major repairs and renewals of equip-
ment and infrastructure;
• direct recurring costs (operation and
maintenance);
• overhead costs (sustaining an adminis-
trative structure, including probably
higher and remoter organizational
levels, national, regional, etc.).
An economist might say that the first two
of these belong together as one ‘capital’
category. But it seems better to make them
distinct, as they usually happen far apart
in time, and by the time that the need for
renewals becomes urgent, the fact of the
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caused great changes in the economic
condition of the users.
In irrigation management transfer,
governments typically aim to transfer to
organizations of the service receivers the
responsibilityforsomeorallofthethirdcost
category, operation and maintenance, but
usually the first and fourth categories are
not transferred. The responsibility for the
secondcategoryisoftenleftunclear,andhas




The overhead costs of governmental
irrigation organizations are not often dis-
cussed in the relevant literature. This could
be because they are very large. Especially
in Asia, governmentirrigationorganizations
are among the strongest and most long-lived
organizations, and have developed large
superstructures, often based in capital cities
far away from their client populations. This
seems to make the overhead cost a special
one, which is not likely to be transferable to
the individual end-users.
5.4 Regulation and Service-delivery
Functions
Let us look now at the three different modes
of basin organization which were identified
at the beginning of the preceding section.
In developing countries, we can usually
find existing organizations that exercise
the functions of service delivery for each
specific use category. These are often quite
old organizations, which have developed a
variety of specialist skills and have large
professional work forces. It seems unlikely
that governments will abolish them. It
seems unlikely, therefore, that basin man-
agement organizations will evolve towards
direct service provision to the ordinary citi-
zens. A more probable path of evolution
will be towards basin organizations taking
up the regulatory functions, while direct
service delivery will remain the task of
other organizations which manage urban
water supply, agricultural water supply,
hydropower and other specific services to
people, to companies and to other user
organizations.
In theory, then, the service-providing
organizations should become more clearly
service-oriented, should behave more com-
mercially, should become more subject to
compliance with laws about pollution and
other adverse social consequences of their
activities, and (depending on the politics of
the country) may be considered for privat-
ization; while the regulatory organization
exists in the public domain to ensure good
laws, allocation of resources by administer-
ing a water-rights or licence system, conser-
vation and protection of water sources, and
compliance with all of this.
That still leaves open the very difficult
questionofwhoshould undertakenewcapi-
tal investments for infrastructure provision.
Will it be the service providers, or the basin
organizations? There are strong arguments
both ways. But it seems clear that this issue
willbeavitaloneindeterminingthecharac-
ter of a basin organization, and its relation-
ships with service-providing organizations.
If basin organizations are going to be
constructors of major new facilities, their
financial requirementswillbemuchheavier
than if they are purely regulators.
Itseemsthattheprimaryreasonwhywe
need basin organizations, as the prospects
of water deficits appear in an increasing
numberofcountries, isforestablishing com-
pliance with a body of rules that will enable
the people at large, through institutions, to
regain some kind of control over the dimin-
ishing quality and quantity of water in their
rivers. If we take that view, then perhaps we
will think that this is a sufficiently huge and
important task, and that we should not give
the same organization more conventional
tasks, such as construction of major facili-
ties,orevenownershipoffacilitiesthatexist
already.
One of the problems of establishing
basin-management organizations is that
there is clearly a potential conflict with
existing organs of local government, which
almost everywhere have boundaries that are
differentfromtheboundariesofriverbasins.
80 C.L. Abernethy
92 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:34:59 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesIt is said sometimes that, since provinces or
otherlocalgovernmentunitsareresponsible
for achieving development within their
specific boundaries, they must have control
over such a major development factor as
water. There is certainly much force in
that argument. However, the separation
of regulatory and service-delivery functions
opens a way to escape from this problem. It
is possible to organize regulatory functions
on a river basin (or aquifer) basis, while
service-delivery functions can be organized
on a different basis which may conform
more closely to the boundaries of local or
provincial governments.
5.5 Sources of Funds
The Dublin and Rio de Janeiro Conferences
of 1992 enjoined us to regard water as an
economic good (International Conference
on Water and Environment, 1992). That
seems to mean that users of it should pay
for it according to the amount that they
use. The way ahead, according to this view,
seems to involve finance coming primarily
from users of water, paying to service-
providing organizations. In that pattern,
it would seem practicable to finance
regulatory basin organizations through
some system of levies on the income of the
service-providers.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see
that service-providing organizations, in the
poorer countries, are going to be able to
behave commercially, and at the same time
invest substantially in new capital facilities.
The low profitability of the prime user, irri-
gated agriculture, together with the socio-
political resistances to full-cost charges for
basic needs (discussed above in Section 5.2)
indicate that, for many countries, this is not
an immediate prospect.
Probably, too, the phrase ‘economic
good’ suggests that the prices we pay for
water services should somehow reflect the
sort of factors that usually influence prices
of other economic goods. For example, if
water is an economic good we might expect
its price to rise in times and places of
scarcity, and to fall in circumstances of poor
quality.
Concepts like this, however satisfactory
they are economically, face many difficul-
ties from social and political angles. Water
has been treated for long as an aspect of
welfare provision, and in many places long
periods of provision of agricultural water
at zero price, or extremely low price, have
promoted high effective demand, which is
now very difficult to reduce.
However, there seem to be few alter-
native routes available for financing the
activities. Either they must be financed from
user charges, or they must be financed from
central government budgets, or they will
probably not happen effectively at all. The
problem of central government funding, for
the poorer countries at least, is that there is
very little of it available, and there is strong
competition for that little amount. We can
see from the fate of (for example) hydro-
logical data-collecting organizations, which
in many countries have become weak and
inadequate for their tasks, that centrally
funded organizations which are doing
thingsthatdonothavedirectpopularappeal
are likely to be left on the sidelines in
the budget contest. Funding river-basin
organizations this way may well make them
unstable, and unable to pursue consistent
long-range planning.
In Europe, there has been a trend in
recent years towards the use of abstraction
licences as a means of raising a significant
proportion of the funds needed for sustain-
ing regulatory organizations. This becomes
possible when the regulatory function is
clearly separated from the service-provision
function. Regulatory organizations assess
the available quantities of water and issue
licences accordingly. In that system, the
service-providing organization can be just
another holder of an abstraction licence.
Abstractionfeesarenotthesameasuser
fees. A service-providing organization may
pay abstraction fees to the regulatory organi-
zation, and then sell the water to ordinary
people or businesses, charging them a user
fee, which exceeds the abstraction fee in
order to cover the costs and financial risks
of delivering the water. In such systems,
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Buckland and Zabel (1998) describe
the workings of these systems, and report
abstraction fees that are typically around the
equivalent of 1–2 US cents/m3, but in some
cases significantly more. In some countries
theproductofabstractionfeesissufficientto
cover the cost of all regulatory functions.
In a licence fee system, there are two
waysofchargingtheuser.Thechargemaybe
based on the measured actual consumption
of water, or it may be based on the amount
allowed by the licence. The system of mea-
suring actual amounts involves a higher
level of regular metering of the users,
whereas the licence-amount method can be
implemented with only occasional checks,
to ensure that the conditions of the licence
are not exceeded. Dual systems, combining
a fixed quota and a volumetric charge for
excess over this, are also used (see for
example, Tardieu, 2001).
If the cost of abstraction licences is set
high enough, they can have an effect on the
consumption of water. In the German state
of Hamburg, for example, a relatively high
abstraction fee for ground-water licences
caused about a third of the licences to be
renounced, and handed back to the regula-
tory organization, which could then re-issue
them to others (Buckland and Zabel, 1998:
270).
There are other possible sources of
revenue for a basin organization. We can
note three principal areas:
• waste-water disposal charges;
• pollution charges or fines;
• charges for permits for other water-
based activities, such as fishing,
navigation, recreation, etc.
Many of the charging methods noted above
can be levied by service-providers, but
would not easily be collected by a purely
regulatory organization, since it has no
retail delivery function and is not in regular
direct contact with household and farm
users of water. Therefore, if we want to
establish a basin organization of the
regulatory type, it seems that we should
seek financing methods that are based
mainly on the relationship between
the regulator and the service-providing
organizations.
The problem of dealing with numerous
individual small users of water is a real
source of difficulty in many developing
countries. Licence systems, such as for
example licences to install and operate
ground-water wells, should therefore be
introduced only after careful preparation, as
they may not be respected if the capacity to
ensure compliance does not exist. However,
licensing systems do not involve the same
amount of administrative work as volumet-
ric use fees, and (subject to the condition of
adequate enforcement capacity) can have a
useful place in the scheme of regulatory
finance.
The principal types of mechanism
for funding a purely regulatory basin
organization therefore appear to be:
• abstraction licence fees,
• waste-disposal permit fees,
• pollution charges and fines,
• permits for water-based activities,
• government subsidy.
The above discussion has focused on the
funding of recurrent costs: regulatory and
operational costs. The question of sources
of funding for capital costs presents other
issues which will not be analysed here.
However it is worth noting the data pre-
sented by Briscoe (1999: 307), who showed
that, in a sample of five developing coun-
tries, the average share of the private sector
in water infrastructure investments was
only about 6%, compared with an average
private share of about 49% in investments
across other infrastructure types: energy,
telecommunications and transport. The low
level of private investment in water reflects
the low financial returns that it produces,
especially in its major developing-country
application, irrigated agriculture. For this
reason, we should expect that capital
investment in water is likely to remain pre-
dominantly a public-sector responsibility,
in the medium term at least. The problems
of bringing river-basin organizations into
this aspect are noted further below (Section
5.8).
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Funding of regulatory organizations from
abstraction charges, direct user charges, or
from a percentage levy on the user charges
collected by the service-providing organiza-
tions does not necessarily mean that all cat-
egories of users pay at similar rates. When
we examine current charging practices,
world-wide, we find a tendency to charge
agricultural users much less, and industrial
users much more, than the average.
This leads us to the question, how
should charges be assessed? If basin
organizations are to draw their funding
ultimately from user charges, how will
those charges be calculated?
This is related to other issues, about the
impacts that we may want a charging system
tohaveuponpatternsofwaterconsumption.
It also brings in some very complicated
issues related to the quantity, quality and
locations of disposal flows, returning to the
natural system after use.
Industrial users are accustomed to pay
formeasuredquantitiesofwaterdeliveredto
their premises. Urban users in the better-off
suburbs also probably pay on the basis
of measured volumes, and poorer users,
especially the very poor, also pay, though
probably not for measured flows but for
volumes brought by water-carriers.
But the biggest users in poor countries,
the farmers, generally do not pay by volume
at all. In the countries where irrigation
service fees are levied, the overwhelming
majority pay an amount that is based on
land area. There are many variants of this,
such as seasonal differences, crop differ-
ences, and so on; but the central point about
the dominant current practice is that the
marginal price, the cost to the farmer for
taking more water, is normally zero.
Countries vary in the way they account
for water that flows back to the river systems
after use. In virtually all the uses of water,
thereissome‘returnflow’,buttheamountof
this varies, and in many uses it is difficult to
measure it. Briscoe (1997: 345) says that:
taking the US as an example, consumptive
use as a percentage of withdrawals was
56% for irrigation, compared with 17% for
urban water supplies, 16% for industry and
just 3% for thermoelectric power.
The UK, following the logic of these differ-
ent levels of consumption and return,
adopted a classification of use types into
four bands, according to their average pro-
portions of return flow. In such a system,
users who consume a large fraction of what
they abstract (such as irrigation) are charged
more heavily than users with a high return
percentage (such as power generation).
There are of course quality aspects in rela-
tion to these return flows as well, which can
be dealt with by the different mechanism of
pollution charges.
In developing countries, water charges
do not vary, generally, according to scarcity
of the commodity. Water prices are usually
calculatedonsomebasisthatisrelatedtothe
cost of delivering it. That means that it stays
the same, and does not respond to variations
in available resources. In many countries,
charging scales are centrally or provincially
determined for large sets of irrigation sys-
tems, so that systems with water abundance
and systems with local water scarcity are
obligedtochargetheirusersthesameprice.
Indeed, when we look at inter-country
comparisons, although the variations in
charging practices are enormous, there are
signs of a correlation between scarcity and
price policy, but it is a correlation that is
opposite to economic logic. Some of the
lowest charges (even when comparisons are
basedonpurchasingpowerparity)arefound
in dry countries such as Egypt or Iran, while
high charges can be found in much wetter
places. This presumably represents a socio-
political logic, which may well be stronger
than economics.
There are even cases where the cost of
taking water for irrigation becomes lower in
the driest, hottest time of the year. The mid-
dleNigerriverissuchacase,simplybecause
at that time the river level is comparatively
high and the cost of pumping water to
adjacent land is therefore less. This kind of
anomaly results frombasing charges only on
the cost of service delivery, which is effec-
tivelyunrelated toscarcity,and oftenis only
weakly related to quality, or to demand.
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some of these anomalies. In many countries,
water has been made legally the property of
the state. It is possible, therefore, for a river-
basin organization to charge the service-
providing organizations on the basis of the
measuredamountsthattheyextractfromthe
naturalsystem(asintheEuropeanexamples
of abstraction licences, noted earlier). Each
basin organization can devise its own level
of charge, related to the amounts of water
that it has available for abstraction. It is pos-
sible for those charges to be varied along
some seasonal or even monthly scale. In this
way, a basin organization could exert some
pressure on the service-delivery organiza-
tions to look for ways of moderating their
rates of water use, while at the same time
improving its own financial independence.
5.7 Collection
In the agricultural sector of developing
countries, the problems of how to finance
irrigation services and how to collect irriga-
tion service fees from users of agricultural
water have been prominent issues through-
out the 1980s and 1990s. It cannot yet be
said that the issues have been satisfactorily
resolved. This experience should make us
aware that the establishment of new basin
organizations in developing countries is
going to face similar difficulties.
Financing urban domestic water sup-
plies is not any easier than financing
irrigated agriculture. The WorldBank (1993:
126–127) reported its experience in lending
for water projects in these terms (referring
mainly to non-agricultural uses):
The Bank has maintained the policy that
cost recovery should be sufficient to pay
both for operations and maintenance and
for a fair return on capital investment . .
cost recovery was rated as unsatisfactory in
80 of 114 projects. And, in 78% of countries
receiving water supply and sanitation
loans, financial covenants were not
fulfilled. In 49 of the 120 water supply and
sanitation projects, fees were not raised
enough to meet financial requirements due
to government constraints.
We can perhaps make a guess, that these
problems, of investment projects whose
cost-recovery conditions are not imple-
mented in reality, happen because such
projects are prepared in the bureaucratic
domain, and subsequently meet strong
resistances in the political domain, due
to neglect (in project preparation) of the
weight of the people’s views. This can only
increase, as more countries are inclining
towards democratic modes of government.
The compliance problem, in respect of
irrigation service fees, became famous dur-
ing the 1980s. The Philippines, especially,
madethe‘viabilityindex’acentralfeatureof
its institutional reforms: this index is the
ratio between fees collected and the costs of
operation and maintenance. Field officials
of the government agency could receive
bonuses depending on the percentage of
fees actually collected. (Oorthuizen and
Kloezen, 1995: 18; Svendsen, 1992: 5). This
strategy addressed financial viability, but
has been criticised by various observers
as having a negative effect on (especially)
maintenance, since reduction of expendi-
ture was one way of enhancing the viability
index, at least temporarily.
Studies of the costs of fee collection
show that they can be a significant propor-
tion of the total amount collected. ‘Passive’
collection, meaning the kind of system
where each user is expected to bring the
fee to the collection office, seems prone to
abuses, or at least to long delays in payment,
which present serious cash-flow difficulties
to service-providing organizations. ‘Active’
fee collection, using paid collectors who
visit houses or farms, incurs a significant
wage cost. Both methods need accounting
staff and certain facilities.
It is hard to make any general statement
about the proportion of fee income that
has to be used for fee-collection (that is, to
ensure that the organization’s income flow
will be stabilised) because of the inherent
variability of the process. For example,
Oorthuizen and Kloezen (1995: 28) found
that the average cost of fee collection in a
small Philippine system was 10.8% of the
organizational income, but even in that one
system this percentage varied between 5%
84 C.L. Abernethy
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These percentages are clearly linked to the
degrees of motivation and energy in the
collecting organization; this is doubtless
why the Philippines introduced collection
incentives. In othercases theremaybeindif-
ference within the bureaucracies, and resis-
tance among the water users; both of these
would be likely to result in collection costs
being substantially higher in proportion to
income. Cases have even been noted where
collection cost is of the same order as the
income that the collection yields.
In the Niger systems passive collection
was used. Costs of collection were still
significant, as there must be an accounting
system to register the collections. Non-
payment was avoided by careful recording
of each individual’s arrears and, ultimately,
withdrawal of service from users in severe
arrears; but the level of arrears nevertheless
caused frequent cash flow crises (Abernethy
et al., 2000).
Howwillriver-basinorganizationsmin-
imize these linked problems of compliance,
delayed payment, and collection cost? The
answer to this seems to be (as for some of the
otherissuesraisedabove)thattheseparation
of regulatory from service-delivery func-
tions should substantially reduce this
problem. The service deliverer must have a
direct relationship with the water users, and
indeed the trend towards user-controlled
service organizations assists this. The regu-
latory organization on the other hand has
different duties, and should collect its
fees from a few major sources, principally
the service-delivery organizations, but also
including any others to which it grants per-
mission for abstractions, pollution permits,
or other water-related activities. On the
whole, passive modes of collection may be
sufficient for this.
5.8 Control of Expenditure
As river-basin organizations come into exis-
tence in an increasing number of countries,
we will face another kind of issue: how
will their expenditure levels be controlled?
These organizations should become, as
far as possible, responsive to the interests
of their own stake-holders. But the stake-
holders are very diverse. Everybody is a
water user; and most of us are water users
in several different modes. Some may want
new storage facilities to be built; others
would prefer that costs be kept down as far
as possible. The interests of birds, fish and
other wildlife have to be accommodated
somehow, along with other non-economic
aspects of water, such as landscape beauty,
waterfalls and the like. All of these things
tend to have cost connotations in some way.
These matters cannot be satisfactorily
resolved by creating river-basin organiza-
tions that are firmly embedded in govern-
mental bureaucracy. A different and more
responsive kind of organization is needed,
which will be accountable to some council
in which all principal stake-holders have a
voice.
In these conditions, control of expendi-
turecanbedonetransparently,withbudgets
approved in advance not by finance minis-
tries, but by the people of the basin who will
havetobearmostofthecostsandreceivethe
consequent benefits.
The problems of expenditure control
provide a strong reason why, at least in the
initial stages, new river-basin organizations
should not be asked to develop functions
that are too large. Stake-holder councils and
other similar institutions are likely to be
rather meaningless and ineffective if they do
not have the general right to formulate an
annual budget, or at least to modify and
approve (or reject) budget plans proposed
to them by some part of the government
bureaucracy. On the other hand, it is likely
that a considerable time will pass before
such councils are trusted to formulate and
supervise a large capital budget effectively.
Risksofincompetentordishonestbehaviour
obviously exist. Capital expenditures also
may frequently have impacts or benefits
outside the basin where the works are
constructed, so their financial management
entails more complex procedures.
For such reasons it seems that it would
be better to move along the path of develop-
ing the financing of regulatory functions
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should be possible within the financial
resources that can be generated from the
kinds of funding sources described earlier.
To ensure public confidence in the
management of such funds, we should
expect that river-basin organizations will
submit to some process of public audit,
according to whatever the relevant national
systems may be, perhaps sharing the same
processes as are applied to (for example)
public auditing of the accounts of local
government bodies.
5.9 Impacts of Charging
The Economist (25 March 2000: 84), report-
ing after the World Water Forum, said,
whether it is Australia or Rajasthan, once
people understand the true cost of water
services, they will conserve water, and even
help to dig ditches if necessary. In return,
they will want transparent prices and better
service from both governments and private
firms.
That is a clear statement of the standard
economic view of the impacts of water
charges: consumption will reduce, capital
costs will be partially taken up by users,
and customer pressures will cause organi-
zational behaviour to improve. Is it true?
It is quite difficult to reconcile this
optimistic view of the power of economics,
with the findings from the detailed work of
PMI-Niger(Abernethyetal.,2000).There,in
a country that is at or near the bottom of the
per capita wealth scale and other human
development scales, irrigation service fees
are among the highest in the world. On the
whole, fee collection rates are high. Farmers
pay 20% of their gross crop value in fees. If
the foregoing quotation is true, water should
be used very efficiently in these circum-
stances. But the water productivity was
found to be equivalent only to 20 US cents/
m3, in terms of gross product value, at pur-
chasing power parity (less than 5 US cents/
m3,atnominalbankexchangerate).Nosigns
of reduction in water consumption could be
detected over ten seasons of monitoring.
There seem to be three sources of the
difference between these observations and
the view quoted earlier. First, The Econo-
mist was drawing lessons primarily from
urban cases. Secondly, water is only one
input to a production process, whether in
agriculture or industry, and it is generally
not a replaceable input; so if the user thinks
that more water is necessary in order to
realize the benefits of other inputs, that user
will probably apply the extra water. But it
seems likely that the third reason is the most
influential. This is that farmers in Niger, as
in most other developing countries, do not
pay for the quantity of water they use. They
pay heavily, but the charge is area-based, so
the marginal cost of taking more water is
zero. In the terms of the above quotation, the
irrigationusersmaynotcometo‘understand
the true cost of water services’. When the
marginal price paid for additional supply is
zero, the price system sends no signal to the
users concerning the true cost of their con-
sumption. Yet area-based irrigation charges,
whichproducethisineffectiveresult,arethe
most usual kind in developing countries.
Urban users, whose quantitative needs
are smaller and more measurable, normally
are not in that situation. For them, the
marginal cost of increasing their usage
of water may be quite high.
This problem, that the major users of
water (farmers) have no direct incentive
to reduce their consumption, is not likely to
change in the near future. Although we can
measure pipe flow volumes acceptably, and
the equipment cost for doing so is quite tol-
erable, devices for measuring flow volumes
(as distinct from flow rates) in open chan-
nels are not available at the scales and costs
required for the small land units typical of
developing countries, especially in Asia. So
the impacts of charging in metered urban
systems can be quite different from those in
small-holder irrigation.
One proposed approach to this problem
is by charging, not to individuals, but to
groups,forexampletoallthefarmersalonga
single commonchannel. Thereis as yetlittle
evidence that this is effective. At the level of
theindividual, itdoesnotaltertheincentive
much. If there are 50 farmers sharing a
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For a financial system to have a strong
impact on water abstractions, it must also
be designed to give incentive to the service-
deliveryorganizations toreduce the convey-
ance losses in their systems. Both urban
water-supply organizations and irrigation
departmentshaveuntilrecentlyshownpoor
records and lack of concern about reducing
losses.Thisisanotherareawhereseparation
of river-basin management from service
delivery is helpful.
If the service-delivery organization has
to buy the right to abstract water, it will be
more strongly motivated to ensure that as
much of that water as possible reaches a
customerwhopaysforit.Waterleakingfrom
a canal or a pipe, in that system, means a
direct financial loss to the service-delivery
organization.Organizationalseparationalso
makes it easier to include in the financing
arrangements some reflection of the value
of leakage water that can be recovered by
pumping fromaquifers,which variesgreatly
according to factors like location, quality
and aquifer depth.
There is also the problem of equity.
As we move more towards the principle
of payment for water services, can we feel
sure that the poorer sections of society
will have adequate access to water? Briscoe
(1997: 349) put this problem clearly:
The inequities of existing command-and-
control mechanisms for water allocation in
irrigated agriculture have been widely doc-
umented . . . Because water has rarely been
formally managed as an economic good in
developing countries, however, there is
little information on the equity effects of
a market-oriented management system.
The problems of inequity are particularly
acute in urban water supply systems. One
of the results of rapid urbanization in mod-
ern times has been that cities have grown
much faster than the administrative and
financial capacities for providing them with
comprehensive public utilities. In many cit-
ies, therefore, piped water is now provided
in only a minor proportion of households,
and many of the other households, unless
they can install their own wells, must
rely on small water vendors. Bhatia and
Falkenmark (1992) gave data on the ratio
between prices per litre charged by such
vendors, and prices charged by public utili-
ties, in a large range of cities. Their data
show that, on average, the vendors’ prices
were about 16 times greater than the prices
charged by the public organizations; and
this ratio ranged up to 100 in very poor
environments such as Port-au-Prince (Haiti)
and Nouakchott (Mauritania). We may
guess too that the water supplied by the
vendors is generally of substantially lower
quality.
Thiskindofinformationisnotevidence
that a ‘market-orientedmanagement system’
will have necessarily bad effects for the
poor.Thevendorsmaynotbeover-charging:
they have costs to meet and transport and
labour to arrange, as well as the primary cost
of the water. These enormous price ratios
rathershowthescaleofunder-investmentin
extending the public piped water systems.
The under-investment in turn may be
linked to inadequate prices charged for
the products of those systems.
We can, however, feel relatively
confident that there are better chances for
restoring equity, under river-basin manage-
ment organizations, than under the present
systems of management. Traditional water
rights have been rapidly eroded by the
political and economic changes of the past
two or three decades, and relatively few
countries have succeeded in supporting the
traditional systems, or in replacing them by
modern systems based on water rights that
are legally enforceable by their users. Basin
management offers a way of redressing this
situation,eitherthroughrightsorlicences.It
would seem reasonable to accept the need
for some payment, or increase of existing
payments, in return for a better guarantee of
supply or abstraction rights.
However we should also note the need
for good, transparent public information
programmes when such a policy change is
under consideration. If public opinion is not
prepared for changes of traditional patterns,
Financing River Basin Organizations 87
99 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:01 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesand not informed about the benefits that
they are intended to bring, they are likely to
be rejected.
Charges, or increases of charges, are
never going to be popular. It is futile to hope
for that. Howeversound our economic logic,
howevermuchwemayfeelthatachargesys-
tem can reduce distributional inequities, or
improve water-use efficiencies, there will
not be demonstrators in the streets demand-
ing the introduction of such charges. It is
good to keep this point in mind, as we think
about possible beneficial impacts of charg-
ingpolicies.Onthecontrary,ifchargingsys-
tems are introduced where there were none
before, the idea will almost certainly pro-
voke a strong adverse reaction, and it must
therefore be preceded by transparent expla-
nations to the people about the benefits that
are intended to be derived from the policy.
Yet there are strong arguments for
saying that the interests of poor people can
be better protected under a stronger system
of financial management, which can be
combined with high charges for heavy uses,
financial penalties for pollution and other
types of social costs, stabilizing of access
and use rights, control of ground-water
depletion, and a number of other desirable
outcomes which at present countries strug-
gle to achieve. The interests of the poor
can be protected to the extent of some cross-
subsidisation, introducing minimal prices
forsmalldomesticbasic-needsquantities,or
even as far as the zero rate for the first 6 m3/
person/month which is proposed in South
Africa.
Weshould notehoweverthat cross-sub-
sidization (supplying to some customers at
prices that are below true costs, or even
zero,andbalancingtheaccountsbycharging
pricesabovetruecoststoothers)isnotinthe
long-term genuine equity, although it may
be justified occasionally in special circum-
stances such as those South Africa faces.
Non-equitable policies of this sort need to
gain the support of a consensus of the water
users of a basin, just as much as other water
management policies.
The equity question can be regarded
as yet another argument for keeping a
separation between the regulatory and
service-delivery functions. Research on
equity effects will probably continue to be
necessary for quite a long time. River-basin
organizations should take some responsibil-
ity for monitoring these effects, and for
encouraging the necessary research. They
shouldbeinthepositiontoadjusttheirregu-
lations, and the constraints on the service-
delivery organizations, so as to take account
of the need to limit the degree of inequity
that may exist, and particularly to ensure
access for all up to a certain basic level.
5.10 Conclusions, and a Possible
Way Forward
River-basin organizations offer a promising
way towards better and more equitable
management of water resources. They need
to be adequately financed, and it is better
that their finance should be generated
locally from among the users of their ser-
vices, who should also have an effective
voice in influencing their policies, than
that their finance and policy should be
determined centrally.
The ways of generating sufficient
finance, in the case of poorer countries, are
notyetcertain,becauseoftheweakfinancial
situation of agricultural users, who account
for the overwhelming majority of water
consumption in most countries. The lessons
that can be learned from the financing
systems of richer countries are of limited
relevance because of the different balance
of user types.
The financing system has a strong
effectonthebehaviourofanorganization,so
the financing system for a new river-basin
organization should be designed not only on
accounting principles, but also with a clear
view of the behaviour we want. The desir-
ablecharacteristicsofariver-basinorganiza-
tion could be summarized as follows:
• Its primary goal is to provide a frame-
work of legality and security for all the
uses of water, including environmental
as well as human uses.
• A river-basin organization should
have no function of delivering water
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tasks will be to monitor and control the
activities of service-providers.
• Its primary funding mechanism should
be through licences for abstractions
and disposals of water, supported to
some extent by penalties for pollution,
excessive use and other unwanted
behaviour, and permits for non-
abstractive uses.
• Its charging structure should reflect
the scarcity and quality of the basin’s
water.
• Its charges should be structured to
ensure that basic human needs can be
satisfied cheaply.
The possible impacts of water charges on
the behaviour of water users include these:
• Consumption reduces;
• Water-saving behaviour increases;
• Organizations perform better;
• Users contribute to the cost of capital
works;
• Equity of access and of use changes.
As we have seen, the actual impacts
depend significantly on the precise mode of
application of the charging system, which
must be designed carefully or it may not
yield the desired outcomes.
Current systems of charging for water
services have many defects. Irrigation
charges are usually area-based, not volume-
based, so they give no incentive for water
saving, neither for the service-delivery
organization to reduce leakages nor for the
end-user to improve application efficiency.
Charging rates are usually calculated on the
basis of the cost of providing water delivery
service, and sustaining a supply organiza-
tion, but do not often reflect the scarcity
or abundance of the water resource, or the
quality of the water. Often economic logic
is reversed, as poor city-dwellers pay more
for low-quality domestic water, and farmers
pay a marginal price of zero for water
applications in excess of real need.
Systems of abstraction licences may
be the most easily implemented method
of addressing simultaneously these various
problems, especially:
• to sustain the kind of river-basin
organization that is needed;
• to give firm legality to long-standing
traditional users;
• to protect principles of equity during
rapid socio-economic changes; and
• to make possible more flexible systems
of charging that will reflect scarcity and
quality, and will follow some progres-
sive scale so that basic needs (both per-
sonal water use and food production)
can be satisfied at rates that are less
than those charged for levels of use
which exceed the fundamental human
requirements.
Figures 5.1 and 3.2 represent the kind of
pattern that is implied by these arguments.
Figure 5.1 is what we may call a ‘traditional
system’ in many developing countries.
A number of service-providing agencies,
which each have a basic single service
function (irrigation department; electricity
authority; water supply board, and so on)
exist, independent of each other and each
under the patronage of a ministry. (There
may also be large industrial companies
in the private sector, which are allowed
to perform ‘self-service’, abstracting, using
and disposing of water for their own func-
tions; there may also be companies which
are privatized water-service providers.) The
service-providing entities are financed by
some combination of government subsidies
flowing down from the parent ministry and
service-related fees flowing up from the
users. The ratio between these downward
and upward components varies among
countries, and is changing over time: 20
years ago, the upward flows were generally
much smaller than now, and the downward
subsidy flows were much greater.
The pattern shown in Fig. 5.1 does not
lend itself easily to integrated management,
as many countries have found. The agencies
and their patron ministries tend to show
rivalry rather than co-operation. Without
integrating the actions of these service-
providing agencies, there can be little pros-
pectofbringingaboutcoherentmanagement
and socially acceptable principles of alloca-
tion of the water resource, and disposal of
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envisage dismantling these long-established
structures, and it is not at all sure that the
disruption involved would be beneficial.
Figure 5.2 indicates a ‘new’ system,
leading towards a gradual integration. The
existing system of organizations and finan-
cial flows can be left in place. Alongside it is
the river-basin organization, which is given
authority by the state to issue licences for
water abstractions and disposals, and to
charge appropriately for such licences.
Initially the licence pattern will no doubt
correspond closely to the existing pattern of
uses. The new system however changes the
processes by which the existing situation
will evolve in future, and makes it more
likely that the allocations of water can be
brought into balance with future needs and
with environmental goals.
Thefinancialflowstotheneworganiza-
tion would, in this model, come initially
from charges on the service-providing orga-
nizations,including‘self-serving’industries
and irrigation schemes. The flows would be
expected toexpand atarelativelyearlystage
to include some flows from individuals,
for example fees for licences to install
new ground-water wells, and gradually to
broaden their revenue sources by taking
up some of the other financing options
mentioned earlier, but leaving the primary
revenue that can bederived fromuser fees to
be collected by service-providers.
To ensure that this system responds to
the general goals of the community, great
care is needed in the design of its organiza-
tion, its procedures of consultation, democ-
racy, equity and so forth. Those important
featuresarebeyondthescopeofthischapter;
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In France, the water management issue is
no longer seen as a question of developing
stakeholders’ participation or transferring
State competence to user associations. As
for the other countries with a complete
and complex institutional framework, the
challenge now is to define clearly the role
of each water management stakeholder and
to answer two remaining questions:
• How do we ensure sustainability of
the investments by raising the price of
water without discouraging economic
development?
• How do we share water among users
when resources are scarce?
The general answer to these questions
relies on the two basic principles of good
water management leading to sustainable
development:
• Since it consumes more than 70% of
the available water during low flow
periods, irrigated agriculture must
respect the other uses by limiting its
demand to the allocated volume;
• Since it involves large and long-term
public investments, irrigated agri-
culture must bear at least the ‘sustain-
ability cost’ (Tardieu and Préfol, 2002)
of the upstream water resources.
Such a general answer is of course largely
case-specific and should be adjusted to
each institutional framework.
France, like other Euro-Mediterranean
countries, has a long history of water devel-
opment, born from water scarcity and a con-
stant search for the best agricultural use and
the fairest sharing. A complex institutional
structure has progressively been set up to
develop private initiatives within a public
service framework.
During the last century, Authorized
User Associations (ASAs) were developed.
They were formal institutions constituted
by landowners for sharing the construction
and management of irrigation systems.
In the 1950s, the State created, within a
more ambitious land-use planning frame-
work, Regional Development Companies
(SARs), which are public corporations with
a ‘concession’ from the State, to develop
water resources and manage irrigation
schemes in the southern regions of
France. Well subsidized by the State at
the beginning, the SARs now cover their
costs from the payments of their customers.
This management is now financially sus-
tainable as it includes the provisions
necessary to maintain the investments
under concession. It nevertheless keeps
the basic characteristics of a French public
service: continuity, equity, sustainability
and transparency.
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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up more recently, with a widened mandate
to include management and protection of
the environment and seek a global consen-
sus on water management by using dialogue
and financial incentives, while the State
keeps the role of regulation.
After a short discussion about the
stakeholders in French irrigation and water
management, this paper addresses both
socioeconomic questions stated above, with
a specific discussion of the case of the
Neste system, a water-stressed basin in
the southwest of France.
6.2 The Key Stakeholders in Irrigation
and Water Management in France
6.2.1 The individual level: farmers
Farmers aim to satisfy the objectives
they select for their household (to ensure
a minimum revenue), their enterprise (to
maximize profits, to minimize risks and
to improve the quality of the products)
and their land (to be sustainable). Each
one freely chooses the crops to grow on the
basis of advice from his profession with
due consideration given to the market. He
consequently optimizes the management
of the production factors, including the
on-farm irrigation system.
The value of water in irrigated agri-
culture varies, largely due to the hetero-
geneity of the production systems. The cost
of irrigation water is generally relatively
high in the Mediterranean regions, implying
high performances with high value-added
crops.
The constraints of agricultural competi-
tiveness make the irrigator very sensitive to
thereliabilityofwatersupplyand,ofcourse,
to its cost. For each crop in a given cropping
pattern, water value can be assessed. Water
demand can thus be represented by a graph
ofwatervalueperunitvolume.Suchagraph
suggests how an irrigator reacts as the water
price varies.
6.2.2 The small system level: ASAs
Gathering irrigators through an association
that owns and/or manages common assets
is the first and the oldest way to manage
collective irrigation (Lesbats et al., 1996).
Such associations bring together the land-
owners concerned with the irrigation
system. They are self-managed organiza-
tions, and, in France, are based on a legal
framework developed in the 19th century.
This framework provides all the authority
needed to manage the irrigation system.
The statutes of ASAs are public and
conferthecapacitytoactforthepublicgood,
particularly in the matter of cost recovery
where they follow the rules of public
accounting. Costs are shared in proportion
to the involvement of each owner in the
project area, generally as a function of his
irrigated area.
These associations have a very long
lifetime, since the properties are irrevocably
engaged in the association. This long experi-
enceprovidesvaluablelessons. Initially,the
collectiveparticipation of membersis exem-
plary. They define their projects according
to their needs and their means of fulfilling
them. They personally ensure operation
and minor maintenance. The apparent
cost, corresponding only to monetary
expenditure, is thus largely below the
comprehensive cost of water.
However, it sometimes happens that
the necessary solidarity decreases and the
ASA goes wrong by lack of involvement and
lack of professionalism. Members are then
concerned about the immediate balance of
theaccounts,andcutdownthemaintenance
expenditure. This entails serious conse-
quencesintermsofqualityandcontinuityof
service.
To preserve or re-establish the durabil-
ity of their systems, at the conception as
well as at the management stage, ASAs have
currently been calling for the assistance of
the State. The ASA statutes indeed foresee
that in case of bankruptcy of the ASA, the
State representative must replace the ASA
President. Considering the State’s other
94 H. Tardieu
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professional advice, particularly from the
SARs (see below).
Such a complementary relationship
between ASAs and a technically competent
body can be organized to guarantee sustain-
able management. This is the case with
the design and/or maintenance contracts
offered by Compagnie d’Aménagement des
Coteaux de Gascogne (CACG), one of the
SARs.
6.2.3 The large systems level: SARs
Created about 40 years ago in the southern
regions of France where water was a
limiting factor to development, the SARs
are characterized by the originality of their
mission and statutes (Plantey et al., 1996).
Their mission, defined by the conces-
sion contract with the State, deals with the
implementation and operation of hydraulic
projects necessary for the development of
their region. Managing the conceded water
resources, they ensure the conveyance of
water to the centres of urban and industrial
consumption, and the distribution of water
in rural irrigated areas. For this purpose,
they have broad rights and obligations as
‘owners’ of the works, but without the right
to sell them.
Their statutes are similar to those of
private companies, implying rules of sound
management and economic efficiency. The
majority of the shareholders are public,
and so is the governance. Local authorities
(Départements1 and Regions) therefore have
control of the strategic resource in the
name of the public good for all water users.
Theagriculturalusersarerepresentedonthe
Board and participate in governance as
the SARs’ private shareholders.
In accordance with the terms of their
concession contracts, the action of the SARs
is guided by the principles of sustainable
management of a public service.
• Quality and continuity of water
service;
• Equity when water is to be shared
between users;
• Sustainability with adequate provi-
sions for long-term maintenance;
• Transparency of the management and
accountability to the Board.
The SARs have been relatively successful at
balancing resources and needs through the
practice of integrated water management.
Despite the relative scarcity of the resource
in the French Mediterranean regions, water
shortages and conflicts among users are
no longer a major concern in the systems
managed by the SARs (Tardieu and Plantey,
1999).
When a crisis situation arises, high-tech
equipment and tested methods of water
sharing allow equitable management of the
resource. This is typically the case for the
Neste system managed by CACG.
6.2.4 The large catchment level
A Basin Committee, a sort of water parlia-
ment where users, local authorities and
government are represented, is in charge of
conserving the water environment and of
water management policy in one of the six
French large catchment basins. It develops,
in collaboration with the State administra-
tion, the long-term water policy plan.
WaterAgenciesaretheexecutivebodies
ofBasinCommittees.Taxes,collectedbythe
Water Agencies in accordance with deci-
sions of the Basin Committee, discourage
polluters and consumers from polluting and
consuming. This incentive to behave in a
more responsible manner is coupled with a
financial policy since the revenue from the
taxes is allocated to financial assistance for
pollution abatement and for conservation
and development of water resources. For
irrigation particularly, Water Agencies
Basin Management in a Water-stressed Basin 95
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and regulation, which are important sources
of water savings.
After 30 years, this system based on
the principles of solidarity and equity (the
polluterpaysandtheconsumerpays)iswell
accepted by the public. It should be under-
stood that the French Water Agencies do not
have direct responsibilities in water system
management, unlike the bodies described
above.
6.2.5 The State level
According to the terms of the 1992 Water
Law, it is not the State’s responsibility to
ensure directly the operational manage-
ment of water resources, except for very
large rivers. Its authority should guarantee
the respect of the necessary regulation
of water uses, which are subject to
previous authorization. Elaborating and
updating the rules should be carried out
in consensus with the members of the
water community to minimize the number
of rule-breakers.
Finally, the State is the owner of
large hydraulic works used for irrigation
purposes and delegated to the SARs by
concession contract. As a consequence, it
supervises both the maintenance and the
best use of the assets in order to meet all
water demands.
Although this presentation of the
French institutional framework in water
management is highly simplified, it does
help to clarify the respective roles of differ-
ent stakeholders in different areas.
• Basin planning and financial policy:
the Basin Committee seeks a consensus
to reconcile all users, both among
themselves and with the environment,
in a global approach to water manage-
ment using financial incentives.
• Operational management: the SARs
manage water resources by contracting
with users, and ensure the sustain-
ability of the assets. The ASAs have
almost the same objectives but for
smaller irrigation systems.
• Regulation and law enforcement: the
State sets up regulatory measures,
keeping in mind both the need for
consensus and acceptance and its own
capability for applying them to all
users.
The French organizational set-up for water
is characterized by a ‘public/private’ mix.
The freedom of the private initiative is
balanced by the responsibility for the
public good. The economic efficiency of
private management is associated with the
sustainability of the public service.
6.3 The Neste System: an Example of
Controlled Water Management
Water management in the Neste system
provides an important example of success-
ful application of a set of rules, consultation
methods and high-tech controls, but also
represents a system facing a regulation
problem because water supply is currently
exceeded by demand. The essential features
of the water management agency, the
CACG, that make success of ‘controlled
water management’ possible include: (i) the
institutional originality of the SARs with a
public mission and private management;
(ii) their joint experience in regional devel-
opment and water management; (iii) their
capacity to carry out maintenance and asset
conservation; and (iv) the practices they
follow in pricing water in combination with
a quota system. Economic analysis of the
water value in each use, particularly for
irrigation, may clarify the allocation of
water and validate the regulation tools
used in ‘controlled water management’.
6.3.1 Presentation of the Neste system
In 1990, after a serious crisis involving con-
flicts between users due to water scarcity, a
new management system was established
(Tardieu, 1991). In operation for 10 years,
it can be described as follows, with its
successes and limitations.
96 H. Tardieu
108 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:06 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees6.3.1.1 Location
• A 10,000-km2 basin located in the
southwest of France with 650 mm of
rainfall, where irrigation is necessary
for most kinds of agricultural produc-
tion (Fig. 6.1);
• Surface water is the only resource for
urban and industrial uses because of
lack of groundwater, and recharged
rivers (1300 km) are the common
resource for every user.
6.3.1.2 Water users
• Fish, wildlife and tourism need
250 M m3/yearto augment low flows;2
Basin Management in a Water-stressed Basin 97
Fig. 6.1. Map of the Neste basin.
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year;
• 51,000 irrigated ha (28,000 l/s sub-
scribed by 3000 irrigators) consume
(average) 70–95 M m3/year (dry years);
• A 10,000-ha waiting list for irrigation
contracts (equivalent to 6000 l/s) exists.
6.3.1.3 Water resources
• The Neste Canal (a State concession to
CACG) diverts 250 M m3 of the natural
flow of the river Neste;
• Stored resources contribute 100 M m3,
of which 48 M m3 are stored in
mountain hydroelectric reservoirs
and 52 M m3 in CACG lakes (also State
concessions).
6.3.1.4 Types of withdrawal
• Individual withdrawals (14,500 l/s)
subscribed through ‘conventions de
restitution’, or ‘pour-back contracts’;
• Collective withdrawals by ASAs or
CACG irrigation networks (13,500 l/s).
6.3.1.5 Monitoring and remote control
• Supply monitored through 200 river
flow meters, 40 dam and canal gates,
and 150 pumping stations under
remote control;
• Demand monitored through 1500
individual water meters (checked three
to four times a year), 6000 meters on
collective networks, and 150 pumping
stations under continuous monitoring.
6.3.1.6 Supply/demand balancing
• Currently the balance is ensured with a
failure rate of 1 year in 4;
• For a more comfortable balance, an
additional resource of 43 M m3 is
needed for the waiting list and 7 M m3
to reduce the failure rate.
6.3.2 Management rules: the contract,
individual and collective
Each user signs with CACG a water contract
called convention de restitution guarantee-
ing that his/her withdrawal is balanced out
by an equivalent upstream replenishment.
The contract states a maximum diversion
flow and a subscribed volume, or quota,
with a two-tiered price. The first price is
a function of the allowed flow (?50 per l/s).
The second price, the over-consumption
price, is a function of the volume consumed
above the quota. (?0.10/m3 above the
4000-m3 quota).
Thus, there are two limits on the
abstraction of water by the user: a flow rate
limit, and a volume limit. If the authorized
flow rate per hectare is 1 l/s and the volume
quota for the year is 4000 m3, the user may,
in effect, abstract water for 1110 h before
the quota is exceeded. The extra payment
required from those who exceed their
volume quota is ?0.10/m3. The price step is
thus large. By paying ?50, the user becomes
entitled to take up to 4000 m3, so if the full
quota is taken its average price per m3 is
?0.012. If the quota is exceeded by the user,
the marginal price for taking more water
rises immediately to ?0.10, almost eight
times the base rate.
In reality, the user will often take less
than the quota, particularly during rainy
years. In that case the payment of ?50
remains, so in effect the average price
paid per cubic meter is more than ?0.012,
which is the minimum possible. Over a long
period, the average price actually paid is
close to ?0.02 per m3.
The contract also fixes penalties for
the user (in case of withdrawing above the
allowed flow rate or the lack of a water
meter)and forCACG (in case ofquotareduc-
tion).Asdemandexceedssupplyevenwhen
dams are full, the Neste Commission, which
brings together all water stakeholders from
the five Départements involved, decided to
start a waiting list of applicants. All applica-
tions who are rejected because of supply
98 H. Tardieu
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file which totals 6,000 l/s to date. Newly
created resources and contract terminations
allow a few of these filed applications to
be accepted annually, according to priority
rules (young farmers) or to seniority on the
waiting list. All the yearly contracts get a
collective withdrawal authorization in each
of the five Départements.
When dams are not full or when it
is anticipated that the Neste river flow
will decrease, the Neste Commission meets
before the irrigation season to decide on a
quota reduction. The choice of the meeting
date is the result of a compromise between
the possibility of making a sound hydrologi-
cal forecast and the possibility for farmers to
adjust cropping patterns or inputs.
During the irrigation period, water
meters are checked regularly. If a quota
seems likely to be exceeded, a warning
letter is sent by CACG to the irrigator. Quota
overruns are billed at the end of the sea-
son. CACG is also in charge of resource
management, which it carries out through
computerized remote control (RIO soft-
ware), tactical water management in order
to save water transferred from the remote-
controlled dams (checked every 3 h) and
strategic water management in order to
optimizewaterallocationbetweenirrigation
and river wildlife. The objective in the latter
case is to empty the reservoirs by the end of
the low flow period with a failure rate of one
in ten (weekly check).
After the irrigation season, water man-
agement performance is assessed in terms
of meeting or exceeding minimum wildlife
flows, supply of volumes subscribed by
irrigators and water savings throughout the
system.
• Since 1990, when the system was first
put in operation, failures to maintain
wildlife minimum flows have been
rare, amounting to only 1–2 days/year
over a reach of a few kilometres, as
compared to the drying up of several
dozens of kilometres over several
weeks in 1989.
• However, irrigators’ quotas have been
reduced 4 years in 10 (though one of
these reductions was later cancelled),
and in 3 years out of 10, users have
been prevented from exceeding their
quotas regardless of extra payments.
More extreme State intervention (by
the Prefect at the Département level),
which constitutes the ultimate recourse
when the crisis cannot be met by means
of quotas, has not taken place.
• After using the RIO software for 10
years, experience has shown water
savings of more than 20% of the
managed volume.
6.3.3 Successes and problems of the system:
can a limited supply be regulated?
In the Neste system, both principles of good
water management are respected:
• Water is shared in such a way that fish
and wildlife are preserved all along
the 1300 km of controlled rivers and
irrigators receive their contracted
volumes;
• CACG, on behalf of the ‘conceding’
State, bills users for the cost of the
service and gets the financial means
to cover at least the system’s ‘sustain-
ability cost’ assuring the maintenance
of assets worth ?540 million at current
prices.
There has clearly been progress in compari-
son with the two ‘wrong practices’ of the
previous period: (i) daily interventions by
the Prefect which irrigators circumvented
by over-investing in pumping capacities;
and (ii) the inability to charge for the
‘resource’ part of the water service, thus
leading to asset jeopardy.
One direct positive consequence of
the new arrangements is that irrigators
are driven to save water and optimize their
croppingpatternsthroughasystemofsound
andsustainableincentivesfarmorevaluable
than any media campaign. It also induces a
renewed interest on the part of research and
extension networks in quota optimization
throughrevisedcroppingpatternsandinput
use (Balas and Deumier, 1993).
Basin Management in a Water-stressed Basin 99
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remains, which concerns continued spatial
development: what about the waiting list’s
demand if water resource creation is ham-
pered by procedural problems and limited
public funds? One solution sometimes
envisaged is to reduce the quotas of current
irrigators in order to admit the new appli-
cants. This bad solution, which includes
issues of equity, economic efficiency, social
acceptance and technical and agricultural
management, has been discussed in a
separate paper (Tardieu, 1999) and is
summarized in Section 6.6 below.
6.4 Key Actors and Essential Basin
Functions
In addition to the key actors described
in the first section of this chapter, other
government units also play important roles
in basin management. These include towns,
the Ministry of the Environment and the
Ministry of Agriculture. The interaction
between key actors and essential basin
functions is shown in Table 6.1. It should
be noted that almost all of the water used in
the basin comes from surface water sources
since little groundwater is available, and
that surface water is used primarily for
domestic, agricultural and environmental
purposes.
The point that stands out most sharply
from a review of Table 6.1 is the central role
played by the SARs in the French model. In
the Neste, CACG plays major roles in con-
structing and maintaining facilities and in
allocating and distributing water to users.
The roles played by the irrigation associa-
tions are, by comparison, rather modest.
Tools employed for allocating water are
not solely administrative. The tiered pricing
system for water deliveries used by CACG
and withdrawal taxes levied by the Water
Agency are important tools that help to
determine the volumes of water that will be
allocated to various users. The Ministry of
Environment also plays an important role in
providing the ‘policing’ powers to enforce
allocation and use rules.
Another important feature of the matrix
is the important planning and monitoring
role played by the Basin Committee and the
Water Agency, its executive arm. Because
the Basin Committee includes most of the
interested basin stakeholders, their involve-
ment at the individual level is subsumed
into the intersection between CACG and the
planning function in the table.
The Ministry of Agriculture, which
represents the State as the owner of the
infrastructure, plays an important regula-
tory role in monitoring the care and mainte-
nance given to the facilities by CACG, the
concessionaire.
6.5 How to Charge for Irrigation
Without Threatening Economic
Development?
Whichever institutional framework one
chooses, a fundamental challenge is to
cover the full cost of water used by raising
the water price and collecting fees from
users. For most irrigation systems managed
by government agencies, public subsidies
are now limited by budget constraints. Such
subsidies may consist of paying salaries of
operating personnel, covering heavy main-
tenance or rehabilitation costs, or under-
pricing energy, etc. For us Europeans, the
principle that ‘users pay for water’ will
be the basis of the new European Water
Directive. Some targeted and transparent
subsidies will still be acceptable, but on
the condition that they will be gradually
phased out. This objective of an irrigation
system breaking even on the basis of its own
water charge revenue is not impossible to
reach, and is already the case in several
regions of France.
However, the economic and social
consequences of water price rises can be
serious,asshownbythefollowingexamples
of likely risks:
• Overall reduction in the country’s
agricultural production, making it
impossible to reach the goal frequently
assigned to irrigation of securing food
self-sufficiency. This consequence may
100 H. Tardieu
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its ‘food sovereignty’ (FAO, 1996). A
regular increase in the price of water
has recently been started in Tunisia,
except for cereals, for which water
charges have been kept constant.
• Higher food prices for urban consum-
ers, which induces larger food imports
and some losses of internal market
shares for irrigating farmers. This
has already been verified in various
African countries.
• Lower agricultural income, hence
increased rural poverty and population
migration towards towns. Even if the
irrigating farmers are not the most
vulnerable in economic terms – since
they can use a wider range of crops
– the economic development of rural
populations must remain irrigation’s
fundamental objective.
On the other hand, the ‘true prices’ process
can also generate some benefits:
• A new respect for water, which
improves management efficiency;
• An incentive to choose the most
profitable crops and to maximize
comparative advantage;
• A means to know which assets have to
be maintained, and which investments
have to be made.
The price adjustment process has to be con-
ducted with great care, taking into account
the economic consequences on production.
This is done by analysing the value of water
for the farmer, i.e. the additional added
value per water unit (m3) provided by
irrigated crops as compared with rainfed
ones.
6.5.1 Full cost and ‘sustainability cost’
Before tackling this issue, it is worth
restating the definition of the full cost of
water from the point of view of the agency
responsible for water resource acquisition
and distribution.
The full cost of water includes the
following.
• Operating costs: staff, energy, daily
upkeep;
• Investment-linked costs: depreciation/
maintenance/renewal, financial costs
of the initial investment.
A water price set at this level secures a
balanced budget for the managing agency
without any subsidies. In France, this price
is about ?0.15/m3 for the large irrigation
schemes, where water charges are based
on the full cost of water with the first
investment partially subsidized.
However, the cost of major headworks
(reservoirs, transfer canals) is generally not
included. The rationale for such under-
charging is based on the consideration that
these works are both strategic and multi-
purpose and that they were created for
the sake of regional development at a time
when economies were more State-backed
and more protected. Today, countries where
such infrastructure is paid forbywaterusers
instead of taxpayers are rare. Nevertheless,
it is the objective that has been set for
irrigation, notably in France, with a transi-
tion period allowing a smooth evolution of
production systems.
During that phase, water charges
are meant to cover what will be called the
sustainability cost of water, something that,
inthecaseofheavy,long-lifeinvestments,is
very different from the full cost.
• Sustainability cost = operating cost +
maintenance and sustainable renewal
cost; or
• Sustainability cost = full cost −
financial cost of initial investment.
With a water price set at the sustain-
ability cost level, no new investment is
possible; but budget constraints are met,
and sustainable operation and maintenance
ensured without having to resort to public
funding.
Table 6.2 shows a simplified example
of the costs generated by the water resource
infrastructure, which, when added to the
water distribution cost, yield the full cost
of water supply. Values are drawn from
the case of the Neste system, where actual
annual costs of a storage reservoir feeding
102 H. Tardieu
114 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:17 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesthe river amount to about ?1.5/m3 with a
quasi-infinite reservoir lifetime.
A water price covering the sustain-
ability cost of ?0.015 m3 is socially accept-
able and, after the public funding of the
initial investment, prevents the need for
further subsidies. In the transition phase,
irrigation distribution costs are calculated at
around ?0.15/m3, i.e. at full cost pricing,
while the irrigator’s share of the water
resource costs is charged more around
?0.015/m3,i.e.atsustainabilitycostpricing.
6.5.2 Water strategic value
On the basis of the existing farming
infrastructure, the strategic value (Vs)
corresponds to the optimum combination
between irrigated and non-irrigated crops,






where VAI = value added from irrigated
crops (before deducting the cost of water);
VANI = value added from non-irrigated
crops (rainfed crops) which could be
cultivated instead of irrigated crops; and
VI = volume of water allocated to irrigation.
This value3 reflects strategic choices
made by the farmer at a point in time when
he can still modifyhis cropping pattern, and
adjust his irrigation practice to a variable
allocated water volume. It is the result of a
decision taken once or twice a year and it
should at least cover the cost of irrigation for
it to be profitable.
Values calculated for each irrigated
cropcan then beplotted against the volumes
of water required to produce the various
crops, i.e. water demand curves showing
the decreasing returns of irrigated crops
(Fig. 6.2).
The following remarks can be made on
the Vs formula presented above.
• Variations in crop prices (domestic or
world price) can lead to changes in
value that rule out irrigation or, on the
contrary, that result in a stronger water
demand. This is particularly the case
for cereals, whose water valuation is
relatively feeble but which call for large
volumes of water.
• Changes in the yield or added value of
a given rainfed crop can paradoxically
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Fig. 6.2. Effect of water quantity on water value.
3 See also Molden et al. (1998).
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demand. For instance, a specific sub-
sidy to rainfed durum (‘hard’ wheat)
makes it an alternative to irrigated
maize in the driest parts of southern
France. On the other hand, the proba-
ble diminishing profitability of cattle
breeding (as a result of the Common
Agricultural Policy of the European
Union) will increase water demand for
irrigated cereals. The improvement of
rainfed crops in Sahelian Africa, lead-
ing to lower import prices, may lead
to reserving irrigation water for high
added-value crops such as vegetables
or fruits.
• Improving irrigation effectiveness, thus
diminishing the formula’s denomina-
tor, increases water value across the
board.
6.5.3 Water’s strategic value, price and
budget constraints
By comparing the strategic value of water
for the farmer and its cost, it is easy to
know the average price that will balance the
irrigation manager’s budget. The problem
for the irrigation agency, and for the State
which backs it, is the following. Water price
rises, which help to balance its budget, have
a negative effect on water sales and, hence,
a tendency to raise the costs of each cubic
metre sold, since irrigation costs are mostly
fixed ones (depreciation, financing and
maintenance costs). This is a vicious circle
leading inevitably to the collapse of the
system. That is why, in a now-transparent
management environment, the State may
find it advantageous to keep on financing
intensification and modernization projects,
thus boosting irrigated agriculture and
increasing its own chances of recouping
heavy sunk costs.
The concept of sustainability cost as
described above is essential, for it consti-
tutes the lowest price the State can accept
(Fig. 6.3). If the water price does not cover
the sustainability cost and exceeds the
strategic value of water for farmers (for at
least one given existing crop), this means
that a long-term public subsidy through
water charges will be necessary to maintain
that irrigated crop in the country or region
considered. The opening up of agricultural
markets and the new transparency in world
trade will make this practice impossible in
the future.
On the other hand, it does not seem eco-
nomically sound to dismantle entire sectors
of irrigated agriculture on the principle that
the full cost of water should be covered . . .
at all costs! This would mean that today’s
irrigators would have to pay for investments
which will also be used by future genera-
tions, which would be unfair, justifying a
certain amount of public subsidy to help



































Fig. 6.3. Sustainable allocation of water.
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process in irrigation, it is essential to have
a good understanding of strategic value of
water to be able to derive demand curves by
farm types and by region. Economic data on
irrigatedcropsarenotalwaysavailable.This
is one negative consequence of the disap-
pearance of public irrigation agencies. The
overall regulation of irrigation investments
and of agricultural production requires
governments to allocate some funds to data
collection and processing that ‘privatized’
agencies can no longer afford. It should not
beforgottenthateconomicissuestobedocu-
mentedshouldalsoincluderainfedcrops,to
be in a position to correctly appraise water
value by comparison between alternative
agroeconomic systems.
6.6 Is Water Pricing Useful for
Controlling Water Allocations?
The points made above assume that an
essential prerequisite has been met – the
clear identification of the economic agents
who measure, buy, and sell irrigation water.
This is an often heavy but always decisive
task, which precedes and accompanies the
true-price process in irrigation. It requires
moving away from the idea that water is a
free gift from the State towards the concept
that irrigation is a service supplied by a
provider to a client farmer. The critical
question of how this transfer should be
accomplished is the subject of many
workshops. Let it just be said that, wherever
water is scarce, it is very tempting to use the
newly established economic links between
‘supplier’ and ‘customer’ to try to regulate
water use through prices.
Indeed, after the beneficial disengage-
ment of the State from direct management of
irrigation schemes, some think that water
allocation can also be taken care of solely by
price mechanisms. To what extent is such
price-based regulation reliable?
Water allocation regulation consists
of inducing each economic agent to respect
the volume of water allocated by the public
authority. Is the pricing of water sufficient
to avoid allocation crises in water-scarce
systems? Can it settle intersectoral disputes
between competing uses? Can it improve
water distribution among farmers?
6.6.1 Quotas and pricing: instruments for
allocation regulation
In many water-scarce regions, water quotas
are allocated to farmers by sub-basin or by
region. For the public authority, the prob-
lem is to ensure that these allocations are
respected. The answer is usually of the law
enforcement type, forbidding off-takes and
penalizing those who withdraw excessive
amounts. This type of regulation generates
economic inefficiency and, sometimes, cor-
ruption. Therefore, it is highly tempting to
use the price of water to avoid disputes
between users, provided all participants
have been identified and the service billed
has been clearly defined.
From analysis of the marginal value
of water,4 a method of water pricing
can be derived with a view to attempting
such regulation. It will necessarily be step
pricing, i.e. a discontinuous series of price
levels, increasing with water demand. The
higher price step, which will counteract
the marginal value, must be higher than the
lower price step, which itself is calculated
to cover at least the sustainability cost of
supplying the water and also to secure the
farmer’s income.
The fairly simple system set up in the
Neste system consists of the following
elements:
• An allocated quota, priced at a fixed
amount which is the same whether the
user takes it all or takes less;
• An over-consumption price for each
unit of water above the quota.
Basin Management in a Water-stressed Basin 105
4 Definedhereasthevalueoftheadditionalproductionthatisbroughtaboutbyoneadditionalcubicmetre
of water applied during the irrigation period.
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ble with the limited resources allocated to
irrigation, as opposed to other competing
uses. For a given existing irrigated area,
there exists a corresponding volume quota
per hectare, which has to be regulated
with a price step high enough to deter
over-consumption.
However, efficient regulation is based
on understandable and practical water
charges within a freely negotiated contract.
Charges are useless if they cannot be recov-
ered. Excessive over-consumption prices
can only lead to jeopardized contracts and
then to legal prosecutions, which is pre-
cisely the regulation mode to be avoided.
Experience from the Neste system
shows that a price step between the quota
price and the over-consumption price
exceeding ?0.10/m3 would not be socially
acceptable at present. The approach out-
lined here provides useful strategic guide-
linesforfixingthevolumequotaperhectare.
In consideration of the marginal value graph
(Fig. 6.3), the highest price step clarifies
the concept of socially acceptable minimum
quota. If the quota is too far below the opti-
mum needs (less than 80% of those needs)
the system does not work in a dry year, and
crises can be frequent, with stalled contracts
and prosecution by the public authorities.
6.6.2 Best practices in water pricing and
water resources development
Stemming from this discussion, three basic
ideas can be emphasized:
• Water step pricing can help to regulate
the allocation system if the quota and
the over-consumption price are set in
consideration of the marginal value of
water and the social acceptability of the
water charge.
• Quotas that are too low compared to
the crop need cannot be regulated by
pricing, and lead to economic ineffi-
ciency linked to enforcing inapplicable
rules. The quest for equity at all costs in
a system with limited resources leads
to the same result.
• Increasing water resources in a water-
scarce system makes it possible, over
and above the direct economic benefits,
to rebuild collective regulation based
on a sound quota + price contract,
which will leave each farmer free
to manage his irrigation efficiently
according to his own water value
function.
Such a water pricing strategy, together
with the investments needed to create
new water resources, are necessary to
help farmers face open market competition.
Other requirements are a guaranteed and
clearly contracted water supply and
full supplier responsibility for irrigation
management without State intervention.
Nevertheless, it is clear that such a
system of price regulation can only work
smoothlywithinanarrowrangeofeconomic
variables–waterpriceandwatervalue–and
it is the State’s responsibility not only to
identify this range but also to be ready to lay
down rules on economically unacceptable
behaviours. Only this type of strong State
makes it possible for the managing agency to
make efficient and economic use of price
regulation.
The main advantage of such a frame-
work is to give back to farmers the freedom
to optimize their choice of crops and their
management of irrigated or non-irrigated
agriculture. This optimization becomes
even more complex in the context of
competitive world markets.
Oneprerequisitetotheefficiencyofthis
economic approach lies in the identification
of the relevant agents (managing agency,
individual farmers, water user groups), the
clear and transparent content of their con-
tract relations (water price, allocated water
volume), and the capacity to measure the
traded economic good (water meters). This
indeed represents a move towards water
markets(Kosciusko-Morizetetal.,1998),but
analysis of the value of irrigation water –
particularly its marginal value – shows that
it would be unwise to go further along
this line, especially when it comes to free
bidding for water quotas, given, on the
one hand, the disproportion between the
106 H. Tardieu
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price of water and, on the other hand, the
necessary equity in the sharing of a socially
highly valued good.
6.7 Conclusion and Lessons Learned
The role of service-oriented organizations
in irrigation and water management is now
largely accepted as a prerequisite for imple-
menting good control of water allocation
and ensuring the sustainability of economic
development (Malano and van Hofwegen,
1999). The transfer of management to water
users’ associations under control of an inte-
grated basin authority is one possible solu-
tion, frequently described but too recent to
be completely convincing. In fact, this type
of solution often leaves unanswered the two
important questions raised at the beginning
of this paper, i.e. how to balance the budget
by raising the water price and how to
reach a fair sharing of scarce water among
users. If water management is transferred to
water users’ associations, the process must
be implemented carefully. The main idea
is to promote ‘self-management without
abandonment’ by transferring to socially
strong users’ associations responsibilities
adapted to their capacity while keeping a
tight partnership with a professional water
manager.
The French history of irrigation man-
agement emphasizes the efficiency of some
other solutions, such as management by
SARs – mixed public-private companies
linked to the Government by concession
contracts. With the experience of such
management, we can propose two recom-
mendations in the very difficult debate on
water pricing and allocation.
• Firstly, a cautious but firm move
towards sustainability cost pricing is
recommended. This involves charging
the amount necessary to ensure the sus-
tainability of the assets, i.e. operation,
maintenance and renewal costs, but not
the full financial cost of the initial
investment or of the most recent
rehabilitation. To correspond exactly to
sustainability, the price charged must
cover all costs incurred in delivering
each drop of water from the dam to the
crop. At this level of cost recovery,
there is no further need of current sub-
sidies for staff, for repairs, for energy or
for future rehabilitation. The subsidy’s
vicious circle is broken. Such develop-
ment is sustainable, even though it is
not designed to recover the initial
investment.
• Secondly, a step pricing system based
on water metering is recommended in
order to facilitate control of allocation
in a fair and transparent water-sharing
system. In case of water scarcity, the
implementation of a quota system is
necessary due to the high marginal
value of water during the irrigation
period. The collective regulation has
to be based on a sound quota + price
contracts between the service provider
and the clients, which will leave each
farmer free to manage his irrigation
efficiently according to his own water
value function. However, in a closing
basin, the new resources must also be
developed to ensure the governability
of the system. The success of controlled
water management, as developed in
the Neste system, has been founded
on joint management of demand and
resources, with the construction of
some new reservoirs during the last
10 years. The shift to an organizational
set-up like the one described here can
succeed, if governance, after the period
of ‘decision without consultation’,
avoids the current tendency towards
‘consultation without decision’.
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River basins are managed at two different
levels. At the higher level, the basin level,
overall policies and plans are set, resources
are allocated and regulations written and
enforced. At the use level, regulated water
deliveries are made to users of water, which
may be irrigators, urban residents, indus-
tries, wetlands or natural river reaches. This
paper focuses on the first level of manage-
ment, the basin level, and examines the way
in which basin level management functions
are performed in the large interior Central
Valley of California. The Central Valley com-
prises what T. Bandaragoda (unpublished
note, 1999, International Water Manage-
ment Institute (IWMI), Colombo, Sri Lanka)
terms an advanced river basin, one which is
already well developed in terms of physical
infrastructure and effective institutions for
integrated water resource management.
Issues of particular interest here are the
interplay of political forces which support
alternative water uses, the currently chang-
ing priorities accorded to alternative water
uses, and processes and institutions
whereby allocational and regulatory activi-
ties at the basin level are directed and
coordinated. One central issue of global sig-
nificance is the extent to which one apex
organization must be in control of the
highest level of decision making in a basin.
Berkoff(1997),forexample,hasassertedthat
‘if water is to be managed holistically, all
aspects must be coordinated by one . . .
agency’. The present study suggests that this
assertion does not apply universally and
raises questions about the conditions under
which different models of basin-level
management would be most effective.
7.1.2 California’s Central Valley
California’s Central Valley is home to mil-
lions and is one of the premiere agricultural
regions in the USA, containing six of the
top ten agricultural counties in the country.
California itself has 33 million residents
and is the most populous state in the
nation. An overwhelming 97% of the
population live in urban areas.
The state as a whole has abundant
renewable water resources, which, in
addition to meeting environmental, urban
and agricultural needs, generate 42% of
the utility-produced electricity in the state.
Irrigated agriculture generates 81% of
California’s total agricultural revenue on
30%ofthestate’sfarmland.Agriculturealso
provides 14.4% of the state’s employment,
thoughonly2.1%ofthatisengagedindirect
production activities. The remaining 12.3%
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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processing, and wholesale and retail sales.
The state is also blessed with a magnificent
andvariednaturalenvironment–thePacific
coast, the Sierra Nevada mountains, broad
inland valleys, wetlands and the southern
deserts. All of these features – the environ-
ment, urban concentrations, power genera-
tion and agriculture – require water for their
sustenance and operation.
SeveralfeaturesofCalifornia’ssituation
make it especially valuable as a case for
study.
• First, California comprises a sophisti-
cated economic environment in which
water is used for a wide variety of pur-
poses and is treated more as a commod-
ity than as a common pool resource.
• Second, intense competition over
water has emerged in what Seckler
(1996) would call a closed water system
– one in which there is little new water
left to develop. This competition
includes agricultural, municipal and
industrial (M&I), and environmental
interests and is driving rapid change in
the institutions that allocate, regulate,
convey and use water.
• Third, the responses to changing public
priorities have been characterized by
pragmatic problem-solving behaviour.
This has made California a virtual
laboratory for innovative solutions to
problems of water reallocation and
management, environmental quality,




California possesses abundant water
resources, receiving nearly 250 billion (109)
m3 of precipitation annually in average
years. Of this amount, about 65% is used by
trees and other natural vegetation. An addi-
tional 10% flows to the Pacific Ocean or
other salt sinks unchecked and unallocated.
The remaining runoff is available as
a renewable water supply for urban,
agricultural and environmental uses.2
Developed surface water resources in
the state total about 80 billion m3,o f
which nearly half are set aside as required
environmental flows.3 About 12% of the
total has been developed under Federal
Government projects, 5% by the State of
California and 17% by local government
entities. An additional 8% comprises water
imported from the Colorado River Basin
under a multi-state water sharing agreement
using facilities also constructed by the
Federal Government.
In addition to surface water sources,
an additional 15 billion m3 is available
as renewable groundwater. Present with-
drawalratesarehigherthanthis,resultingin
anoverdraftofabout1.8billionm3annually,
some 12% of the renewable total. Further-
more, the rate of overdraft is increasing and
was 10% greater in 1995 than it was in 1990.
To some extent, this overdrafting is a
consequence of 1992 federal legislation
reallocating water away from irrigators to
environmental uses. This has led to supply
deficiencies of up to 50% for some Central
Valley irrigators and caused them to
turn to lightly regulated groundwater as
a replacement supply.
Most of California’s precipitation falls
as snow in the mountains of northern
California and in the Sierra Nevada range,
which comprises the high backbone of the
state running from north to south along its
eastern flank (Fig. 7.1). A second range
of much smaller hills, the Coastal Range,
fronts the narrow coastal plane in the West,
creating a broad alluvial valley between
the two ranges. This Central Valley is an
110 M. Svendsen
1 Data for this section are drawn largely from DWR (1998).
2 A portion of the water specifically designated for in-stream environmental use also flows to the Pacific
Ocean.
3 The total of developed surface and groundwater is greater than the 25% of precipitation designated as
available runoff because of reuse.
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conditions for a wide variety of crops and is
theheartofCaliforniaagriculture.Init,more
than 200 types of crops are grown and from
it comes 45% of the nation’s fruits and
vegetables. Two major river systems drain
the Central Valley and some 158,000 km2
of watershed, the Sacramento River in
the north, and the San Joaquin River in the
south. The two rivers meet in the
Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta (the Delta),
justinlandofSanFranciscoBay,fromwhere
they flow into the Bay and out to the Pacific
Ocean.
The fact that two-thirds of California’s
water is in the north, while the bulk of
agricultural land and the largest population
centres are in the south, has led to two
massive engineering projects designed to
transport water from north to south. These
Basin Management in a Mature Closed Basin 111
Fig. 7.1. California’s Central Valley.
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and the State Water Project (SWP).
The CVP was constructed in the 1940s
by the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal
irrigation development agency. Construction
was begun in 1935 as a part of a massive
depression-era public works programme.
TheprojectisanchoredbyShastadaminthe
Cascade Mountains in northern California,
which stores water for use in the south.
Water from Shasta and several smaller dams
is routed down the Sacramento River to the
Delta, which it crosses in a network of natu-
ralandartificialchannels.Someofthewater
is used to irrigate land along the Sacramento
Rivertothe north, but most crosses the Delta
to be lifted 60 m into the Delta–Mendota
Canal (DMC). The DMC supplies 32 irriga-
tion districts in the San Joaquin Valley with
water.
The second project, the SWP, was
developed in the 1960s by the State of
California. Its backbone, the California
Aqueduct, parallels the DMC south from
the Delta before continuing on to southern
California. Its primary purpose is to convey
M&Iwatertodesertcitiesinthesouth(70%),
principally the greater Los Angeles area,
though it does supply irrigation water (30%)
as well. Together these two projects deliver




Overall demand for developed sources
of water is dominated by environmental
reservations (46.5%) and by irrigated
agriculture (42.5%) (Table 7.1). Municipal
demand currently makes up 11.0% of the
total.
7.2.2.2 Changing patterns of demand
Projections for 2020 (DWR, 1998) anticipate
only a very modest expansion in available
supply (1%), but with important shifts in
the composition of use. While environmen-
tal uses of water are expected to remain
constant, urban demand will expand by
37% and agricultural water use will
shrink by nearly 7% to accommodate this
growth. Additional developed supplies will
be devoted entirely to urban use.
The federal Endangered Species Act,
passed in 1973, established the legal
framework for protecting species of
plants and animals listed as threatened
or endangered and the allocation of water
for their preservation where necessary. The
listing of winter run Sacramento River
salmon as endangered under this act in
the early 1990s was the first important
application of the law in California, which
had a significant impact on water allocation
in the Sacramento–San Joaquin Valley. A far
more sweeping change was wrought by the
Central Valley Improvement Act, passed by
Congress in 1992. This act reallocated a por-
tion of the water the federal government had
contracted to deliver to irrigation districts
to the ecosystems of the Sacramento–San
Joaquin Delta. This reallocation has resulted
in significant shortfalls in supplies to many
of the irrigation districts in the San Joaquin
Valley.
7.2.2.3 Urban use
Driving the growth in urban water use
is projected growth in the California
population of nearly 50% between 1995
and 2020, as a result of continuing in-
migration from others regions of the
country and from abroad. The demand for
water caused by this growth completely
overshadows modest potential reductions



























Table 7.1. Average water year water use, 1995
and 2020.
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are fully implemented.5
7.2.2.4 Agricultural use
California has more than 3.6 million ha
of agricultural land under irrigation, 80%
of it in the Central Valley. Projections
for 2020 indicate a modest reduction in
the total irrigated area of about 130,000 ha
(3.6%) resulting mainly from urban
encroachment, land retirement due to
drainage problems, and more competitive
economic markets for agricultural products.6
In addition, changes in cropping patterns
and irrigation technology and practices will
yield small reductions in the rate of per
hectare water use (an estimated 2.4% of
1995 use levels).
7.2.2.5 Environmental use
Environmental water use comprises several
categories of flows that have been set aside
for environmental purposes. These are:
• Dedicated flows in designated ‘wild
and scenic’ rivers (64%);
• Instream flow requirements in other
rivers established by water right per-
mits, court actions, agreements or other
regulatory actions (17%);
• Required Sacramento–San Joaquin
Delta outflows (15%);
• Wetlands freshwater requirements
(4%).
Note that while there are other environ-
mental uses of water, the above uses
are distinguished by being managed and
quantifiable. Most of this environmental
water allocation is brought about by
legislative and regulatory processes rather
than through the water right permitting
process, which authorizes agricultural and
municipal uses.
7.2.3 Summary
California is well endowed with renewable
water resources. Of the 250 billion m3
received as precipitation annually, about
one-quarter is available for various allo-
cated uses. About half of this allocated
water is set aside for instream environmen-
tal uses. The remainder (just over 50 billion
m3) is available for withdrawal for agricul-
tural and urban uses. Groundwater, though
abundant, is currently overdrafted by about
12% of the renewable total and exploitation
continues to expand.
Two major plumbing projects, one
federal and the other state, transfer water
from the wet north to the arid south of the
state. Water moving through both of these
systems must transit the Sacramento–San
Joaquin Delta ‘in the open’, where it mixes
with water in the Delta and contributes to it.
The Delta is also important environmen-
tally, and it serves as the nexus of the debate
over the future of California’s water.
According to the most recent version of
the California Water Plan, urban demand
is expected to grow by 37% over the next
quarter-century, while agricultural water
use shrinks by 7% and environmental
use holds constant. Additional allocations
to environmental uses are being promoted,
however, and if they are adopted, additional
reallocation of agricultural water will be the
likely outcome.
7.3 Legal, Policy and Institutional
Environment
7.3.1 Water rights
Water in California, as in the USA in gen-
eral, is regarded as a good belonging to all
and held in trust by the State.7 Management
of water, and allocation of rights to use
Basin Management in a Mature Closed Basin 113
5 If explicit conservation practices are not implemented, per capita urban demand will increase by about
6%.
6 Thereis potential for much more significant reductions if major proposed conversions of agriculturalland
to wildlife habitat are implemented.
7 This is the Public Trust Doctrine, derived from Roman Law.
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ual states. Rights to use water in California
comprise a complicated mixture of types,
priorities and levels of security. Ground
and surface water rights are treated sepa-
rately, and surface water rights, which are
the most important, include both riparian
and appropriative rights. Underlying and
articulating the various elements of the
allocation scheme are a number of state
and federal laws and numerous court
cases, each of which establishes precedents
upon which subsequent cases build.
Riparian rights to surface streams
are available, under common law, to the
owners of property abutting streams. Water
abstracted under a riparian right cannot be
applied to plots of land that do not abut the
stream, and cannot be transferred to other
uses removed from the riparian land. They
comprise about 14% of rights to non-
imported surface water in California.
Appropriative rights to surface water
are more flexible and comprise the remain-
ing 86% of non-imported surface water
rights. Appropriative rights are granted
through a permitting process managed by
the State of California. Appropriative rights
can be for use at points removed from the
stream of origin and are subject to transfer
and change of purpose. Maintenance of an
appropriative water right requires continu-
ous beneficial use, and the courts have held
that appropriative rights can be lost after
5 years of non-use. Riparian rights are
neither created by use nor lost by non-use.
Groundwater use is only lightly regu-
lated. There is no permitting process
for groundwater exploitation, which is
available, in the first instance, to owners of
overlying land for reasonable beneficial use
on those lands. Groundwater users establish
rights simply by use. Rights are correlative
withtherightsofotherowners,meaningthat
ifthewatersupplyisinsufficient,thesupply
must be equitably apportioned. Subject to
future requirements on overlying lands,
‘surplus’ groundwater may be appropriated
for use on non-overlying lands. Again, no
permit is required.
This very vague and permissive
specification of rights to groundwater has
two important implications. First, as pres-
sure on nearly fully allocated surface water
sources continues to build, users turn to
groundwater to make up deficits, leading
to a serious and growing problem of over-
drafting in many portions of the state.
Second, groundwater is a magnet for litiga-
tion as water users joust over such terms
as ‘surplus’, ‘sufficient’, ‘reasonable’, ‘equi-
table’ and ‘beneficial’. Development of
a suitable institutional framework for
managing groundwater in the state is
urgently needed but proceeding slowly.
7.3.2 Actors
There are seven important groups of actors
involved in basin-level water management
in California, in addition to the general
public. These are the managers, the service
providers, the users, the regulators, advo-
cacy groups, elected officials and the
courts. Some groups, such as regulators,
service providers, the courts and elected
officials, consist of both federal and state-
level actors, while others are purely local.
The main actors in each category are
discussed briefly below.
7.3.2.1 Managers
The most important managing organiza-
tions are two California state organizations
– the Department of Water Resources
(DWR) and the State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB). The DWR replaced
the Office of the State Engineer in 1956,
assuming responsibility for planning and
guiding development of the state’s water
resources. Over the past 45 years, it has
grown from 450 staff to a level ten times that
in 1967 before dropping back, and now
employs about 2000. DWR operates on an
annual budget of about $1 billion and is a
division of the state public administration
under a director who is accountable to
the state governor. Its responsibilities are
primarily technical and operational, but do
include some regulatory functions. Major
responsibilities include the following.
114 M. Svendsen
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Water Plan every 5 years;
• Operating and maintaining the SWP;
• Protecting and restoring the
Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta;
• Dam regulation and flood protection;
• Public education;
• Providing technical assistance to local
communities.
The SWRCB performs functions that are
managerial, regulatory, and quasi-judicial
in nature. It thus occupies a special niche
in the overall set-up. Among its important
responsibilities are the following:
• Allocating rights to appropriate (use)
surface water;
• Adjudicating disputes over rights to
water bodies, such as the Sacramento–
San Joaquin Delta;
• Establishing water quality standards;
• Guiding and overseeing the nine
Regional Water Quality Control Boards.
Board appointments are made by the
governor and the makeup of the Board is
as described in Box 7.1.
Regional Water Boards under the
SWRCB do not allocate water rights but
manage and regulate water quality through
the following kinds of actions:
• Writing waste discharge permits;
• Implementing contamination clean up
operations;
• Monitoring quality and use of regional
ground and surface waters;
• Inspecting dischargers and enforcing
state and federal water quality laws.
Regional Boards consist of five members
who are also appointed by the governor.
7.3.2.2 Service providers
At the basin level, the most important
water service providers are the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR or ‘the
Bureau’) and DWR. The USBR is an agency
of the Federal Government housed in the
Department of the Interior. The Bureau
constructed most of the federally financed
water conveyance and control facilities in
the state, including the pivotal CVP, and
operates the storage and delivery facilities it
has constructed. However, while it retains
operating responsibility for the upstream
portions of the CVP, it has recently
transferred operating responsibilities for
the portions of the system lying south of the
Delta to an organization established and
controlled by San Joaquin Valley water
users, the San Luis–Delta Mendota Water
Authority (SLDMWA). Users have pro-
posed that they assume responsibility for
the upstream portions as well, but action on
that step is more controversial.
The other major water storage and
conveyance project in the state, the SWP, is
operated by DWR, which constructed the
facilities using state resources.
7.3.2.3 Users
Principal water users are the various dis-
tricts that purchase water and deliver it to
the members or residents in the district.
Districts are generally organized to supply
irrigation water to farmers or municipal
water to urban residents. Districts are
incorporated as non-profit entities under
state law and are self-governing. The largest
share of managed surface water is delivered
to agricultural users, most of whom are in
the Central Valley. Other users include
the state Department of Fish and Game,
conservation districts, hydropower facility
operators, and DWR and the USBR for flood
control operations. Freshwater navigation,
though significant in the past, is of minor
importance today.
7.3.2.4 Regulators
Water-related regulation centres around
provisions of federal and state laws protect-
ing endangered species and maintaining
drinking water quality. The federal Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973 is the most
important of these and is enforced by the
national Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Of the endangered species affecting
water use in California, the most critical are
the listed runs of salmon. Technical regula-
tions and certifications relating to salmon
Basin Management in a Mature Closed Basin 115
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Service (NMFS), whereas criteria for other
animal species are set and supervised by
the federal Fish and Wildlife Service.
State environmental regulators also list
endangered species, and this list includes
somethatarenotonthefederallist.Thestate
Fish and Game Department supervises
enforcement of water quality and quantity
requirementsrelatingtostate-listedspecies.
The SWRCB and its subtended regional
boardsbearoverallresponsibilityforsurface
and groundwater quality in the state. The
Federal Clean Water Act and the California
Water Quality Control Act, both aimed at
pollution control, are enforced by these
boards.
7.3.2.5 Advocates
One of the most dramatic recent changes in
the cast of characters in the water drama in
California, and in the USA, is the emer-
gence of environmental advocacy groups
as potent political actors. Most groups are
membership based and supported and may
116 M. Svendsen
Box 7.1. Evolution of a water control agency.
1940s Serious water-quality problems emerged in California, including outbreaks of water-borne
diseases and degradation of fishing and recreational waters. In 1949, a fact-finding committee
highlighted cumbersome and unreasonable laws and administrative procedures, multiple
jurisdictions, limited and conflicting interests, and overlapping authorities as roots of the evident
problems. The committee concluded that the state’s limited water resources could only be
extended through planning to maintain water quality while at the same time allowing maximum
economic use and reuse. It recommended a central focus point at the state level to coordinate
water pollution control activities.
1949 Legislation created a State Water Pollution Control Board consisting of nine gubernatorial
appointees representing specific interests and four ex officio state officials. Its duties included
formulating statewide policy for pollution control and coordinating the actions of various state
agencies and political subdivisions of the state in controlling water pollution. The same legisla-
tion created nine Regional Water Pollution Control Boards in major watersheds. These regional
boards had responsibility for administration, investigation and enforcement of the state’s
pollution abatement program. Five gubernatorial appointees, representing water supply, irrigated
agriculture, industry, and municipal and county government in the region, served on each
regional board.
1959 The 1949 law was revised and broadened on the basis of 10 years of experience. State ex officio
members were removed from the board, increasing its separation from the state administrative
machinery.
1963 The state board was renamed the State Water Quality Control Board and given the broader
mandate of water quality control, replacing the more limited earlier focus on sewage and
industrial waste control.
1967 A proposal to consolidate water-related functions, including water quality control functions,
within the Department of Water Resources (DWR) was rejected on the grounds that this would
create conflicts of interest internal to DWR. Instead quantity and quality management functions
were consolidated external to DWR by merging the State Water Quality Control Board and the
State Water Rights Board into the State Water Resources Control Board. The ‘State Water Board’
consists of five full-time members mandated to protect water quality and to determine rights to
surface water use. Members are appointed by the governor and fill specialized roles on the Board,
i.e. an attorney versed in water law, two civil engineers with expertise in water rights and water
supply, a water quality member, and a public member.
1969 A new Water Quality Control Act was passed which retained the basic structure of state and
regional boards but provided a new regulatory framework for waste discharges to both surface
and ground waters. This act served as a model for the federal Clean Water Act, passed 3 years
later.
Source: http://www.dwr.water.ca.gov
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Some focus on a single issue – a resource or
species – while others have a broader range
of interests. The group Friends of the River
is an example of a resource-focused group
which is largely concerned with restoring
free-flowing rivers in California, while the
Sierra Club, based in California but national
in scope, is an example of a group with a
wide range of conservation interests beyond
water. There are about 20 environmental
groups in California interested in water
issues. These groups are linked through
an Environmental Water Caucus, which
meets every couple of weeks. Accompany-
ing expanded federal and state environ-
mental regulation over the past 25 years
has been greatly strengthened requirements
for transparency in regulatory processes.
7.3.2.6 Elected officials
Legislators at both the federal and state lev-
els write the laws providing the framework
for water resource management in the state.
Although establishing systems for allocat-
ing water resources is the purview of the
state legislature, the federal government
exerts a powerful influence on water alloca-
tion by applying the terms of the federal
Endangered Species Act. This act con-
strains water-related construction projects
in various ways, and can require increased
in-stream allocations of water for fish spe-
cies classed as threatened or endangered.
The governor is a particularly important
figure in the state water resource manage-
ment picture, controlling appointments to
the State Water Board and the regional
Water Quality Boards and as the head of
the state administrative apparatus, which
includes the important DWR. The US Con-
gress also influences allocation through
its ability to mandate changes in water
permits, which are held on behalf of
the US Government by the US Bureau
of Reclamation. Water quality is regulated
by both federal and state statutes.
7.3.2.7 Courts
Both state and federal courts hear cases
relating to water. Where the US Govern-
ment is a party to the litigation, a federal
court must be the venue, as state courts
cannot have jurisdiction over the Federal
Government. Almost all of the cases heard
are civil cases rather than criminal cases,
involving disputes between parties rather
than a violation of state or federal law.
A prominent federal judge in the
Central Valley estimates that about 20% of
his caseload consisted of water cases, and
that the volume of water-related cases had
increasedconsiderablyoverthepast9years.
Cases have also increased in complexity.
The introduction of the Federal ESA and the
listing of a number of fish species in impor-
tant California rivers has played a major role
in this increased complexity. The integra-
tion of Public Trust Doctrine into California
water law8 has also made decisions more
complicated. Throughout this period of
change, the non-governmental (NGO) sector
has increasingly become a ‘third presence’
innearlyeverysignificantcivilcase,seeking
to include the environmentalist viewpoint
into the deliberation.
Major drawbacks to the heavy reliance
on the court system for dispute resolut-
ion are the often drawn-out nature of
proceedings, their expense and the diffi-
culty of reaching sound decisions through
adversarial proceedings. A federal judge
interviewed cited approvingly an old adage,
‘hard cases make bad law’. Increasingly
attention is shifting to various modes of
alternative dispute resolution.
7.3.3 Essential functions
Burton (1999) has identified 11 essential
functions of basin management. A some-
what modified listing of these functions is
shown in Table 7.2, crossed with the key
actors identified in the previous section.
Basin Management in a Mature Closed Basin 117
8 Accomplished by a decision of the state Supreme Court in 1983 in a suit filed by the National Audubon
Society.
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ate, across four broad categories – surface
water, groundwater, wastewater disposal
and agricultural return flows. Cells are
marked to indicate an actor active in a
particular functional area. Information is
drawn from interviews, printed materials
and Internet postings. A number of interest-
ing points emerge from an examination of
Table 7.2.
• A comprehensive planning function
rests with the state DWR. This respon-
sibility covers surface and ground-
water and both quantity and quality.
Although technical analyses and
modelling are done by DWR, extensive
interaction with a variety of stake-
holders in the planning process makes
planning a widely shared activity. The
primary planning document is the
State Water Plan, which is updated
every 5 years in a process led by DWR.
• Surface water allocation and water
quality assurance are assigned to a
single state agency, which is independ-
ent of the other state agencies engaged
in planning or system operations. The
WRCB is autonomous, though it is
political to the extent that the members
are appointed by the governor of the
state. The US congress assumed a
certain amount of de facto allocational
authority in passing a 1992 law, which
directed the USBR to reallocate water
from agricultural users with whom it
held contracts to environmental uses.
Federal and state courts also play
important roles in the allocational
process by resolving disputes over
allocation.
• Enforcement of water quality standards
rests with nine regional boards with
strong local ties but under the overall
guidance of the state-level WRCB. The
courts also play significant roles in
interpreting disputes related to water
quality.
• Retail water delivery services are, for
the most part, in the hands of user-
controlled districts. Such irrigation
and municipal water supply districts
are financially autonomous and self-
regulating. They usually obtain water
from wholesale suppliers through
legally enforceable contracts.
• Groundwater is the most lightly
planned and regulated segment of the
state’s water resources. There is little
control over abstractions, and the state
is in a serious overdraft situation.
• Advocacy groups (environmental
NGOs) make up an important third
presence in most important disputes
involving water. This is a relatively
recent development, but has pro-
foundly changed the way in which
decisions are made, and modified their
outcomes. These groups also play
important roles in joint consensual
processes, such as CALFED and the
American River Water Forum, which
are being used increasingly to develop
mutually acceptable plans and agree-
ments over contentious water-related
issues.
• There is a certain internal conflict
within the DWR with respect to its
multiple roles as wholesale supplier
of water, water resource planner and
regulator. Transparency of process
appears to keep these potential con-
flicts in check. Although not included
in the table, there is a significant
conflict of interests internal to the
US Army Corps of Engineers, which is
charged with wetland permitting and
protection, but is, at the same time, a
construction and operating agency
with close ties to the congressional
appropriations process.
7.3.4 Coordinating processes
Managing an important publicly held natu-
ral resource will always involve multiple
actors, differing interests and perspectives,
and relational dynamics. This is true even
in situations where a single agency is
responsible for all aspects of basin water
management, as there will be winners and
losers among users of basin water resources
Basin Management in a Mature Closed Basin 119
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having differing perspectives and interests.
In California, where there are many dis-
crete actors in the water resource allocation
and management picture, coordination and
decision making have long been important
and contentious functions. Traditionally,
the courts, both federal and state, have pro-
vided a critical dispute resolution function.
As the Sacramento–San Joaquin basin has
closed and water becomesrelativelyscarcer,
disputes have become more frequent and
the number of interested parties has grown,
making proceedings more complex. There is
presently growing interest in various forms
of alternative dispute resolution, including
the use of mediation, arbitration and special
masters.
There is also growing reliance on
processes of shared consensual decision
makingtoreplacethemoretypicaltwo-stage
process of a technical decision made by a
government agency, followed by extensive
and lengthy litigation initiated by unsatis-
fied parties. The most prominent example is
the ongoing CALFED process, which tackles
some of the most contentious water-related
problem in the state, as shown in Box 7.2.
CALFED is a consortium of federal and
state government agencies with manage-
ment and regulatory responsibilities in the
Bay–Delta system. It was formed in 1994
with the mission of developing a long-term
comprehensive plan to restore ecological
health and improve water management for
beneficial uses of the Bay–Delta system, the
heartoftheCentralValleyhydraulicsystem.
CALFED spent its first 2 years identifying
and defining problems and a further 4 years
assessing the environmental implications of
various actions that might be taken. It is
abouttobeginanimplementationphasethat
could last 30 years and cost $10 billion.
What sets CALFED apart from other
programmes is the fact that problems and
solutions are being discussed from the out-
set in an open forum with participation that
spans the entire range of water-related
interests, and that it is proposing an entire
basket of measures which will address the
four problem areas in an integrated, comple-
mentary, sustainable way. Fundamental
principles guiding the process are shown in
Box 7.3. What is striking is the commitment
of all participating parties to make the
CALFED approach work. This commitment
arises in part from the fear that if the process
fails, years of litigation will follow in a far
more adversarial and expensive process of
dispute resolution.
7.3.5 Enabling conditions
The essential functions and actors’ roles
depicted in Table 7.2 provide a static view
of responsibilities. Additional attributes of
well-functioning basin governance9 systems
relate to their dynamics. We term these
attributes, which provide the context
for functional performance, enabling
conditions.
120 M. Svendsen
9 Thetermgovernanceis usedinasomewhatdifferentsenseherethaninBurton’s list ofessentialattributes,
of which it is one. Here the term refers to the rules providing the context for multi-actor basin management and
the processes and activities engaged in by those actors operating within this set of rules.
Box 7.3. CALFED solution principles.
Affordable – solution can be implemented and
maintained with the foreseeable resources of the
CALFED stakeholders
Equitable – solution will focus on resolving
problems in all problem areas
Implementable – solution has broad public
acceptance, legal feasibility and will be timely
and relatively simple compared with alternatives
Durable – solution will have political and
economic staying power
Reduce conflicts – solution will reduce major
conflicts among beneficial users of water
Box 7.2. Bay–Delta problem areas.
• Ecosystem restoration
• Water quality assurance
• Levee system improvement
• Water supply reliability
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institutional environment at the basin level
that must be present, in some measure, to
achieve good governance and management
of the basin. These attributes are not specific
to any one actor, but apply to all actors and
their interactions and comprise necessary
(but not sufficient) normative conditions
for success. Basic enabling conditions are
shown in Box 1.2 in Chapter 1. While a full
analysis of these factors is well beyond
the scope of this chapter, a brief sketch of
each, in the context of California, is given to
illustrate the concepts and indicate broad
strengths and weaknesses.
7.3.5.1 Political attributes
Representation is generally well developed,
with groups having similar interests allied
into various associations. These associa-
tions are supported by their members
who provide funds for representation
and litigation. Environmental concerns are
represented by NGOs, which have grown
over the past 25 years in number, resources
and influence. Supported by protections
provided by federal and state endangered
species laws, they now enjoy power com-
mensurate with the other major players.
7.3.5.2 Informational attributes
The availability of information and trans-
parency of decision-making processes in
the USA, and in California, has also
expanded over the past quarter-century.
These changes have been driven by require-
ments in environmental protection laws, by
the existence of the World Wide Web, and
by growing public demand for information
and openness. It is now a rare deci-
sion-making process that is not character-
ized by ready availability of technical infor-
mation, public hearings and extensive
opportunities for public comment.
7.3.5.3 Legal authority
The system of surface water rights, though
complex, is relatively well specified in law
and through cumulative court decisions.
Rights to groundwater are not well speci-
fied and comprise an area where a stronger
and more appropriate legal basis is urgently
required.
There is a sound legal framework
underlying user-based districts, which pro-
vide such services as irrigation, domestic
water supply, groundwater management
and wetland conservation. Districts are self-
financing and self-governing and generally
work effectively.
7.3.5.4 Resources
Though participants always feel that
financial resources are inadequate, both
financing and human resources within the
basin management system appear generally
adequate. There is a well-developed physi-
cal infrastructure for transferring water
around the state, and from neighbouring
basins, and a steady stream of additions
and improvements to it. Environmental
restrictions and concerns, however, make
infrastructural design a far more demanding
process than it previously was, and have
completely stymied some proposed pro-
jects, such as the peripheral canal around
the Delta. New institutional forms (along
with a legal basis for them) will likely be
required in the future to legitimize and
implement consensual agreements reached
by ad hoc bodies such as CALFED, but the
need for these is still evolving.
7.4 Salient Characteristics of California
Basin Management
A number of important features character-
ize basin water management in California.
These are summarized below:
• Multiple sources of authority and
power – no single public agency
manages water resources in California’s
river basins. Instead, decisions are
made and enforced by a number of state
and federal agencies. Integration is pro-
vided by the State Water Plan, various
regional plans and processes such as
Basin Management in a Mature Closed Basin 121
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• Dynamic interplay of competing inter-
ests – an even broader group of actors
participate in and influence decision
making. These actors are from both
public and private sectors. They debate
in a variety of fora to assert their points
of view. These include public hearings,
the media and the courts. Extensive
lobbying of public officials also takes
place behind the scenes. Decisions
emerge from this interplay.
• Adequate representation of all inter-
ested parties – major parties in the
water debate are well represented and
financed. These include municipal
water districts, agricultural water dis-
tricts, public water supply agencies,
state and federal environmental
regulators, and environmental NGOs.
• Heavy reliance on legally enforceable
contracts and agreements – many of the
water-related decisions made take
the form of contracts or agreements
between two or more parties, rather
than administrative decree. This
requires confidence on all sides in the
enforceability of the agreements.
• Separation of operating and regulatory
functions – regulatory functions are
generally handled by organizations
which are independent of federal, state
and user-controlled operating agencies.
• Adequate databases on hydrologic
processes and capacity to research
new issues – extensive measurement
and data collection programmes have
created a large database of information
on California water resources and their
uses and impacts. Equally importantly,
a strong technical capacity exists in the
private sector to conduct additional
assessments, on a consulting basis, as
needs arise.
• Open access to information and
generally transparent decision-making
processes – information on water
flows, water quality, wastewater qual-
ity, water rights and so on is available
to the public and is generally accessible
through the World Wide Web, and
in publications and public records.
Decision-making processes are gener-
ally conducted in the open and include
public hearings.10 Moreover, decisions
reached are subject to challenge in
court and decisions over controversial
issues often are so challenged.
• Self-financing autonomous districts as
retail service providers – retail water
service delivery is typically handled by
irrigation or water districts, which
are user-controlled, self-financing,
non-profit quasi-municipal entities
incorporated under state law. This
vastly simplifies the service delivery
problem by reducing the number of
major ‘users’ to several hundred from
tens of thousands.
• Important role of an impartial court
system in resolving disputes – federal
and state courts are regularly called
upon to settle disputes brought to them
as civil suits. Without this service, the
water resource management system in
the state would be unworkable.
• Well-defined system of water rights
(except groundwater) – there is a clear
system of allocating and protecting
rights to surface water, which provides
reasonable security to users. Protection
of groundwater is presently more
problematic.
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees8 River Basin Closure and Institutional
Change in Mexico’s Lerma–Chapala Basin
Philippus Wester, Christopher A. Scott and Martin Burton
8.1 Introduction
The Lerma–Chapala basin in central Mex-
ico is a telling example of the institutional
and political challenges that river basin
closure poses, especially for locally man-
aged irrigation. Although rainfall in the past
10 years has been slightly above average,
total water depletion in this basin exceeds
supply by 9% on average. Groundwater is
being mined, with sustained declines in
aquifer levels of 1.00–2.58 m/year (Scott
and Garcés-Restrepo, 2001), while surface
water depletion exceeds supply in all but
the wettest years. As a result, Lake Chapala,
the receiving water body of the basin, is
drying up. In early 2001, the volume of
water stored in the Lake was around 20% of
capacity, the second lowest level recorded
since systematic data collection began in
1934. This lake is the largest in Mexico,
giving it a high symbolic value, and it
generates significant tourism revenue.
Approximately 68% of the annual
renewable water in the basin is used to
irrigate around 700,000 ha, all of which is
locally managed. Since the basin’s water
is fully committed, there is no scope for
irrigation expansion, and the drilling of new
wells and the construction of new dams has
been prohibited. Moreover, water pollution
is serious, with significant wastewater reuse
for irrigation within the basin. Lastly, water
is being transferred from agriculture to
the urban and industrial sectors, without
due compensation to farmers. In sum, the
sustainability of locally managed irrigation
in the basin is under serious threat, carrying
with it grave implications for social equity.
Due to basin closure, the poorer segment of
the farming community is losing its access
to primary water sources as it is diverted
to economically higher-valued uses. Conse-
quently, poor farmers increasingly vie for
derivative water such as wastewater and
drainage effluent (cf. Buechler and Scott,
2000).
In response to the water crisis in the
basin, several institutional changes have
occurred in the basin since 1989, including
the signing of a river basin coordination
agreement (1989), the creation of a River
Basin Council (1993) and the establishment
of aquifer management councils (1995
onwards). Water reforms at the national
level, such as the creation of a national
water agency (1989), the decentralization
of domestic water supply and sanitation to
state and municipality levels (starting in
1983), the transfer of government irrigation
districts to users (1989 to present), the
creation of state water commissions (from
1991 onwards), and a new water law (1992),
have also significantly altered institutional
arrangements for water management in the
basin (González-Villareal and Garduño,
1994). The water reforms in Mexico are
driven by the need to deal with increasing
water over-exploitation, and influenced
by the vested interests of the hydraulic
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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policies pursued by the Mexican govern-
ment (Rap et al., 2004).
This chapter assesses the institutional
arrangements for water management in the
Lerma–Chapala basin and how well they
are dealing with basin closure. It does so by
presenting an overview of the basin’s water
resources and uses, followed by a section
exploring the legal, policy and institutional
conditions that influence how the basin is
governed and managed. This basin profile
provides the backdrop for an analysis of the
essential functions for river basin manage-
ment, after which the key challenges facing
the basin, namely surface and groundwater
allocationmechanismsandthemanagement
of derivative water, are reviewed and
conclusions for the future direction of
institutionalchangeinthebasinaredrawn.
8.2 The Lerma–Chapala Water Balance
The Lerma–Chapala basin covers some
54,300 km2 and crosses five states: Querétaro
(5%), Guanajuato (44%), Michoacán (28%),
Mexico (10%) and Jalisco (13%).1 The
basin is home to a dynamic agricultural
sector and a growing industrial sector and
accounts for 9% of Mexico’s GNP. It is
the source of water for around 15 million
people (11 million in the basin and 2
million each in Guadalajara and Mexico
City) and contains 13% of the irrigated
area in the country. The average annual
runoff in the basin from 1940 to 1995 was
5,757 million cubic metres (MCM), a little
over 1% of Mexico’s total runoff (CNA,
1999a).
The headwaters of the Lerma River rise
intheeastofthebasinnearthecityofToluca
at an elevation of 2600 m a.s.l. (metres
above sea level) to discharge into Lake
Chapala in the west at an elevation of
1500 m a.s.l. The total length of the Lerma
River is 750 km, and eight major tributaries
discharge into it (Fig. 8.1). Lake Chapala,
with a length of 77 kmand a width of 23 km,
is Mexico’s largest natural lake, storing
8125 MCM and covering 111,000 ha when
full. The shallow depth of the lake (average
7.2 m)2 results in the loss of around
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Fig. 8.1. Topography and stream network of the Lerma–Chapala basin.
1 Percentages indicate the area of the basin that falls in each state.
2 On a scale of 1 : 10,000 the dimensions of the lake are 7.7 m by 2.3 m and less than 1 mm deep.
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runoff in the basin) of its storage to
evaporation each year (de Anda et al.,
1998). At times of high water levels, Lake
Chapala discharges into the Santiago River,
which flows in a northwesterly direction
and then drops to the Pacific Ocean after
524 km.
The climate in the basin is semiarid to
subhumid, with 90% of the rain falling
between May and October. Rainfall is
highly variable, with an average over the
1945–1997 period of 712 mm/year, a mini-
mum of 494 mm in 1999 and a maximum of
1022 mm in 1958 (CNA, 1999e). Average
monthly temperatures vary from 14.6°Ci n
January to 21.3°C in May; thus a range of
crops can be grown throughout the year.
The potential evapotranspiration mirrors
the temperature variation, with a peak in
April/May, and an annual total of some
1900 mm. In every month except July and
August there is a net deficit between rainfall
andpotentialevapotranspiration,indicating
the importance of irrigation.
Forty aquifers have been identified in
the basin (CNA/MW, 1999). The upper layer
of these aquifers is generally 50–150 mthick
and composed of alluvial and lacustrine
materials, while the lower layers, several
hundred metres in depth, are composed
primarily of basaltic rocks and rhyolite
tuff. The aquifers are recharged through
rainfall infiltration, surface runoff and,
importantly, deep percolation from surface
irrigation. Various sources report different
dataonannualextractionandrechargerates,
making it hard to portray with any precision
thegroundwatersituationinthebasin.What
is clear is that 30 of the 40 aquifers are in
deficit, with static water levels dropping
at 2.1 m/year on average (Scott and
Garcés-Restrepo, 2001). Recent data from
the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA;
National Water Commission) indicate
that average annual recharge is 3980 MCM,
while average annual extractions are placed
at 4621 MCM, giving a deficit of 641 MCM,
some 71% of the total water deficit in the
basin (CNA, 1999a).
Table 8.1 presents current average
consumptive water use for different sectors
in the basin compared to average annual
renewable water, and shows a deficit of
900 MCM.Thepercentageofavailablewater
that is developed and put to use in the
basin is 109%, showing its degree of over-
commitment. The out-of-basin transfers are
to Guadalajara (surface water) and Mexico
City (groundwater) for urban water supply.
To portray basin closure in the Lerma–
Chapala basin, it is instructive to analyse
fluctuations in the water levels of Lake
Chapala.Figure8.2showsthesefluctuations
from 1934 to 2000 and relates them to
developments in the basin.
Starting in 1945,water levels in the lake
declined sharply, from around 97 m on
River Basin Closure and Institutional Change 127
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Table 8.1. Water balance of the Lerma–Chapala Basin.
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesaverage to 90.8 m in 1954,3 due to a pro-
longed drought combined with significant
abstractions from the lake for hydroelectric-
ity generation. During this period, around
200,000 ha were irrigated in the basin,
mainly with surface water, and the con-
structed storage capacity in the basin was
1628 MCM. This period was the first time
the basin headed towards closure as far as
surfacewaterisconcerned.However,thanks
to good rains towards the end of the 1950s,
the lake recuperated, and levels fluctuated
between95.5and98.5 mfrom1960to1979.
In 1979, a second period of decline
set in, leading to basin closure in the
mid-1980s.Bythis time,constructed storage
capacity in the basin had increased to
4499 MCM and the average irrigated area
had grown to around 670,000 ha, with a sig-
nificant increase in groundwater irrigation.
Although abstractions from the lake for
hydropower generation had ceased, the
combination of these factors resulted in
declines in the lake level, from around 95 m
at the start of 1980 to 92 m in 1990. After
a modest recuperation in the early 1990s,
lake levels declined again after 1994, and
by February 2001 had fallen to 91.5 m, the
lowest level measured since 1954, due to
continued over-exploitation of surface and

























Fig. 8.2. Lake Chapala water levels and basin developments.
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Sources for lake levels: de P. Sandoval (1994) and CNA (1991, 1992, 1993a, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998, 1999b, 2000b).
aDecade average for de P. Sandoval (1994) for 1934–1949 and CNA/MW (1999) for 1950–1999.
bPopulation data for the end of the decade. Source: de P. Sandoval (1994) for extimates for 1939, 1949,
1959, 1969 and 1979, and CNA/MW (1999) for actual figures for 1989 and 1999.
cConstructed storage capacity at end of decade. Source: de P. Sandoval (1994) and CNA (1999e).
dAverage actual irrigated area over the decade. Source: CNA (1999e).
eDecade average, excluding evaporation for de P. Sandoval (1994) and CNA (1991, 1992, 1993a, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999b).
3 Lake elevations are measured relative to a locally defined benchmark where 100 m is set as the high
shoreline (de Anda et al., 1998).
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recoverwithoutexceptionalrunoff,asmight
begeneratedbyamajorhurricane.Whilethe
river basin was closing in water quantity
terms, water quality also deteriorated
severely, with increased effluent discharges
and hardly any treatment of urban and
industrial wastewater before 1989. Cur-
rently, the Lerma River and most of its
tributaries are classified as contaminated.
Two of its tributaries, the Turbio River and
Guanajuato River, are classified as highly
contaminated (CNA, 1999a).
8.2.1 Irrigated agriculture
The main water user in the basin is
irrigation, depleting 59% of total available
surface water and 79% of renewable
groundwater (Table 8.1). Nine large-scale
canal irrigation systems (termed irrigation
districts in Mexico) command around
285,000 ha and some 16,000 farmer-
managed and private irrigation systems
(termed unidades de riego in Mexico) cover
510,000 ha. Twenty-seven reservoirs with
a storage capacity of 250 MCM provide
235,000 ha in the irrigation districts with
surface water, whereas around 1500 smaller
reservoirs serve 180,000 ha in the unidades.
An estimated 26,000 deep tubewells
provide around 380,000 ha in the basin
with groundwater, of which 47,000 ha are
located in irrigation districts (CNA, 1993b;
CNA/MW, 1999). In the irrigation districts,
there are an estimated 88,000 water users
(70,000 ejidatarios and 18,000 pequeños
propietarios4) compared to 100,000 water
users in the unidades (84,000 ejidatarios
and 16,000 pequeños propietarios) (CNA/
MW, 1999). Detailed data on cropping
patterns and productivity for the whole
basin are not available, although studies
on selected irrigation systems are available
(e.g. Kloezen and Garcés-Restrepo, 1998;
CNA/MW, 1999; Flores-López and Scott,
2000; Silva-Ochao, 2000). These studies
show that the main crops irrigated in the
basin are lucerne, wheat, sorghum and
maize, whereas vegetables and fruits are
increasing in importance.
In the early 1990s, the Mexican govern-
ment transferred the government-managed
irrigation districts to water users associa-
tions (WUAs) (cf. Rap et al., 2004). Transfer
was part of a major reform of the agricultural
sectorinitiatedatthehighestlevelofgovern-
ment.Reformwasdrivenbymarket-oriented
economic and political imperatives and
resulted in the following.
• Removal/reduction of direct and indi-
rect subsidies to agricultural production;
• Privatization/elimination of public sec-
tor input supply and crop marketing
bodies;
• Removal/reduction of tariffs and
barriers to agricultural trade;
• Reform of the Mexican Constitution to
permit the sale and renting out of ejido
land.
The intent of these reforms was to stimulate
economic growth through private invest-
ment in agriculture. The main objective of
the Mexican irrigation management transfer
(IMT) programme was to reduce public
expenditure on irrigation by creating
financially self-sufficient WUAs that would
shoulder the full operation and mainte-
nance (O&M) costs of the irrigation systems
(Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997). Farmers
were initially resistant to these changes, but
have now generally come to accept them.
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, nine
irrigationdistrictsweretransferredtofarmer
management in the early 1990s. WUAs now
manage secondary canal units varying in
sizefrom1500to30,000 ha.TheWUAswere
formed as legally recognized non-profit
associations to which CNA granted 30-year
concessions for the use of water and the
River Basin Closure and Institutional Change 129
4 Ejidatariosaremembersofejidos,landreformcommunitiescreatedaftertheMexicanRevolutionof1910.
Land holdings per ejidatario are typically less than 5 ha. Pequeños propietarios are private farmers with a limit
on land ownership of 100 ha; however, holdings may be managed in much larger blocks, with nominal
ownership in the hands of family members, friends and others.
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CNA continues to manage the dams and
headworks, and in mostdistricts, it manages
the main canals and delivers water in bulk
to the WUAs as well. However, in the Alto
Río Lerma irrigation district, a federation of
WUAs has been formed to manage the main
system (Kloezen, 2000).
Research carried out by Kloezen et al.
(1997) shows that the WUAs in the Alto Río
Lerma irrigation district have been effective
in improving the provision of services
and recovering costs from users.5 More
recent work in the district raises questions
about the WUAs’ long-term sustainability
(Monsalvo,1999;Kloezen,2000).Itisimpor-
tanttonotethatIMTwasexternallyimposed
and occurred at a time when the Lerma–
Chapala basin was already closed. This has
placed a double strain on the newly created
WUAs. On the one hand, they have had
to learn how to manage sizeable secondary
canal units, at which they have been rela-
tively successful, and how to interact with
the CNA. On the other hand, they need
to organize themselves by establishing
relations with WUAs in other irrigation
districts to ensure their voice is heard in
river basin management discussions.
The management structures in the
unidades are much more diverse, and may
consist of informal WUAs, government rec-
ognized WUAs, water judges, pump groups
or commercial management (Silva-Ochoa,
2000). As state intervention in the unidades
has been piecemeal in comparison to the
districts, and has usually only consisted of
assistance in construction and the concess-
ioning of water rights, government control
over water use in the unidades is much
weaker than in the irrigation districts. As
a corollary, the representation of unidades
in basin-wide decision-making forums is
weak.
8.2.2 Urban water supply
Domestic water supply in the basin
mainly depends on groundwater (95%),
with total consumptive use at 791 MCM.
In addition, water is transferred out of the
basin to provide Guadalajara (237 MCM
surface water) and Mexico City (323 MCM
groundwater) with urban water. The popu-
lation in the basin has increased sig-
nificantly, doubling from 2.1 million
inhabitants in 1930 to 4.5 million in
1970 and then more than doubling
again to 11 million in 2000 (CNA/MW,
1999). The population of the basin will
again double in the next 30 years if the
population growth rate of 2.16% remains
the same (CNA/MW, 1999). Besides a
fivefold increase in population in the
past 70 years, the basin’s population has
become strongly urbanized. Population
in the seven largest cities in the basin
increased from 12.7% to 40.9% of the
basin’s total population between 1930 and
2000, while the rural population dropped
from above 75% to less than 25% during
the same period (CNA/MW, 1999). Popula-
tion growth has led to increasing pressures
on the basin’s water resources. Scott et al.
(2001) project that urban water demand in
the medium term will increase by some
4.1% per year.
Starting in 1983, domestic water
supply, wastewater collection, and, more
recently,theoperationalcostsofwastewater
treatment, were decentralized to municipal-
ities. The creation of water utilities has been
promoted to separate these activities from
other municipal responsibilities. However,
according to CNA (1999d, p. 8) ‘most of
the water utilities have a poor perfor-
mance and need to be greatly improved
to achieve technical and economical
sufficiency.’
130 P. Wester et al.
5 Based on an extensive survey of farmers’ perceptions on changes in irrigation management after transfer,
Kloezen et al. (1997) report that 36% of the farmers perceived that water adequacy at field level had improved
with IMT, 26% perceived no change and 23% reported it had become worse. According to 64% of the
ejidatarios and 47% of the private farmers the condition of the irrigation network had improved, while 54% of
theejidatariosand38%oftheprivatefarmersstatedthedrainagenetworkhadimproved.Costrecoverywentup
from 50% to more than 100%.
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Although industry only uses a small
amount of water (278 MCM or 3% of annual
renewable water in the basin), it generates
35% of Mexico’s industrial GNP and pays
around US$42 million in water taxes6 to the
federal government (CNA/MW, 1999). The
6400 registered industrial firms in the basin
are a major source of water pollution (fig-
ures are not available), although officially
they must have a permit from CNA indicat-
ing effluent standards to discharge waste-
water. Fees for discharging wastewater
above effluent standards were established
in 1991 and updated annually. According
to Tortajada (1999), most polluters do not
pay these fees, while industries and cities
that have submitted wastewater treatment
proposals to CNA are exempted from
payment.
8.3 The Hydro/Institutional Landscape in
the Lerma–Chapala Basin
A watershed year for water management
in Mexico was 1989. Whereas the previous
100 years were characterized by increas-
ing federal control over water, since
1989 decentralization has been the
norm. Currently states, municipalities and
water users have a larger say in water
management decision making. The current
distribution of competencies in water
management in the Lerma–Chapala basin
is set out below.
8.3.1 Water rights
In Mexico, surface water is defined in the
Constitution as national property placed
in the trust of the federal government. As
the trustee of the nation’s water, the federal
government has the right to concession
surface water-use rights to users for periods
ranging from 5 to 50 years (Kloezen, 1998).
In irrigation districts and unidades, conces-
sions are granted to WUAs and not individ-
ual water users. The concession titles
set out the volumes of water concession
holders are entitled to, although CNA may
adjust the quantity each receives annually
to reflect water availability, with priority
being given to domestic water users (CNA,
1999b). Thus for allocating surface water,
Mexico follows the proportional appropria-
tion doctrine and, in theory, all concession
holders share proportionally in any short-
ages or surpluses of water.7 Once issued,
water concessions need to be recorded
in the Public Register of Water Rights
maintained by CNA. After registration, the
concessions become fully tradeable within
river basins, although the CNA needs to
be notified of trades and needs to approve
them (Kloezen, 1998).
The situation surrounding groundwater
is more complex, as the Constitution does
not define it as national property but rather
states that overlying landowners may bring
groundwater to the surface as long as this
does not affect other users. In 1946, the
Constitution was amended to enable the
federal government to intervene in aquifers
in overdraft by issuing pump permits
or declaring that new pumps may not be
installed. Based on a ruling of the Supreme
Court in 1983, groundwater is now consid-
ered national property, although this is
not reflected in the Constitution or the
1992 water law (Palacios and Martínez,
1999). Groundwater concessions in Mexico
are granted on a volumetric basis, with a
maximum extraction or pumping rate
specified.
River Basin Closure and Institutional Change 131
6 Under the Federal Law on Excise Taxes, updated annually, water users have to pay a tax for the benefits
derived from using water, because it is national property. For agriculture a zero rate was established; farmers
only have to pay irrigation service fees to WUAs (Tortajada, 1999).
7 This contrasts with the prior appropriation system, where first rights have seniority.
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and stakeholders
Numerous stakeholders are involved in
water management in the Lerma–Chapala
basin. The government agency responsible
for water management in the basin is the
CNA, a semi-autonomous federal agency
falling under the Ministry of Environment.
Created in January 1989, the CNA is
charged with defining water policy,
granting water concessions and wastewater
discharge permits, establishing norms for
water use and water quality and integrating
regional and national water management
plans. The aim of unifying all government
responsibilities related to water in the CNA
was to create the necessary conditions for
moving towards sustainable water manage-
ment (CNA, 1999d). To complement this
move, a modern and comprehensive water
law was promulgated in 1992 (CNA, 1999c).
This law defines an integral approach for
managing surface and groundwater in the
context of river basins, which it considers
the ideal unit for water management. It
also promotes decentralization, stakeholder
participation, better control over water
withdrawals and wastewater discharges,
and full-cost pricing.
To discharge its mandate, CNA consists
of four levels: federal headquarters, regional
offices, state offices and irrigation district
offices. Specific responsibilities of the
federal headquarters include the following:
• Manage the nation’s water and act as its
custodian;
• Formulate and update the National
Water Plan and ensure its execution;
• Maintain the Public Register of Water
Rights;
• Monitor water taxes payment and send
reports to fiscal authorities;
• Facilitate the resolution of, or arbitrate
in, water conflicts;
• Promote conservation and efficient use
of water;
• Support the development of urban and
rural domestic water supply and drain-
age and sanitation networks, including
the treatment and reuse of wastewater;
• Support the development and manage-
ment of irrigation and drainage systems
and storm and flood protection works.
To facilitate river basin management
and interaction with stakeholders, CNA
has divided the country into 13 hydrologic
regions based on river basin boundaries and
established an office in each region. These
regional offices have been delegated res-
ponsibilities from the national level and
are relatively autonomous. Their main
responsibilities include the following:
• Organize and manage CNA’s actions
at the regional level concerning the
planning, execution and evaluation of
the Regional Water Plan;
• Integrate and validate requests for
water concessions (users), allocations
(municipalities) and permits (ground-
water and wastewater), issuing those
that fall in its competency and forward-
ing to HQ those that do not;
• Supervise the Public Register for
Water Rights offices at the state level,
and consolidate and send to HQ all
information necessary to keep the
Register updated at the national level;
• Assist CNA state offices in their
collection of water taxes from users;
• Integrate and update programmes
for the operation, maintenance and
rehabilitation of irrigation districts and
water treatment plants;
• Supervise and assist in the operation
of climate and river flow measuring
networks;
• Enforce legal standards concerning
water pollution and wastewater
discharges.
Responsibilities for water management at
the state level are more diffuse. CNA has
established offices in Mexico’s 31 states
that function under the supervision of
the regional offices. The role of state
governments, as opposed to the federal
government, in water management has been
limited to regulating municipal water utili-
ties and supporting utilities showing poor
technical and economic performance. As
part of the ‘new federalism’ policy during
132 P. Wester et al.
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the federal government promoted delega-
tion of responsibilities and programmes
to the states, but, notably, not financial
resources. Although the federal government
has encouraged the modification of state
laws to promote the participation of state
governments in water management through
the creation of State Water Commissions,
the response has been lukewarm. This is
not the case in Guanajuato, where CEAG
(Comisión Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato;
Guanajuato State Water Commission) has
taken on its new role with vigour (Guerrero-
Reynoso, 2000). The relationship between
the State Water Commissions and the CNA
still needs to be defined.
At the irrigation district level, CNA
and WUAs share responsibility for water
management. According to the 1992 water
law and the WUAs’ concession titles, CNA
remains the authority in the irrigation
districts. The CNA Irrigation District Office
retains the following responsibilities and
powers:
• Notify the WUAs on the volume of
surface water they have been allocated
for the coming year;
• Operate and maintain the dams and
headworks of the irrigation district
and also the main system if a
federation of WUAs has not been
established;
• Approve irrigation service fee levels,
determined by the WUAs according to
the procedures outlined by the CNA in
the concession title;
• Establish and periodically revise the
instructions for the operation and
maintenance of the secondary canal
units managed by WUAs;
• Approve the WUAs annual mainte-
nance plan and ensure that it is carried
out satisfactorily;
• Participate in the General Assembly of
the WUAs with the right to speak but
not to vote;
• Cancel or refuse to renew concession
titles if WUAs perform unsatisfactory.
Based on the concession granted to them
by the CNA, WUAs legally assume the
responsibility to operate, maintain and
administer their secondary canal unit.
Their specific responsibilities to the CNA
are the following:
• Develop and enforce bylaws that detail
procedures for water distribution, sys-
tem maintenance and investment, cost
recovery, and dealing with complaints
and sanctions;
• Collect irrigation service fees that fully
cover the O&M and administration
costs of the WUA;
• Pay CNA a percentage of the revenues
from fee collection for CNA services
related to O&M of the dams, headworks
and main canal system;
• Prepare annual operation and mainte-
nance plans and budgets and send to
CNA for approval.
At the river basin level, an important inno-
vation has been the creation of river basin
councils. The water law stipulates that
stakeholder participation is mandatory in
water management at the river basin level.
To this end river basin councils, defined
in the water law as coordinating and con-
sensus-building bodies between the CNA,
federal, state and municipal governments,
and water user representatives (CNA,
1999c), have been established by CNA in 25
river basins (CNA, 2000a). The stated goal
of the councils is to foster the integral man-
agement of water in their respective river
basins through proposing and promoting
programmes to improve water management,
develop hydraulic infrastructure and
preserve the basin’s resources. Formally,
the river basin councils have little
decision-making power, as CNA remains
responsible for water concessions, the col-
lection of water taxes and water investment
programmes. The role of the councils is to
assist CNA in the execution of its vested
powers and to ensure that CNA takes
stakeholders’ opinions into account (CNA,
2000a).
Mexico’s first river basin council was
established in the Lerma–Chapala basin in
response to the dropping level of Lake
Chapala in the 1980sand the severe contam-
ination of the Lerma River (Mestre, 1997). In
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fivestategovernmentssignedacoordination
agreement to improve water management in
the basin by: (i) allocating surface and
groundwater fairly among users and regulat-
ingwateruse;(ii)improvingwaterqualityby
treating effluents; (iii) increasing water-use
efficiency; and (iv) conserving the river
basin ecosystem and watersheds. Based on
this agreement, a formal Consultative Coun-
cil was formed in September 1989 to follow
up on these objectives. Based on the 1992
water law the Consultative Council became
the Lerma–Chapala River Basin Council on
28 January, 1993.
In the past 10 years, the River Basin
Council has beenin flux, and onlyin August
2000 was its structure formalized (CNA,
2000a). It now consists of a Governing
Council,aMonitoringandEvaluationGroup
(MEG), a Basin Level User Assembly and
Special Working Groups, while the CNA’s
regional office forms the Council’s secre-
tariat (Fig. 8.3). The Governing Council is
chaired by CNA, while user representatives
from six sectors (agriculture, fisheries, ser-
vices, industry, livestockand urban) and the
governors of the five states falling in the
basin are its members, yielding a total of 12
members. Although agriculture uses 68% of
the annual renewable water in the basin, it
only has one vote out of 12 on the Council.
The decision-making body of the River
Basin Council is the MEG, which is a carbon
copy of the Governing Council except that
state governors send representatives in their
stead, while CNA is represented by the head
of its regional office. The MEG meets on a
regular basis to prepare and convene Coun-
cil meetings and more importantly to draft
agreements to be signed at formal Council
meetings.
ThestructureoftheRiverBasinCouncil
is complemented by a stepped form of user
representation, consisting of water user
committees for the six water use sectors rep-
resented on the Council. These committees
can be formed at the regional, state or local
level, building on already existing WUAs or
other legally recognized water management
groups where possible. The water user com-
mitteesformtheBasinLevelUserAssembly,
which elects the six user representatives on
the Council. In addition, forums at the sub-
basin level, such as watershed commissions
and aquifer management councils, form part
of the structure of the River Basin Council
(Fig. 8.3).


















































Fig. 8.3. Structure of the Lerma–Chapala River Basin Council.
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Management
As set out in Chapter 1, a set of essential
functions has been posited to analyse the
institutional arrangements for river basin
management. A list of these functions as
they apply in the Lerma–Chapala basin,
crossed with the key actors identified
in the previous section, is shown in
Table 8.2. Cells are marked to indicate if
an actor is active in a particular functional
area, while action verbs such as Execute
(E), Supervise (S), Advise (A), Authorize
(Aut), Regulate (Reg) and Represent (Rep)
are used to describe the nature of an actor’s
activities or responsibilities. The table,
together with the description of the actors,
gives an indication of which essential
functions are accounted for and who is
involved in their execution. In itself, this is
useful to identify whether certain essential
functions are not being executed. A number
of interesting points emerge from Table 8.2:
• Most of the essential functions relating
to surface water are covered.
• The withdrawal and distribution of
groundwater is weakly regulated, and
the construction of new facilities
continues although this has been
prohibited.
• Monitoring and ensuring the quality
of primary water sources are relatively
weak functions. Stopping groundwater
pollution is a function that is not
covered at all.
• The monitoring of wastewater quality
and enforcing wastewater discharge
norms are also functions that receive
little attention, while the allocation
and distribution of wastewater in the
basin is not regulated at all and left to
actors on the ground.
• Industries and non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) are hardly involved
in water management in the basin.
Another, perhaps more interesting, ques-
tion is how efficiently the functions are
executed and if they are effective. To
evaluate how well the functions are being
performed, an evaluation matrix was devel-
oped and applied to the Lerma–Chapala
basin. This matrix consisted of eight
variables for each essential function, four
related to effectiveness and four related
to efficiency. For each variable, three
questions were formulated that could be
answered on a scale of 1 to 5, giving a maxi-
mum score of 60 points for effectiveness
and 60 points for efficiency per function.
The scores per function can be set out
against each other, with effectiveness on the
x-axis and efficiency on the y-axis, yielding
a graphical representation of how well the
functions are executed (Fig. 8.4). The scores
presented in Fig. 8.4 are the averages of the
responses given by 15 key water manage-
ment stakeholders in the basin. Although a
drawback of the evaluation matrix is that it
did not distinguish between surface and
groundwater or between primary and deriv-
ative water sources, it is presented here as
it reflects overall impressions of key water
management actors in the Lerma–Chapala
basin regarding the execution of the essen-
tial functions in their basin. An interesting
point that emerges from Fig. 8.4 is that none
of the essential functions are executed effi-
ciently according to key water managers in
the basin. What also stands out is that, apart
from protecting the environment, the effec-
tiveness of the execution of the essential
tasks is moderate. The next section presents
more detail on the overarching issues facing
the basin.
8.5 Overarching Issues
Through steady changes in the institutional
arrangements in the Lerma–Chapala basin
in recent years, progress has been made
towards improved water management.
This progress is significant, in light of the
complicated transition from highly central-
ized water management to one in which
states, municipalities and water users have
a larger say. None the less, from a water per-
spective the Lerma–Chapala basin is still in
crisis. The efforts of the Council over the
past 10 years need to be redoubled to tackle
River Basin Closure and Institutional Change 135
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it. Three challenges stand out, namely
the allocation of surface water and ground-
water, and the management of derivative
water.
8.5.1 Surface water allocation
To allocate surface water in the basin, the
governors of the five states in the basin and
the federal government signed a treaty in
August 1991 (CCCLC, 1991). An important
objective of the treaty is to maintain ade-
quate water levels in Lake Chapala and to
ensure Guadalajara’s domestic water sup-
ply. To preserve Lake Chapala, the treaty
sets out three allocation policies, namely
critical, average and abundant, based on
whether the volume of water in the lake is
less than 3300 MCM, between 3300 and
6000 MCM, and more than 6000 MCM,
respectively. Each year the Council verifies
the volume stored in Lake Chapala to deter-
mine the allocation policy to be followed
for the next year. For each allocation policy,
formulas have been drawn up to calculate
water allocations to the irrigation systems
in the basin, based on the surface runoff
generated in each of the five states in the
previous year. Table 8.3 indicates how this
works for the Alto Río Lerma irrigation dis-
trict. Based on extensive modelling of these
formulas, it was concluded that the result-
ing water allocation would not impinge on
the 1440 MCM needed by Lake Chapala for
evaporation. Thus, as shown in Table 8.3, if
the surface runoff generated is below a cer-
tain threshold, a fixed volume is deducted
from the irrigation district’s allocation so
that this can be passed on to the lake.
Since 1991, the MEG of the Council has
met each year and has applied the water
allocation rules set out in the treaty. Figure
8.5 sets out the volumes of water allocated
and used from 1992 to 2000, as well as the
volume of water stored in Lake Chapala.
This shows that the 1991 treaty has been
enforced,asactualusehasneverbeenhigher
than the allocated values. A caveat here is
that only the extractions by irrigation dis-
tricts are accurately measured, thus actual
withdrawals may have been higher as the
amount of water going to the unidades de
riego is unknown.


















Ineffective and inefficient Effective but inefficient
Efficient but ineffective Efficient and effective
 1. Protect ecology
 2. Construct facilities
 3. Flood protection
 4. M/E Water quality
 5. Maintain facilities  
 6. Plan (basin-level)
 7. Distribute water
 8. Allocate water
Fig. 8.4. Effectiveness and efficiency of essential functions in the Lerma–Chapala basin.
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the surface water treaty, Lake Chapala’s
volume has halved in the past 8 years. This
is so, in part, because the treaty takes the
surface runoff generated in the previous
year to determine water allocations. In 1997
rainfall was only 645 mm (against the
average annual value of 712 mm) and dam
storage (used here as a proxy of surface
runoff) was consequently low. Combined
with a lake volume below 3300 MCM, the
critical allocation policy was followed for
1998, leading to the lowest allocations since
the treaty was signed. However, rainfall in
1998 was exceptionally good, at 810 mm
some 100 mm above average, leading to a
recuperation of the volume of water stored
behind dams and a slight increase in the
volume of Lake Chapala to 3361 MCM. As
a result, the average allocation policy was
followed for 1999 and 3664 MCM were allo-
cated to water users, the highest level since
thesigningofthetreaty.Unfortunately,rain-
fall in 1999 was a historic low of 494 mm.
These two factors resulted in Lake Chapala
dropping toits lowestlevelsince thesigning
of the treaty and point to inadequate
provisions in the treaty for inter-annual
planning of water availability and dealing
with contingencies.
ThemembersoftheCouncilhaverecog-
nized the shortcomings of the surface water
138 P. Wester et al.
Lake Chapala volume
Surface runoff generated (SRG) in
the State of Guanajuato (MCM)





if SRG between 280 and 1260
if SRG > 1260
if SRG between 144 and 1125
if SRG between 1125 and 1400
if SRG > 1400
if SRG between 19 and 1000
if SRG between 1000 and 1200
if SRG > 1200
then VA = 94.2% of SRG–262.8
then VA = 924
then VA = 94.2% of SRG–135.6
then VA = 924
then VA = 955
then VA = 94.2% of SRG–17.9
then VA = 924
then VA = 955
Source: CCCLC (1991).





















Volume allocated Volume used
Lake Chapala volume on 1 Nov. Dam storage on 1 Nov.
Fig. 8.5. Surface water allocated and used in the Lerma–Chapala basin. Sources: CNA (1991, 1992,
1993a, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999b, 2000b).
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treaty, as it was clear that it was not rescuing
Lake Chapala. In 1999 and 2000, detailed
studies were carried out with hydrological
data from 1945 to 1997 (an improvement
over the 1950–1979 data used for the
previous treaty) to develop a new model for
calculatingsurfacerunoff(CNA,1999e).The
Council signed the amendment of the 1991
surface treaty on 24 August, 2000 (Consejo
de Cuenca Lerma–Chapala, 2000).However,
various states in the basin feel that they did
not have sufficient input in the design of the
surface runoff model and that CNA imposed
the treaty on them. In addition, consultation
with water users concerning the new treaty
has beenminimal,although user representa-
tives on the Council voted in favour.
Although the signing of the new treaty
shows the adaptability of the Council and
thecommitmentofitsmemberstoconstruea
waterallocationpolicythatmeetsurbanand
agricultural needs while safeguarding the
environment, the process by which it was
arrived at is contested.
An issue that the Council has not yet
started to consider is how to compensate
farmers for water transferred out of agricul-
ture for urban and environmental demands.
Scott et al. (2001) calculate that the benefits
forgone for farmers in the Alto Río Lerma
irrigation district as a result of a reduced
waterallocationtothe district for1999/2000
amounted to US$14 million. Although suffi-
cient water was stored in the district’s reser-
voirs to cover its full allocation (955 MCM)
the district was allocated only 648.2 MCM
under the treaty, due to the critically
low volume of water in Lake Chapala and
the minimal surface runoff generated in
Guanajuato in 1999. To shore up water
levels in Lake Chapala, the CNA released
240 MCM from the district’s main reservoir
into the Lerma River in October 1999,
thereby transferring surface water from
the agricultural sector to the urban and
environmental sector.
The reduced allocation to the Alto Río
Lerma irrigation district in 1999 resulted in
some20,000 haoutofatotalof77,000 hanot
being irrigated with surface water in the
winter season. Four of the 11 WUAs in the
district went without irrigation altogether,
whereas in the other WUAs, irrigation was
restricted to a maximum of 3 ha per land-
owner. For better off farmers who could
switch to groundwater, this was not too
problematic, but for many poorer farmers
whomainlyrelyonsurfacewater,theresults
were disastrous. In addition, many poor
farmers who traditionally pumped return
flows from the Lerma River were hard hit as
the use of this precarious source of water
was prohibited and enforced through army
patrols along the river. The surface water
allocations for all the irrigation districts in
the basin forthe 2000/01winter season were
so low that the WUAs decided to let
200,000 ha (of a total of 235,000 ha in the
irrigation districts normally irrigated with
surface water) lie idle. Once again, poor
farmers were hardest hit. On the other hand,
Lake Chapala has dropped to its lowest
levels in 50 years, and environmental
NGOs and the Jalisco state government are
demanding the transfer of water stored
behind the dams of the irrigation districts to
the lake.
The lack of water in the past 2 years has
galvanized WUA leaders to take action. In
May 2000, the presidents of WUAs located
in Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán met
each other for the first time to discuss ways
to strengthen their representation in the
River Basin Council. Until then, WUAs of a
particular irrigation district had dealt only
with the CNA, and there were no horizontal
linkages between WUAs from different dis-
tricts. In 2001, WUAs from irrigation dis-
tricts in Querétaro and Mexico joined the
discussions, and thecombinedWUAs estab-
lished a new working group in the River
Basin Council focusing on agriculture. They
have vowed that not a single drop of water
will be passed to Lake Chapala and have
threatened civil disobedience if CNA trans-
ferswaterasinOctober1999.Itisclearthata
serious conflict is brewing in the basin sur-
rounding surface water and that the Council
needs to act fast to come up with a workable
solution. What is more worrisome is that the
lack of surface water has led many farmers
to increase their use of groundwater, while
aquifers are already in perilous decline.
River Basin Closure and Institutional Change 139
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The serious overdraft of the basin’s aquifers
is arguably a more pressing issue than sur-
face water allocation. Although the Council
signed a coordination agreement to regulate
groundwater extraction in the basin in
1993, progress on the ground has been slow
(CCCLC, 1993). A key problem is that the
Council, through the CNA, does not physi-
cally control the water extraction infra-
structure (the wells), as it does in the case of
surface water (the dams). Although the Con-
stitution mandates the federal government
to intervene in aquifers in overdraft by plac-
ing them under veda, prohibiting sinking
of new wells without permission from the
federal government, the experience with
vedas has been disappointing (Arreguín,
1998). The reality of groundwater extraction
in Guanajuato clearly shows how ground-
water regulation by the federal government
has run aground. According to Vázquez
(1999) 10 vedas were issued in Guanajuato
between 1948 and 1964 prohibiting the
drilling of new wells in large parts of the
state, and in 1983, the remainder of the state
was placed under veda. Notwithstanding
these legal restrictions, the number of
wells in Guanajuato increased from
approximately 2000 in 1958 to 16,500 in
1997 (Guerrero-Reynoso, 1998).
Based on the recognition that vedas
have not worked and to counter the
continued depletion of groundwater in the
basin, CNA started promoting the formation
of Comités Técnicos de Aguas Subterráneas
(COTAS; aquifer management councils)
in selected aquifers in 1995, as an out-
growth of the 1993 agreement. Through the
establishment of COTAS, which fall under
the River Basin Council, the CNA is seeking
to stimulate the organized interaction of
aquifer users with the aim to establish
mutual agreements for reversing ground-
water depletion, in keeping with Article 76
of the water law regulations (CNA, 1999c).
BasedonrecentdevelopmentsintheStateof
Guanajuato, where CEAG enthusiastically
promoted the creation of COTAS (Wester
et al., 1999; Guerrero-Reynoso, 2000), the
structure of the COTAS has been defined at
the national level in the rules and regula-
tions for river basin councils (CNA, 2000a).
In these rules, the COTAS are defined
as fully fledged user organizations, whose
membershipconsistsofallthewaterusersof
an aquifer. They are to serve as mechanisms
for reaching agreement on aquifer manage-
ment taking into consideration the needs
of the various sectors using groundwater
(CNA, 2000a).
To date, 14 COTAS have been formed
in the basin. However, none of them has
yet started to devise ways to reduce ground-
water extraction. Considering that some
380,000 ha in the basin are irrigated with
groundwater and that industrial and domes-
tic uses depend almost entirely on ground-
water, it is fair to say that groundwater is the
strategic resource in the basin, particularly
from a water productivity perspective. The
long-term consequences of its continued
depletion easily overshadow those of Lake
Chapala drying up. Although the COTAS
are a timely institutional response to the
pressing need for innovative approaches to
managing aquifers in the basin, it remains
to be seen if they will succeed in reducing
aquifer over-exploitation. Current discus-
sions in the COTAS focus on installing
sprinkle and drip irrigation systems to save
groundwater, but the tough issue of how
to reach agreement on an across the board
reduction in pumping has not yet been
broached. In addition, new pumps continue
to be installed and regularized through
extra-legal means. The reluctance of the
government to impose strict pumping limits
and thecontinued racetothepumphouse by
farmers bode ill for the COTAS.
8.5.3 Management of derivative water
The effects of the new institutional arrange-
ments in the basin on surface and ground-
water management were briefly described
above. The picture that emerges is that,
although some progress has been made,
the basin’s primary water sources are
still seriously overdrawn, to the particular
detriment of poorer farmers. For them,
140 P. Wester et al.
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frequently the only, available source of
water (cf. Buechler and Scott, 2000). In
1993, the municipal wastewater flow
generated in the basin was estimated at
12,700 l/s, and by 1997, this had risen to
17,000 l/s, which is equal to around
536 MCM per year (Mestre, 1997). The
return flows from agriculture are not
measured, but the fact that hardly any
water flows into Lake Chapala suggests that,
whatever the magnitude of the return flows,
they are used upstream. The extent of waste-
water irrigation in the basin has not been
accurately assessed, but estimates range
from 20,000 to 40,000 ha (CNA/MW, 1999).
The use of return flows and wastewater is
currently a free-for-all and is not formally
regulated by the institutional arrangements
for water management in the basin. How-
ever, as Buechler and Scott (2000) outline,
farmers at times need to obtain informal
permission from municipalities or WUAs
to use wastewater. These claims are being
threatened by the construction of waste-
water treatment plants and the de facto
reallocation of treated water to other uses.
In 1989, the River Basin Council
launched an investment programme to
clean the Lerma River through the planned
construction of 48 treatment plants with a
capacity of 3700 l/s. Priority was given to
citieswithmorethan10,000inhabitantsthat
discharged directly into the Lerma River or
Lake Chapala. This was essential, as up to
1989hardlyanyofthe municipal and indus-
trial wastewater in the basin was treated. As
a result, large stretches of the Lerma River
were heavily contaminated, as were two
of its tributaries, the Turbio and Querétaro
Rivers, while Lake Chapala was classified as
contaminated.On28January,1993,theriver
basincouncilagreedonasecondwatertreat-
ment programme, entailing the construction
of 52 new plants and the enlargement of five
existing ones, with a combined treatment
capacity of 10,835 l/s (Mestre, 1997). It was
foreseen that the two investment program-
mes would create a total treatment capacity
of14,561 l/s,representing85%ofmunicipal
wastewater generated in the basin. At the
end of 1999, 48 plants had been constructed
with a treatment capacity of 6037 l/s, while
six additional large plants are still under
construction, with a capacity of 3513 l/s
(CNA, 1999a). Of the installed capacity of
6037 l/s, only 3155 l/s provides full treat-
ment. Although the River Basin Council has
not succeeded in attaining the ambitious
goals it set for itself, the installed capacity of
6037 l/s,upfrom0 l/sin1989,isanachieve-
ment in itself. The Council readily admits
that more needs to be done, although the
large investments required and the lack of
financial resources at the basin level makes
this difficult (CNA, 1999a).
Scott et al. (2000) place the value of
wastewater irrigation for 140 ha of irrigated
land that depend on the City of Guanajuato
for their water at some US$252,000 per year.
As part of the Council’s water treatment
programme, Guanajuato City is in the pro-
cess of contracting for an activated sludge
wastewater treatment plant and plans to sell
thetreatedwatertocommercialinterests.As
a result, farmers will lose their access to
wastewateraswellasthenutrientbenefitsof
that water. This raises the question how a de
facto right to derivative water should be
addressed when water treatment redirects
wastewater outflows. Although the CNA,
the River Basin Council and the State Water
Commissions are actively pursuing the con-
struction of wastewater treatment plants,
the allocation and distribution of derivative
water has received no attention. In closing
river basins, where primary water sources
have already been captured by the better off
and renegotiating water rights is extremely
complicated, derivative water rapidly
becomes the poor farmer’s last resort
and should be recognized as such.
8.6 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the dynamic
interplay between trends in water use and
institutional changes for water management
in the Lerma–Chapala basin. Drought and
water shortages between 1945 and 1954
resulted in a doubling of the reservoir
capacity within the basin. Pressures on
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ground, continued to increase with the irri-
gated area increasing almost fourfold up to
1989 and the population increasing almost
threefold. After primary water resources
had become over-committed, institutional
reforms were introduced from 1989 onwards
devolving responsibility for water manage-
ment in irrigation systems to water users
and initiating participatory water manage-
ment bodies at the basin level for high-level
decision making on water allocation.
A central component in this reform has
been the 1992 water law, though of equal
importance have been the institutional
capability to put the law into practice and
institutions’ ability to adapt to a dynamic
situation with additional measures for con-
trolling and managing available surface and
groundwater resources. The assessment of
the institutional arrangements for water
management in the Lerma–Chapala basin
brings out clearly the need for coordinating
mechanismsatthebasinlevelinriverbasins
facing closure. Through the Lerma–Chapala
RiverBasinCouncil,progresshasbeenmade
towards improved water management in the
basin. This progress is encouraging, in light
of the complicated transition from a highly
centralized management of water resources
to one in which states, municipalities and
water users have a larger say. Though the
institutional measures have had a signifi-
cant impact in restructuring water manage-
ment, the basin is still in crisis, with the
level of Lake Chapala in perilous decline
and aquifers running dry. The efforts of
the River Basin Council over the past ten
years will need to be redoubled to tackle the
significant challenges lying ahead of it.
Although surface water allocation
mechanisms are working, and the revision
of the 1991 treaty may lead to increased
inflows to Lake Chapala, compensating
farmers for water transferred out of agri-
culture needs to be considered. In closed
basins, inter-sectoral transfers are inevitable
and it will invariably be the irrigation sector
that will need to cede water. A key institu-
tional challenge in closed river basins
is dealing with these transfers in a just
and equitable manner, such that the
sustainability of locally managed irrigation
is ensured. The Lerma–Chapala River Basin
Councilcouldbeaforumfordrawingupand
enforcing compensation mechanisms for
surface water transferred out of agriculture,
but to date it has been reluctant to consider
this issue due to the costs involved. To be
credible and effective partners in basin
management, WUAs and farmers need to
make concerted efforts to reduce water use,
for which there is real scope, and to join
forces to argue their case more strongly in
the River Basin Council.
A much more serious challenge that
the Council and other water management
stakeholders in the basin need to deal with
urgently is the overdraft of the basin’s
aquifers. The aquifer management councils
are a step in the right direction, but their
role in groundwater management should go
beyond mere consultation. Bundling extrac-
tion rights in an aquifer and concessioning
this to a COTAS is feasible under the
Mexican water law and should be seriously
considered. Placing aquifer management in
the hands of the aquifer users, under the
supervisionoftheRiverBasinCouncil,State
Water Commissions and the CNA, shows
more promise of reducing extractions than
the current system of vedas and federal
regulation.
With basin closure, poorer farmers
in particular are losing, or have lost, their
access to primary water due to reductions in
surface irrigation and increased costs for
groundwater irrigation. Hence derivative
water, both wastewater and agricultural
drainageeffluent,isincreasinglybecominga
critical resource for poor farmers. However,
its allocation in the basin is currently a free-
for-all. Although progress has been made in
constructing wastewater treatment plants,
the management of derivative water has
received little attention. More generally,
meeting the water needs of poor people, and
including poor women and men at all levels
of water management decision making, is
notapriorityoftheCouncil,norisitastrong
feature of the larger set of institutional
arrangements for water management in
Mexico. The Council needs to seriously
consider how to safeguard and improve the
142 P. Wester et al.
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bat the current de facto concentration of
water rights in the hands of the few. Overall,
a coherent approach for tackling the contin-
ued pressures on the basin’s primary water
sources, the significant re-use of wastewater
(derivative water) and the deterioration of
water quality needs to be developed.
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Management in the Olifants Basin of South
Africa: Past, Present and Future
M. de Lange, D.J. Merrey, H. Levite and M. Svendsen
9.1 Introduction
The singular history of South Africa has
created huge development challenges,
along with important opportunities to
address them. During apartheid, rights to
productive resources such as land, water
and minerals were controlled by the domi-
nant minority, while the remainder of the
population was concentrated into isolated
‘bantustans’ or ‘homelands’. Although for-
mal barriers to residence and economic
activity were quickly dismantled in the
wake of democratic elections in 1994, the
legacy of earlier policies persists in rural
areas. This manifests itself in huge income
disparities; dense concentrations of black
South Africans in the regions of the former
‘homelands’; a skewed distribution of basic
infrastructure such as roads, electricity and
piped water supplies; extremely high levels
of unemployment; and a dualistic agricul-
tural economy.
In irrigation, this dualism is reflected in
the disparity between the commercial and
the subsistence or small-scale irrigation sec-
tor. Only about 100,000 ha of the national
total of 1.3 million ha is currently workedby
small-scale farmers. A sophisticated irriga-
tion industry with extensive manufacturing
and equipment distribution capacity serves
the commercial sector, while small-scale
farmers remain isolated from this capacity
by insecure land tenure, and lack of formal
education, capital, market access and man-
agement experience. At the same time, the
presence of such a sophisticated industry
probablyinhibits the development of a more
informal irrigation services sector. One of
the results of these disparities is that, in the
new government, there is an almost exclu-
sive policy focus on the historically disad-
vantaged sector, in contrast to the previous
predominant focus on the commercial
sector. The historically disadvantaged
sector is receiving a spectrum of support
to both deracialize commercial agriculture
and create sustainable livelihoods for the
12 million people residing in the former
bantustans. Although agriculture directly
generates less than 5% of South Africa’s
grossdomesticproduct (GDP), itis onlynow
gaining recognition for its importance in
combating widespread rural poverty and as
a stabilizing factor in the national economy.
Taking a broader perspective on the contri-
bution of agriculture to GDP and including
associated support services and agro-
industries, agriculture actually accounts for
more than 14% of the total. The GDP multi-
plier of agriculture is 1.51 overall. Further,
out of an economically active population of
13.8 million people, at least 35% is directly
or indirectly dependent on agriculture.
About 10% of total export earnings of
the country is from agriculture. Irrigation
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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on 11% of the cultivated land (Hirschowitz,
2000; Mullins, 2002).
One of the early actions of the post-
apartheid government was to formulate
a new and progressive water policy that
mandated, among other things, integrated
management of water resources at the basin
level. The vehicle for basin level manage-
ment is the Catchment Management Agency
(CMA), which is intended to be the primary
policy-making and management entity at
the basin level. The country is presently
engaged in implementing this policy, and in
the process, confronting a number of very
challenging issues. These include the taskof
developing integrated representative gover-
nanceoftheCMAinabipolarsocialandeco-
nomic environment, sharing costs among
water-using sectors, and formalizing and
reallocating water use entitlements in a
context of growing water scarcity.
The present study analyses manage-
ment of a South African river basin under
the old regime and policies, and that envi-
sioned under the new set-up. The analysis
employs a matrix of essential functions and
key actors to identify the extent of coverage,
gaps and overlaps, extent of participation,
andneedsforcoordination.Itfocusesonone




9.1.2 The Olifants basin
The Olifants River basin is located in the
northeastern corner of South Africa and
southern Mozambique (Fig. 9.1).
ThebulkoftheSouthAfricanpartofthe
basin lies in Limpopo and Mpumalanga
Provinces, with a small portion in Gauteng
Province. The river flows from southwest to
northeast and, upon leaving South Africa,
enters Mozambique and joins the Limpopo
river before discharging into the Indian
Ocean about 200 km north of the capital
Maputo.
The Olifants River is about 770 km long
and, with its tributaries, drains 73,534 km2.
UnderthenewNationalWaterAct,theCMA
excludes the two northernmost tributaries,
bringing the total drainage area under the
future CMA to about 54,000 km2, an area the
size of Slovakia or Croatia.
The climate is semiarid, with rain fall-
ingprimarilyduringthesummer(November
to March). Precipitation averages 630 mm
and potential evaporation is 1700 mm.
146 M. de Lange et al.
Fig. 9.1. Location of the basin in the region.
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equator, much of the basin is located at
relatively high elevations (300–2300 m
above sea level). This explains its cool
winters and the wide annual temperature
variation, which ranges from −4 to 45°C.
The population of the basin was 3.4
million in 2000. Population densities vary
considerably, depending on whether a par-
ticular area was a former black ‘homeland’
(bantustan) or a part of the former white
area, with densities ranging from 100 to 350
people/km2 in former black areas and from
50 to 100 people/km2 in former white areas.
Whites currently comprise about 7% of
the basin population. Ninety per cent of the
black population lives in rural areas in the
basin. The rate of illiteracy in the basin is
more than 50%.
The basin is divided into five hydro-
logic areas generally regrouped in four
ecological regions (Fig. 9.2).
• The Upper Olifants which correspond
to the Highveld region;
• The Upper Middle and Lower Middle
Olifants represent the Middleveld
region;
• The Steelpoort basin assimilated to the
Mountain area;
• The Lower Olifants situated in the
Lowveld region.
9.1.2.1 Highveld region
The upper basin or Highveld region has a
slightly higher rainfall than the Middleveld,
and is characterized by extensive rainfed
cropping and stock farming, coal mining
and coal-fired power generation. Although
the pollution impact of these activities
is significant, the strategic importance is
clear: 55% of South Africa’s electricity
is produced here. Annually, around 200
million m3 of water is imported, mainly
from the neighbouring Vaal River basin, for
water-cooling the power plants.
Another interesting characteristic ofthe
upper basin is that the landscape is dotted
with natural pans and farm dams. Users
Planning and Management in the Olifants Basin 147
Fig. 9.2. Main hydrological regions.
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experience prolonged effects of droughts as
a result, since these pans and dams in the
upper basin have to fill up before significant
runoff reaches the Middleveld.
9.1.2.2 Middleveld region
The Middle Olifants stretches for about
300 km from below Loskop dam to the
dramatic drop down the escarpment near
Hoedspruit. This escarpment area is famous
for its natural beauty and exciting river
rafting when the river flows full. However,
this beauty and pleasure is in stark contrast
to the plight of the 1 million people
living in the old ‘homeland’ area in the
Middleveld. This is one of the poorest
regions in the country, where 75% of the
population cannot read or write, and infant
mortality, hunger and crime are rife.
The area directly below Loskop dam is
quite different from the barren situation in
the old homeland. Loskop dam was built
by poor white labour as a public works
programme after the Second World War.
Below the dam are 28,800 ha of intensively
irrigated land growing a variety of crops,
with a trend towards permanent high-value
crops including large citrus plantations and
export table grape production under hail
netting.
9.1.2.3 Mountain region
There is intensive irrigation in Steelpoort
sub-basin and extensive mining activity in
the valley. Expansion of platinum mining
near the Steelpoort–Olifants confluence
may result in the construction of another
major dam on the Olifants River. This
region is a heavy contributor to the basin
water supply because of its high rainfall
and steep slopes.
9.1.2.4. Lowveld region
Except for the upper part of this area (Blyde
river sub-basin), there is little irrigation
along the Olifants River below the escarp-
ment, possibly because of poor soils. This
region is characterized by game farms and
industrial activity concentrated at the town
of Phalaborwa, on the border of the famous
Kruger National Park conservation area.
The minimum dry season flow and the
impact of the industrial effluent on the
quality of the water entering the Kruger




Basin water resources either originate from
precipitation, which is transformed into
runoff, evaporates or flows in the ground, or
are imported from neighbouring basins.
9.2.1.1 Rainfall
Rainfall has an average value of 630 mm/
year in the basin, and does not vary greatly
at the level of the water management region
(Table 9.1). At a smaller scale, however, the
range is significant, varying from 500 to
1000 mm with values of up to 2000 mm
along the Drakensberg escarpment.
There is a distinct rainy season between
October to April, with the heaviest rain
generally occurring in December and
January, but the main characteristic of
the precipitation is its high degree of
unevenness, spatially, throughout the year
and inter-annually. Midsummer dry spells
are a common occurrence, often in January
when dryland crops are at their most
vulnerable.















Source: BKS (2002, Appendix C, p. 4-2 [Table
11]).
Table 9.1. Precipitation by region.
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The mean annual runoff (MAR) calculated
under ‘virgin conditions’, that is, without
the introduction of exotic vegetation (such
as afforestation with eucalyptus species)
and without the impact of human activities,
would be 1992 million cubic metres (MCM)
(Table 9.2). The average value of observed
runoff with these influences present is
around 1235 MCM at the mouth of the
South African part of the basin, on the
border with Mozambique.
A recent study of surface water
resources (Midgley et al., 1994) presents
relationships between rainfall and runoff by
location in the basin. To generate significant
runoff, rainfall has to be sizeable. In this
regard, the mountainous regions play the
most significant role. The Mountain region
(Steelpoort sub-basin) as well as Blyde River
(part of the Lowveld) provide about 42% of
totalrunoff.Itappearsalsothatgroundwater
is of major importance in maintaining base
flow in the river. The wide range observed
in MAR follows the high inter-annual
variability of the precipitation.
Typically, high flows occur from
DecembertoFebruaryandthendeclineuntil
September. At the end of this period, the
Olifants River can experience periods of no
flow in the Kruger Park on the border with
Mozambique. A major feature of the basin is
also its capacity to generate extreme flows,
yielding dreadful floods especially affecting
Mozambique. During the last flooding
period in February 2000, the flow in the
Olifants peaked at 3800 m3/s at the mouth.
9.2.1.3 Groundwater
Total groundwater recharge in the basin
is estimated by the Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) to be 3–6% of
the mean annual precipitation. This would
amount to approximately 1800 MCM. Most
of this recharge occurs during periods of
heavy precipitation and it is suspected that
the majority of water reaching the water
table does so via macro pores (cracks,
fissures, etc.) in the soil rather than through
the actual soil body (Ashton, 2000).
Groundwater is an important source of
water supply for many small towns, villages
and small-scale farms, where it is used
for stock watering and some irrigation,
especially on the Springbok Flats in the
Middleveld region. The largest share of the
catchment’s exploitable groundwater exists
in a relatively shallow weathered aquifer
that gives average yields in the vicinity of
1 l/s. Areas of higher potential (5 l/s and
more) do occur in the area of the Steelpoort
River,whileroughlyhalfofthecatchmentto
the west of the Drakensberg Mountains may
be classified as having moderate potential
(1–3 l/s).
9.2.1.4 Storage, imports, exports and
return flows
There are approximately 2500 dams in the
basin, including 31 major ones defined as
those storing more than 2 MCM. The total
storage of major dams is 1100 MCM with
a firm yield of 645 MCM per year. Small
and minor dams supply additional storage
capacity of 193 MCM. This storage capacity
also represents an important source of loss
by evaporation, estimated for all dams to be
around 159 MCM.
Figure 9.3 shows the historical pattern
of water resource development in the basin.
As seen, periods of rapid growth took place
in the late 1930s and again between 1970
and 1990. Plans for several additional dams
in the basin exist, but await approval and
funding.





























Source: BKS (2002, Appendix C, p. 4-2 [Table
11]).
Table 9.2. Runoff per sub-region.
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of the basin, primarily for coal-fired power
stations. Imports total around 200 MCM
annually, and are derived from the adjacent
Komati, Usutu and Vaal River basins. Com-
parable volumes of water are not reliably
availableintheupperreachesoftheOlifants
basin itself and the quality of the available
water is often unsuitable. Small amounts
of water are exported from the basin to
the Limpopo provincial capital, Polokwane
(5 MCM), and these exports are slated to
expand inthefuturedue togrowingdemand
for domestic water supply there.
Return flows are not well estimated.
BKS (2002, appendix C, Table 10) gives the
figure of 42.3 MCM, mainly generated by
urban areas in the Upper and Lower part
of the basin. Return flows from mining
activities are relatively small, varying from
0% to 20%, due to recycling processes.
However, the high pollution levels in the
river indicate that return flows that do occur
are often heavily polluted. Little is known
about return flows from irrigation, though
they are undoubtedly significant, and this
portion of the basin water budget requires
further study.
9.2.2 Demand
There are various estimates for total water
demand, even in the same report, suggest-
ing the estimates are approximate at best.
BKS (2002, Table 3.2) provides total water
demand figures of 1125.1 MCM/year in
1995 and a prediction it will rise to
1356.5 MCM by 2010. These figures include
use of imported water and can be broken
down among users as shown in Table 9.3.
It should be noted the ecological and basic
needs reserve, and the obligation to Mozam-
bique as the downstream riparian, are not
included.
9.2.3 Water balance
The basin is a water-stressed catchment and
imports high-quality water from neighbour-
ing catchments for economically important
uses in the upper basin.
Nevertheless, in the Upper region there
is a net surplus of 218 MCM per year
currently, which is expected to drop to an
estimated 168 MCM by 2010. In the Upper
Middle, there is already a deficit of 60 MCM
in 1995, growing to 79 MCM/year by 2010.
The Lower Middle region shows a small
surplus. Taking into consideration the
need to meet ecological and downstream
requirements, it is expected that water
resources will be fully utilized by 2010 in
the Upper, Upper Middle and LowerMiddle
regions.
For the Mountain region, the water
balance shows surplus water available
for further development. The Lower region
appears to be in the same situation, with
150 M. de Lange et al.






































Fig. 9.3. Development of water resources in the Olifants basin (data from Midgley et al., 1994).
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sub-basin and the escarpment. The Selati
RivernearPhalaborwaisexperiencingwater
shortages, and transfers are planned from
the neighbouring Letaba River basin to solve
the problem (BKS, 2002, pp. 6-1–6-2).
Thus over the medium term, water in
the basin appears to be adequate in terms of
quantity, but there are serious distributional
issues, related to both regions and user
groups, that need to be addressed. Solutions
contemplatedcomprisebothconstructionof
new storage and transfer facilities and real-
location of available supplies among uses.
9.2.4 Water quality
The basin faces significant water quality
problems, due to mining activities, indus-
tries, power generation and agricultural
use of water. The impacts of pollution
from these activities (high salinity, high
concentrations of metals, low pH) are
probably multiple with serious ecological
impacts. Of particular concern is the down-
stream Kruger National Park, which is a major
tourist attraction, as well as very worrisome
health impacts, since many people rely on
untreated surface water for drinking.
9.3 Legal, Policy and Institutional
Environment
9.3.1 Water policy and water law
9.3.1.1 Pre-1994
With the establishment of a Dutch settle-
ment at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652,
customary principles governing access to
water for stock watering and domestic use
were supplemented and gradually replaced
with ideas of European origin as the Cape
Colony expanded. Over time, a pastiche of
Planning and Management in the Olifants Basin 151

























107,000 ha, 95% white commercial farming
9% increase projected mostly in the Upper Middle, Lower Middle
and Lowveld regions
Major crops: cotton, grapes, citrus, vegetables and grain
Total of 2.3 million large stock units by 2010. Mainly in the
Highveld and watered from boreholes (70%)
A 55% increase is likely to result from improving living conditions
and population expansion, especially in the former homelands
In the Highveld region, open cast coal mining uses both water
from the catchment and imports from the Komati, Usutu and
Vaal Rivers. In the Mountain region, mines are a major user of
both surface and borehole water. The Lowveld part of the basin
contains numerous mines, but most of these are gold mines and
have low water requirements, though they may have appreciable
pollution potential
Indigenous forests will probably remain at 11,500 ha and permits
for 15,000 ha of additional commercial afforestation will have
been granted. It is envisaged that the existing 60,000 ha of
exotic afforestation will only increase by a further 7000 ha
Determination underway but first figure of 460 MCM for the
ecological Reserve is proposed in the Proposed National Water
Resource Strategy (PNWRS, August 2002)
Not determined. The Olifants is the largest contributor of the flow
to Massingir Dam in Mozambique
Source: BKS (2002, Appendix C, Figs 2–7).
Table 9.3. Trends in water demand in the Olifants basin.
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English water law emerged to govern water
allocation in South Africa (Thompson et al.,
2001). Initially, allocation policy employed
the public trust doctrine, which gave the
State (or the Dutch East India Company) the
right to control and allocate use. Later a
strong riparian component was added,
giving individual landowners adjacent to
natural watercourses the right to use water
on those lands, subject to the rights of other
similar landowners. Generally, the riparian
principle was employed by white commer-
cial large-scale farmers to secure water for
irrigation. Appropriative rights to abstract
water and use it elsewhere were also granted
on a case-by-case basis. Water was classed
as private or public, with water arising on a
landowner’s property entirely his to use.
Flows in public streams were apportioned
into ‘normal’ and ‘surplus’ flows, with dif-
ferent rules applying to each. These rules
developed as the need arose from intensify-
ing economic activity to regulate use among
the commercial farms, mines and urban
concentrations of the minority European
population. In sum, during the apartheid
era the white government, commercial
farmers, mining firms and other interests
established a complex system of formalized
laws and institutions on a largely ad hoc
basis, which excluded a large majority of
the population (van Koppen et al., 2003).
9.3.1.2 Post-1994
The introduction of democratic government
in 1994 demanded changes in the skewed
distribution of access to water for both basic
and productive purposes. It offered a rare
opportunity for comprehensive review of
all water-related legislation to develop a
modern water policy appropriate to a water-
scarce region. This was done in a very
deliberate and conscientious way under
the farsighted Minister of Water Affairs and
Forestry, Professor Kader Asmal (Box 9.1),
and resulted in the new National Water Act
of 1998 that is widely regarded as a model
piece of legislation.
Two fundamental provisions in the
1996 constitutional bill of rights give ‘basic
rights’ status to access to water to support
life and for personal hygiene and a healthy
environment,bothnowandforfuturegener-
ations. These constitutional rights under-
gird two fundamental pieces of new water
legislation, the National Water Act (NWA)
and the Water Services Act (WSA). The new
water policy, as embodied in the White
Paper on National Water Policy for South
Africa, marks a radical departure from the
previous legal regime. Basic principles are
shown in Box 9.2.
South Africa’s new water law reserves
committed outflows to neighbouring coun-
tries. South Africa is a signatory to a SADC
Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems
based on the Helsinki Rules, the Dublin
principles and Agenda 21 of the Rio Earth
Summit. The SADC protocol strives to
maintain a balance between developmental
needs of the member countries and the
need for environmental protection and
conservation. Signatories to the protocol
commit themselves to seeking peaceful
solutions to disputes. The protocol provides
for the formation of basin-wide commis-
sions, such as those for the Okavango and
the Limpopo.
The new water law principles declare
all water in the hydrological cycle to be
an indivisible national asset, held in trust
by national government (Box 9.2). Highly
fragmented resource management across
apartheid borders is being replaced by a
catchment-based management system that
follows natural, rather than internal politi-
calboundaries.Privatizationofservicespro-
vision is possible, but strictly governed by
national legislation, administered through
new local government structures.
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Box 9.1. Water policy timeline.
May 1994 Review of all water related
legislation initiated
Nov 1994 Water Supply white paper published
Nov 1996 Fundamental Principles paper
approved by cabinet
April 1997 Water Policy white paper published
Sept 1997 Water Services Act promulgated
Aug 1998 National Water Act promulgated
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water users have by-and-large remained the
same, but there is a much greater emphasis
on basic service provision to historically
marginalized communities. The Government
has embarked on a major investment pro-
gramme to provide basic water supplies to
the poor. New legislation also enables the
establishment of water users’ associations
(WUAs) for user-management of shared local
infrastructure – an option previously open to
commercial farmers only. Furthermore, the





DWAF During the apartheid era, the
national DWAF was responsible for water
resources management in the white areas of
the Republic, while similar departments in
the former homelands and self-governing
territories concentrated largely on basic
services provision. This fragmentation
created severe problems in water resources
management. In the white areas, water
services were rendered by well-resourced
municipalities while few resources were
available to homeland water departments,
leading to huge disparities in service levels
between the white and homeland areas.
The 1996 constitution established
water as a ‘national competency’, vesting
responsibility for water resources and ser-
vices in the DWAF. The character of the
Departmentwasfundamentallytransformed
in terms of its functions and staff profile
(i.e. race, gender, discipline) to respond
to its new mandate. DWAF embarked on
an aggressive programme to speed up
basic water and sanitation service delivery
to the marginalized areas and changed
the resources management paradigm
from a supply-driven to demand-driven
approach.
The NWA requires DWAF to develop a
National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS),
to create CMAs in the 19 Water Management
Areas and to delegate catchment-based
water resources management functions to
theseCMAs.EachCMAistodevelopitsown
catchment management strategy through a
participative process with water users in its
area.
Through the WSA, DWAF designates
local government structures as water ser-
vices authorities (WSAs) and local govern-
ment, water boards or private sector entities
as Water Services Providers (WSPs).
NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND
PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENTS OF AGRICULTURE
After 1994, nine provinces were created
integrating the former four white provinces,
six ‘self-governing’ territories and four
‘independent’ states. In the 1996 constitu-
tion, agriculture is a ‘concurrent function’,
meaning it is a shared responsibility
between the new National Department of
Agriculture (NDA) and the nine Provincial
Departments of Agriculture (PDAs).
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Box 9.2. Principles of the National Water
Policy.
• All water in the water cycle is a part of an
indivisible national asset
• This asset is held in trust for society by the
national government
• Water to meet basic human needs, to sustain
the environment, and to meet legitimate needs
of neighbouring countries is reserved
• All other water uses must be beneficial in the
public interest
• The riparian system of allocation is abolished
• Allocations will no longer be permanent but
for a reasonable period, e.g. 40 years, and can
be traded
• Water resources will be managed on a
catchment basis by specialized bodies
• All water use in the water cycle is subject to
one or more charges intended to reflect the full
financial costs of protecting and managing the
water resource
• Water-based waste disposal is subject to
appropriate charges
• Charges for water for basic human needs and
for small-scale productive purposes may be
waived for disadvantaged groups
Source: White Paper on a National Water Policy
for South Africa (1997)
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ityforirrigationinfrastructurecreatedprevi-
ously. In the Limpopo Province, for exam-
ple, the PDA has inherited over a hundred
irrigation schemes of various types. Many
are no longer functioning because the subsi-
dies previously provided have been with-
drawn and no new farmer-based structures
areyetinplace.TheProvincehaslauncheda
veryambitious‘revitalization’programmeto
organize farmers into WUAs and help them
achievethecapacitytotakeoverandmanage
their irrigation schemes profitably.
The former homeland departments of
agriculture had played a significant role
in creating irrigation infrastructure (often
through parastatal corporations) and some
of the PDAs have inherited responsibility
for the operation, maintenance and refur-
bishment of these schemes. National policy
currently promotes Irrigation Management
Transfer (IMT) to the users, though progress
in implementing this policy to date has been
slow.
The homeland governments’ role in
water allocation for agriculture resulted
from the link between land and water con-
tained in the Water Act of 1956. Extension
officers, together with tribal authorities,
controlled the issuing and repeal of ‘Permis-
sion to Occupy’ (PTO) certificates to small-
holder farmers, which conveyed rights to
both land and water. Through the repeal of
the riparian principle under the new NWA,
the direct link between land and water
allocation has been broken.
OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS Before
1994, several departments played strong roles
in water resources management, while more
controlnowvests in DWAF through the new
NWA. However, the Department of Mineral
and Energy Affairs and the Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism still
play important roles in the protection and
restoration of water resources through their
requirements for Environmental Planning
and Management Reports and for Environ-
mental Impact Assessments, respectively.
FORMER HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS In pursuit
of the goal of separate institutions for each
racial and ethnic group, apartheid-era gov-
ernments attempted to divide the country
gradually into various independent and
autonomous racially homogeneous States.
National States had a large degree of inde-
pendence, while self-governing territories
were to be gradually led to independent
State status. Virtually no country other than
South Africa recognized this system. The
Olifants basin encompassed small portions
of the national State of Bophuthatswana and
included sections of three self-governing
territories – Lebowa, KwaNdebele and
Gazankulu (Thompson et al., 2001). There
were various departments in these home-
land governments that dealt with water-
related matters, but because only certain
functions were transferred to the homeland
administrations, others being retained by
the Republic of South Africa, there was
considerable confusion over some basic
functions, such as the issuance of water
use permits. Homelands were abolished
in 1996 with the adoption of the national
constitution.
SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT TRUST AND OTHER
PARASTATALS The Development Trust, cre-
ated originally in 1936 as the South African
Native Trust, was responsible, among other
things, for supplying basic infrastructure in
the homelands, including water-related
infrastructure. It did this directly and acting
through the varioushomeland Development
Corporations which it was responsible for
establishing, financing and maintaining. It
was dissolved with the implementation of
the new constitution in 1996 and its water-
related functions transferred to DWAF.
TRADITIONAL LEADERS Historic tribal leader-
ship in the Olifants basin was seriously
undermined during the apartheid period.
Forinstance,inanareathatwouldtradition-
ally be the domain of four tribal chiefs, the
apartheid government ordained more than
100 new chiefs, mostly drawn from among
lower ranking leaders who were willing to
cooperate with the apartheid regime. This
fragmentation, together with an influx of
people through forced removals from white
areas, created serious conflicts over tribal
154 M. de Lange et al.
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served in homeland government structures
and areas of resistance to the regime were
neglected in development initiatives. They
had considerable authority over access to
resources such as water and land (van
Koppen et al., 2003).
In the new set-up, tribal leadership is
again at the heart of deep conflict, this time
oversharedlocalgovernancewithnewdem-
ocratically elected structures. In the deep
ruralareas,membersoftheoldergeneration,
especially, swear allegiance to their chiefs
andbelievethatthespirallingcrimerateisat
least in part related to the disrespect for the
traditional systems and leadership. In turn,
thenewdemocraticstructuresarebattlingto
establish themselves with limited resources
and virtually no experience or systems for
servicedelivery.Inanattemptatintegration,
the tribal heads are automatically members
of the new local councils, while other mem-
bers are elected. As one community in the
Olifants basin recently pointed out to their
chief in a public meeting: ‘these youngsters
will come and go depending on election
results, but you will stay, therefore we need
you to take the lead for the sake of our
development.’
LOCAL GOVERNMENT/MUNICIPALITIES Local
governmentis responsible forwater services
delivery, while the new CMAs will be res-
ponsible for water resources management.
Localgovernmentstructures,inturn,willbe
represented in the Olifants basin CMA.
Before 1994, ‘municipalities’ were
established for service delivery in all cities
and white towns of 200 houses or more.
Their functions were limited to white urban
concentrations, while rural areas were the
responsibility of regional services councils.
Separate structures were responsible for
servicedeliverytoblacksinthehomelands.
After 1994, these boundaries were abol-
ishedandaperiodofrestructuringfollowed.
Most recently, a system has been adopted
through which the entire country is divided
into three types of local government struc-
tures: metropoles (class A) and shoulder-
to-shoulder local municipalities (B), which
are grouped together into 42 District
Municipalities (C). In effect, the former
municipalities have seen their boundaries
redrawn to include the rural hinterland.
WATER COURT/TRIBUNAL Under the 1956
Water Act, a specialized Water Court ruled
on disputes between rights holders. In the
new legal framework, water use entitle-
ments will be issued by the CMAs according
to a water allocation plan that will form
part of the catchment management strategy.
People can appeal to the Minister on issues
of unjust administrative process, followed
by appeal to a newly established Water
Tribunal.
9.3.2.2 Boards and agencies
CMAS The NWA mandates the Minister
of Water Affairs and Forestry to develop
catchment-based water resources manage-
ment through the creation of CMAs in the
19 Water Management Areas. Each CMA
will develop and review, on a 5-yearlybasis,
its own catchment management strategy
through a participative process with water
users in its area. As the CMA develops the
necessary capacity, DWAF will progres-
sively delegate functions to it. This is not
true devolution of power, but rather a dele-
gation, since the Minister has the right to
revoke authority if he is convinced that a
CMA is falling short of its commitments.
The CMA board must be representative
of the range of water users in the catchment.
The Minister appoints board members
through the following process. First (s)he
appoints an advisory council to identify
water user groups and relevant institutions
in the basin. The Minister invites these
institutions or organizations to nominate
candidates for appointment to the CMA
board. If (s)he is not satisfied with the
suitability of a nominee, (s)he can ask for
an alternative. The Minister then appoints
the nominees and if necessary, ‘tops up’ the
board with additional members to achieve
racial and gender balance.
TheCMAboardappoints aChiefExecu-
tive Officer to develop and manage the CMA
office or operational structure. This office
may develop its own capacity to perform the
Planning and Management in the Olifants Basin 155
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it may contract out some or all of these
functions. The NWA authorizes the CMA
to collect a catchment management charge
from water users to cover its costs.
As of early 2003, no CMA has yet been
established, though proposals for several,
including for the Olifants basin (BKS, 2002),
are nearly ready to be submitted to the Min-
ister. In the case of the Olifants, there has
been a long period of attempting to consult
with stakeholders in the basin as a basis
for preparing a proposal. While the well-
organized commercial sectors have partici-
patedactively,ithasbeenrelativelydifficult
to find effective means to consult the poor
people scattered throughout the basin,
particularly those residing in the former
homeland areas (Wester et al., 2003). Such
consultation will be a continuous process,
which will hopefully be done more effec-
tively through the CMA when it is estab-
lished.TheproposednameoftheCMAisthe
Lepelle Catchment Management Agency.
WATER BOARDS AND OTHER WSPS Water
boards were developed to provide services
and perform water management functions
beyond the reach of the old municipalities.
Increasingly, they engaged in regional water
supply schemes primarily for industrial and
domestic use. Water boards are now regu-
lated, together with other WSPs, under the
WSA where their role in water resources
management is considered incidental rather
than intentional.
IRRIGATION BOARDS AND WUAS The 1956
Water Act provided for the establishment
of membership-based organizations called
irrigation boards, through which groups of
farmers could join forces to develop infra-
structure and jointly manage their water
supply – essentially a type of WUA. These
irrigation boards were eligible for a one-
thirdcapitalsubsidyonsharedwatersupply
infrastructure, but membership was legally
restricted to people who had title to the land
receiving services from the irrigation board.
Thiseffectivelyexcludedblackmembership
in white irrigation boards, since blacks were
excluded from land ownership in ‘white
areas’, but there was also no similar institu-
tion available to groups of black farmers
with similar needs. Irrigation services in the
homelands were supplied by government
or parastatal corporations and participating
farmers were passive recipients with no
power to demand adequate services.
The NWA of 1998 calls for the trans-
formation of existing irrigation boards into
WUAs and removes title deed as a member-
ship requirement. It thus also enables the
establishment of WUAs on communally
owned tribal orState land. Indeed, the NWA
authorizes the issuance of water use entitle-
ments – and by extension membership in
WUAs – to water users rather than landown-
ers. This is of particular importance in tribal
areas where Permission To Occupy (PTO)
certificates have traditionally been issued to
men, but where women are predominantly
the users of the land and water.
As of early 2003, only a few irrigation
boards nationally have been officially trans-
formed into WUAs, and only one formal
WUA has been established on a small-scale
irrigation scheme in the Olifants basin.
9.3.2.3 Farmers
COMMERCIAL IRRIGATORS Irrigation farmers
account for more than half of national water
use and a quarter of the agricultural output
in South Africa, irrigating in all 1.3 million
ha. The commercial irrigation sector pro-
duces a wide range of crops for export and
local use. It is supported by a sophisticated
irrigation equipment manufacturing indus-
try – indeed, micro irrigation technology
originated in South Africa before it was
developedintoamajorindustryinIsraeland
the USA. Backward and forward linkages to
input suppliers, service providers, process-
ing, value-adding and export industries are
not accurately quantified but are significant,
both in terms of the national economy and
employment.
Commercial irrigators fall roughly into
three categories in terms of their access to
water. About one-third of the irrigated area
falls under irrigationboardsorWUAs as dis-
cussed above, while another third is served
from government water schemes, most of
156 M. de Lange et al.
168 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:51 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreeswhich are at some stage of handover to user
management. The balance derived their
water rights from the riparian principle
and withdrew water directly fromrivers and
streams. The latter group had no need to
participate in user management groups,
a situation likely to change with the
implementation of catchment-based water
resources management.
Commercial irrigation in the Olifants
River basin is almost a microcosm of the
national situation, with farmers in govern-
ment schemes and irrigation board schemes
and unassociated farmers, as discussed
above,growingawidevarietyofcrops.Basin
farmers also represent a wide cross-section
of attitudes to the new political reality, from
the most conservative to the most liberal.
Commercial farmers are well organized, but
often overwhelmed and uncertain about
the implications of the NWA. Many are also
concerned about the affordability to water
users ofthe establishment and operationofa
CMA.
EMERGING IRRIGATORS AND OTHER VILLAGE-LEVEL
ECONOMIC ACTORS Some of the poorest
rural areas in the country are found in the
Olifants basin. Smallholder irrigation has
had a troubled history of imposed develop-
ment and State-managed irrigation infra-
structure in a context of serious mistrust
between the ‘benefactor’ and ‘beneficiaries’.
The 1600-ha Arabie–Olifants and other
smallholder irrigation schemes in the basin
have suffered in varying degree from the
dependency created by this approach. Only
a small portion of the irrigated area in the
Olifants basin is occupied by smallholders,
but a relatively large number of families
derivedatleastpartoftheirlivelihoodsfrom
irrigation, either on the formal government
schemes or on much smaller communal veg-
etable gardens or homestead food gardens.
Not surprisingly, recent withdrawal of gov-
ernment management and subsidies for the
schemes resulted in the collapse of most of
the production here, with serious effects on
food security in the area. However, amidst
the collapse of the large systems, communal
gardens and informal food producers have
largely continued their activities as before.
In these poverty-stricken areas, the
opportunities for expansion of both food
production and income generation from
agriculture and other small-scale village-
based economic activities (such as brick
making, ice making, poultry rearing, food
processing) are largely dependent on the
availability of water.
While their need for access to water is
desperate, this sector is probably the most
disorganized and under-represented of all
water user sectors in the Olifants and
many other South African river basins. The
concept of small-scale water users forums
(SWUFs) with representation in representa-
tive, decision-making and operational struc-
tures within the CMA framework has been
proposed in the draft CMA proposal to
address this problem (BKS, 2002).
9.3.2.4 Industrial firms
MINING COMPANIES Coal mining dominates
in the upper or Highveld region of the
Olifants basin, while the mining and
processing of platinum and related minerals
is a growth sector in the Middleveld. Copper
and phosphates mining and associated
industries are the most important economic
actors in the Lowveld area.
POWER GENERATOR (ESKOM) The Olifants
basin is of national strategic importance
since more than half of the country’s
electricity is generated in coal-fired power
stations in the coal-rich Highveld region of
thisbasin.Theelectricityprovider,ESKOM,
depends on the transfer of high-quality
water from other basins for its cooling
towers.
FOREST PRODUCTS FIRMS Two national for-
estry and forest products companies are
active in the Olifants basin. Although the
forestry activity in the Olifants is limited
compared to other basins, the industry has
been well represented in public consul-
tations. Through the NWA, commercial
forestry has been declared a Streamflow
ReductionActivity(SFRA),whichisviewed
as a water use under the Act and therefore
subject to all provisions in the Act that
Planning and Management in the Olifants Basin 157
169 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:52 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesapplies to other water uses, including
allocationrules,waterchargesandmeasures
for the protection of water resources.
TOURISM FIRMS Several tourism companies
operate river rafting and other recreational
attractions, especially in the escarpment
area. River rafting and fishing is entirely
dependent on the flow in the river and
therefore on dam operations, and high water
quality is also important. Because of the
small size of this sector, however, it is
unlikelythattourismfirmswillsignificantly
influence water resources management
decisions Like many other users, though,
these firms stand to benefit from improved
and timely information on water releases
from the major dams in the system.
9.3.2.5 Environmental advocacy groups
The Olifants is one of six significant rivers
crossing the Kruger National Park. Pressure
on mining companies and other industries
because of their impact on Olifants water
quality as it enters the Park, resulted in the
founding of the Olifants River Forum (ORF)
in the early 1990s. In the early stages of con-
sultation to form a CMA, there was a vague
expectation that the ORF might become the
CMA, but it quickly became apparent that
its history and limited membership base
excluded this possibility. ORF now sees its
role as that of an environmental watchdog
and remains very active.
9.3.2.6 Development banks
Water infrastructure in the past has been
funded almost exclusively by government.
In the case of the former homelands, funds
for irrigation development were adminis-
tered through the Development Bank of
Southern Africa. The new economic policy
promotes private financing and requires
transparency and sustainable financing, not
only of infrastructure development, but also
of its operation, maintenance and future
replacement. It is therefore expected that
commercial financing institutions will
increasingly play a role in the construction
and rehabilitation of infrastructure.
9.4 Essential Functions for River Basin
Management
Chapter 1 identified 11 essential functions
of basin management. A slightly modified
listing of these functions is used in Tables
9.4 and 9.5, crossed with the key actors
identified in the previous section. These
functions are replicated, as appropriate,
across four broad categories – surface water,
groundwater, wastewater disposal and dif-
fuse returns, or agricultural return flows.
Cells are marked to indicate an actor’s level
of activity in a particular functional area.
Information is drawn from interviews,
printed materials and Internet postings. A
number of interesting points emerge from a
comparison of Table 9.4, which reflects the
situation during apartheid (pre-1994) and
Table 9.5, which conjectures about the
possible scenario 5 years after the expected
establishment of a CMA for the Olifants.
This projection is made on the basis of
a group discussion with key officials in
DWAF in July 2001.
A few observations emerge from an
examination of Tables 9.4 and 9.5.
• Prior to 1994, DWAF was the pre-
eminent organization in managing
surface water and wastewater, playing
a major role in planning, allocating,
supplying and protecting surface water
resources.
• Roles of many key actors are changing,
none so dramatically as that of DWAF.
In combination with the CMAs, most of
the same functions previously covered
by DWAF will be covered in future.
However, DWAF will delegate con-
siderable authority to the CMAs and
will assume new responsibilities in
environmental protection.
• The important flood protection func-
tion, previously handled by DWAF
and provincial and local government
authorities, appears to have no primary
locus of responsibility in the future.
The CMA role is uncertain.
• Many uncertainties remain regarding
who will do what in the future. In
particular, the roles to be played by
158 M. de Lange et al.
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and maintaining facilities that deliver
surface water are undefined.
• Some institutions from the previous
regime have now disappeared (such
as the South African Development
Trust and homeland governments)
and new ones are still in the process of
formation. The first CMAs should be
established in 2003; WUAs began being
established in 2002 as DWAF worked
out procedures and principles.
• Prior to 1994, planning was largely
a technocratic and political process
with little participation by other
players. Planning under the CMA is
expected to be much more inclusive
and participatory.
• Prior to 1994, there was virtually no
regulation of groundwater allocation
and use, or of groundwater quality.
In future, both the CMA and the water
tribunal are expected to be involved
in water allocation, while DWAF,
the CMA and other government depart-
ments are expected to ensure quality.
• The roles envisioned for the CMA span
a wide range, including planning and
allocation, wastewater regulation, and
monitoring and enforcement of water
quality standards. It remains to be seen
whether all of these functions, particu-
larly the enforcement ones, are appro-
priate to such a pluralistic institution.
• Virtually no formal activity in regulat-
ing the quality of agricultural return
flows is envisioned in the near future.
This reflects both the existence of
other higher priority concerns and the
difficulty of addressing these issues.
The following sections provide additional
observations based on the consultation
with the stakeholders around the essential
functions framework.
9.4.1 Water resources management
Before 1994, DWAF dominated the manage-
ment and regulation of surface water
resources and water quality, but with
limited jurisdiction in the homeland areas.
There was limited activity in the planning
and allocation or control of groundwater
and diffuse returns.
The intention is that the Minister
of Water Affairs and Forestry will progres-
sively delegate these functions to CMAs,
as the CMAs achieve adequate capacity to
assume such functions. DWAF will develop
and maintain a national resource classifica-
tion system against which the CMA will
manage its resources in accordance with
agreed resource quality objectives. In effect,
DWAF will be transformed from a planning
and implementation agency to one that does
national level planning, provides technical
support to CMAs and local water service
agencies, and regulates all of these. The
structure and personnel of DWAF are being
modifiedtomeetthesenewresponsibilities.
CMAs are intended to be more partici-
patory and sensitive vehicles for managing
basin water resources. They incorporate a
mix of public and private characteristics but
are still a work in progress and the exact mix
of characteristics that will emerge remains
uncertain. On the one hand, CMAs are
intended to be self-financing and semi-
autonomous.Ontheother,theyareexpected
to represent the broader public interest in
protecting water resources and the natural
environment. How compatible these func-
tions will prove to be, and whether they will
prove affordable for a self-financing CMA
remains to be seen.
9.4.2 Water services provision – domestic
and industrial use
Before 1994, DWAF played a dominant role
in bulk water supply, but was generally not
involved in service provision to end users.
For domestic and industrial use, this was
the domain of the homeland governments,
water boards and urban municipalities.
Several changes in the South African
government system affect the way in
which water services will be provided
in future. Most importantly, the new local
government operates in newly demarcated
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erase the fragmentation along racial bound-
aries and consolidate jurisdiction over
functions formerly held by the home-
land structures, tribal authorities, urban-
focused municipal areas and regional
servicescouncils. These newmunicipalities
serve as the new WSAs under the WSA
of 1997, and can act as WSPs themselves
or contract this function out to the private
sector, water boards or public sector WSPs.
9.4.3 Water services provision –
agricultural use
The dominant water users in agriculture
are the white commercial irrigation farmers,
accounting for more than half of national
water use. Before 1994, roughly one-third
of the 1.3 million irrigated ha was serviced
through irrigation boards. Irrigation boards
acted as a type of WUA, providing services
to its members, occasionally also supply-
ing water to the municipality of the
nearby rural town. However, only proper-
ties with full title deed were eligible for
membership, which excluded blacks, who
were prohibited from owning titled land in
white areas.
All of this is now changing. Land and
water rights have been separated by law,
and there are some black water users that
must be accommodated in the transforma-
tion of irrigation boards to WUAs. In fact,
most applications for transforming boards
to WUAs in 2002 were rejected by DWAF
because they were not sufficiently inclusive
(Faysse, 2003). Small-scale irrigation farm-
ers are getting organized into WUAs, albeit
not rapidly. In stressed river basins, the
licensing process could very well lead to
reductions in water allocations to commer-
cialfarmers,thoughthisremainstobeseen.
The tables reflect a new idea that has
recently emerged with regard to WUAs: the
concept of distinguishing between ‘grass-
roots’ and ‘umbrella’ WUAs. Initial inter-
pretations of the NWA held that where
there were both commercial and small-scale
emerging farmers in one area, they must all
bemembersofoneWUA.However,basedon
experiences in the Olifants, it was realized
that it may often be useful to enable smaller
groups of water users sharing a sub-scheme
to organize around their water infrastruc-
ture, and the various smaller WUAs could
be federated into a larger WUA to address
mutual problems.
9.5 Enabling Conditions
The essential functions and actors’ roles
depicted in Tables 9.4 and 9.5 provide a
static view of responsibilities. Additional
attributes of well-functioning basin gover-
nance systems relate to its dynamics. Chap-
ter 1 suggested a list of attributes termed
enabling conditions to analyse these. Here
we discuss a slightly modified version of
this list with respect to the Olifants basin
(see also van Koppen et al., 2003; Wester
et al., 2003).
9.5.1 Political attributes
South Africa’s negotiated transition from
white minority rule to democracy is legend-
ary and is embodied in its 1996 Constitu-
tion. This early success firmly established
negotiation as the preferred modus operandi
and representativeness, legitimacy, equity
and sustainability became requirements of
the new political environment. The intro-
duction of democratic governance gave
South Africa’s post-1994 government an
unprecedented mandate for change. This
mandate for major change brought
uncertainty that dislodged vested interests
sufficiently to enable fundamental policy
review. In reviewing the water law, Profes-
sor Kader Asmal’s strong political leader-
ship resulted in this window of opportunity
being seized to introduce a new system
of inclusive representation and balanced
power in water resources decision making.
The new system has to create mecha-
nisms through which water users across
the board can make themselves heard
and understood, enabling gradual and
164 M. de Lange et al.
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inequities, whilst ensuring a secure base for
economic growth. This is a major challenge
in policy and implementation. Lack of
access – through both lack of rights and lack
of infrastructure – is a priority issue of the
rural poor in the Olifants basin. Their ade-
quaterepresentationishardtoachieve:most
live in remote areas, excluded from partici-
pation through the cost of transportation
and a lackoforganization. Industrialists and
commercial irrigation farmers, by contrast,
are well organized and have larger financial
resources, better enabling them to partici-
pate in consultation processes. The pre-
eminent challenge to the CMA process is
tofindwaystoensurerepresentativepartici-
pationofmajorstakeholdinggroupsandlev-
elling the playing field to allow the various
stakeholders to interact with equivalent
knowledge, authority and legitimacy.
The environment is nominally pro-
tected through the strong provisions in the
NWA for priority allocations to maintain
the integrity of the resource base. However,
the Environmental Affairs Ministry and the
environmental non-governmental commu-
nitymaylacktheorganizedpoliticalcloutto
ensure that such provisions are adequately
implemented.
The proposed CMAs ignore internal
political boundaries, playing to both the
strengths and weaknesses of the new
national political scheme. The South
African situation is in contrast to countries
like Turkey, where a long history of strong
and stable local government provided ideal
vehicles for the establishment of their new
WUAs. In South Africa, local government
structures were deeply problematic: well-
resourcedwhitemunicipalitiesandregional
councils historically excluded black repre-
sentation, while structures in the former
homeland areas were weak and now have to
grapple with major ideological differences
betweentraditionaltriballeadershipandthe
new democratically elected representation.
Apart from the advantages from a natural
resource perspective of managing along nat-
ural boundaries, the thinking was that this
deliberate disregard for political boundaries
would enable the CMAs to continue their
business throughout successive political
changes. Nevertheless, the Constitution
providesfor‘cooperativegovernance’where
there are overlapping functions. The CMAs
will have to find ways to engage effectively
with the local governments, who both
represent the citizens’ interests and have
responsibilities to provide water and
sanitation services.
9.5.2 Informational attributes
It has been argued that, on the one hand, the
consultation process in the Olifants basin
for establishing the CMA was not fully
effective in reaching the large majority of
poor stakeholders; and on the other hand,
the long consultation process is delaying
action to address some of the serious issues
and problems of the basin (Wester et al.,
2003). One of the lessons of the water law
consultations was the importance of trusted
information as a basis for consultation and
negotiation. Good information is crucial to
delineate areas of agreement and disagree-
ment to structure and inform debate, but of
little use if the source is doubted. Equally,
good information becomes useful in negoti-
ation and decision making only when it
is accessible by all interested and affected
parties. South Africa is well equipped to
use the most modern techniques for data
gathering, storage and knowledge creation,
but faces a major challenge in presenting
information in a meaningful way to the
wide range of interests in the sector. Those
most in need of water for basic and produc-
tive uses are poorly equipped to access and
interpret information from the national
systems.
Indeed, good information has the
power to defuse unnecessary tensions,
while misinformation and lack of informa-
tion are powerful instigators of conflict. For
example, during public consultation on
South Africa’s largest inter-basin transfer
scheme, from the Orange River system to the
economic heartland around Johannesburg
through the Lesotho Highlands, irrigating
farmers along the lower Orange were
Planning and Management in the Olifants Basin 165
177 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:54 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesconcerned that their future was in jeopardy.
A rumour spread quickly that the water cri-
sisinJohannesburgwasduetotheestimated
6 million illegal immigrants in and around
the city. A quick back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation put an end to the rumour: the basic
water needs of 6 million people would only
irrigate about 5000 ha, a fraction of the irri-
gation along the Orange and less than 0.5%
of the irrigated area nationally. However,
information is often more complex than in
this example, and open to interpretation.
The language of consultation is a partic-
ularly important tool in processes of inclu-
sion and exclusion. Preparatory consulta-
tions in the local languages are a powerful
techniquetopreparetheruralpoortoengage
with other water user sectors. This problem
is recognized but not yet fully addressed.
9.5.3 Legal authority
South Africa possesses a strong legal frame-
work for water resources management.
Water is viewed as an indivisible national
asset, held in custody by the State. Conse-
quently, significant powers vest in the
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry.
Legal authority is not expected to be a
constraining factor in the implementation
of basin management. Similarly, the CMAs
and WUAs are provided a strong legal
base in the NWA. Indeed the NWA pro-
motes the establishment of CMAs, at the
initiative either of water users in the Water
Management Area or of the Minister.
9.5.4 Resources
It is often said by South Africa’s neighbours
that they lack the resources to conduct
public consultation processes as compre-
hensive as those characterizing South
African policy making. The ongoing cost
of consultation during implementation was
the subject of exhaustive debate during the
water law review. Compromise was reached
by toning down the specifics around con-
sultation requirements in the NWA. Still
there are important unresolved questions
regarding the potential for financial auton-
omy of the CMAs and how they will be
funded.
Water resources management functions
will be delegated to CMAs in 19 Water Man-
agement Areas. Currently, some functions
areperformedatDWAFhead-officeinPreto-
ria, while others are the responsibility of its
regional offices. Demand may well outstrip
supply of human, financial, institutional
and infrastructural resources to service such
alargenumberofwatermanagementoffices.
Modern water resources management is
dependent on a range of specialist skills that
may be unaffordable and unattainable by
all 19 CMAs in the short to medium term.
This possibility has led to discussions over
the possible sharing of specialist expertise
across CMAs. In the new political frame-
work, another challenge would be to find
leadership with command of the technical,
social and political skills required by the
job. Water managers of the previous era
werehighlyskilledtechnically,butwerenot
obliged to possess the wider range of skills
necessary in the new framework.
9.6 Conclusion
Speculation on the future of integrated
water resources management in the Olifants
basin needs to be informed by the current
policy and legislative framework, as well as
historic factors and issues of water scarcity,
and emerging critical issues. Some key
themes which will characterize the future
are outlined below.
• There is a single source of authority
and power. The Constitution and the
NWA vest the custodianship of South
Africa’s water in the Minister of Water
Affairs and Forestry. While this enables
DWAF to keep tight control on the
CMAs’ adherence to national policy as
expressed in the NWRS, it implies that
the process is externally induced and
driven. At the same time, the CMA may
be tempted to inflate its empire with
functions better addressed at either
166 M. de Lange et al.
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problems of sustainable financing. The
ministry will have to proceed carefully
to empower the emerging CMAs, and
to refrain from casual interventions
once they are empowered, if they are to
develop a sense of responsibility and
local accountability. Another distinct
advantage of this single source of
authority is that water allocations,
called ‘water use entitlements’ in the
NWA, are well defined.
• Poverty and poor representation of the
neediest sectors. It is still unclear to
what extent the CMA will have a devel-
opmental agenda focused on address-
ing poverty, though the latest draft of
the CMA proposal (BKS, 2002) does
recognize this role. Schreiner et al.
(2002) suggest two possible scenarios:
(i) ‘public participation’ that is cap-
tured by the powerful, thus reinforcing
marginalization of the disadvantaged,
and (ii) a scenario that builds poverty
eradication and achieving gender
equity into the initial design of the
CMA. Even if the second scenario
prevails, however, ultimately a balance
must be secured by the disadvantaged
themselves developing the organiza-
tion and political muscle to protect
their rights and privileges. The right to
water for ‘basic human needs’ is a well-
protected right in both the Constitution
and the NWA, but lack of access to
water for domestic use is still a very
serious problem in the former home-
lands in the Olifants. Development of
domestic water services, which is the
domain of local government, is of the
utmost importance to rural residents
and is largely independent of the CMA.
However, in the realm of small-scale
economic activity, CMA activities
could affect tremendously the ability of
the poor to improve their livelihoods
by making available additional alloca-
tions of water to these sectors. Informa-
tion flows need to be designed to reach
all water user sectors, but especially
those with limited access to modern
media.
• From administrative to public proces-
ses for water allocation. Water alloca-
tion was historically an administrative
process with little public involvement.
The NWA introduces mechanisms for
public interaction at a relatively local-
ized level, through the development
of an ‘allocation plan’ in the CMA’s
5-yearly catchment management strat-
egy. This implies a shift from user-
to-official interaction to a much more
direct negotiation among user groups.
In a context of growing water scarcity,
conflict management is likely to
become increasingly important. This
is a vitally important issue. Powerful
interests, such as mining and large-
scale commercial sectors, still have
very strong voices, and of course have
strong arguments for protecting their
access to water: mining and agriculture
in the Olifants basin are major earners
of foreign exchange. On the other hand,
there are concerns as to whether this
status quo is best for the millions of
poor people living in the basin, with
little or no access to water for their
own productive uses. Further, there are
large uncertainties regarding the degree
to which there will be unmet water
demands in the future in this basin and
the extent to which these can be met
by better demand management (Levite
et al., 2002).
• Growing water quality issues. Intensifi-
cation of economic activities like min-
ing, industry and farming, as well as
growing population densities will put
increasing pressure on the quality of
water resources. Innovations like the
existing agreements on quality manage-
ment through ‘controlled releases’ of
polluted water from coal mines during
high-flow periods will gain impor-
tance, but remediation will eventually
need to enter the next, more costly
phase of treatment. Water quality
impacts of dense settlements and
agricultural outflows will demand
attention, especially in the light of
national standards, requirements for
the maintenance of an ecological
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quality objectives.
In sum, South Africa is at an early stage of
its long journey to effective integrated man-
agement of its water resources. While its
legislation and policies are ahead of those
of many countries, it faces special major
challenges. Both nationally and in many of
its basins, it faces potentially serious gaps
between growing demand for water and the
available resources. It needs to focus far
more than it has on how to use the
water productively while also reducing
the current gross inequities and achieving
the aspirations of its poor majority to
benefit from this and other resources.
References
Ashton, J. (2000) Conceptual Overview of the
Olifants River Basin’s Groundwater, South
Africa. African Water Issues Research Unit,
University of Pretoria.
BKS (2002) Proposal for the establishment of
a Catchment Management Agency for the
Olifantswatermanagementarea.Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry. Draft,
November 2002. Appendix A, B, C, D, E.
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.
Proposed National Water Resource Strategy,
first edition, August (2002) (also website
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/
Policies/NWRS/Default.htm) and its
Appendix 9 D4, concerning the Olifants
river basin.
Faysse, N. (2003) Possible outcomes of small-
holders’ participation in water resource
management institutions in South Africa.
Draft paper under review for publication.
IWMI, Pretoria.
Hirschowitz,R.(2000)MeasuringPovertyinSouth
Africa. Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
Levite, H., Sally, H. and Cour, J. (2002) Water
demand management scenarios in a water-
stressed basin in South Africa. Paper
presented at the 3rd WARFSA/Waternet
Symposium, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania,
30–31 October.
Midgley, D.C., Pitman, W.V. and Middleton, D.
(1994) Surface Water Resources of South
Africa 1990. Water Research Commission,
Pretoria.
Mullins, D. (2002) Calculation of Sectoral Multi-
pliers. Conningarth Economists, Pretoria.
Schreiner, B., van Koppen, B. and Khumbane, T.
(2002) From bucket to basin: a new paradigm
for water management, poverty eradication
and gender equity. In: Turton, A. and
Henwood, R. (eds) Hydropolitics in the
Developing World: a Southern African
Perspective. African Water Issues Research
Unit (University of Pretoria), Pretoria.
Thompson, H., Stimie, C.M., Richters, E. and
Perret, S. (2001) Policies, Legislation and
Organizations Related to Water in South
Africa, with SpecialReferenceto theOlifants
Basin. IWMI Working Paper 19 (South
Africa Working Paper 7). IWMI, Colombo,
Sri Lanka.
van Koppen, B., Jha, N. and Merrey, D.J. (2003)
Redressing Racial Inequities Through Water
Law in South Africa: Revisiting Old Contra-
dictions? Comprehensive Assessment of
Water Management in Agriculture Research
Paper 3. IWMI, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Wester, P., Merrey, D.J. and de Lange, M. (2003)
Boundariesofconsent:stakeholderrepresen-
tation in river basin management in Mexico
and South Africa. World Development 31,
797–812.
168 M. de Lange et al.
180 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:35:55 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees10 Water Resource Management in the
Dong Nai Basin: Current Allocation Processes
and Perspectives for the Future
Mark Svendsen, Claudia Ringler and Nguyen Duy Son
10.1 Introduction
Vietnam is emerging slowly from an era
of strong, but compartmentalized, central
control of all-important functions to one
where limited authority is being delegated
and more effective linkages among sectors
and ministries are being established. One
sector in which this is taking place is the
water resource sector.
This chapter examines the policy and
institutional environment governing water
allocation and other management functions
in the Dong Nai River basin, together with
the rules-in-use, which currently control
allocation decisions. In doing this, it
employs the interactional analysis matrix
developed in Chapter 1 and the concept of
stages of basin closure, developed in Chap-
ter 2. The chapter will define the basin and
overview basin hydrology and water uses. It
will then assess the present level of stress on
basin water resources and its implications.
Following this, it will describe the legal
framework for basin management, identify
the important stakeholders in basin water
management, and examine the processes
by which allocation and water control deci-
sions are currently made. A final section




Vietnam is formally divided into nine
basins for water resource planning. One
of these is the basin entitled Dong Nai-Sai
Gon and Surrounding Areas. It covers about
15% of the total surface area of the country,
not including the roughly 10% of the
total Dong Nai watershed, which lies in
neighbouring Cambodia. The main stem of
the Dong Nai River extends for 628 km, all
within Vietnam.
While based primarily on watershed
boundaries of the Dong Nai and tributaries,
this planning unit includes a number of
short coastal rivers that flow out of the
mountains and across a narrow plain
directly to the South China Sea. In addition,
the West Vam Co River adjacent to the
Mekong Delta is not included in the
planning basin, though it is a tributary to
the Dong Nai River near its mouth.1
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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1 A primary reason for this is that the West Vam Co receives substantial transfers from the Mekong River
through a connecting channel.
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appropriate as a planning unit, for manage-
ment purposes the Dong Nai basin is more
properly defined as the hydraulic unit
draining into the South China Sea through
the Dong Nai River. This definition would
exclude the coastal rivers in Ninh Thuan,
Binh Thuan and Ba Ria-Vung Tau Provinces
and include the West Vam Co River in Long
AnProvince.Therationaleforthisisthatthe
management unit should cover a hydrauli-
cally integrated area where water-related
decisions in one part of the unit have the
potential to affect other parts of the unit. It
should exclude unaffected and unrelated
areas. The southeastward-flowing coastal
rivers generally do not satisfy this criterion
and should thus be excluded from the
management unit.
Management decision making relating
to these small external watersheds should
rest with local stakeholders and not with
the larger basin council. This has two
complementary advantages. First, it avoids
unnecessarily expanding the basin council
and complicating its decision-making pro-
cesses. Second, it allows control of the
smaller coastal basins to remain with local
stakeholders, rather than transferring influ-
ence and control to the larger multi-party
body.
Complicating this picture, however, is
an existing transfer from the upstream Dong
Nai River to the Cai River in the coastal area.
Additional diversions are planned. Clearly
planning for future inter-basin diversions
needs to include all of the affected areas,
justifying the current planning boundaries.
For management purposes, however, unless
these inter-basin diversions are the domi-
nant source of water for the receiving
basin, it is more appropriate to manage
transfers through bilateral interactions
between managers of the two basins. If the
transfers do comprise the majority of flow in
the receiving basin, then it may be reason-
able to include the whole of the receiving
basin in the purview of the management
body for the larger basin and give receiving
basin stakeholders representation in this
body.
Definedasamanagementunit,asabove,
the Dong Nai basin covers about 40,200 km2
and comprises four major branches. These
are the Dong Nai main stem, the Be, the
Saigon and the two branches of the Vam Co
(Fig. 10.1). The basin covers all or nearly all
of five provinces2 and a part of five others.
10.2.2 Characteristics
The Dong Nai basin has several distinct
hydrogeological regions, ranging from the
lowland areas in the Vam Co Dong River
system that are inundated from Mekong
floods during the rainy season, to the
Central Highland areas of up to 1600 m.
The lower basin reaches are subject to tidal
influences, particularly during the dry sea-
son, with substantial saltwater intrusion.
Precipitation averages 2000 mm, ranging
from 1200 mm in the lowlands to 2800 mm
in the highlands. The basin exhibits marked
seasonal variations in flow with 87% of
total precipitation concentrated during
the rainy-season months of April/May to
October/November. In addition, there are
modest temporal variations in flow, with
low inflows of 28 billion (109) cubic metres
(BCM) in 1998 compared to high inflows of
40 BCM in 1997.
10.2.3 Basin water balance
10.2.3.1 Supply
The natural yield of the basin, averaged
over the 1978–1998 period, is around
36.26 BCM annually. Imports from the
Mekong to the Vam Co tributary contribute
an estimated additional 6.22 BCM per year,
while power generation diversions to the
Cai basin reduce the basin water avail-
ability by about 0.64 BCM.
The current project inventory for
the basin includes additional storage of
170 M. Svendsen et al.
2 Ho Chi Minh City is considered as a province here.
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likely to be in service by 2010. By that year,
basin storage would thus total about
7.56 BCM (Fig. 10.2). Still, the options
available to system managers will remain
limited as a consequence of the limited
storage. Limited storage also means that
seasonal variations in discharge and
demand become extremely important, and
that short-term water balances, rather than
annual averages, will drive allocation and
management decision making.
Significant development of storage
began in 1963 with the construction of
the Da Nhim dam and is continuing. Total
storage in the basin is relatively small at
5.61 BCM, and comprises only about 13%
of average annual discharge. All basins are
different and have different characteristics
and storage requirements for effective man-
agement. In general, however, storage is an
essential element of water control and man-
agement and it is informative to contrast
storage ratios in some other basins with that
of the Dong Nai. Indonesia’s Brantas basin,
for example, lacks reservoir sites and can
store only about 4% of annual discharge. On
the other hand, Australia’s Murray–Darling
basin storage is about 250% of annual
discharge, and on the Colorado River in
the USA storage is about 400% of annual
discharge. Other things being equal, this
suggests that additional storage in the
Dong Nai would enhance the scope of
management options available to managers
there.
10.2.3.2 Demand
Current demand for water in the basin is not
known with certainty, but is estimated in
Table 10.1. As can be seen, while domestic
and industrial demands are important, irri-
gation and salinity control requirements are
the dominant items. Estimates of the level
of sustained dry-season reservoir releases
required for salinity control in the lower
river vary widely. Values used here are flows
of 85 m3/s at Binh An on the Dong Nai River
from Tri An Reservoir and 25 m3/s at the
site of the future Ben Than intake on the Sai
Gon River from Dau Tieng Reservoir. The
aggregate salinity control requirement shown
is intended to control the tidal salinity front
at the points of withdrawal of the Ho Chi
Minh City (HCMC) urban water supply, and
does not directly consider any additional
environmental or waste dilution needs.3
























Fig. 10.2. Cumulative basin storage capacity, 1950–2010.
3 HCMC does receive some controlled deliveries for waste dilution.
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implicitly for surface water, is the lack
of current knowledge about ground and
surface water interactions in the basin.
This uncertainty affects both irrigation and
domestic/industrial demands, but is most
important for irrigated agriculture. While
about one-fifth of domestic/industrial use is
currently drawn from groundwater, future
growth in this use sector is expected to
be met almost entirely from surface water
sources, making it reasonable to allocate
domestic and industrial use to surface water
demand.
Groundwater use for irrigation, how-
ever, is growing rapidly, and much of the
new high-value crop production, such as
coffee, fruit and pepper now being estab-
lished relies on private pumping of ground-
water. The extent to which groundwater
aquifers and surface water flows are inter-
connected in a given region is thus
important in determining the share of
demand that should be allocated to surface
water resources. In Tay Ninh Province, for
example, it is known that seepage from
the Dau Tieng Reservoir and associated
irrigation facilities have caused a rise in the
regionalwatertablefrom10–12 mbelowthe
surfacetojust4–5 m,facilitatingprivateirri-
gation development and allowing extraction
with cheaper centrifugal pumps. In other
areas, private pumping is drawing down the
water table. Shallow water tables are typi-
cally hydraulically connected with adjacent
streams and rivers, and it is reasonable to
attribute this private well demand to surface
supplies until more detailed information is
available which would permit partitioning
into surface and groundwater supplies.
10.2.3.3 Balance
Viewed on an annual basin, there is still
little stress in the basin, and seemingly
little need to incur significant expense
for coordination and management. Total
current demand is only about 30% of
annual supply, even assuming no reuse
of municipal and industrial return flows.
The picture changes significantly,
however, when supply and demand are

























Fig. 10.3. Hydrographs of Dong Nai Basin supply and demand.












Table 10.1. Gross water demand in the Dong
Nai basin.
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shows monthly supply and demand aver-
aged over 3 years, 1996–1998.
The without storage curve depicts the
volume of synthesized inflows to streams
and rivers throughout the basin. The with
storage curve shows supply as reservoir
releases from the three major storage reser-
voirs in the basin combined with natural
inflows below each reservoir. The second
curve thus shows the same volume of
inflows as the first, but distributed over
time according to the pattern of reservoir
operations prevailing during the subject
period. Existing storage is able to take the
monsoon peak off the inflow hydrograph
andprovidenearlyfourtimesthedry-season
flow in March and April than would have
resulted without storage.
More important to observe, however, is
that during the first 4 months of the year,
supply and demand are nearly in balance,
and with small increases in demand over
time, or in poor rainfall years, the basin will
be seasonally in deficit. This will place the
domestic water supply for HCMC, located at
the lower end of the basin, at risk, both in
terms of absolute volume of available water
and as a consequence of inadequate flows
pushing the tidal salinity front below the
HCMC water intake on the Dong Nai River at
Binh An. This constraint can be relaxed in a
number of ways, including shifting more
hydropower production to the dry months
when reservoir releases can do double duty.
However, each alternative solution has its
own set of benefits and costs.
The important point here is that, from a
monthly and seasonal perspective, the basin
is already approaching a stressed condition
and pressure will be increasing to find the
lowest-cost approaches that will relieve
stress and ease constraints on the most
affected sectors.
10.2.4 Water use sectors
10.2.4.1 Hydropower
Five reservoirs currently produce electricity
in the basin (Table 10.2). The Dong Nai
basin is one of two major hydropower
producers in the country, the other being
the Da River basin in the north. Installed
capacity at the five Dong Nai hydropower
stations is about 1.2 GW. The basin thus
represents about 25% of the national
hydroelectric capacity and about 18% of
total national installed generating capacity
of around 6.5 GW. It is thus an important
power producer, but not the major one in
the country. A 500-kV north–south inter-tie
makes it possible to transfer power back
and forth between the north and the south
of the country in response to demand.
Staff at each of the power stations
are employed by Electricity of Vietnam
(EVN), a State-owned company established
under the Ministry of Industry (MoI).
Generation is controlled by an EVN unit,
the National Regulation Center (NRC), in
Hanoi. Under the NRC are two Regional
Regulation Centers – one for the north, also
in Hanoi, and one for the south, located
in HCMC. Prior to the completion of the
north–south inter-tie in 1994, Dong Nai
basin power stations were under the control
of the Southern Regional Center in HCMC.
Since completion of the inter-tie, all power
stations in the country are controlled from
the national centre in Hanoi. The NRC
prepares yearly, quarterly and monthly
plans for power production for each
power station in the country, thermal
and hydro, and directs operations on a
real-time basis. Power station personnel
have little discretionary authority with
respect to operations.
































Table 10.2. Hydropower generation in the Dong
Nai basin.
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higher operating costs, operators attempt
to maximize the use of the hydro stations.
Moreover, generation from hydro stations
is generally increased during daily periods
of peak demand to take advantage of
their flexibility. Plants are thus operated
for a combination of base load and peaking
power. Daily and hourly changes in generat-
ing levels are ordered by the national centre
through a computer network linking the
stations and the centre. Data on actual
releases and generation are also fed into this
system by the power stations. These data are
closely held by EVN.
In addition to generation targets, there
is an operating curve for each reservoir
giving maximum allowable reservoir
elevations throughout the year. When a
reservoir level exceeds that specified by the
curve, spill is ordered. Spills are generally
avoided whenever possible because they
bypass turbines and result in a loss of
potential energy generation. These curves
are regarded as a part of the dam design, and
arerarelychanged.Thereisthusnodynamic
allocation of flood storage based on long-
range weather and climate patterns. Rule
curves for Tri An Dam are shown in
Fig. 10.4.4
10.2.4.2 Irrigated agriculture
The Dong Nai River basin boasts a highly
dynamic agricultural sector, with products
ranging from basic staples like rice and maize
to raw materials for local industry includ-
ing rubber, cashew (both non-irrigated) and
sugarcane and to high-valued crops like
coffee, fruit, grapes, pepper, tea and vegeta-
bles. It produces about 15% of the total nat-
ional agricultural output (Ringler et al., 2001).
Low rainfall during the dry season
(aslittleas10–50 mm/month)anddryspells
in the rainy season make irrigation indis-
pensable for the cultivation of many crops.
According to estimates by the Sub-Institute
for Water Resources Planning (SIWRP), the
gross irrigated area in the Dong Nai basin
(excluding the area irrigated by the West
Vam Co River) is 630,000 ha. The net area
irrigated during the dry season is an
estimated 293,086 ha or 24% of the total
agricultural area.
Estimates of the share of groundwater
irrigation in total irrigated area vary widely,
ranging upward from a conservative
10–15% of the total to a third of all the crops
in the basin. Groundwater-irrigated crops
include the larger share of the coffee area,
pepper and fruit trees, some upland crops,















Fig. 10.4. Example of a rule curve for a basin reservoir.
4 Elevations shown for each month are for the first day of the month.
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rice. The higher estimate is supported bythe
rapid increase in the number of pumps in
use in the basin. In 1999, pumps numbered
an estimated 248,000, having grown at a rate
of 16.1% per year during 1991–1999. This
rateofincreaseissecondonlytotheMekong
Delta, where private pumping from canals is
prevalent.
Overthe1999–2010period,Vietnamese
planning authorities project growth in gross
irrigated area in the basin of 3.85% per year,
with a rapid increase in area under upland
and industrial crops and perennial crops,
and slowing growth in areas under rice
(SIWRP, 2001). As there are no water quan-
tity measurements in the basin’s irrigation
systems, irrigation water demand must be
estimated. Estimates based on the FAO crop
water demand methodology yield irrigation
demands of about 4.6 BCM. Estimates based
on a detailed farm production survey yield
water demands of 3.8 BCM. The difference
can be accounted, in part, by the large crop
water demand of perennial crops indicated
by the FAO methodology that, in effect, is
being supplied from shallow groundwater
duetotheplant’sdeeprootsysteminsteadof
irrigation applications. Based on the SIWRP
irrigation expansion planning for 2010,
irrigation water demand will increase to
5.4 BCM by 2010, at a rate of 3.3%/year.5
10.2.4.3 Flood control
The Dong Nai basin is subject to flooding in
both upstream and downstream areas. In
downstream areas, flooding from rainfall
received in the upper watershed can be
exacerbated by flooding from the adjacent
Mekong River, local rainfall and tidal influ-
ences. The official flood season is specified
as 1 July to 30 November (MARD, 2000).
The three large upstream reservoirs in
the system afford some flood control poten-
tial, but the level of protection provided
depends on the way in which the reservoirs
are operated. Presently, two of the three
largest reservoirs (Tri An and Thac Mo) are
operated primarily for hydropower produc-
tion, while the third (Dau Tieng) is not
equipped for power production and is oper-
ated for irrigation, domestic and industrial
water supply, and downstream salinity
control. The operating regulations for Dau
Tieng describe operation for flood control
and require consideration of Tri An and
Thac Mo operating plans. In all three cases,
however, emphasis appears to be on opera-
tion to fulfil the reservoir’s primary purpose
– irrigation and hydropower generation,
respectively. Even releases from Dau Tieng
that are well below spillway design capacity
can cause flooding and damage in down-
stream Binh Duong Province, where habita-
tion and economic development is present
on the flood plain below the dam.
The hazards of this single-purpose
operating regime were demonstrated in
October of 2000, when continuous heavy
rains overmuch ofthe watershed resulted in
the need to spill water simultaneously from
all three reservoirs (Ngoc Anh, 2000). The
rains occurred near the end of the rainy
season when reservoirs were nearly full and
spillwasrequiredtoprotectthedams.Major
spills occurred for 10 days on 10–20 Octo-
ber. Downstream flooding in the basin
resulted in 18 deaths, more than 37,000
dwellings damaged or destroyed, while
affecting more than 60,000 ha of crops.
In addition to calling for construction
of additional reservoirs and river dyking, a
report on the 2000 flooding prepared by
SIWRP suggests a number of new basin
management initiatives. These include the
following:
• Operations studies on the three large
reservoirs to develop multipurpose
operating criteria and assigning top
priority to flood control;
• More catchment rainfall gauging sta-
tions and improved flood forecasting;
• Flood control planning;
• Surveys and research on flash flooding;
• Flood warning and rescue systems.
176 M. Svendsen et al.
5 This value was estimated based on the average irrigation application values from the farm household
survey applied to the projected crop mix in 2010.
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The Dong Nai basin is the economic centre
of the country, and domestic and industrial
water use has increased rapidly over the
last decade driven by increased invest-
ments in industrial zones and water supply
infrastructure. Despite this development,
less than half of the population in the
basin is served with public connections.
For example, in 2000, the HCMC water
supply company had a capacity of
837,000 m3/day (10% of which was from
groundwater). Domestic deliveries in the
same year reached about 417,000 m3/day
for an urban population of 4.2 million
people. Currently HCMC employs two large
treatment plants utilizing water from the
Dong Nai River. A third plant, on the Sai
Gon River was completed in 2004. In addi-
tion, private wells accounted for estimated
additional 400,000 m3/day. In general,
urban areas such as Tay Ninh Town, Thu
Dau Mot, Da Lat, Bien Hoa and HCMC have
piped distribution systems for treated water
drawn primarily from surface sources.
Groundwater supplements these sources
and provides the only source of supply for
some smaller towns and many individual
households.
Overall, domestic water demand has
been estimated at 0.5 BCM, based on a
standard of 160 l/day per person for urban
areas and 60 l/day per person for rural areas.
Thisprobablyexceedscurrentactualsupply
and use rates.
Industries in the basin are concentrated
inthelowerbasinprovinces,includingBinh
Duong, Dong Nai, and HCMC. Estimates for
industrial use can vary by more than
an order of magnitude, ranging from
162,000 m3/day based on delivery informa-
tion to 2,000,000 m3/day based on an esti-
mate of water use in the production of main
industrial products in the basin. Industrial
supplies come both from municipal-treated
water supply systems and from individual
river intakes or private wells. Organized
industrial estates in some areas provide
industrial water supplies from wells to
concerns within the estates. Current indus-
trial demand is estimated at just under




Environmental uses of water in the basin
appear, in practice, to have a lower priority
than the extractive uses of irrigation and
municipal and industrial water supply.
Guidelines exist which suggest minimum
flows of 25 m3/s at the future Ben Than
intake on the Sai Gon River and 85–100 m3/s
at the Binh An water supply intake on the
Dong Nai River. These flows typically
require releases of 25 m3/s from Dau Tieng,
100 m3/s from Tri An and 70 m3/s from the
future Can Don reservoir. The Dau Tieng
release satisfies needs of local irrigation on
about 5000 ha in Binh Duong Province
along the Sai Gon River below the reservoir
and to control salinity, and the Tri An
releases are to prevent the tidal salinity
front from migrating upstream past the point
of the HCMC municipal water intakes. At
the same time, however, these releases have
the effect of putting a small assured flow
into the rivers below the reservoirs.
10.2.4.6 Other uses
Fisheries and aquaculture are relatively
small activities in the freshwater portions of
the basin, but are important contributors to
local incomes and local diets. Cage aqua-
culture contributes importantly to waste
loads in reservoirs, particularly Tri An.
The Sai Gon River is navigated by
ocean-going freighters visiting the HCMC
port. The rivers upstream from HCMC are
used only by much smaller craft, and water
flows and channel depths for navigation
have not been a significant issue for basin
management or reservoir releases.
10.3 Institutions and Actors
10.3.1 Legal framework
In 1999 and 2000, Vietnam initiated a series
of major reforms in the country’s water
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Water Resources (hereafter called the Water
Law) of 1999, and the Decision on the
Establishment of the National Water
Resources Council (NWRC) in June of 2000.
Among other things, the Water Law enables
the establishment of river basin committees
or organizations in the country.
These measuresaremeanttobringmore
coherence into a sector currently comprised
of highly fragmented water authorities with
sometimes overlapping responsibilities and
little coordination. They follow the 1995
merger of the Ministry of Water Resources
and the Ministry of Agriculture, which
tended to align water resource management
with one of its most important user sectors,
but at the cost of potential for a broader
resource-based perspective. As a result, the
country is currently transitioning from a
water sector that is fragmented and weakly
coordinated to a more holistic, decentral-
ized and integrated management of the
country’s water resources at the river basin
level.6
The Water Law was adopted on 20 May
1998 and went into force on 1 January 1999.
According to the law, water resources
belong to the people under the management
oftheState,andorganizationsandindividu-
als have a right to exploit and use the
resources (Official Gazette, 1998). Water
allocation is carried out from a river basin
perspective adhering to the principles of
fairness and reasonability. Priority in use is
accorded to drinking water in both quality
and quantity (Article 20).
According to the Water Law, the Minis-
try of Agriculture and Rural Development
(MARD) is in charge of overall management
ofthecountry’swaterresources,butthegov-
ernment may delegate authority for specific
water uses to other ministries. Water man-
agement is to be carried out in river basins
that follow hydrologic catchment bound-
aries, and not administrative ones. MARD,
together with provincial governments, is
in charge of establishing both flood and
drought plans for the country’s river basins.
Both water use and wastewater discharge
are to be licensed by provincial government
authorities (People’s Committees) under the
guidanceofMARD.Decree179/1999/ND-CP
of 30 December 1999 assigns specific duties
to MARD, other ministries and Provincial
People’s Committees (PPCs) related to
water resources management. Additional
regulations are currently being drafted to
implement the framework Water Law.
In addition to the Water Law, several
other laws and regulations are important for
water resources management in Vietnam.
They include the Environmental Protection
Law (27 December 1993) and the Ministerial
Instruction from the Ministry of Science,
Technology and Environment (MOSTE)
entitled Guiding Environmental Impact
Assessment for Operating Units (Instruction
No. 1420/QD-MTg).
In June 2000, a national-level umbrella
organizationforthewatersector,theNWRC,
was established, based on Article 63 of the
Water Law (Government Decision No. 67/
2000/QD-TTg). The NWRC has an office in
MARDandanumberofpermanentmembers
who represent the range of ministries and
organizations that are involved in water
resources management in the country.
In analysing water resource institutions,
it is important to understand one salient
concept pervading governance in Vietnam
– the concept of State management. State
managementgivespre-eminencetotheState
across a wide range of public decisions. The
key actor in this is the government, which is
embodiedintheofficeofthePrimeMinister.
Ultimate State management responsibility
resides here, and the most important deci-
sions are made by this office. State
management authority for lesser decisions
is delegated to ministries at the national
level and to PPCs at the provincial level.
For example, for water resources, Article
57 of the Water Law assigns a number of
178 M. Svendsen et al.
6 In August 2002, after this chapter was written, water resources was again separated out from agriculture
and placed under the newly created Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE). Hence most of
the functions ascribed below to MARD are now functions of the MONRE.
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to MARD. At the same time, Article 58
reiterates the supremacy of the government
in exercising these State management
functions and makes MARD answerable
to the government in carrying out the
responsibilities assigned to it.
A variety of other organizations, which
do not possess State management authority,
are placed under the direct supervision of
an organ of government which does have
it. Notable among these is the plethora of
public ‘companies’, which have been cre-
ated by various government units to provide
particular services, such as infrastructure
design and construction, or irrigation
system management. These companies
typicallyhavestrictlylimitedautonomyand
are directly supervised by an entity with
State management authority. This supervi-
sion goes beyond what is generally consid-
ered ‘regulation’ and blurs the distinction
betweengovernmentand nominallyautono-
mous State corporations. While the concept
of State management, as applied to State
companies, appears to be evolving slowly to
allow more autonomy, it is still a strong and
integral part of their governance.
10.3.2 Basin actors and stakeholders
Actors can be defined as organizations and
individuals who take part in the process
of managing basin water resources. Stake-
holders can be defined as those organiza-
tions and individuals having some direct
interest affected by the outcomes of basin
management decision making. The set of
stakeholders thus includes actors, but is
broader, in that it can include groups such
as coastal fishermen, urban environmental-
ists and small farmers who may not have a
direct role in basin management.
InVietnam,actorsinbasinmanagement
tend to be government organizations rather
than associations of individuals, trade orga-
nizations and other civil society groups. In
the case of multi-province basins, govern-
ment organizations at national, regional and
provincial levels are typically involved,
with international agreements coming into
play for the Mekong River. There are no
international agreements for the Red River,
despite its being an important trans-bound-
ary river. In the case of the Dong Nai, the
small portion of upper watershed located
in Cambodia has so far not been cause
for international consultations on basin
management.
There is a strong sense of hierarchy
in Vietnamese government structures, with
bondswithinministerialgroupsofunitsand
organizations being significantly stronger
than those among units across different
ministries. This is true even where these
units are addressing a common set of
issues. Within ministerial groups, there are
often extensive consultations and upward
requests for clearance before decisions are
made. This can slow decision taking and
limit cross-ministerial discussion. At the
same time, it leads to coherence and confor-
mity with ministerial policy directives.
The general form of public administra-
tion in Vietnam employs a matrix model,
in which sub-national administrative units
are responsible in two directions (Fig. 10.5).
At the provincial and district level, sector-
based units such as Agriculture and Rural
Development or Public Works and Trans-
portation are accountable administratively
to the Provincial or District People’s Com-
mittee, while in technical matters they are
responsibletothecorrespondingministryin
Hanoi. Budgets flow through the People’s
Committee, and staff are employed by the
province but receive technical direction
from Hanoi.
This picture is complicated by the
presence of a large number of ‘companies’,
which have been created by government
ministries and departments at both national
and provincial levels. These companies are
State-owned and typically closely tied to
their parent ministry or department, often
sharing staff, functions and budgetary
resources. Most exist to do business with
the government or with other State-owned
companies.
In the water sector, important examples
are the MARD engineering design compa-
nies, of which there are two at the national
Water Resource Management in the Dong Nai Basin 179
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1and 2(HEC 1,HEC 2)–and numerous ones
at provincial levels, and water resources
constructioncompaniesatbothnationaland
provincial levels. Similar sets of design and
construction companies are found under
the Ministry of Construction (MoC) and
provincial construction departments for
domestic water supply and under the MoI
for hydropower development.
Inaddition, MARDandmanyprovinces
have set up irrigation management compa-
nies (IMCs) to supply water for irrigation
and maintain irrigation facilities. Three of
these are directly under MARD – the Dau
Tieng Management Company, which oper-
ates Dau TiengReservoiron theSaigon River,
andtwoothers,whichoperatelargeirrigation
systems in the north. Most provinces have
also created one or more IMCs to operate
irrigation systems within their boundaries.
Provincial IMCs are units of the Provincial
Agricultural and Rural Development Ser-
vice (PARDS). The IMCs are generally
intertwined with the PARDS themselves.
The government is moving slowly to
privatize these engineering design and
construction companies, and to put them
into competition with a growing number of
private firms in the same field. Currently,
however, private firms are largely limited to
subcontractor roles and many functions are
still reserved for State firms.
Because IMCs operate in a natural
monopoly setting, such competitive reme-
dies are not available for the management
problems affecting them. Moreover, some
IMCs have also become involved in the
constructionbusiness,creatingfurtherques-
tions of conflicting interests and privileged
competition against private firms. Future
remedies lie in creating a much clearer
separation between the parent government
unit and the IMC, providing for user
governance control of IMCs, transparent
subsidies (if present) and other measures to
enhance corporate behaviour and operating
efficiency.
10.3.2.1 National and regional actors7
Important national and regional actors in
the Dong Nai basin are shown in Box 10.1.
The government, as discussed in an earlier
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Fig. 10.5. Generalized management structure in Vietnam. Source: DWRHWM (2002).
7 DescriptionsoflinegovernmentministriesanddepartmentsdrawonDWRHWM(2002) andRingleretal.
(2001).
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tions, in part through delegation to minis-
tries and Provincial and District People’s
Committees.
In addition to MARD, the lead ministry,
other ministries are also involved in the
water sector, as delegated by the govern-
ment.Currently,thewatersectorinVietnam
is in a transition period and water resources
are still largely administrated on a sectoral
basis. Thus, for example, the MoI is respon-
sible for the National Hydropower Plan; the
MoC is responsible for urban water supply
planning;MARDislargelyfocusedonirriga-
tion sector development and flood control;
andMOSTEisresponsibleforwaterquality.
NWRC The recently established NWRC is
the apex organization for water resources in
thecountry.TheCouncilischairedbyaVice
Prime Minister and includes the Minister
of MARD as a standing member and 15
other permanent members comprising
vice ministers from Agriculture and Rural
Development; Planning and Investment;
Construction; Science, Technology and
Environment; Finance; Transportation;
Fisheries;andIndustryaswellastheheadof
the General Department of Hydro-meteorol-
ogy; the Chairman of the NWRC Office; and
four specialists working in the water sector.
The Chairman of NWRC may also appoint
non-permanent members representing cen-
tral and local agencies relating to specific
issues on the agenda for each session of the
Council.
The Council has the objective of
facilitating coordination among the various
ministries and agencies involved in water
resources management. Its role is to advise
the government on important decisions
related to water resources management,
including: (i) strategies and policies on
national water resources; (ii) major river
basin plans; (iii) plans for major inter-basin
diversions; (iv) projects for protection,
exploitation and utilization of water
resources and projects for flood control
and water damage control; (v) management,
protection, exploitation and utilization of
international water sources and dispute
settlement; and (vi) conflict resolution
between ministries and branches, and
between ministries and provinces and cities
under central control.
MARD MARD, established in 1995 out
of the three former ministries of water
resources, agriculture and food industry,
and forestry (Decree 73/CP of 1 November
1995), is the State agency in charge of water
resources management and reports directly
to the government. The 1999 Water Law
reaffirmed this role.
MARD manages water resources in the
country,especiallyinthefieldsofirrigation,
drainage, flood control and bulk water sup-
ply. It is responsible for the overall policy
framework, the planning and prioritization
of new development, and the allocation of
inter-provincial water resources. Funding
for large capital projects, including main
canals of large irrigation and flood control
projects, is largely provided by the central
governmentand includes significant foreign
assistance. Secondary works and local
projects are designed and funded by the
provincial government with assistance from
the central government.
Water Resource Management in the Dong Nai Basin 181
Box 10.1. National actors in water resource
management of the Dong Nai Basin.




• Various construction-related departments
• SIWRP
• Southern WR Research Inst
• HEC 1, HEC 2
• Construction companies









• Design Company for WSS
• WSS Companies 1 and 2
• MoPH
• Ministry of Fisheries
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WaterResources and Hydraulic WorksMan-
agement(DWRHWM);(ii)FloodControland
Dyke Management; (iii) the Centre for Rural
Water Supply and Sanitation (CERWASS);
and (iv)Plan and Planning. Other associated
units comprise design companies, construc-
tion companies, the Institute of Water
Resources Planning, the Water Resources
University and the Institute of Water
Resources Research.
MARD is responsible for constructing
dykes, headwork and canals down to
150 ha, and provinces are responsible for
the areas below 150 ha. Operation and
maintenance of existing irrigation systems
generally rests with the provinces in which
the systems are located. MARD controls
three large inter-provincial irrigation
systems – Bac Hung Hai, Bac Nam Ha and
Dau Tieng.
MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND INVESTMENT (MPI)
The MPI is the central agency for allocating
resources among sectors. It receives sectoral
submissions and prepares consolidated
public investment plans. The MPI coordi-
nates Official Development Assistance
(ODA) and direct foreign investment.
MOC The MoC is responsible for urban
water supply, drainage and sanitation. It
sets regulations, and plans, designs and
constructswatersupplyandsanitationfacil-
ities, working through associated design
and construction companies. Following
construction, management is transferred to
a State-owned water supply company. The
MoC is also responsible for water supply in
small rural towns.
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (MOPH) The
MoPH is responsible for monitoring water
quality and for sanitation.
EVN EVN is responsible for hydropower
development under the direction of its
parent ministry, the MoI. It identifies
hydropower development and establishes
operating rules for reservoirs. EVN designs,
constructs and operates schemes through
associated companies.
MOSTE The MOSTE was created in
conjunction with the enactment of the
environmental protection law in 1993.
It sets water quality standards, conducts
research and manages the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) process for new
water resource projects. Its primary action
arm with respect to environmental manage-
ment is the National Environmental Agency
(NEA).
GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF HYDROMETEOROLOGY
(GDHM) TheGDHMreportsdirectlytothe
government. It collects primary level hydro-
meteorological data through its hydrology
and hydrometeorology stations network




The PPC is the paramount authority at the
provincial level. Beneath it is a structure of
departments that mirrors that existing at
the national level. As indicated earlier,
there are technical accountability linkages
from these provincial departments back to
corresponding ministries in Hanoi.
In the water resource sector, the PARDS
is responsible for planning and implement-
ing smaller water resource projects (less
than 150 ha) and for irrigation system
organization and management through
associated IMCs. Other water-related res-
ponsibilities are carried out by departments
generally corresponding to the ministries
described above.
A number of national agencies have
branches that are responsible for different
regionsofthecountry.However,branchesof
different departments and ministries have
different geographic mandates. The result
is that particular provinces may fall into a
‘southern’ region for one function and into
a ‘central’ region for another. Table 10.3
shows the way that Dong Nai basin
provinces are allocated among different
sub-national jurisdictions for selected
agencies. The result is an even greater
number of actors involved in basin planning
and management functions.
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Civil society organizations, such as
trade and professional groups, commodity
producers, environmental and other issue-
based non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and landowner groups are non-
existent or relatively unimportant in
Vietnam, at least in so far as water resources
and agriculture are concerned. Basin plan-
ning and management organizations in
closing (water-short) basins in other nations
often include extensive participation of
such civil society groups. These groups give
voice to the interests of particular groups
of stakeholders such as farmers, urban
water supply utilities or the environment.
Stakeholder interest groups are typically
supported by member contributions and
membership cuts across administrative
boundaries. The relative absence of such
stakeholder representation in Vietnam is a
factor that must be taken into account in
designing basin management organizations
and considering their future development.
Also to be considered is the political imbal-
ance which may arise as powerful interests
which are sophisticated and with relatively
few members, such as industry groups,
emerge in the absence of groups represent-
ing more numerous but less powerful and
sophisticated stakeholders, such as agricul-
tural water users. The natural environment
represents a special case of particular
importance in that it has no direct represen-
tatives and its interests must be advanced
by public agencies such as MOSTE, or by
nascent civil society groups such as
environmental NGOs.
10.3.2.4 Dong Nai Basin Council
According to the 1999 Water Law, water
resources in Vietnam are to be managed at
the basin level. A Planning Management
Council for the Dong Nai River Basin was
established by a 9 April 2001 Decision
issued by MARD. The Council consists of
12 standing and ten non-standing members,
with the Vice Minister, MARD as chairman
and the Director of the MARD DWRHWM
as vice chairman. Standing membership
also includes the Director of the SIWRP in
HCMC, who is designated as Head of the
Council Office. The Office functions as a
secretariat for the Council and is housed
at SIWRP in HCMC. Though the Office is
not yet operating, two SIWRP staff members
have been designated to staff it, and it has
received a small allocation of VND 80M
(US$5,333) to purchase furniture and office
equipment. At the same time, councils were
established for the Red River basin and
the Mekong Delta. These three basins are to
serve as pilot sites for implementing the
basin planning and management concept
stipulated in the Water Law.
Of the three possible models for basin
organizations posited by Millington (1997),
(i) a coordinating committee or council; (ii)
a river basin commission; and (iii) a river
basin authority, the council fits the first, and
simplest, model, though it also contains a
Water Resource Management in the Dong Nai Basin 183









































GW, Division of Hydrogeology and Engineering (working on groundwater); FIPI, Forestry Inventory and
Planning Institute; NIAPP, National Institute of Agricultural Planning and Projections. S, south; N, north;
C, centre.
Table 10.3. Regional responsibility breakout by selected agencies.
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commission in Millington’s framework.
Significant features of the Council, as
established, include the following:
• All 12 standing members of the Council
are representatives of departments and
ministries of the central government.
Representation is generally at the
departmental Vice-Director level. Ten
of the 12 are based in Hanoi, while
two are located in HCMC but directly
connected with central government
organizations.
• The ten non-standing members of the
Council represent the ten provinces
included in the planning basin (see
Basin boundaries above).8 Representa-
tion is at the relatively junior level
of Vice-Director of the PARDS. As
such, provincial representation does
not include sectors of public health,
domestic water supply, wastewater
handling and treatment, and environ-
mental quality. Non-standing members
participate in the Council upon
individual invitation.
Given their administrative level and status
as non-standing members, provinces will
likely have limited influence in the Council
relative to representatives of the central
government.
A second separate basin-level effort
related to water quality management is also
underway. This effort grows from a United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-
sponsored programme, which brought
together representatives of Departments
of Science, Technology and Environment
(DOSTEs) in five key basin provinces in the
late 1990s to discuss basin water planning
and management. Although the original
UNDP support for this activity has lapsed,
provinces have continued to discuss a
basin-wide effort focused on water quality
management. A meeting in April 2002
resulted in a formal proposal for an interim
committee comprising ten basin provinces
and HCMC, which was presented to the
Office of the Prime Minister for decision.
The interim committee would focus on:
• Developing a common information
system for the basin;
• Increasing cooperation among provin-
cial leaders for water quality
management;
• Establishing communication channels
among provinces for this purpose.
The proposal envisions primary representa-
tion by the provincial DOSTEs, a secretariat
that rotates among the provinces, and the
designation of an existing institution to
manage a monitoring system for the basin.
10.3.3 Functions and actors
Chapter 1 described a set of essential func-
tions of river basin management. A listing
of these functions, crossed with the key
actors identified in the previous section, is
shown in Table 10.4. These functions are
replicated, as appropriate, across three
broad categories – surface water, ground-
water and return flows (drainage). The
return flow category includes both urban
and industrial wastewater flows and agri-
cultural return flows. Cells are marked to
indicate an actor active in a particular func-
tional area and whether the actor plays a
major or a minor role in performing the
function. Information is drawn primarily
from informal focus group sessions with
knowledgeable personnel at SIWRP com-
bined with the experience of the authors.
It is very important to note that the classifi-
cation is based on assessments of actual
effective performance rather than nominal
or official responsibility. Thus, where a par-
ticular agency is given a clear official man-
date to perform a function, but is ineffective
in carrying out this mandate, its scoring
184 M. Svendsen et al.
8 LongAn, which– from a hydraulicperspective– has about 95% of its areawithin the DongNaibasin, has
not been included as a non-standing member, compared with Dak Lak province, which has only about 15%
within the Dong Nai basin or Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan with even lower shares.
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Composite  Default screenmay indicate that it plays a minor role, or
no role at all. Different observers can obvi-
ously score the matrix in different ways,
depending on their assessments of perfor-
mance and effectiveness and the weights
they attach to different components of per-
formance.9 Nevertheless, the matrix gives
a broad indication of which functions are
being covered effectively, and by whom,
and which are not being addressed or are
addressed by a multitude of actors. It could
readily be refined – by developing separate
tables for nominal and actual responsibil-
ity, for example – but is introduced here to
serve as a base for discussion and a broad
indication of involvement and responsi-
bility. Descriptions of the functions shown
in the text are given in Chapter 1.
Allfunctionsrepresentthe‘actionedge’
of functional performance. Underlying each
areasetofsupportingfunctions suchasdata
collection and management, resource mobi-
lization, consultation and so on, that are
required to carry out the top-level function
shown. For simplicity, these have not been
shown separately.
10.3.3.1 Key functions
Three key functions are of greatest impor-
tance for basin level water management in
the Dong Nai basin. These are resource
development, water allocation and water
quality management, and are discussed
below. Other functions, particularly those
relating to water service provision, are also
important, but are beyond the scope of this
chapter (World Bank, 1996; Ringler et al.,
2001; Chapter 1 of this book).
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT Resource develop-
ment remains the primary focus of water
resource management in Vietnam. Impor-
tant functions involved are planning and
preparing investments, and constructing
facilities. A very large number of ministries,
departments and institutes are involved in
the planning and investment preparation
process, particularly for surface water
resources. Many of these entities lie within
MARD itself. Elaborate procedures for this
survive from the earlier era of comprehen-
sive central planning. Many of these
are based on old Soviet standards and
procedures, but are being slowly updated
to achieve compatibility with standards
and procedures used by multilateral
lending institutions and other international
lenders.
Constructionofwaterresourcefacilities
is carried out principally by State-owned
construction companies, and a number of
State agencies are involved in monitoring
and supervising construction. For smaller
projects, planning and construction pro-
cesses employed at the national level are
replicated, in somewhat simpler form, at the
provincial level.
Important resource development deci-
sions are ultimately made by the govern-
ment or PPCs.10 In addition to their signifi-
canceforwaterresourcedevelopment,these
decisions also have important implications
for water allocation, as discussed in the
following section.
WATER ALLOCATION Water allocation can
be accomplished in different ways. These
range from a permitting or rights allocation
system covering all uses, to an open access
system where water is available for the
taking. The 1999 Water Law calls for a per-
mitting system for both surface and ground-
water to be operated by MARD, granting use
rights for water to larger-scale users. Rights
to groundwater use would be granted for 15
years and surface water use rights for 20
years. Small quantities of both ground and
surface water may be extracted and used
without permission by individual families
for domestic use and for small-scale agricul-
ture, forestry, aquaculture and other home
188 M. Svendsen et al.
9 Thismakesthematrixausefultoolingroupplanningprocessestoilluminatestrengthsandweaknesses,as
well as areas of agreement and disagreement among stakeholder participants.
10 The MPI plays an important role in allocating investment funds among projects, but is not separated out
here for simplicity.
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priority is accorded to domestic water sup-
plies over all other uses. MARD is currently
developing regulations for implementing
this important provision of the law, but
the permitting system is not expected to be
operational until 2003.
Allocationofaccesstosurfacewateruse
is currently controlled implicitly through
the investment decision-making process.
Since major users of water are almost
exclusively public agencies and companies,
public investments in new water-using
facilities determine, de facto, the basic
allocation of surface water among users.
Such uses include irrigation schemes,
hydropower stations, riverine port facilities
and municipal water supply systems. Obvi-
ously, the State would not construct these
facilities unless it intended that they have
access to a reliable supply of water – a
de facto allocation of water use rights.
Hydrologic studies conducted during pro-
ject preparation determine the availability
of water in the source to be tapped, and
may also detail the expected return flow
contribution to receiving waters. By prepar-
ing plans for such facilities, planning agen-
cies such as SIWRP, HEC 2 and PECC 2
play important supporting roles in water
allocation. Ultimately, water-allocating
investment decisions are taken by the
government, on the advice of MARD and its
DWRHWM.
Surface water can easily be over-
allocated in this way as basins approach
closure; hence the need for a more rigorous
and explicit allocation system as envisioned
in the Water Law. Conflicts among water
uses can also arise over the shorter term,
during periods of seasonal low flow and
during drought years. Similarly, the need
to control flooding creates the need to
make allocation decisions – between hydro-
power generation and increased flood
storage capacity, for example – over the
shorter term.
In addition to the allocation of longer-
termaccess tothewaterresource,short-term
allocation decisions are required to deal
with changes in water availability and
demand throughout the year and to allocate
shortages in low flow years. In these cases,
where capacity has been created to use more
water than is available at a given time, some
process is needed to allocate the scarcity
among existing users. The Water Law indi-
cates that in such cases, after giving priority
to domestic water supplies, water shall
be distributed according to ‘the percentage
defined in the planning of the river basin
and the principle of ensuring fairness and
reasonability’. EVN is an extremely impor-
tant actor in short-term allocation through
its decisions about when and where to gen-
erate power. The timing and magnitude of
power releases have the effect of controlling
the amount of water available to down-
stream users, particularly during the dry
season.
Presently decisions regarding the
allocation of shortages among users during
droughts and seasonal low-flow periods rest
with the Southern Disaster and Flood Com-
mittee. However, this committee is mostly
concerned with flood prevention. In prac-
tice, shortages are allocated by PPCs for res-
ervoirs located within a single provincial
jurisdiction. At present, there does not
appear to be a comprehensive functional
systemfordealingwithshortageconditions.
With respect to flood control allocation
decisions, dam managers, i.e. the Dau Tieng
Management Company and EVN, make
release decisions on the basis of unchanging
rule curves as discussed elsewhere in this
chapter. These allocation rules are thus
largely fixed at the time of dam design,
though operators have some operational
flexibility over the short run within the
confines of the upper and lower boundary
curves. In the case of severe floods, the
Southern Disaster and Flood Committee
also meets and has the power to change
allocations.
A more formal allocation procedure
is currently in place on an interim basis
for groundwater. These interim procedures
will be supplanted when implementing
regulations for permitting under the 1999
Water Law are finished. Present rules call
for groundwater abstractions greater than
1000 m3/day to be licensed by MARD,
while smaller abstractions are licensed by
Water Resource Management in the Dong Nai Basin 189
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WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT Water quality
management consists of two basic functions
– quality monitoring and quality assurance
and enforcement. The former consists of
data collection, processing, analysis, dis-
semination and storage. The latter is a more
complex task consisting of standard setting,
problem recognition, problem diagnosis
and problem solution through provision of
incentives, enforcement of standards and
regulations, and mitigation of damage.
Both monitoring and quality assurance
functions can be applied to ambient waters,
both ground and surface, and to drainage
discharges from potentially polluting water
uses, including agriculture, municipalities
and industry. In all cases, it is important to
addressboththesimplemonitoringfunction
and the more complex and difficult quality
assurance and enforcement function.
In the Dong Nai, a number of organiza-
tions from both national and provincial lev-
els are active in monitoring the quality of
surface water in basin rivers. These include
the NEA, MoPH, SIWRP, Southern Institute
for Water Resources Research (SIWRR),
GDHM, DOSTEs and water supply compa-
nies. Groundwater quality is also monitored
by several agencies and departments,
though less extensively than surface water.
Monitoringofdrainagewaterquality,partic-
ularlymunicipalandindustrialpointsource
return flows, is more limited still. Overall,
there are problems with inconsistent data
sets, lack of continuous time series data,
and a profound reluctance to share data and
information with other agencies and with
the general public. Monitoring is taking
place, but it is fragmented and sometimes
duplicative, and information is difficult to
access. Most basin provinces feel the need
for an integrated water-quality monitoring
network for the basin.
There is far less activity in the area
of ensuring quality of receiving waters
and enforcing water quality standards. The
provincial DOSTEs are the primary enforc-
ing actors, but they often lack resources and
clout to provide aggressive enforcement.
At its present stage of economic and water
resource utilization in the country, empha-
sis is on resource development, economic
growth, expanding industrial output and
employment, and enhancing agricultural
exports. These objectives tend to take prece-
dence over those related to water quality
assurance. Concomitantly, the influence of
national ministries and municipalities and
provinces which host major industrial
growth zones is generally greater than
that of offices charged with protecting the
environment. This results in a situation in
which enforcement of existing quality and
discharge standards is incomplete.
Fortunately, the general abundance of
water in the Dong Nai basin has prevented
pollutants in wastewater discharges from
causing majorproblemsthus far. Despite the
fact that HCMC, a city of 5 million people,
currently has no wastewater treatment facil-
ities whatsoever, pollution in the coastal
estuary of the Saigon River, which receives
this effluent load, is said not to be a signifi-
cant problem. Still, this is an issue likely to
grow to significant proportions in the near
future and will require cross-sectoral and
inter-provincial cooperation to address.
10.4 Perspectives for the Future
Vietnam in general and the Dong Nai basin
in particular remain in an evolutionary
stage of water resource development. There
is still relatively little pressure on the over-
all water resources in the Dong Nai basin,
and water quality problems have yet to
reach crisis proportions. Concomitantly,
primary emphasis remains on increasing
storage and developing new use potential
in the basin rather than on improving
efficiency in individual use sectors or on
re-allocating water from lower to higher
productivity uses.
190 M. Svendsen et al.
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based reasons for this. Vietnam did not
participate in the reservoir construction
boom, which took place in Asia during
the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, there is
presently storage for only about 13% of the
annual discharge of the Dong Nai River
system, and major portions of its large
monsoonal flow reach the South China
Sea unused. This limits dry-season water
availability for all uses, as well as the
options available for controlling and allo-
cating water in the basin. Hence, while on
an annual basis the basin is still amply
supplied with water, seasonally a constraint
is rapidly being approached.
A water quality problem is emerging
together with growing dry-season scarcity.
Burgeoning industrial growth and an
absence of municipal wastewater treatment
are degrading dry-season river water quality
with consequences for users of high quality
water such as HCMC and other expanding
lowland population centres, and certain
kindsofindustriessuchasfoodprocessing.
Authorities are moving to address prob-
lems on several fronts. These include regu-
larizing the permitting system for water use
rights, monitoring water quality and estab-
lishing abasinplanning committee.Overall,
however, primary emphasis appears to rest
on ambitious storage development plans for
the basin, which call for a 35% increase in
surface water storage over the next 8 years.
However,thefactthatmuchofthisstorageis
beingdevelopedforhydropowerproduction
leads to important potential conflicts
in operational goals among hydropower
operators, irrigators, municipalities and the
environment.
Presently, surface water allocation is
implicit in the basin investment planning
process. Individual projects are evaluated
with respect to water supply availability
and, once approved and constructed,
possess a de facto right to use water. MARD
is currently working on implementing
regulations for a formal system of use rights
allocation as called for in the 1999 Water
Law. Groundwater regulations are being
tackled first, to be followed by surface water
permitting rules. Principles articulated in
the Water Law establish priority for domes-
tic water use and provide for a proportional
system of sharing shortages, though details
of this procedure remain to be worked out.
A basin planning management council
fortheDongNaiwasestablishedin2001,but
operating regulations forthe council are still
being worked out. Those regulations will
provide more insight into the functions
the council will be performing, which, at
present, are very broadly defined.
Based on the make-up of the council,
the resource planning mandate of its secre-
tariat, and the pattern of public priorities
and decisions observed to date, it is possible
to speculate that the primary role of the
council, at least at the outset, will be in
planning new basin development activities.
In this role, the council will serve as an
important consultative body for SIWRP in
the planning process.
Other roles may be added subsequently
as basin infrastructure becomes more fully
developed, stress on the available resource
increases, and water quality deteriorates.
A primary requirement for more compre-
hensive basin management will be the
devolution of greater power over resource
management to provincial authorities. This
is happening, but at a very deliberate
pace. Provincial, municipal and other local
authorities are closer to the needs and prob-
lems of the water users in the basin and
are in a better position to represent those
interests.Theyalsohavemoreatstakeinsat-
isfying local constituencies. Ultimately, one
would expect to see direct representation
emerging, as interest groups in civil society
develop their own structure and voices.
Over the short-term, it is likely that impor-
tant decisions with respect to basin manage-
ment will continue to rest with MARD and
the MoC and EVN in Hanoi, and that deci-
sions will be more grounded in national
interests than in regional or local ones.
A parallel basin-wide coordinating
effort has been ongoing for several years
under the sponsorship of MOSTE and
support by the UNDP. This effort differs
from the MARD-based planning manage-
ment council in that it is based in provincial
governments and in its focus on water
Water Resource Management in the Dong Nai Basin 191
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will need to be integrated or closely coordi-
nated. For the time being, they appear
positioned to evolve on parallel tracks. In
someways, this is apositivedevelopmentas
it aids the emergence of a provincially based
capacity to engage in basin management
activities. Coordination will be required
and,atsomepoint,thetwomechanismsmay
bemerged,butthis should notbedoneatthe
expense of the seemingly more democratic
and representative process emerging at the
regional level.
What are the implications for irrigated
agriculture of this unfolding scenario? A
principal one is that a management strategy
basedonexpandingbasinstorageisunlikely
to stress agriculture significantly, or require
it to relinquish water supplies it is currently
using, or even to curtail growth in the agri-
cultural sector. Additional storage should
enhance dry-season water supplies, which
can be used by urban and industrial users
downstream of the turbines of the hydro-
power dams. In addition, the position of
MARD as both water resource manager and
agricultural supervisor should assure a priv-
ileged place for allocations to agriculture in
the basin.
Within the irrigated agricultural sector,
strongest growth is expected in the cash-
crop sector, where shallow groundwater is
the most important source of supply. This
has the important advantage of being widely
availableandbeingademand-drivensupply
underthecontrolofthewell-owningfarmer.
On the other hand, shallow groundwater
sources are vulnerable to drought-induced
shortages, since the shallow aquifer
reservoir volume is often small, and to
over-exploitation. This leads to the need
to consider strategies to replace reliance
on groundwater with farmer-controlled
reservoir-backed surface water supplies,
and for artificial groundwater recharge
to buffer the effect of seasonal droughts
on high-input cash crops, particularly
perennial crops.
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Turkey is a rapidly modernizing country of
about 66 million people with a population
growth rate of 1.5% per year. At the begin-
ning of the 1980s, national economic
strategy switched from a policy of industri-
alization based on import substitution to a
policy aimed at allowing a greater role for
markets. Between 1979 and 1993, the Turk-
ish economy expanded at an average rate of
around 5% per year, with growth in recent
years being even faster. The GNP in 1998
was US$200 billion, similar to that of Aus-
tria or Sweden. However, per capita income
was a more modest US$3160, slightly
less than those of Malaysia or Venezuela.
Turkey is a very dynamic but still emerging
country, displaying characteristics of both
developing and developed nations.
The service sector dominates the econ-
omy,contributing62%ofGDPin1999,while
agriculture provided just 15%. However,
agriculture still employs a very significant
45% of the nation’s workforce. Agricultural
incomes, though, average less than one-
quarter of those in other sectors. Regional
disparities in income and other measures of
development also remain significant.
Asaresult,extensiveinternalmigration
is leading to rapid urbanization. At present,
65% of the population lives in urban areas,
and the urbanpopulation is growingat2.8%
per year while the rural population shrinks
at an annual rate of 0.7%.
Turkey clearly sees itself joining the
ranks of economically developed Western
democracies and hopes to join the European
Union by 2023, the 100th anniversary of its
independence. This is a powerful motive
across all sectors for harmonizing Turkish
policies, practices and standards with those
of the EU.
At a national level, Turkey is a parlia-
mentary democracy. At the sub-national
level, the country is governed by a mixed
system employing both local elections and
central government appointments. Popula-
tion centres (cities, towns and villages)
are governed by locally elected assemblies
or councils with administrations headed by
locally elected mayors. Provinces and dis-
tricts, while having locally elected assem-
blies, are headed by senior civil servants
appointed by the Ministry of the Interior.
National-level policy guidance and instruc-
tionisimportantatalllevelsandcentralized
revenue collection makes revenue transfers
from national to local levels important and
enhances the power of the centre.
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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The Gediz basin is located in Western
Turkey (Fig. 11.1) near Turkey’s third
largest city, Izmir, which is, however,
located just outside the basin.
The Gediz River rises in the mountains
of Western Turkey and enters the Aegean
Sea to the north of Izmir. It covers a distance
of about 400 km and drains an area of
17,000 km2, about 8% of which is irrigated.
The basin had a population of 2.33 million
in 1997.
The Gediz basin has changed consider-
ably in the past decade, shifting from a com-
paratively water-rich basin to one that is
now closing.1 Change has been driven by an
above average increase in urban and indus-
trial demand, rapidly growing concern for
issues of water quality and environmental
protection, and reduced rainfall over the
catchment. Paralleling these hydrologic
changes has been a much slower institu-
tional response that has not kept up with the
requirementsforchanges in the waywateris
allocated and managed.
11.1.3 The case study
Characteristics of the nation and the basin
together make the case an interesting one
for study for the following reasons:
• Turkey is a dynamic middle-income
country with rapidly growing demands
for industrial and municipal water
supplies;
• Agriculture is an employment source
for nearly half of the Turkish popula-
tion and the country’s most important
current user of water;
• The Gediz basin represents these
trends well, containing both significant
agricultural water use and rapidly
expanding municipal and industrial
demands; moreover, its water resources
are nearly fully allocated.
Although the drought of the early 1990s has
now passed, the legacy is seen in a number
of important issues that continue to lie
at the core of the debates surrounding the
management of water in the Gediz basin.
Several of these are highlighted below and
discussed in more detail in the remainder of
the chapter:
• The increasingly apparent need for
a unified coordinating mechanism
for water allocation among irrigation,
urban areas, industries and the envi-
ronment to replace existing bilateral
processes;
• The continuing struggle between older
long-established institutions dealing
with water resource development and
water allocation and emerging institu-
tions concerned primarily with water
quality and environmental issues;
• The need to represent and protect
the interests of certain water users,
such as the Gediz delta ecology and
194 M. Svendsen et al.
Fig. 11.1. Location of Gediz basin.
1 A closed basin is one in which there is no unused water left to be allocated.
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established during the past 5 years
to assume O&M responsibility for
110,000 ha of large-scale irrigation sys-
tems, within the wider debate of water
resources allocation and management;
• The need for: (i) clear rules assigning
responsibility for setting water quality
and quantity standards and monitoring
actual conditions; and (ii) sufficient
political power and will to sanction
violators of the standards.
In the remainder of the chapter, we deal
first with the hydrology and water use pat-
terns within the basin and then turn to the
legal, policy and institutional conditions
which influence how the basin is governed
and managed. Finally, we combine the two
assessments to summarize the problems
facing the basin and the challenges it must
meet to overcome them.
11.2 Water Resources of the Gediz Basin
11.2.1 Hydrology
11.2.1.1 Surface water
The hydrology of the Gediz basin is typi-
cally Mediterranean. Precipitation falls
between November and April, and peak
river flows occur in February or March.
Annual precipitation varies from 800 mm
in higher inland areas to about 450 mm near
the coast, with about 80% falling in the
winter months. Under natural conditions,
there is a steady decline in stream discharge
until May when many of the smaller streams
dry up. Summer flows are only present in
the Gediz River and its largest tributaries,
and even they may be negligible in the peak
summer months. Following the irrigation
season, the only flows in the Gediz River
are from the few larger tributaries plus
residual return flows from irrigated areas
and industrial and municipal wastewater
discharges to the river (Fig. 11.2).
Following the construction of Demir-
kopru Dam in the 1960s, net annual surface
water availability in the main basin and the
delta is estimated to have been approxi-
mately1900millioncubicmetres(MCM)per
year. During the period 1989–1994, a severe
drought affected the basin, and since 1990
therehasbeenapersistentdeclineinsurface
water flows into Demirkopru. Annual water
availability since that time has averaged just
940 MCM. As some of this flow occurs in
winter and is derived from tributaries where
there is no storage, there is little difference
between annual surface water availability
and current demand of about 660 MCM.
11.2.1.2 Groundwater
Groundwater resources are able to make up
some of the potential shortfall in overall
water availability. The central part of the
basin is an alluvial plain whose ground-
water reserve is replenished in most years.
In the alluvial fan areas on either side
of the main valley and in the Nif Valley, the
situation is more critical. Tubewell-based
farmers in the Akhisar area complain of a
steadyandlong-termdeclineinwatertables,
and in the Nif Valley, the water table is
reported to have dropped by 5–8 m in the
past 10 years as industrial extractions have
burgeoned. Springs in the limestone areas
arealsoreportedtohavedeclined inthepast
decade.
The estimated safe annual yield for
groundwater in the main part of the valley
is 160 MCM/year, which is about one-third
less than the 219 MCM estimated as being
extracted from the main and Nif valleys.
Despite the absence of definitive figures,
it appears that groundwater use presently
exceeds, by a sizeable margin, the
sustainable limit.
In the Gediz delta there is little ground-
water utilization, and extraction near the
coast is prohibited to prevent saltwater
intrusion. The groundwater is deep and
therefore there are no shallow tubewells.
11.2.2 Basin water use
The Gediz basin contains a typical range of
water users, although the balance among
them has been changing during the past
Governing Closing Basins 195
207 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:36:12 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreescouple of decades. Each user category is
described briefly.
IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE Traditionally, the
largest user of water has been irrigated
agriculture, originally deriving from small
run-of-the-river diversions from the Gediz
and its tributaries dating back some 3000
years. Since 1945, the development of large-
scale systems and groundwater exploitation
has transformed irrigated agriculture.
LARGE-SCALE SURFACE IRRIGATION The first
investments in modern irrigated agriculture
began in 1945 with the construction of
two large regulators to tap the flow of the
Gediz River. Adala regulator serves some
20,000 ha of land in the middle portion
of the basin, whereas Emiralem regulator
commands 22,000 ha in the Gediz delta
(Fig. 11.2). In the 1960s, a second set of
investments were made that included the
construction of Demirkopru Reservoir a
few kilometres upstream of Adala, a third
regulator at Ahmetli, and the regulation
and raising of the natural lake of Gol
Marmara. Ahmetli Regulator commands
some 45,000 ha of land. The final surface
water developments took place in the
Alasehir Valleywith the construction of two
small reservoirs. The total command area of
the large-scale surface systems is approxi-
mately 110,000 ha. The predominant crops
are cotton (50%), grapes (35%), maize, fruit
orchards and vegetables.
At present, surface water issues from
Demirkopru are limited to the interval
between mid-June and mid-September,
which is focused on the cotton-growing sea-
son. Natural stream flows from tributaries
canbeusedforlandpreparationforcottonor
for early irrigation of grapes and fruit trees,
buttherearenoreleasesmadeintotheGediz
River from Demirkopru outside this period.
Wateruse in the 90,000 haofthe central
and delta zones is limited to 75 m3/s from
Demirkopru and 15 m3/s from Gol Marmara
for a release period of approximately 60
days, or a total of some 550 MCM during the
year. This is equivalent to some 450 mm of
irrigation water for the growing season.
In the Alasehir Valley in the east of the
basin, irrigation is almost exclusively for
grapes. Application rates are approximately
350 mm/season and during the summer
there is no significant net outflow into









Fig. 11.2. Irrigation and drainage flow patterns, Gediz basin.
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that, through a combination of surface
application and some pumping of the
shallow aquifer, approximately 60 MCM are
consumed during the summer season.
SMALL-SCALE SURFACE IRRIGATION In many
tributary valleys into the Gediz, there are
small-scale surface water diversions that
take advantage of winter runoff and spring
snow melt. Typical crops are fruit trees,
winter wheat and vegetables, because
these only require water in spring and early
summer before the streams dry up.
Therearenoaccuraterecordsofthetotal
areainvolved,but it almostcertainlyis more
than 25,000 ha, since almost every village
situated on the valley fringe has some
irrigated area (Kayam and Svendsen, 1999).
Because the number of irrigations is low,
normally two to four irrigations of about
50 mmeach forthe entire season, totalwater
useisalsolowandisestimatedat50 MCM.
GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION There are two
different categories of groundwater users:
those who are members of village or pump
cooperatives and those who make private
investments.
Starting in the 1960s, but increasingly
in the 1970s, the government has fostered
community-basedirrigationfromdeep tube-
wells. Most deep tubewells have discharges
in the range of 50–150 l/s and are often tap-
ping groundwater at least 100 m below the
surface.Themajorityofwellsareoutsidethe
boundaries of the surface irrigation systems
and are concentrated in the Akhisar and
Nif Valleys (Fig. 11.2). Typically, crops are
high-value, and include tobacco, vegetables
and fruit trees. Total water extractions are
estimated at 30 MCM/year on the basis of
100wellshavingatypicaldischargeof75 l/s
and operating for 40–50 days/year.
Private groundwater exploitation
started during the drought of 1989–1994.
Many individuals purchased centrifugal
pumps to exploit shallow groundwater
within the boundaries of surface irrigation
systems, and in some cases neighbours
formed informal pump groups to purchase a
pump and well and then share operating
costs at the end of the season. Farmers have
continued using these pumps and there
has been a recent small increase as some
farmers adopt trickle irrigation systems for
high-value fruits and vegetables.
The vast majority of private pump own-
ers are within the boundaries of the surface
irrigation systems. As such, they rely on the
seepage and management losses from the
surface irrigation system. While there is
some evidence that the shallow ground-
water table dropped during the drought, it
has since recovered and it is assumed that
they do not mine groundwater but merely
re-use surface water. Their net water use is
therefore included in the total surface irriga-
tion volumes. However, official records of
surfaceirrigationshowsthatonlyabout70%
of farmers use surface water and some of
those also pump. It is estimated that some
40,000 ha of land in the command areas of
the surface irrigation systems are actually
pump-based with only 70,000 ha relying
primarily on canal water.
A few private pump owners are situated
onthefringesofthesurfaceirrigationsystem
or in the area between the Alasehir Valley
and the main Gediz Valley. These are
estimated to use some 5 MCM/year that is
not direct recharge from surface irrigation
systems.
11.2.2.1 Municipal water supply
The Gediz basin has two separate classes of
urban and municipal water users: the towns
and villages within the basin itself and a
substantial transbasin diversion of drinking
water to Izmir.
WITHIN-BASIN USE There are no accurate
records of total water extractions for urban
and municipal water consumption in the
Gediz basin. All municipal extractions are
from groundwater. Based on estimates pro-
vided by the different municipalities, it
appears that extractions are in the order
of 130 MCM/year. However, much of this
returns in the form of wastewater as either
percolation into the groundwater or dis-
charge in surface water. Allowing for 20%
actual consumption, the net municipal
Governing Closing Basins 197
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26 MCM/year.
Some municipalities also have shown
interest in using good-quality spring water
fortheirwatersupply.Inafewcases,munic-
ipalities have arranged with villages to use
a portion of their spring water and agree
to compensate them by improving village
irrigation systems.
IZMIR USE OF GEDIZ WATER Izmir has had a
long-standing claim on groundwater within
the Gediz basin and there are two main well
fields,atSarikizinthenorthofthebasinand
Goksu near Manisa. Actual consumption
data are not available, but Izmir has
extracted as much as 108 MCM/year from
these well fields. Because the water is trans-
ferred out of the basin, there is no return
flow.2 An important potential source of
additional water for in-basin use is the
estimated 50% of the water entering the
Izmir municipal system that is lost to
underground leakage. Since Izmir is on the
sea,noreuseoftheselossesispossible.Ifthe
conveyance efficiency of the Izmir piped
system were improved, up to 50 MCM of
high-quality groundwater could be left in
the Gediz basin annually and used for other
purposes.
11.2.2.2 Industry
There are two important industrial areas in
the basin. The largest is in the Nif Valley
immediately east of Izmir in Kemalpasa
municipality (Fig. 11.2). There is also a
growing industrial estate on the western
edge of Manisa. Industries included
ceramics, leather, food processing, metal
works and assembly plants.
In both areas, groundwater is used
for the industries, and each industry must
obtain a permit from the General Directorate
of State Hydraulic Works (DSI). However,
there are no records of how much water
is consumed and it is difficult to make an
estimate of total water use.
11.2.2.3 Hydropower
Between 1970 and 1988, Demirkopru
Reservoir was used for hydropower genera-
tion throughout the year. Since the drought,
however, power generation has been
restricted to periods when water is released
for irrigation and no special releases for
hydropower are made.
11.2.2.4 Environmental consumption
The seaward fringe of the Gediz delta
is an important nature reserve and has
recently been designated as a Ramsar site
to protect rare bird species. Originally, the
area received excess water from the Gediz
River for much of the year, but since 1990,
with restrictions on irrigation releases, the
reserve suffers from water shortages. The
summer months are the critical time for
providing water specifically for the nature
reserve, since during the winter water is
available from the Gediz River before
flowing to the sea.
In response to demands to preserve bird
habitat, onesmallchannel with acapacityof
0.7 m3/sdoesnowextendfromtheirrigation
system into the nature reserve. However, the
channel does not always flow at the maxi-
mum rate during the 60-day irrigation sea-
son, and so the potential volume of just
under 4 MCM for the season is not normally
provided. One preliminary estimate sug-
gests that to maintain appropriate condi-
tions for freshwater bird habitat, as much as
1.5 m3/s is required during the 120 days of
thesummerseason,atotalofabout15 MCM.
Two other options are available for supply-
ing water to the reserve. A pair of pumps on
a nearby drainage channel can supply
0.5 m3/s and a well is available which can
provide a modest 0.05 m3/s. These pumps
198 M. Svendsen et al.
2 Plans are in place for Izmir to supply irrigators in lower portions of the Gediz basin with treated
wastewater. Irrigators are enthusiastic about this because of the very poor quality of the surface water they
currently receive. There are concerns, however, about possible high salinity levels in the treated effluent. At
design output, the treatment plant would produce about 880 MCM/year, roughly equivalent to the entire
current use in the basin.
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A second component of environmental
demand is the water needed for waste con-
veyance from points of origin within the
basin to the sea. In transporting wastes, the
flow must provide sufficient velocity to
keep organic compounds and heavy metals
adsorbed on to soil particles from settling
out before reaching the sea and sufficient
dilution to avoid in-stream environmental
harm. Obviously, reducing the pollutant
loads that must be carried would reduce the
quantity of water needed for this purpose.
11.2.3 Summary
The total estimated water extraction by the
different users is shown in Table 11.1.
Irrigation currently uses a large share of
the surface water resources of the basin.
Withdrawals total about 660 MCM, with
83% of that going to large-scale irrigation
systems. Current surface water allocation
practices are primarily aimed at providing
reliable water deliveries to the IAs in the
large irrigation systems, and this has been
achieved with considerable success. Hydro-
power generation has no priority of its own
and uses only water that is to be released for
irrigation. A small and probably inadequate




from urban areas and industries within the
basin seriously degrade the quality of sur-
face water in natural channels, particularly
in the low-flow summer months. Since
water use for these purposes is growing at
an estimated rate of 6–8% per year, this
degradation can be expected to worsen
unless major efforts at control are made
successfully.
Groundwatersuppliesroughlyaquarter
ofbasin wateruse, ofwhich about16%is for
irrigation and the remainder for urban and
industrial use. Groundwatersupplies nearly
all of the water used for these latter two
purposes. Irrigation use of groundwater is
largely static or declining as less-water
intensivecropsreplacecottonandimproved
water application technology gains a foot-
hold. Municipal and, particularly, indus-
trial use is expanding rapidly, however. At
present as much as one-quarter of ground-
water withdrawal in the basin may be
unsustainable overdrafting, and pressure
on these aquifers is expected to increase as
industrial demand continues to grow.
Much of the water withdrawn for
municipal and industrial use within the
basin is returned to surface waterways, but
in seriously degraded condition. This, in
turn, gives rise to a need for additional
Governing Closing Basins 199
Estimated consumption









Urban within the basin




















From Demirkopru and Gol Marmara
Alasehir Valley
No priority for hydropower
Current releases only; needs more
Only those outside surface irrigation area
18% of extraction, remainder is return flow
Trans-basin transfer, no return flow
Estimated by DSI
MCM, million cubic metres.
Table 11.1. Estimated water use by sector.
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transport and dilution, water which is sim-
ply not available at present. The alternative
is to improve quality of wastewater dis-
charges significantly at their sources.
11.2.3.1 Changing patterns of demand
Patterns of agricultural demand are in flux.
Rice used to be grown in poorly drained
central parts of the basin but has been
replaced by cotton, and there has been a
steady increase in grape and fruit tree areas
as agroindustrial enterprises have grown up
to support cash crop agriculture. The trend
toward grape cultivation, partly a response
to the growing market for raisins, resulted
in decreased demand for irrigation water,
and total irrigation deliveries are now only
about 70% of the pre-drought situation.
With a recent surge in interest in drip
irrigation by fruit, vegetable and seed maize
growers, demand is likely to continue to
decline.
In contrast, non-agricultural demand is
growing rapidly. The area has a higher than
average growth rate because of in-migration
from poorer parts of Turkey, and Izmir’s
promotion of industrial development
to complement agricultural production.
Domestic demand for water has been
growing by 2–3% a year and industrial
demand by as much as 10% per year. Given
that most non-agricultural consumption of
water is from groundwater rather than
surface water, aquifer management requires
closer attention than surface water with
respect to available volumes.
However, an additional demand is
arising which is associated with growing
concern over water quality, particularly
during the peak of the summer season when
surface water supplies are limited. Figure
11.3 shows actual and estimated growth of
basin population between 1970 and 2010,
along with estimated organic load from both
domestic and industrial sources. As seen,
although domestic load increases modestly
along with population growth, industrial
load grows exponentially. Note that the
chart shows only potential loads created
and does not take into account the effect of
treatment facilities that may subsequently
be built.
11.3 Legal, Policy and Institutional
Environment
11.3.1 Water rights
All natural water resources, except some
small privately owned springs, are vested
in the State by the Turkish Constitution
(Yavuz and Cakmak, 1996). The basic prin-
ciple governing surface water use rights in
Turkey provides that water is a public good
which everyone is entitled to use, subject to
the rights of prior users. Surface water use














Fig. 11.3. Estimated Gediz basin population and organic waste load generation, 1970–2010.
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prior authorization. Conflicts are resolved
by first referring to local customary rules
and regulations. If the dispute cannot be
resolved in this way, rights are settled by
court decision. There is no registration
system for surface water rights or water
use. In large basins where impacts of new
diversions are diffuse, this system is gener-
ally unable to prevent or resolve conflicts
between new and existing claims, and this
is leading to serious problems of over-
allocation in some basins (Svendsen and
Nott, 2000).
Groundwater also is State property.
Its management is governed by a 1960 law
giving sole authority over the use and pro-
tectionofgroundwatertoDSI.Drillingawell
deeper than 10 m requires prior approval
from DSI, while constructing shallower
wells requires only that DSI be notified.
Shallow groundwater is thus an open access
resource, while deeper aquifers are subject
to some controls.
According to the groundwater law,
when abstractions ‘approach the safe
output level’ of the aquifer, a committee of
representatives of ‘relevant ministries’ is to
be formed to decide on pending and future
applications for groundwater utilization.
Frederiksen and Vissia (1998) conclude that
enforcement of the groundwater law is
weak, implying that, in practice, the system
of groundwater rights created by the current
groundwater law is not as effective as it
could be.
Rights to both ground and surface water
use are thus not formalized. Although they
follow roughly the appropriative doctrine of
allocation, there are no guarantees of contin-
ued access. The principles of the system of
water rights outlined above apply in the
Gediz basin.
11.3.2 Actors
In an earlier section, five categories of water
users in the Gediz basin were identified and
their respective water uses outlined. Some
of these water users are able to represent
their own interests (industries and munici-
palities), while others may be either many
and disorganized (small system irrigators)
or unable for other reasons to represent
themselves (ecosystems). In addition, there
are other State actors such as DSI involved
in Gediz basin water management, which,
while not water users, are important play-
ers. The range of basin stakeholders is thus
different, and broader, than the group of
actual water users. The major ones of these
are described below.
11.3.2.1 Public agencies
DSI The DSI is the main executive agency
of the Government of Turkey for the coun-
try’s overallwaterresourceplanning, execu-
tion and operation. It was established in
1954andiscurrentlyapartoftheMinistryof
Energy and Natural Resources. The mandate
of DSI is ‘to develop water and land
resources in Turkey’ (DSI, 1995). It is
responsible for major irrigation, flood
control,drainage, hydropowerdevelopment
and supplying water to cities with a popula-
tion over 100,000. DSI centralizes most of
theStatefunctionsinvolvedinplanningand
developing large-scale water resources.
Until recently, DSI’s policy has been to
manage the irrigation schemes it designs
and constructs. Current policy and practice
is to transfer schemes to locally based IAs
to manage. DSI also transfers hydropower
and municipal water supply schemes that it
designs and constructs to other agencies to
operate.
DSI is also responsible for managing
and allocating groundwater to prospective
users. It does this through the permitting
system described in the previous section. Its
responsibilities for groundwater quality are
limited to monitoring.
DSI maintains 26 regional offices across
the country, organized along watershed
lines. The Gediz basin lies entirely within
one of these regions and is serviced by the
regional office in Izmir.
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT The Ministry of
Environment (MoE) is the public agency
with overall responsible for surface water
Governing Closing Basins 201
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ever, its mandate and capacities cover only
some of the functions that implementing
this responsibility entail. Its major responsi-
bilities include coordinating plans among
the various public and private agencies
involved with protecting the environment,
commissioning environmental impact
assessments of major water resources
projects, and setting standards for and
monitoring surface water quality. Actual
monitoring and reporting of water quality
andwastewaterdischargesarecarriedoutby
provincial offices of MoE. The explicit
mandate of the MoE does not extend to
groundwater quality. Neither the national
nor the provincial offices of MoE possess
direct enforcement powers.
MUNICIPALITIES AND VILLAGES Towns and
villages play three important roles in the
water resource arena. First, they are water
users and dischargers of wastewater. There
are 19 settlements in the basin with a com-
bined population of 1.35 million. All draw
their domestic water supplies from ground-
water. Of the 19, only three have completed
wastewater sewage systems and treatment
plants. The remainder discharge untreated
wastewater into the Gediz and tributaries.
The second important role played by
towns and villages is that of representing
irrigation water users in their areas. They do
this:(i)throughtheirstatutorydominanceof
the boards of large-scale IAs; (ii) as owners
and operators of municipal irrigation
wellfields; and (iii) as representatives of the
interests of otherwise disorganized farmers
irrigating fromprivate wells or small surface
water sources who make up parts of their
constituencies.
The third role is that of environmental
regulation. Municipal and village adminis-
trations are responsible for operating water
and wastewater treatment plants within
their jurisdictions and monitoring the qual-
ity of domestic water supplies.3 They also
have some authority to monitor industrial
wastewater discharges, although most are
not active in this area.
PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS Provincial and
district governors, appointed by the Minis-
try of the Interior in Ankara, are the only
authorities with the power to assess fines
or issue and enforce prohibitions against
violators of water quality regulations. All
other actors, including MoE, MoH, DSI and
municipalities, may only report cases that
contradict laws for which they are responsi-
ble to the provincial or district governor.
District governors must secure approval
from the provincial governor before taking
action. Provincial governors are thus
singularly responsible for water quality
enforcement proceeding.
STATE PLANNING ORGANIZATION The State
Planning Organization is an arm of the
Prime Ministry that prepares a rolling
5-year investment plan for the nation. It is
responsible for planning all public capital
investment in the country, including invest-
ments for water resource development,
wastewater treatment and environmental
problem mitigation.
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF RURAL SERVICES The
General Directorate of Rural Services
(GDRS), a part of the Prime Ministry, is
responsible for developing small-scale
groundwater resources for irrigation, devel-
oping surface water sources with flows of
less than 500 l/s for irrigation, on-farm irri-
gation development, and the construction of
rural roads and village water supply sys-
tems. GDRS’s minor irrigation schemes are
transferred to farmers’ cooperatives or local
governments upon completion. GDRS does
not have an operation and maintenance
capacity.
11.3.2.2 Semi-public or private groups
IAS ThirteenIrrigationAssociations(IAs)
were established in the seven large canal
202 M. Svendsen et al.
3 TheMinistryofHealth(MoH)maymonitorthequalityofdrinkingwaterinpipeddistributionsystemsatthe
request of a municipality or village.
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under the accelerated irrigation manage-
ment transfer programme of DSI and have
assumed operational control of canal irriga-
tion in those areas. DSI continues to operate
the main reservoir and river diversion struc-
tures, but operational management below
that level is now in the hands of the IAs.
The legal basis for forming IAs is a law
allowing the establishment of associations
of local governments, and the present gover-
nance structure of the IAs is dominated by
elected village headpersons, town mayors
and elected members of local municipal
councils.IAsarepublicbodiesthatenjoytax
exemptions and are non-profit, but are not
bound by standard government civil service
regulations and financial procedures.
Although this system has drawbacks, it does
provide valuable links with local govern-
ment structures. IAs operate the canal sys-
tems within their areas, employing hired
staff and financing operations and mainte-
nance through fees collected from water
users. The 13 IAs collaborate extensively on
an informal basis and have discussed the
possibility of forming a more permanent
association to represent their common
interests. They are the most important water
users in the basin and retain a strong func-
tional tie to DSI, which provides their bulk
water supply and serves as the basin water
allocation authority in the absence of a more
explicit system of water right allocation.
OTHER IRRIGATORS Other irrigation water
suppliers and users not encompassed by
IAs include towns and villages that have
developed well-fields for irrigation supply
intheirareas,individualfarmersandgroups
of farmers who have invested in irrigation
wells, and farmers who employ small sur-
face water diversions in upper parts of the
Gediz catchment to irrigate crops. There is
no formal organization tying these water
users together, though their number is sig-
nificant. To some extent, local village heads
and town mayors are able and generally
willing to represent the interests of these
irrigatorswhenaneedarises.Suchrepresen-
tation is not coordinated among villages,
however, and in general would not be
expected to be particularly potent in compe-
titionwithlarger,betterorganizedinterests.
ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZAT-
IONS (NGOS) There are many NGOs active
inthefieldofenvironmentalconservationin
Turkey. A 1995 directory lists 98 of them,
and there are others not included in the
directory. With respect to water-related
issues in general, and the Gediz in par-
ticular, the following are among the most
important:
• Turkish Erosion Control, Reforestation,
and Environment Foundation (TEMA).
TEMA was established in 1992 with
strong business community support. It
currently has about 50,000 members
and in 1997 operated on a budget of
US$2 million. TEMA publishes a
monthly bulletin on environmental
issues and every 2 years publishes
an Environmental Profile of Turkey,
which is also available in English.
It enjoys good contacts with the MoE,
and has been instrumental in shaping
the new national environmental laws
and regulations.4 It is the most influen-
tial of the national environmental
NGOs.
• Gediz Basin Erosion Control Reforesta-
tion and Environment Foundation
(GEMA). This NGO has interests simi-
lar to those of TEMA but is concerned
specifically with the Gediz basin.
• Society for the Protection of Wildlife.
This society was established in 1975
and works to raise awareness of shrink-
ing populations of various wildlife
species, with a special focus on birds.
The society works extensively with ele-
mentary school children, publishing a
newsletter and guidebooks for schools
and others. It collaborates with the
World-Wide Fund for Nature and other
international organizations.
Governing Closing Basins 203
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these organizations places a priority focus
on it. Most NGO activities to date have
been concerned with education, awareness
raising and lobbying, with little independ-
ent scientific or information collection
effort evidenced.
INDUSTRIES Although industrial plants are
scattered throughout the Gediz basin, the
largest concentration is in two Organized
Industrial Districts, one in Kemalpasa in
Izmir Province with about 180 enterprises,
and the second near Manisa in Manisa Prov-
ince with about 50 enterprises. The owners
oftheseindustries areorganizedintoseveral
associations, which wield considerable
political power. These include the Aegean
Chamber of Industry, the Businessmen’s
Association and the Young Businessmen’s
Association.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSEMBLIES Local environ-
mental assemblies (Mahalli Cevre Kurulu)
have recently been formed in several basin
areas. Authorized under the Environmental
Law, assemblies are broadly constituted,
comprising mayors, DSI, the Chamber of
Industry, and so on, and are typically
chaired by the provincial governor. They
meet monthly and are authorized to make
fairlyinfluentialdecisionsonissuesrelating
to urban environmental quality. Such an
authority, chaired by the district governor,
exists also for the Kemalpasa Organized
IndustrialDistrict.Asimilarassociationwas
established for the Gediz delta bird reserve
in 2002.
WATER AND THE POOR As always, the poor,
particularly those living in makeshift and
illegal housing on the urban fringe, have the
worst access to safe drinking water and sani-
tation services. Because of more limited
mobility,theyarealsotheonesmostaffected
by pollution of the Gediz, which they are
more likely to use for recreational purposes.
Access to irrigation water is determined by
access to land, which in turn is also related
to wealth, both as a cause and as an effect.
Many smallholders do practise very produc-
tive agriculture, however, often growing
high-value horticultural crops.
11.3.3 Essential functions: gaps and overlap
Essential functions of basin management
are described and defined in Chapter 1. An
essential functions matrix for the Gediz
basin, crossing functions with key actors, is
shown in Table 11.2. These functions are
replicated, as appropriate, across four broad
categories – surface water, groundwater,
wastewater disposal and agricultural return
flows. Cells are marked to indicate an
actor active in a particular functional area.
Information is drawn largely from richly
detailed reports prepared by Harmanciohlu
and Alpaslan (1999, 2000a,b).5
A number of interesting points emerge
from an examination of Table 11.2, supple-
mented with background observations:
• There has been very limited planning
at the basin level with respect to
surface water and virtually none for
groundwater and waste disposal.6
There is no integrated plan that consid-
ers both ground and surface water
availability, nor does existing planning
consider water quality, wastewater dis-
posal, current and projected land use,
anticipated future demand and return
flows, or projected future quantity and
quality of water resources.
• Water is allocated, in practice, by a
variety of agencies and users operating
independently of each other. These
include DSI, private surface and
groundwater irrigators, municipalities
and industries. There is no national
204 M. Svendsen et al.
5 Notethattheactivityindicationscontainedinthetablerefertoactualactivityinpractice,andnotnominal
responsibility as assigned in statutes. Open circles indicate limited activity, while filled circles indicate more
extensive activity. Situations where there is only minor activity might not be indicated in the table. The
indicationsarethecollectivejudgementsofthestudyauthorsanddonotrepresentformalorofficialjudgements
by any of the collaborating organizations.
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and only a rudimentary system of allo-
cating access to groundwater, and, as
a result, both are largely open-access
resources. Although nominal control
is stronger for groundwater than for
surface water, groundwater is presently
the most stressed of the two resources.
It is also the more desirable of the
two, in part because of the poor quality
of Gediz surface water in the lower
reaches, but also because of the relative
ease of access provided by ground-
water. The current system of registering
groundwater withdrawals does not
appear to be effective at limiting over-
drafting, which is occurring in certain
sub-basins.
• Water quality monitoring takes place,
but information is often not available in
useful forms to interested parties. DSI
operates 14 water-quality sampling
locations within the Gediz basin,
sampling about 35 parameters on a
monthly or bimonthly basis. The infor-
mation collected, however, remains
as raw data in DSI files and is not
generally used as a basis for policy
making or decision making for basin
management.
• A single actor, the provincial gover-
nor’s office, is empowered to authorize
enforcement of breaches of wastewater
discharge regulations by banning
offending practices or imposing fines.
In practice, attempts to process fines
or prohibit industrial activities often
leads to confrontation between indus-
trialists and public administrators,
with the administrators generally
lacking the political will and power to
make penalties stick. It is very common
for files of violation reports to remain
unprocessed in the offices of district
and provincial governors.
• Ensuring surface and groundwater
quality is not actively practised in the
Gediz basin. Ensuring water quality
involves conducting follow-up investi-
gations of observed substandard water
quality to identify its sources and
proposing remedies.
• No attention is currently paid to the
quality of agricultural return flows. It
is sometimes presumed that these
flows contribute nitrates to ground-
water and nitrates, phosphorus and
organic chemical residues, e.g. from
pesticides, to surface water, but there is
little hard information on this, nor is
any responsible party actively monitor-
ing or assessing the quality and impact
of agricultural return flows.
• Agricultural drainage infrastructure is
inadequately maintained at present.
Drain maintenance receives a lower
priority from IAs compared with
delivery channel maintenance and
DSI does not have an adequate budget
and equipment to fully maintain larger
drains. In addition, responsibility for
maintaining main drains, which serve
more than one IA, is under dispute by
DSI and IAs.
• NGOs have no specific role in perform-
ing essential management functions,
but clearly have an important role to
play in overall basin governance.7 This
leads to the discussion of enabling
conditions in the following section.
11.3.4 Enabling conditions: where
problems lie
The essential functions and actors’ roles
depicted in Table 11.2 provide a static view
of responsibilities. Additional attributes of
well-functioning basin governance systems
206 M. Svendsen et al.
6 DSI is currently anticipating a new Gediz basin planning exercise. The previous plan was prepared 35
years ago and updated in 1982, but covered only surface water. The groundwater section of the DSI regional
office is also planning a new groundwater survey in the near future.
7 The term governance is used refering to the rules providing the context for multi-actor basin
management and the processes and activities engaged in by those actors operating within this set of
rules.
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which we term enabling conditions, were
defined in Chapter 1 and are shown in Box
1.2. A full analysis of these factors is well
beyond the scope of this paper. A brief
sketch of each in the context of the Gediz
basin will be attempted to illustrate the
concepts and indicate broad strengths and
weaknesses.
11.3.4.1 Political attributes
This is perhaps the most important gap in
the current set of enabling conditions.
Although some water users are well repre-
sented, others are not, and in the arena of
political give and take, those without repre-
sentation become losers. Industrialists, for
example, have ample financial resources,
are well organized and have ready access to
political decision makers. Other irrigators,
on the other hand, are not organized and
enjoy representation only through their
local village heads. IAs are intermediate.
They enjoy multiple connections to the
local political establishment by virtue of
having a number of village heads and town
mayors on their managing committees.
In addition, they collaborate informally,
sharing information and coordinating
activities. IAs would benefit by establishing
more formal linkages among themselves
to allow a single spokesperson to represent
them collectively in discussions over basin
water allocation, water quality standards,
irrigation return flow restrictions, and so
on. Other irrigators could affiliate with such
an association and, contributing financially
to it, participate in its representational
benefits.
The most serious failure of representa-
tion currently relates to the environment.
Although nominally represented by the
MoE, the Ministry is still relatively
young and has yet to establish presence
and capacity in many areas. For example,
it currently has provincial offices in only
two of the four provinces covered by the
Gediz basin. It also lacks sufficient budget
to perform its many duties fully. Moreover,
as a government agency, it will always be
subject to political pressures and pulls that
encourage or inhibit vigorous pursuit of
particular water quality issues. Experience
from other countries has shown that strong
NGOs rooted in civil society are essential
components of the political system sur-
rounding environmental issues. These
NGOs serve as advocates for environ-
mental values and for unrepresented future
generations. There are several groups with
potential to fulfil this role, but they pres-
ently provide an ineffective counterweight
to other interests.
Just as important as the existence of
representational bodies is the need for a
rough balance of political power and influ-
ence among various interests. When power
isone-sided,issuesarenotairedadequately,
and decisions are also one-sided. A key to
the evolution of a suitable and balanced
governance regime for the Gediz basin is
further maturation of non-government
organizations and associations based in
civil society which can advocate for
environmental interests.
11.3.4.2 Informational attributes
Stakeholders in the basin need to have
access to accurate and up-to-date descrip-
tive information on water-related issues
in the basin, and open access to decision-
making processes related to plans, regu-
lations, violations and sanctions to
participate effectively in basin governance.
Data collection in the Gediz basin is
incomplete, in that it falls short of the set
of data required for competent professional
management of the basin’s water resources.
Data that are collected, however, are
often not widely disseminated or, worse,
are sequestered and jealously guarded by
the collectors. This retentiveness may stem
from feelings that the data are a source of
power if they are not widely available, or
perhaps from doubts about the reliability of
the data. In a larger sense, though, it reflects
the lack of a strong demand for the data
for use in basin planning and management.
Once active planning and management pro-
cesses are mounted, the pressures for access
to data will grow and push much of this
data into the open.
Governing Closing Basins 207
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Establishing appropriate institutions requires
suitable legal authority. This does not
appear to be the most serious current prob-
lem constraining the emergence of an effec-
tive governance regime in the Gediz basin.
Although improvements can be made, and a
number of legislative changes are proposed
in the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the most
important short-term constraints appear to
lie in other areas, such as balanced political
power and providing adequate resources.
Over the longer run, however, the legisla-
tion of a new legal basis for an effective sys-
tem of water rights allocation, protection
and transfer will be essential.
11.3.4.4 Resources
Clearly, all four types of resources listed
in Box 1.2 are needed for effective imple-
mentation of basin management activities.
In a number of the responsible public orga-
nizations, they are inadequate. In some, this
constraint may be relaxed by reassigning
staff positions from functions that have lost
importance to those that are increasingly so.
Another potential problem is scattering of
resources among a variety of institutions,
where each lacks a critical mass to be effec-
tive. In a context of cooperation, it is not
necessary that resources be consolidated
under a single administrative structure for
effective implementation. However, cooper-
ation and coordination must be effective if a
decentralized strategy is to be effective.
11.4 Toward Solutions
11.4.1 Problem recap
In this section, the hydrologic, policy
and institutional problems identified in
earlier sections are brought together and
summarized.
11.4.1.1 Poor surface water quality
The most pressing water-related problem
facing the Gediz basin presently is the poor
and deteriorating quality of its surface
water. The deterioration results primarily
from the basin’s recent rapid growth in
population and the even more rapid growth
in local industry, coupled with the wide-
spread use of agricultural chemicals in a
highly productive agriculture. Failure to
control this growing problem at its several
sources leads to large requirements for
in-stream flows for dilution – flows that
are then unavailable for other uses. The
problem stems from several sources:
• Weak enforcement – first and foremost,
it is the inability of the provincial and
district governors, appointed by the
Ministry of Interior, to apply and
enforce sanctions and penalties on
violators of wastewater discharge
standards that is responsible for the
growing pollution problem. Although
monitoring could be improved and
standards tightened, the failure to
effectively enforce existing standards,
based on existing information, sends
a powerful signal to polluters that
compliance is unnecessary.
• Weak coordination – a second cause
of deteriorating surface water quality
is poor coordination and cooperation
among the three separate agencies
responsible for: (i) surface water
quality monitoring; (ii) wastewater
discharge monitoring; and (iii) enforce-
ment of standards. To some extent, this
is driven by bureaucratic tussling over
turf. In addition, the failure of any
of the three parties to come forward
with effective, inclusive and forward-
looking leadership is a cause.
• Limited availability of data – because
of restricted access, the debate on
water quality is poorly informed and
emotional rather than scientific,
making development of acceptable
remedial measures difficult and
contentious.
• Haphazard monitoring of wastewater
discharges – the most readily identifi-
able and correctible causes of Gediz
pollution are untreated or inadequately
treated wastewater discharges from
208 M. Svendsen et al.
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responsibility of the MoE to monitor
these discharges and report breaches of
standards to the provincial governor.
Limited staff, laboratory facilities and
funds currently forestall an adequate
monitoring programme.
• Inadequate funding for wastewater
treatment plants – inadequate funding
has two components, capital and
operating expenses. Several funding
windows are available to industries
and municipalities for investment
capital but a shortage remains. For
municipalities, there is little private
sector involvement in constructing
and operating treatment facilities, in
contrast to the case in many other
countries. A considerable share of the
funds made available by the State for
municipal treatment plant construction
have come through the Bank of the
Provinces, but with little expectation of
repayment. This makes the discipline
of mobilizing private capital for such
investment difficult or impossible.
Inadequate investment in wastewater
treatment by the industrial sector
relates, in part, to the weak enforce-
ment record of provincial governors.
As long as the costs of compliance
exceed the costs of non-compliance,
this situation is likely to continue.
• Limited public awareness of the
problem – negative effects of surface
water pollution include harm to public
health, increased costs to other water
users and negative environmental
effects, particularly in the Gediz delta.
Limited public awareness of the
problem and its impacts results in
limited public pressure and support
for reforms, which in turn affects every
single one of the factors outlined above.
Causes of limited public awareness
include restricted public access to
water quality data collected by govern-
ment agencies, inadequate MoE efforts
to publicize water quality problems,
and the failure, to date, of environmen-
tal NGOs to become effective advocates
and spokespersons.
11.4.1.2 Unknown groundwater quality
The extent of possible groundwater
contamination, particularly in the Nef
Creek watershed, is unknown. Due to
coarse alluvial soils and the extensive use
of in-ground holding pits, some wastewater
from both urban and industrial sources
may go into groundwater rather than being
disposed of as surface water effluent.
Groundwater quality monitoring is not
widespread and the results not publicly
available, making it difficult to know if
significant degradation of groundwater
quality is occurring.
This is a significant gap because aquifer
pollution is often more difficult and expen-
sive to mitigate than pollution of surface
waters. The possibility of contamination
gains added significance as a result of
the almost total dependence of the basin’s
population on groundwater for domestic
supplies.
11.4.1.3 Loosely controlled allocation
among users
Shallow groundwater is an open access
resource in the Gediz basin, meaning that
anyone with physical access to such water
can withdraw and use it. Deep groundwater
and surface water, once released from
Demirkopru Reservoir, share this open
access characteristic, in part, as well.
The result is that some legitimate needs,
especially environmental needs, are inade-
quately met, access of existing users is
insecure and it is difficult to transfer water
allocations among users in a rational way.
Among the causes are the following:
• Inadequate representation – interests
of some users are not well represented
in allocational planning and decision
making. The most salient example is
the environment, and, in particular, the
needs of the Gediz delta and its rich
complement of wildlife.
• Inadequate specification – while water
needs in the basin for large-scale irriga-
tion and urban use are generally
known, present use and future require-
ments for small-scale irrigation, the
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environment are not well specified in
terms of quantity, timing and quality
requirements. This makes allocation
decision making difficult.
• Ineffective reporting and record keep-
ing – while municipal extractions are
reasonably well documented, indus-
trial extractions from groundwater
remain largely a matter of conjecture.
This makes evaluation of new requests
for withdrawal permits difficult. There
is likewise no cumulative inventory of
the total number of permits issued, the
agreed extraction rates and the depth
from which water is extracted, render-
ing this process even less rigorous and
reliable.
11.4.1.4 Overarching future problems
In addition to the current problems affect-
ing water allocation and basin governance,
there are longer-term problems that will
require more fundamental changes in laws,
policies, institutions and practices. Two of
the most significant are the following:
• Rudimentary water rights system – the
current national system of recording
and harmonizing rights to use water
dates from an earlier simpler time and
is not well adapted to a water-short
environment. It does not provide secu-
rity for present users, does not allow for
or adequately protect environmental
uses of water, and does not provide
incentives for economy of use or for
orderly transfers among sectors.
• Lack of integrated planning –
assessment of basin water resources
is currently separated into ground and
surface water components. Because
these interact in practice, the basin
needs to be understood as an integrated
water resource system. Also, because
water quality influences the uses to
which water can be put, and gives
rise to its own quantitative demands
for dilution flows, quantity and quality
must also receive joint consideration.
11.4.2 Recent strides
The current situation in the Gediz basin,
and at the national level, is dynamic and
somewhat fluid. Locally, a number of steps
have been or are being taken to improve the
enforcement of water quality standards and
protect the natural environment. Many of
these steps began with a Franco-Turkish
basin study of the Gediz in the mid-1990s.
Although this study was intended to lead
to various action programmes, the latter
failed to materialize because of lack of co-
operation among the different institutions
involved.8 The study did raise awareness of
problems and stimulate other initiatives,
however.
In 1996, the provincial MoE office
conducted a study of polluting industries in
Izmir province, which resulted in sanctions
on 14 firms. In that same year, MoE offices
in Izmir and Manisa began a 2-year surface
water-quality sampling exercise in the
Lower Gediz.
In early 1998, three provincial gover-
nors from the Gediz basin, together with
MoE and other parties, convened a ‘coordi-
nation meeting’ for the basin, which led to
the establishment of a coordinating commit-
tee consisting of the directors of the three
provincial MoE offices. More recently, this
coordinating committee was transformed
into a permanent body named the Environ-
mental Protection Service Association of
Gediz Basin Provinces. This Association
was officially authorized by the cabinet of
the national government in December 1999,
givingitalegalpersona.Thisassociationhas
a broader base than earlier initiatives, and,
in principle, has considerable power. Since
its creation, however, it has lain largely
dormant due to lack of resources and the
ongoing bottleneck in the enforcement of
existing standards and regulations.
210 M. Svendsen et al.
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change is reflected in the recently published
Eighth Five-Year Plan covering the period
2001–2005.ThePlanrecognizestheneedfor
change in the way water is allocated and
managed. There is a commitment to intro-
duce new water legislation that will cover
such issues as water rights, responsibilities
for water allocation, setting and enforcing
environmentalstandards, andconsolidating
the position of the IAs. However, the Plan
does not specifically mention basin-level
water management nor is there any provi-
sion for establishing basin-level entities that
could implement or coordination various
basin-level activities. Reduction in support
for utilization of fertilizers and agricultural
chemicals is a preliminary step toward
addressing non-point source pollution
problems. Revising water and wastewater
standards to comply with EU standards will
raise the bar for existing polluters and those
in compliance alike.
The Plan does indicate that the private
sector will becomemoreinvolved in various
aspects of water, adding an additional set
of regulatory challenges to the existing
situation and raising the question of the
security of rights to water use by less well-
represented groups. Until these new initia-
tives are defined and brought into place,
however,currentinstitutional arrangements
will continue within the context of rapid
growth in demand for water and increasing
pressure on water resources from waste-
water disposal from urban, industrial and
agricultural users.
11.4.3 Strengths to build on
Although the problems faced are formida-
ble, Turkey and the Gediz basin have a
number of strengths on which to build an
effective basin governance regime. These
include the following:
• The premiere water resource agency in
the country, DSI, is responsible for both
ground and surface water, providing a
strong base for integrated treatment in
the future. This is not the case in many
other countries, where separate organi-
zations are responsible. Moreover,
handing over irrigation management
responsibilities to IAs positions it well
to take on the role of basin planner and
water quality monitor for both ground
and surface waters.
• Water quality is squarely identified as
an important problem in the Gediz
basin. Moreover, while serious, it has
not yet reached catastrophic propor-
tions, offering a grace period in which
action can be taken. Some actors in the
basin appear to be responding to the
warning signals.
• There is recognition that a number
of different actors must be involved in
solving water quality problems in the
Gediz. It is important to transform
this recognition into effective ways
of working together, rather than
squandering energy and resources in
intra-governmental squabbles over
bureaucratic turf.
• Likewise, there is recognition that
there are multiple dimensions to water
resource management problems – dif-
ferent disciplines, different interests,
different uses, ground and surface
water, quantity and quality, and so on.
Recognizing this provides opportunity
to develop an integrated approach to
basin water resource planning and
management.
• A new water law is under consider-
ation, offering an opportunity to lay
legal groundwork for effective basin
management and protection for the
Gediz and other water-short basins in
the country.
• There is a strong university-based sci-
entific community, e.g. CEVMER and
others in or near the basin, providing
capability for applied problem-solving
research and, where needed, independ-
ent scientific assessment.
• There are linkages with international
institutions such as IWMI, which pro-
vide access to international experience
with basin governance problems. More-
over, there is a healthy willingness
to look outside the country to the
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interest in harmonizing standards,
practices and procedures with those of
the EU.
11.4.4 Challenges
A number of immediate solutions to prob-
lems affecting governance and management
of water resources in the Gediz basin are
self-evident from the listing of problems in
Section 11.4.1. In this concluding section,
we indicate four important longer-range
challenges facing the basin. Addressing
these challenges effectively would go a long
way toward putting into place a strong,
dynamic and flexible system of basin
governance.
11.4.4.1 Systematize water rights
The current rudimentary rights system
cannot provide security and flexibility in an
era of growing water scarcity. A new system
which is fair, flexible, and effective needs
to be designed, based on both Turkish and
international experience.
11.4.4.2 Build representational presence
and political muscle
Some basin water users, such as the natural
environment, are not well represented in
water-related discussions at present, and
there are severe imbalances of political
power among the various water users. Fair
and equitable governance of basin water
resources requires that users and interests
be represented in discussion and decision-
making fora in a balanced way. NGOs
rooted in civil society provide an important
voice and advocacy presence for the envi-
ronment, supplementing the efforts of the
MoE. Their emergence as a political force
will add balance to decision making and
pressure for effective enforcement of
sanctions for water quality violations.
11.4.4.3 Develop coordinating mechanisms
Alternative models for water basin gover-
nance exist. At one pole is a comprehensive
basin authority, which concentrates power,
responsibility and capacity to implement
directly many basin management tasks. At
the other pole is a coordinating committee,
which simply provides a forum for discus-
sion and voluntary coordination. Between
these poles, many variations are possible.
One thing that is clear is that the present
system of compartmentalizing water quan-
tity and quality, ground and surface water,
and fresh water and wastewater is not an
effective base for the future. Mechanisms
have to be developed for bringing these
components together in a functional inte-
grated system for planning, governance and
management.9
A useful first step would be the
completion of an integrated assessment of
basin water resources of all types and of
the present and predicted demands on
those resources. High-level political com-
mitment to such an undertaking and strong
leadership would be essential. It is equally
important that this exercise not be carried
out by a single organization, but that it
involves the various agencies, and the
different departments within agencies,
which have mandates to address water-
related issues in the basin. The report
produced is only half of the desired
output of such a process. The other half
is the experience of joint action among
agencies and groups to implement the
study and the creation of ‘ownership’ of
the result by the various stakeholders.
11.4.4.4 Involve the private sector
In many countries, the private sector plays
important roles in water resource manage-
ment. Turkey is well embarked on the
212 M. Svendsen et al.
9 One reason that Turkey is not pursuing the concept of basin-wide authorities at present is because of the
difficultissuesposedbyimportanttrans-nationalriverbasinssharedbyTurkeyandseveralofitsneighbours.Itis
said that the next 5-year plan may address this option.
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previously State-operated irrigation systems
to locally based associations. The private
sector can also play a major role in provid-
ing safe drinking water and effective sanita-
tion services to urban areas. Private sector
involvement has a number of advantages,
including operational efficiency, ability to
mobilize private capital and access to new
technology. To attract such involvement
without State guarantees of repayment,
firms must have confidence that the princi-
ple of payment-for-service will be honoured
and supported by the involved govern-
mental entities. Bringing in such private
participation would provide needed capital
for wastewater collection and treatment
systems and provide wider access to these
essential services.
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees12 Managing River Basins: Lessons from
Experience
Mark Svendsen and Philippus Wester
12.1 Introduction
The case studies presented in the preceding
chapters provide a rich vein in which to
prospect for common threads and mean-
ings. The six cases vary along a number
of dimensions and, at the same time, each
is, in some respects, unique. Moreover,
the case studies employ similar, though
not identical, formats. This chapter will
compare the cases and attempt to draw con-
clusions that will aid those establishing
and strengthening basin management
capabilities elsewhere.
We first ask what drives countries
to establish and maintain mechanisms for
basin coordination and management. Next,
we describe the mechanisms that have
emerged in the six case study basins, con-
trasting selected characteristics. Then we
look at the conditions which enabled these
mechanisms to emerge, or which prevented
them from emerging. Finally, we summarize
lessons learned.
12.2 What Drives Basin Management?
In a matter as complex as the emergence of
human institutions, it would be astonishing
if a single variable explained the emergence
conclusively. In this case, we are not to be
astonished, as a number of factors appear
to come into play, while other plausible
influences do not seem to have a strong
effect. If the sample of cases were wider, no
doubt other factors would rise to the surface
as well. Table 12.1 shows the six cases
arrayed against a number of dimensions
related to the possible emergence of basin
management mechanisms.
At this point, we make the summary
judgement that the first three basins – those
in France, California and Mexico – have put
in place mechanisms to manage water at the
basin level, while the other three have not
yet done so. The mechanisms in the first
three basins are very different from each
other and operate with different degrees of
effectiveness, but they do exist and operate.
In the study basins in South Africa and Viet-
nam, governments intend to develop such
mechanisms and have taken preliminary
stepsinthisdirectionbutneitherisyetoper-
ating. In Turkey, there are as yet no clear
planstointroduceformalbasinmanagement
practices. We will examine the nature of
these mechanisms subsequently, but for the
moment it is interesting to explore some of
the possible driving forces relative to this
simple ‘with’ and ‘without’ dichotomy.
Thefirstdimension,thesizeofthebasin
in question, seems to have little or no effect
on its propensity to develop management
mechanisms. It might be supposed that
larger basins would have a stronger need for
organizedmanagement.Conversely,itcould
be thought that smaller basins would be
easiertomanageandthereforemorelikelyto
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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both the smallest watershed and the largest
in the sample fall into the ‘with manage-
ment’ category. Moreover, the two smallest
watersheds – those in France and Turkey –
clearly are of great importance in their
respective countries, and yet one has a very
sophisticated management set-up while the
other has virtually none.
Per capita income, which would indi-
cate the ability of an economy to pay for
basin management services, is a potential
enabler of formal basin management. In this
case, the sample of case studies offers some
support for this hypothesis, since the two
wealthiest countries clearly have the most
sophisticated basin management set-ups.
However, the strong steps being taken by
Mexico contrast sharply with the virtual
absence of action on the part of Turkey,
though both countries have similar income
levels, and if regional income measures
were compared, the Izmir/Gediz area would
doubtless show a considerably higher per
capita income than both the Turkey and
Mexico averages.
A second connection between higher
levels of per capita income and basin devel-
opment is that per capita income serves as a
roughproxyforahigherlevelofinstitutional
specialization and diversification. This has
implicationsforavarietyofthings,fromdata
collection and analysis capacity to the avail-
ability of a large pool of trained enterprise
managers. It is likely that this effect is
also operating here, though lower national
incomes are certainly not an absolute
constraint on the emergence of basin
management mechanisms.
It is probably significant that all three
of the ‘with management’ basins are experi-
encing severe surface water availability con-
straints, while in the three ‘without’ basins
the constraint is less severe. The judgement
made here on ‘quantity constraint’ is not as
rigorous as is the designation of a ‘closed
basin’ in the depletion methodology out-
lined in Chapter 3. In particular, the ‘closed
basin’ definition effectively requires that
the temporal variability in water supply has
already been smoothed out through the
creation of in-basin storage, since this is the
heart of the stair-stepped water availability
function in that concept. In this sample of
cases, the Lerma–Chapala has storage for
nearly four-fifths of the annual runoff of the
basin, and the construction of additional
storage in both the Neste and in California is
severely constrained by public policy and
environmental considerations. It is thus rea-
sonable to regard these basins as essentially
closed. The Oliphants and Gediz basins
both have the capacity to store more than
the annual basin runoff and have utilized
most of the available supplies, but effective
demand has not yet risen to the point where
there is serious conflict over existing
resources. As historical inequities are
redressed in the Olifants, however, demand
will doubtless expand to exceed supply. In
the Gediz, the agricultural demand for water
is declining as cropping patterns shift under
economic pressure to less water-intensive
crops, reducing the pressure on the resource
from this source. The Dong Nai is lightly
used at present and has ample scope for
additional storage to smooth out seasonal
peaks in water supply. While seasonal con-
straints on availability are approaching in
the Dong Nai, availability has not begun to
approach the utilizable limit.
So in all three ‘with’ basins, serious
competition over available basin water sup-
plies appears to drive basin management
efforts, supporting the fundamental premise
developed in Chapter 2.
Water quality concerns have not, by
themselves, been sufficiently strong to
drive the creation of basin management
mechanisms in the two basins where they
are most prominent – Lerma–Chapala and
Gediz. Similarly, groundwater overdrafting,
which is serious in three of the basins, does
notfigureprominentlyinbasinmanagement
plans, where they exist. In fact, in the Gediz
basin where overdrafting is the most severe,
basin management has received the least
attention among the six cases.
Four of the basins have important
environmental assets at their lower end.
In California, the Sacramento–San Joaquin
Delta is the focal point of environmental
concern and controversy in the state, and in
Mexico the level of Lake Chapala is seen as a
Lessons from Experience 217
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ment efforts. In the Olifants the world
renowned Kruger National Park lies astride
the river on the South African border with
Mozambique, and in the Gediz the estuary
where the river enters the Mediterranean
is an important bird sanctuary recognized
internationally as a Ramsar site. These four
sites are evenly divided between the ‘with’
and ‘without’ basins.
From this discussion we can hypothe-
size that absolute limits on available water
supply in practice provide the strongest
impetus for creating formal basin manage-
ment mechanisms and that wealth and
institutional resources in the larger society
areimportantenablingfactorsfortheiremer-
gence. Where water supply expansion is
feasible,itislikelytobeapreferredoptionto
more intensive management and conserva-
tion of existing supplies, as seems to be the
caseintheDongNai.Waterqualityandenvi-
ronmental protection problems do not seem
to be sufficient motives, by themselves, to
causetheemergenceofcomprehensiveman-
agement mechanisms. Equally, overdrafted
groundwater, while worrisome, is not a
strong driver of management efforts. In part,
this may be because groundwater over-
drafting is a devilishly difficult collective
problemtogetagripon,andalsobecausethe
problem is ‘invisible’ and its consequences




The Neste is managed by a carefully struc-
tured set of interlinked organizations that
cover all major basin management func-
tions. It was first put into place about
40 years ago. Management is focused on
surface water, since groundwater is unim-
portant in this basin. The centrepiece of the
structure is a Regional Development Com-
pany (RDC) – a state-owned firm holding an
operating concession for public water rights
and facilities that plays major roles in con-
structing and maintaining facilities and in
allocating and distributing water to users.
Water users comprise towns and munici-
palities, individual agricultural water users,
and a few water users’ associations (WUAs).
ABasinCommitteeor‘waterparliament’
made up of local and national authorities
and water users develops long-term policies
and plans for the basin. An executive arm
of the Basin Committee, the Water Agency,
collectswaterandpollution-basedtaxesand
monitors water quality, but does not take a
direct role in water management.
Regulatory oversight and ‘policing
powers’forwaterqualityandenvironmental
protection are provided by the Ministry of
Environment. The Ministry of Agriculture,
which represents the State as the owner of
the infrastructure, plays a regulatory role in
monitoring the care and maintenance given
to the facilities by the concessionaire, the
RDC.
The RDC is not involved in managing or
regulatingderivativewaterfrommunicipali-
ties and agriculture, which is handled by
towns and individual farmers, supervised
by the Water Authority and the Ministry of
Environment.
The organizational set-up thus contains:
(i) a broadly based representative body, the
BasinCommittee,supportedbyitsexecutive
arm, the Water Agency, to make plans and
set policy directions; (ii) a government-
owned company to build, operate and
maintainhydraulicfacilities;and(iii)public
regulatory agencies comprising the Minis-
tries of Environment and Agriculture. Nota-
ble by their relative absence are irrigation
associations providing irrigation service to
their members and representing their inter-
ests and other pressure groups representing
environmental interests. The State, on the
otherhand,hasastrongpresenceinallofthe
important organizations in the management
set-up.
12.3.1.2 Central Valley
Institutional arrangements for managing
California’s Central Valley water resources
stand in marked contrast to the planned and
218 M. Svendsen and P. Wester
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institutions have grown up by accretion
over more than 100 years of resource devel-
opment into a boisterous confluence of
actors, laws, policies, plans and influence.
Here two important categories of actors not
figuring importantly in the Neste arrange-
ments, interest groups and the courts, are
involved, and in each of the major catego-
ries of involved actors – managers, service
providers, users, regulators, advocacy
groups, elected officials and the courts
– there are multiple actors.
Major water resource development
investmentsmadeinCaliforniaoverthepast
100 years have blurred basin boundaries by
making it possible to transport water across
basins from north to south, and from the
Colorado River basin west to southern
California. This infrastructural develop-
ment has multiplied the options available to
managers, but at the same time, it has made
traditional watershed boundaries somewhat
obsolete as delimiters of responsibility and
authority. Thus, while California has never
had a basin management authority in the
traditional sense, such an authority might
well have become obsolete by now had one
been established.
Instead of a formally structured author-
ity to manage the waters of the Sacramento
and San Joaquin Rivers, what controls is
rather a body of laws, rules and plans that
govern water allocation and reallocation,
water quality and return flows, and which
protect the natural ecology. Changes in
existingpracticesandresponsestochanging
conditions are contested by a variety of
interestgroupsbeforedecisions arereached.
Federal and state courts usually serve as the
final arbiters in these contestations.
The state Department of Water
Resources (DWR) is the primary water
resource manager, planning water develop-
ment and use in the basin, constructing and
maintaining major facilities, and protecting
against floods. The United States Bureau
of Reclamation (USBR) also constructs,
operates and maintains major water
control and supply facilities as does a
large private consortium of irrigation water
users.
The users of water in the Central Valley
consist almost entirely of user-controlled
water districts. These districts are non-
profit, quasi-municipal entities governed by
farmers, in the case of irrigation districts,
and by urban residents in the case of muni-
cipal water districts. The districts receive
water from the DWR or the USBR and, in
turn, provide water services to their member
farmers or households. These water districts
have been features of the institutional land-
scape in the Central Valley for more than
100 years, and continue to operate reliably.
They are linked together in associations and
are thus influential actors in basin water
management decision making.
Environmental protection and miti-
gation is a critically important issue in
California and nearly half of the state’s
developed water resources is allocated to
environmentalpurposes.Regulatingalluses
and protecting environmental resources are
several powerful federal and state agencies.
The important state Water Resources Con-
trol Board and the Regional Water Quality
Control Boards are independent of the DWR
and are insulated to some extent from other
organs of state government as well. In addi-
tion, influential mass-based environmental
action groups actively lobby for particular
causes, join court cases, publicize and
provide their own analyses of water/
environment interactions.
Groundwater is far more lightly regu-
lated than is surface water in the Central
Valley and is seriously overdrafted. No state
agency takes effective responsibility for
regulating groundwater use and the legal
basis for such regulation is deficient.
The regional water quality control
boards enforce quality of return flows from
both municipal uses and from agriculture
rigorously, with support from the courts as
needed. Municipal return flows are becom-
ing increasingly important as water sources
foragriculture,landscapeandturfirrigation,
aquifer recharge, and even new municipal
supplies.
In sum, institutions are in place to con-
struct, maintain and operate water facilities
intheCentralValley,toprotectwaterquality
and the environment, to distribute water to
Lessons from Experience 219
231 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:36:21 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesend users efficiently, to reallocate water
among uses using both market and adminis-
trative mechanisms, and to plan for future
water supply and use. However, specialized
basin-based management organizations do
not exist and are unlikely to emerge. User-
governed water supply organizations pro-
vide services to end users in most cases, and
they remain healthy and effective. The insti-
tutional glue that holds the management
system together consists of an accumulated
body of legislation and case law, legally
enforceable contracts, environmental rules
and regulations, and an inclusive planning
process led by the state DWR every 5 years.
Market mechanisms play an increasingly
important role in reallocating water to new
and more highly valued uses.
12.3.1.3 Lerma–Chapala
Water resource management in Mexico
operates under the strong centralized
authority of the National Water Commis-
sion (CNA). CNA is a young organization,
created in 1989, and operates under a com-
prehensive water law promulgated in 1992.
It is empowered to manage national water
resources, plan development and manage-
ment, assign and register water rights,
collect water-related taxes, and develop
irrigation and urban water supply systems.
It operates through a set of 13 regional
(basin) and 31 state offices.
Day to day management of irrigation
systems has been handed over to irrigation
districts, similar to those in California, in
a highly successful management transfer
programme dating from the early 1990s.
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, a Basin
Council was established under the new
water law in 1993. A Governing Council
chaired by the CNA Director General is the
topleveldecision-makingbody,andaMoni-
toring and Evaluation Group (MEG) acts as
its executive organ. The regional CNA office
serves as a secretariat for the Council. A
basin-level users assembly brings together
the users of the basin and selects representa-
tives from the various sectors to the Council.
Council working groups address particular
problems. Although the Basin Council
provides a prototype vehicle to manage
basin water resources, it has little decision-
makingpower,sinceCNAremainsresponsi-
ble for major decisions, including water
concessions, the collection of water taxes
and water investment programmes.
The Lerma–Chapala Basin Council
displays some of the features of the French
Neste model, such as a users assembly, a
top-level governing body, and strong State
involvement and direction. At the same
time, the set-up in Lerma–Chapala lacks the
professional management expertise of the
French Regional Development Company, its
councils and assemblies have little of the
decision-making authority of their French
counterparts and they are heavily depend-
ent on the CNA for authority, funds and
technical expertise.
An analysis of actors and functions
shows that, as in California, most of the
essential functions related to surface water
are covered, while groundwater is only
weakly regulated. Planning, water alloca-
tion and water distribution are done reason-
ably effectively, while other functions are
not. Demand management and reallocation
to Lake Chapala are particular weaknesses.
Monitoring and ensuring the quality of
primary water sources are relatively weak
functions, and controlling groundwater
pollution is not covered at all, as is the
case in the Gediz basin in Turkey. Advocacy
groups do not have an important voice in
basin management decisions.
In a backlash against restrictions
imposed by the Council on agricultural
water use, agricultural interests have
recently coalesced to strengthen their voice
and influence. WUA presidents from five
basin states have met together to coordinate
their actions and have formed a new Work-
ing Group for agriculture within the Basin
Council. Interestingly, as in California and
Turkey, limitations on surface water access
haveledirrigatorstoincreaseexploitationof
less regulated groundwater, exacerbating a
groundwater overdraft problem in all three
countries.
To try to regulate this overdrafting,
member states of the Council signed a
coordinating agreement in 1993. To date,
220 M. Svendsen and P. Wester
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Statehasprohibitedthesinkingofnewwells
in the basin, groundwater development con-
tinues apace, and overdrafting accelerates.
Another issue to be faced in the
future is the right of access to derivative
water. With a major programme of con-
structing wastewater treatment plants now
showing results, raw wastewater streams,
whichwereavailableforreuseinrivershere-
tofore, are now controlled and improved in
quality and can be diverted to new users
who are willing to pay for the right to
use them. Complicated issues of rights to
derivative water and compensation for lost
use rights await.
12.3.1.4 Olifants
Prior to majority rule in 1994, water
resources in South Africa were managed for
the benefit of the white minority under a
hybrid system of riparian and appropriative
rights. The national Department of Water
Affairs (DWA) was the pre-eminent organi-
zation managing surface water and waste-
water, playing a major role in planning,
allocating, supplying and protecting surface
water resources.
After 1994, water institutions, along
with most other public institutions, under-
went massive fundamental changes. The
1996constitutiongave‘basicrights’statusto
access to water to support life and for per-
sonal hygiene and a healthy environment.
There followed two new water acts in
1997 and 1998, which remapped the water
landscape. Water was made a public trust
and the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry (DWAF) was made their custodian,
with wide-reaching powers similar to those
of the CNA in Mexico.
Following 1994 and in accord with
the new water legislation, institutions that
formerly served white farmers and commu-
nities were modified and expanded to cover
all citizens. Thus, for example, the former
irrigation boards are being converted into
WUAs and established wherever irrigation
willbepractisedacrossthecountry,arrange-
ments similar to those existing in the USA,
Mexico and Turkey.
Inamajorbreakwithtradition,theman-
agement of water resources was assigned
to a set of 19 semi-autonomous Catchment
Management Agencies (CMAs) to be created
in major water basins in the country. The
Olifants is one of these. The CMA must
plan a 5-year management strategy and
will progressively assume management
and monitoring functions delegated to it by
DWAF. It will collect fees from water users
to cover its costs. The roles envisioned for
the CMA span a wide range, including
planning and water allocation, wastewater
regulation,andmonitoringandenforcement
of water quality standards. It remains to be
seen whether all of these functions, particu-
larly the enforcement ones, are appropriate
to such a pluralistic institution.
The process of forming a CMA in the
Olifants basin has been deliberate, with
much attention paid to obtaining wide-
spreadparticipationofbasinstakeholdersin
the formative process. However, with more
than 3 million people in the basin, securing
the vitally important participation of black
rural residents has been difficult. Other
interests, such as industrial users, power
generators and white commercial farmers
arewellorganized,articulate(inEnglishand
Afrikaans) and politically adept, and tend to
overshadow smallholder farmers and other
rural residents.
The process of creating locally account-
able basin management organizations is in
an early stage. It is underlain by an exem-
plary body of legislation, a wealth of good
intentions and capable technical support,
andfacesanenormouschallengeinbringing
stakeholders together to govern the CMA
in a fair and balanced way. The technical
challenges of information collection and
management, planning, and reallocation
also lie ahead.
12.3.1.5 Dong Nai
Like Mexico and South Africa, Vietnam
also has a new and comprehensive water
law. Promulgated in 1999, the new law
provides a forward-looking structure for the
sector and mandates that water resources
be managed on the basis of hydrologic
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An apex-level National Water Resources
Council was established in Vietnam in 2000
to anchor the new set-up. While logical and
consistent with international thinking on
the topic, the notion of management at the
basin level across administrative boundaries
runs counter to the administrative model
currently in place, wherein administrative
boundaries form the basis of a complex,
interlocking and hierarchical administra-
tive set-up extending downward from the
national level to provinces, districts and
communes. Administrators at all of these
levels are currently involved in water
resource management, and it makes for a
very complex situation.1 Unfortunately, too,
the tendency is to see basin-level manage-
ment as an overlay to this existing structure
rather than as a new model that cuts across
and supplants existing governmental units
and authority, and this has the potential to
make the set-up even more complex.
As in South Africa, the government is
only just starting to implement this new
model. A Planning Management Council for
the Dong Nai River basin was established
in 2001 under the new water law. The 12
permanent members of the council are all
representatives of national level ministries
and agencies, while the involved provinces
are represented by non-standing members
drawn from more junior administrative
ranks. Moreover, provincial representation
is drawn from the provincial Agricultural
and Rural Development Service and does
not include the sectors of public health,
domestic water supply, wastewater handling
and treatment, and environmental quality.
It seems likely that the initial role of the
Council will be planning new basin devel-
opment projects, serving as an extension
of the Sub-Institute for Water Resources
Planning, which also acts as the Council’s
secretariat.
A parallel basin-wide coordinating
effort has been ongoing for several years
under the sponsorship of the Ministry of
Science Technology and Environment.
Participants are trying to establish a ten-
province-plus-HCMC committee to monitor
and manage water quality in the basin. This
effort differs from the MARD-based Plan-
ning Management Council in that its pri-
mary members are provincial governments
and in its focus on water quality issues. For
the time being, these two basin-level organi-
zations appear positioned to evolve on par-
allel tracks. In some ways, this is a positive
development as it aids the emergence of
a provincially based capacity to engage in
basin management activities in addition to
the nationally based one. Coordination will
be required, and at some point, the two
mechanisms maybe merged, but this should
notbedoneattheexpenseofthemoredemo-
cratic and representative process emerging
at the regional level.
12.3.1.6 Gediz
The Gediz basin represents the negative
image of basin management – obvious in its
absence. The national water agency, DSI, is
similar to the Mexican CNA in its broad and
comprehensive powers to develop, manage
and regulate the nation’s water resources.
It has been in existence for 50 years and
is a capable and professional organization.
As with the CNA in Mexico, DSI has imple-
mented a very successful management
transfer programme over the past 10 years,
shifting management responsibility for 80%
of the irrigated area under its charge to
locally controlled Irrigation Unions.
However, despite its professional
competence and its success in devolving
operational control of most of its irrigation
systems to water users, DSI has not yet re-
interpreted its mandate to include basin-
level water resource management. As a
result, there is a sizeable gap in institutional
coverage of basin management functions.
This is manifested in very limited
planning of surface water at the basin level
and virtually none for groundwater. There
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ground and surface water availability, nor
does existing planning consider water qual-
ity, wastewater disposal, current and pro-
jected land use, anticipated future demand
and return flows, or projected future
quantity and quality of water resources.
Water is allocated, in practice, by a
variety of agencies and users operating
independently of each other. There is no
national legal framework for surface water
rightsandonlyarudimentarysystemofallo-
cating access to groundwater. As a result,
both are largely open-access resources.
Although nominal control is stronger for
groundwater than for surface water, ground-




also because of the relative ease of access
provided by groundwater. The current sys-
tem of registering groundwater withdrawals
has been no more effective at limiting over-
drafting than practices in California and
Mexico.
Water quality monitoring takes place,
but information is often not available in
useful forms to interested parties. The
informationcollectedremainsasrawdatain
agency files and is not generally used as a
basis for policy making or decision making
for basin management.
Despite serious quality degradation of
surface waters in the basin, there is little
enforcement of water quality regulations
because a single official, the provincial gov-
ernor, is empowered to authorize enforce-
ment. Although a number of environmental
NGOs exist in Turkey, these have not yet
developed sufficient confidence and inde-
pendence to lobby effectively for enhanced
environmental protections.
Insum,theneedforbasin-levelmanage-
ment in the Gediz is acute, and adequate
authority and professional competence
exists within DSI to begin this process.
Bringing the process to completion will
requireanewnationalsystemofwaterrights
tosafeguardexistingusersandpreventover-
allocation; however, there are many inter-
mediate steps related to integrated planning
and data collection and dissemination that
could be taken now. This has not been a
high priority for DSI, perhaps because of
a primary focus on extensive irrigation
construction activities elsewhere in the
country.
12.3.2 Enabling conditions
Additional attributes of well-functioning
basin management systems relate to dynam-
ics. We term these attributes enabling con-
ditions (see Chapter 1). Enabling conditions
are features of the institutional environ-
ment at the basin level that must be present,
in some measure, to achieve good gover-
nance and management of the basin. These
attributes are not specific to any one actor,
but apply to all actors and their interactions
and comprise necessary, but not sufficient
normative conditions for success.
12.3.2.1 Political attributes
An important political attribute of an effec-
tive basin management system is adequate
representation of interests. Equally impor-
tant is the need for a rough balance of politi-
cal power and influence among the various
interests. When power is one-sided, issues
are not aired adequately, and decisions are
also one-sided.
In twoofthe study cases, awide arrayof
interests represent themselves in basin man-
agement discussions and decision making.
In California, the various principal sectors –
agricultural, municipalities and the envi-
ronment – are well organized and funded
and represent their members in a variety
of different forums. Involved entities
include associations of irrigation districts,
associations of municipal water districts,
federations of farmers, state and federal
management and regulatory agencies, and
environmental NGOs. Following debate,
decisions are made by the state legislature,
the US Congress and regulatory authorities.
Disputesareadjudicatedbystateandfederal
courts. Voluntary agreements among parties
are often reached after negotiation and
formalized in legally enforceable contracts.
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Commission or ‘water parliament’ serves as
a discussion and decision-making forum
involving the major actors.
In three other cases, those of Mexico,
South Africa and Turkey, some interests are
well organized and well represented, while
others are not. For example, in the Gediz,
localindustrialists formassociations, which
promotetheirinterestswithDSIandthegov-
ernment. Farmers, though more numerous,
are less well organized and funded, and do
not speak with a unified voice. However,
Irrigation Unions recognize their disadvan-
tage in this regard and have begun to discuss
coordination and possible federation among
themselves. In Mexico also, the success of
WUAs in fiveLerma–Chapala basin states in
forming an irrigation working group within
the Basin Council and in taking a common
position against further reductions in their
water allocations shows their increasing
sophistication and an evolution toward
greater balance in representation. In both
countries, the environment is poorly repre-
sented in debates over allocation and pollu-
tion because of the relatively weak status of
thenationalenvironmentalagenciesandthe
relative absence of effective environmental
advocacy groups based in civil society.
Neither country appears to be taking a
proactivestancetorectifytheseimbalances.
In South Africa, the cleavages are quite
different. Here, the dualism resulting from
the apartheid legacy has created a situation
where wealthier white segments of all sec-
torsofthewatereconomyarewellorganized
and represented, while the generally poorer
black segments of the same sectors are not.
Industrialists and commercial farmers are
better endowed to participate in consulta-
tion processes and are concerned about con-
tinued access and water quality issues. The
environment is well represented and sup-
ported by strong provisions in the National
Water Act mandating priority allocations to
meet environmental needs.
Administrative structures serving black
South Africans in the former homeland
areas were extremely weak and have been
disbanded. These populations currently
have to grapple with major ideological
differences between traditional tribal
leadership and the new democratically
electedrepresentation.Thisdisparityinrep-
resentation and influence is rightly recog-
nized by policy makers as the pre-eminent
challenge in developing democratic and
representative basin management agencies.
They recognize that the new system
must create mechanisms through which
water users across the board can make
themselves heard and understood, enabling
gradual and systematic redress of racial and
gender inequities while ensuring a secure
base for economic growth. Lack of access –
both through lack of rights and lack of infra-
structure – are priority issues for the rural
poor in the Olifants basin. At the same time,
however, adequate representation is hard to
achieve: large numbers of people live in
remote areas, excluded through the cost
of transportation and an absence of
organization. The government, through
DWAF, is experimenting with a variety of
approaches to achieving better balance in
representation.
In Vietnam, the model is quite different.
Power rests overwhelmingly with the State
and the Party, and there is scant scope for
representational associations based in civil
society. It is assumed that the various organs
of government – ministries of agriculture,
environment and energy, and the multitude
of other involved government bodies – can
adequately represent the interests of all
involved stakeholders. Moreover, national
level agencies tend to have much stronger
representation than provincial and local
level ones. As a result, basin forums tend
to involve only public sector actors and
are dominated by those representing State
(national)agencies.Theresultisanadminis-
trative technocratic approach to planning
and management which does not necessar-
ily reflect the values of provincial authori-
ties or private economic actors active in the
various sectors.
In sum, in the five multi-party democra-
cies, representation of the variety of public
and private interests involved in basin
planning and management is either present
or evolving. The modes and mechanisms
for this vary widely, as do the present
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stakeholders themselves, and, in most cases
the governments, recognize the importance
ofthisprocess.Inthesixthcase,Stateorgans
represent all of the involved interests,
resulting in a more centralized, public
policy-oriented and technocratic approach
to planning and management.
12.3.2.2 Informational attributes
Another essential enabling condition is the
presence in the public domain of accurate
and up-to-date descriptive information on
water in the basin, along with open and
accessible decision-making processes related
to plans, regulations, violations and sanc-
tions. The first of these stipulations requires
that information on basin water allocations,
reservoir positions, groundwater elevations,
water quality conditions, available resources
and so on be a part of the public record.
This disclosure condition applies to intra-
and interdepartmental information relation-
ships as well as to those with the general
public. The second stipulation, transpar-
ency of public proceedings, is similarly
essential to fair democratic processes.
Rent-seeking behaviour requires darkness
and privacy to thrive, and conducting regu-
latory processes in full view of the public is
an effective antidote to such practices.
With regard to data openness, the con-
trast between California on the one hand,
and Turkey and Vietnam on the other is
strong. In California, law requires such
openness and the many players in basin
management demand it. Information is
readily available in paper form and on the
Internet. In the other two cases, information
is often regarded as a source of power and
is jealously guarded by the collecting unit.
There may be a reluctance to share even
within the same agency or ministry. Such
sequestering of information may be rational-
ized in terms of state security, but legitimate
justification for this is usually lacking, and
the real reasons generally relate to control,
power and perhaps to avoid conflict or
embarrassment.
Generating improved information on
basin water resources and making it
available to all interested parties can be
an early step in establishing basin planning
and management mechanisms, and can be
applied inbothdemocraticandtechnocratic
environments. Improved information gath-
ering and dissemination can help to ease
tensions between involved parties, even
wheredistrustisextreme.IntheKura–Araks
basin of the South Caucasus, for example,
where the three riparians of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia agree on little else,
they have recently been willing to collabo-
rate on data collection and sharing relating
to river hydrology.
In South Africa, the problem is
different. One of the lessons of the water law
consultations was the importance of trusted
information as a basis for consultation and
negotiation. Good information is crucial to
delineate areas of agreement and disagree-
mentandtostructureandinformdebate,but
of little use if the source is doubted. Equally,
goodinformationbecomesusefulinnegotia-
tion and decision making only when it is
accessible by all interested and affected par-
ties.SouthAfricaiswellequippedtousethe
most modern techniques for data gathering,
storage and knowledge creation, but faces a
major challenge in presenting information
in a meaningful way to the wide range of
interests in the sector. Those most in need
of water for basic and productive uses are
poorly equipped to access and interpret
information from the national data collec-
tion systems. Good information has the
power to defuse unnecessary tensions,
while misinformation and lack of informa-
tion foster conflict. In Mexico also, good
information is available, but other actors in
addition to CNA, which collects most of it,
need to learn to assess, analyse and employ
it. Ultimately, private stakeholders may
begin their own programmes to collect
and analyse key information as a check on
information from official public sources.
12.3.2.3 Legal authority
Mexico, South Africa and Vietnam all have
recent comprehensive water laws to serve
as a basis for water resource management.
The other three case study countries rely on
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ture the sector. There does not seem to be
any particular relationship between the
existence of a modern comprehensive water
law and successful basin management
practices. In California, for example, some
legislation governing the sector, such as
that governing water rights, is more than
100 years old, while laws dealing with
other aspects are quite recent. In addition,
court decisions in California may have the
effect of modifying law and creating new
principles. For example, the public trust
doctrine was added to the body of Califor-
nia law by a court decision in 1983. South
Africa achieved this same effect through
provisions in the new water law.
In Turkey, the 1954law establishing the
nationalwaterresourceagencyconsolidated
broad authority over water resources in that
agency, which has allowed it to respond to
many of the changing needs it has encoun-
tered over the past 50 years. For example, it
was able to use another existing law autho-
rizinglocalgovernmentstoformconsortiato
deal with issues cutting across their bound-
aries to establish effective Irrigation Unions
in the 1990s. However, the absence of a
legally sanctioned system of water rights,
poorly designed enforcement powers for
water quality standards, and reform of the
structure of the Irrigation Unions all require
new legislative action, and the absence
of such reform legislation hamstrings the
development of basin water management
mechanisms.
In Vietnam, the principles embodied in
the new water law still await implementing
rules and regulations to translate them into
actionable practices. Effective implementa-
tion also requires establishing administra-
tive systems for managing water permits,
collecting and consolidating data, and the
like. In a larger sense, too, to be fully imple-
mented, the tension between principles in
the new law and the prevailing administra-
tion culture will have to be resolved.
The important lesson in this is that
developing and promulgating a new and
comprehensive water law to subsume and
replace existing laws is not a necessary con-
dition for effective basin management. This
stepmaybeusefulwhenamajortransforma-
tion is contemplated, as it was in South
Africa and Mexico, but it does not appear
essential. What is important, however, is
that the legislative basis for water resource
managementbekeptcurrentthroughregular
legal amendments, updated administrative
rules and reinterpretations of current rules
and practices. Where this has not happened,
as in Turkey, emergence of new basin
management institutions will certainly be
constrained.
12.3.2.4 Resources
Resources needed to practise basin
management can be classified as human,
financial, institutional and infrastructural.
The human resources needed are those
individuals skilled in engineering, hydrol-
ogy, water chemistry, economics, mass
organization, management and other
disciplines needed to plan and manage
the use of basin water resources. In all of
the cases studied, professional skills in the
basic disciplines are probably available,
though particular skills, professional
management expertise for example, may be
in short supply in particular countries. In
addition, specialized training will often be
necessary to build on basic disciplinary
expertise. This will be particularly true in
countries just beginning to practise basin-
level water management. To a degree also,
the availability of these skills to the basin
organizations will depend on the financial
resources available to hire them, and to
compete with other potential employers in
cases where particular skills are scarce.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the
wealth of a society will help determine
the financial resources available for basin
management tasks. Most funding is usually
drawn from the public treasury, since tasks
such as data gathering and analysis, issu-
ance and recording of water and wastewater
permits, monitoring, and enforcement of
rules and standards are public sector tasks.
However, it is also important that some
resources be available from private user
groups as well to preserve their independ-
ence. In France and California, for example,
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sectors are drawn from the members of these
organizations. In Mexico and South Africa,
this is happening for some, but not all, user
sectors. Within the public sector as well,
it is important that resources be available
through the budgets of different sectoral
ministries and agencies, rather than being
routed through a single ministry budget, so
that potentially divergent interests such as
hydropower generation and flood control
or agriculture and environment can
be represented with some independence.
On the other hand, a potential problem is
scattering of financial and human resources
among too many organizations, where each
lacksacriticalmasstobeeffective,asmaybe
the case in Vietnam at present.
Institutional resourcesarethose needed
to translate policy and law into action.
They include public organizations tasked
with collecting and processing data and
monitoring and enforcing standards, user
organizations to represent sectoral interests,
and coordinative and adjudicatory bodies
to knit sectors together and reach decisions.
In a broader sense, institutional resources
extendtocoverbasicsocialinstitutionssuch
as rule of law, enforceability of contracts,
right to organize, and so on. These are less
amenable to change than more specific
institutions are, such as a system of water
rights, but are important determinants of
the type of basin management set-up chosen
and the expectations held for it. The stock of
institutional resources varies widely among
the case study countries.
Infrastructural resources are those that
facilitate control of the water resource. They
include plumbing such as dams, diversions,
canals and reservoirs, as well as measure-
ment and data management and processing
technology. One of the most important of
these characteristics is the amount of con-
trollable storage available in a basin, both
above and below ground. This characteristic
interacts with basin hydrology, since snow-
fed rivers such as those of the Central Valley
will need less storage, other things being
equal, than those fed by monsoonal rainfall
such as Dong Nai. Without storage, options
available to managers are much more
limited. The storage estimates shown in
Table 12.1 for the various basins show the
wide range of controllable water supply
available to managers in these basins and
suggest different strategies for dealing with
basin development and management.
In addition to the ability to store water,
infrastructural resources also allow transfer-
ring water from one basin to another in
response to politically expressed demands
andrelativewateravailability.Thiscapacity
is considerable in the Central Valley and
Neste, and is also present in Olifants and
Dong Nai. This capacity often, but not
always, comes in later stages of basin
development.
12.4 Conclusions
Conclusions from any set of case studies
always depend on the cases making up the
set, the information included in them and
the frame of reference employed in analys-
ing them. Recognizing these limitations, we
offer the following conclusions drawn from
our interpretation of this particular set of
cases and tempered by our experience in
other basins around the world:
• Constrained surface water availability,
coupled with an absence of readily
accessible groundwater to take up
slack, is the most powerful driver of
concerted water resource management
at the basin level. Other needs which
constitute potential drivers of basin
level management – overdrafted
groundwater, water pollution and envi-
ronmental degradation – are usually
less potent than constrained water
availability in fostering the necessary
institutions. In part, this is because
excess surface water can compen-
sate for water quality degradation by
diluting waste streams and substitute
for constrained groundwater, though
perhaps at higher cost.
• High-quality basin management ser-
vices are expensive, and wealthier soci-
eties are better able to bear these costs
than poorer ones. Moreover, wealthier
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of human and institutional resources
available internally that are needed in
basin planning and management than
do poorer ones. This does not prevent
the practice of basin management in
any society, but may influence the
form that management takes and the
objectives established for it.
• Basin management, as conceived here,
is better described as a political process
than a technical one. This observation
stems both from the concepts of ‘rules
in use’ and ‘water as a contested
resource’ developed in Chapter 1, and
from practices, organizational struc-
tures, and interactions described in the
six case studies. Going a step further,
basin management is, in essence, a
democratic process, rather than an
autocratic or administrative one.
Although technical processes of water
measurement, demand estimation,
modelling, water quality sampling, and
so on are involved, the core processes
of basin management involving making
fundamental decisions on water alloca-
tion and quality on the basis of particu-
lar economic interests, social values,
priorities and expectations – decision
making that is inherently political. In
this conception of basin management,
pride of place belongs to the gover-
nance of basin management processes,
in turn placing high value on access
to information, transparency, account-
ability, balanced representation, and
rule of law. Introducing basin manage-
ment processes into a social context
which also values these characteristics
of good governance is consequently
much easier than introducing them
into one which does not.
• Management institutions do not have
to be embodied in a unitary organiza-
tional structure to be effective. A more
dispersed set of organizations can also
manage a basin effectively if they are
knit together with suitable processes,
rules and other institutions, and if they
provide for revision and updating. That
said, when a country chooses to make a
radical change in its organizational
set-up for managing water resources,
a comprehensive reassessment and
restructuring may be an appropriate
way to understand and introduce the
interlinked set of changes that such a
major reorganization implies.
Finally, we offer for consideration a set of
four broad institutional changes that seem
to take place as a basin closes. The first of
these is expansion in the number of public
and private sector actors involved in basin
planning and management. This expansion
includes service providers for water uses
of growing importance, such as municipali-
ties, industries, environmental agencies;
citizens groups; and other regulatory bod-
ies. In addition to growing scarcity, this
expansion is occasioned by shifts in the
composition of demand for water, deterio-
rating water quality, growing public con-
cern over environmental quality, and
growth in public wealth and increased pro-
fessionalism in resource management as a
result of overall economic development.
A second change is that organizations
associated with basin planning and manage-
ment becomemorespecialized and differen-
tiated. One important shift that typically
takes place is the separation of basin
functions into three broad categories:
• Regulation and standard setting;
• Resource management;
• Service provision.
Regulation and standard setting are carried
out in the public interest and are necessar-
ily functions of government. Resource
management tasks include allocating and
protecting water resources, and must be
done even-handedly and responsively to
both clients and regulators. Resource
management is generally done by public
agencies, or by hybrid public/private
organizations. Water-related services such
as irrigation and drainage or municipal
water supply are generally provided by
a special-purpose organization operating
under private-sector-like incentives to
provide services to clients effectively and
efficiently. Experienced observers argue
228 M. Svendsen and P. Wester
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tion is a necessary precondition of a
functional and efficient basin manage-
ment structure as closure is approached
(Millington, 2000; van Hofwegen, 2001).
The third shift is greater involvement
of civil society in basin planning and man-
agement. With rising standards of living,
urbanization, and in the face of progressive
environmental deterioration, elements of
civil society increasingly mobilizeto protect
the environment and reverse cumulative
adverse effects of resource exploitation and
industrialization on it. By organizing into
associations, societiesandothergroups,this
perspective gains entry into water resource
decision-making processes.
The fourth shift is toward a broader
range of disciplines playing roles in basin
planning and management. A typical
progression begins with engineers and
hydrologists and then expands to include
economists, agronomists, management spe-
cialists, ecologists,publichealth specialists,
water chemists and others. This places
a growing premium on communication
and sharing of information, both among
specialistsandwithcivilsocietyasawhole.
Thesechangesseemtooccurinavariety
of contexts as water resource exploitation
progresses, but they are in no way ordained
by basin closure. Basin closure is just one of
asetofchangesthatproceedsimultaneously
as societies grow and develop. These
changes are interlinked, but not rigidly so.
Corollary changes in a society include
expanding exploitation of all available
resources (including water); rising agri-
cultural productivity; expanding industrial
and service sectors; a growing population;
urbanization, rising per capita incomes;
rising educational levels; burgeoning waste
discharges to land, air and water; and
numerous others. Growing scarcity of water
creates pressures and incentives for institu-
tional change, but the actual manner and
pace at which these institutional changes
take place are particular to the prevailing
social, political and cultural environment.
Moreover, in the absence of leadership and
direction, countries may ‘sleepwalk’ into
potential disaster as basin closure progres-
ses, but without appropriate institutional
responses. Moreover, the pace of institu-
tional change will accelerate as closure
approaches, i.e. morerapid change will tend
to occur between stages 2 and 3, utilization
and reallocation, than between stages 1 and
2, development and utilization.
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Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees13 Providing Irrigation Services in
Water-scarce Basins: Representation
and Support
Philippus Wester, Tushaar Shah and Douglas J. Merrey
13.1 Introduction
As water becomes scarcer, competition
intensifies and its value rises; irrigated
agriculture must change profoundly to use
water more productively. Compounding
this challenge is the widespread poverty in
river basins in developing countries and the
pressure this creates to reallocate water to
the poor for productive uses. This chapter
draws from the river basin studies in this
book, along with supplementary materials,
to outline the challenges facing irrigation
service provision in closing river basins
in developing countries and the implica-
tions this has for institutional support
systems. It also addresses the adequate
representation of the large numbers of
small-scale water users characteristic of
developing country river basins, along
with other interests, in basin-level decision-
making institutions.
In semiarid regions, irrigation is gener-
ally the largest water user in the basin. In the
past 50 years, vast sums of money have been
invested, by both governments and farmers,
to construct new irrigation systems or reha-
bilitate deteriorating ones. The irrigated
area nearly doubled from 140 million ha in
1960 to 275 million ha in 2000. In many
countries, this occurred under the banner of
integrated river basin development, aptly
summarized as ‘the orderly marshalling of
waterresourcesofriverbasins...topromote
human welfare’ (UN, 1970, p. 1, quoted in
Barrows 1998, p. 172). In the past 15 years,
governments have shifted away from irriga-
tion infrastructure development for poverty
reduction to improving irrigation manage-
ment, frequently through institutional
reforms such as irrigation management
transfer (IMT). An overriding concern in
irrigation reforms has been to reduce
government subsidies to the operation and
maintenance of irrigation systems, while
the focus on poverty reduction through the
development of large-scale irrigation has
waned. Only recently has a paradigm shift
started to occur in water management, based
on the recognition that providing access to
water for drinking and growing food, eradi-
cating poverty, and stopping groundwater
overexploitation are central challenges in
river basins in developing countries that
require new ways of thinking.
In the developing world, institutional
arrangementsforbasinmanagementareonly
starting to take shape and are still rather
weak at a time when the management of
river basins is becoming more difficult and
challenging (Vermillion and Merrey, 1998).
In part, this is due to the widespread trend
to decentralize the management of water
services, such as with IMT or to privatize
urban water supply, but also because
local institutions – such as water users
©CAB International 2005. Irrigation and River Basin Management
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dependent on agencies for resources as well
as technical support. While having mixed
outcomesintermsofaccountabilityandcost
effectiveness at local levels, decentraliza-
tion leads to a multiplicity of organizations,
often with competing interests, and makes
water management in river basins reaching
closure more challenging. Although a large
body of literature has developed on river
basin management, relativelylittle attention
has been given to the needs of locally man-
aged irrigation and how to address water
deprivation in closing river basins in devel-
oping countries. The closure of river basins
(see Chapter 2) in semiarid regions poses
significant challenges for pro-poor water
policies. The following issues stand out:
• The over-exploitation of primary water
sources (waters tapped from rivers,
lakes and aquifers, i.e. ‘blue water’)
leads to environmental degradation
through the destruction of aquatic
ecosystems, depletion of aquifers and
generation of polluted wastewater
flows (both industrial/urban effluents
and agricultural drainage effluents). In
closed river basins, the only way to
reverse these trends is to consume less
primary water and to make judicious
use of derivative water (municipal
wastewater, industrial discharges and
agricultural return flows).
• Alleviating poverty through the creation
of new hydraulic property (Coward,
1986) becomes very difficult as primary
water sources are already fully commit-
ted, and frequently under the control
of the relatively better off. Creating
new entitlements for the poor must
therefore be sought in renegotiating
rights to primary water. Equally
important is the need to increase the
productivity of ‘green water’ (water
stored in the soil profile) through
rainwater harvesting and anti-erosion
measures.
• The lack of possibilities to develop new
water supplies and perceptions that
agriculture is a ‘low-value’ use of water
leads to increasing inter-sectoral water
transfers. These are frequently one-way
transfers from agriculture to industry
and domestic use, as well as intra-
sectoral transfers in agriculture to
higher-value crops, usually grown by
commercial farmers.
• Without clear water rights and effective
enforcement, it is relatively easy for
poor people, such as smallholder irri-
gation farmers, to lose access to water
for production due to these transfers.
Consequently, poor farmers increas-
ingly have to turn to derivative water as
their only source of water.
• Before IMT, most irrigation schemes
were under government management
and to a degree, protection. After IMT,
this protection may disappear, and the
local irrigation management entity may
find itself under-represented at higher
levels (Svendsen et al., 2000).
To address these issues, concerted change
at different levels, building on the
strengths of government, civil society
groups, popular movements and communi-
ties, is necessary. Such change needs to
focus on the creation of interlocking institu-
tional arrangements at the local, meso and
macro level to manage water in a socially
just and equitable manner that meets the
needs of the poor and ensures the sustain-
ability of locally managed irrigation. Of
special concern is the need to represent and
protect the interests of water users that are
at risk, such as the large number of small-
scale water users that fall outside the ambit
of formal water management. Furthermore,
the ability of groundwater irrigators to make
mincemeat of any effort towards orderly
resource management at the basin level
needs to be taken into account. Previous
chapters of this book have analysed the
institutional challenges that arise when the
utilization of water nears or exceeds the
annual renewable water in a river basin
and how various countries are dealing with
these challenges. In this final chapter, we
endeavour to draw lessons from these expe-
riences as they relate to irrigation service
provision and poverty alleviation. One
fundamental premise of the chapter should
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countries, it is desirable to find ways to
preserve and improve irrigated agriculture,
as this is a major source of livelihoods
and food security for which there are few
substitutes.
13.2 Challenges Facing Locally Managed
Irrigation in Closing River Basins
Between the 1950s and 1980s, vast invest-
ments were made in poor countries to
increase the area served by large-scale
irrigation systems dependent on surface
water. A central purpose of this effort was
to reduce poverty and to attain national
food self-sufficiency. However, starting in
the 1980s, serious concerns were raised that
public investments in large surface irriga-
tion were not sufficiently benefiting poor
farmers and that the government agencies
charged with irrigation management were
performing poorly, especially in recovering
costs from farmers. To reduce the burden on
the public purse, and under the influence
of the structural adjustment programmes of
the 1980s, the role of government in
irrigation management in many developing
countries started to change, with an empha-
sis placed on transferring management
responsibilities and financial obligations to
farmers. Much of this reform is captured in
the phrase ‘irrigation management transfer’,
though the actual reforms are broader than
‘simply’ transferring water management
responsibility from government to water
users. The widespread trend to devolve irri-
gation management to farmer organizations,
coupled with the rapid increase in ground-
water irrigation and water harvesting and
local storage means that currently a large
majority of the world’s irrigation is locally
managed. A distinguishing characteristic of
large portions of locally managed irrigation
is that it has thin or no contact with formal
resource governance structures. Examples
include the 20 million people pumping
groundwater in South Asia and the commu-
nities that depend on South India’s 300,000
tanks or China’s 7 million ponds.
The chapters in this book have
shown that there are clear stages to river
basin development related to the changing
pattern of demand for water over time.
A fundamental point for understanding the
challenges facing locally managed irrigation
in water-scarce basins is that irrigation
reforms such as IMT were not enacted to
deal with river basin closure but rather
to reduce government expenditure. Thus,
management transfer in many countries is
occurring at a time when water resources
in river basins are becoming increasingly
scarce and the subject of inter-sectoral com-
petition. This places an extra burden on
farmers, who, while having had little time
to develop their associations, immediately
needtostartfocusing ontheriverbasinlevel
to secure and retain an adequate share of
water. As many governments have been
transferring irrigation management to user
organizations rather hastily, the world’s
irrigation is increasingly likely to be
managed by ill-formed and ill-prepared
user organizations. Where systematic efforts
are not made to support newly established
WUAs and secure their access to water, the
sustainability ofsmallholder irrigationitself
may come into question (cf. Shah et al.,
2002). At the same time, burgeoning infor-
mal irrigation economies, unrestrained by
nationalpoliciesandgovernmentregulatory
structures, defy initiatives for more orderly
basin-level water allocation and manage-
ment, and are instead driven by their own
rules and internal logic.
The challenges facing locally managed
irrigation in water-scarce basins are thus
twofold: internal and external. This chapter
mainlydealswiththeexternalchallenges,as
previous studies have adequately identified
the internal support needs of locally
managed irrigation(Yoder, 1994;IIMI, 1997,
1998;FrederiksenandVissia,1998;Huppert
and Urban, 1998; Svendsen et al., 2000;
Huppert et al., 2001). Local irrigation
management entities need to focus inter-
nally on improving irrigation water manage-
ment, while at the same time negotiating
externally with policy makers, river basin
authorities and other water users to protect
their water allocation at the basin level.
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gain or maintain access to water supplies
that other sectors may try to capture. As
the entities managing local irrigation are
spatially dispersed and mainly focused on
their own irrigation system, they need to
confederate to lobby and compete at the
basin level. Compounding this challenge
is the declining share of the agricultural
sector in many countries, and the
perception that other uses of water are
higher value, while the persistent
dependence of a large share of the popula-
tion, especially of the poor, on farming for
livelihoods continues. There is growing
pressure on local irrigation management
entities and farmers to increase water
productivity and to make the case that they
are not wasting water.
The above challenges apply to both
surfacewaterandgroundwatermanagement
organizations, and locally managed irriga-
tion in upper catchments as well as newly
formed water users’ organizations in large-
scale irrigation systems under IMT pro-
grammes. Although this is necessarily a
broad-brush approach, and the specific
challenges to the myriad irrigation organiza-
tions that exist depends on many more
factors than river basin closure, several
common threads emerge from the analysis
of the basins studied in this book.
13.3 Irrigation Service Provision in
Water-scarce Basins
The challenges facing locally managed
irrigation in water-scarce basins outlined
above directly affect the institutional
requirements for irrigation service provi-
sion. A service provision perspective on
irrigation management entails focusing on
the different service roles or functions
performed by the multiple actors involved
in water management in a river basin and
the mechanisms that govern the exchange
of services between them. Huppert et al.
(2001, p. 41) distinguish between primary
services (the provision of irrigation infra-
structure and water delivery), secondary
services (maintenance and operation of
infrastructure) and supporting services. Of
importance in irrigation service provision is
the large number of actors involved, as the
provision of primary services (such as water
delivery to a farmer) is the result of a net-
work of (supporting) service providers and
receivers. Thus, when analysing service
networks, it is necessary to look at the
service relationships between actors by
identifying the laws, procedures, contracts
and/or common practices that are the basis
for the relationship, i.e. the governance
mechanisms between service providers and
receivers. Analysing service arrangements,
whether highly formalized in contracts or
based on customary understandings, entails
studying the following:
• Which services are being provided, by
whom and to whom;
• What is being exchanged in return for
each service;
• Which governance mechanisms struc-
ture the service delivery and whether
this results in the provision of services
in a way that suits those concerned.
Our concern here is not with the service
arrangements between farmers in the case
of self-provision of services, which is
the most common form in much of the
developing world, or with the arrangements
between farmers, local irrigation manage-
ment entities and others governing the
provision of primary and secondary
irrigation services. While important for
a clear understanding of the internal
workings of locally managed irrigation
and identifying areas for improvement (see
Huppert et al., 2001, for different strategies
to strengthen locally managed irrigation),
we focus here on the external threats to the
sustainability of locally managed irrigation.
Several essential support needs for locally
managed irrigation in water-scarce basins
stand out, namely water rights systems
and water allocation mechanisms, compen-
sation mechanisms for water transfers,
and increasing water productivity. These
three support needs are briefly outlined
below.
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allocation mechanisms
The basins studied in this book demon-
strate the increasing pressure being placed
on irrigated agriculture to relinquish water,
primarily for environmental and urban/
industrial uses. It follows that in water-
scarce basins with increasing competition
for water, the need for effective mechanisms
for allocating water becomes critical. In the
absence of such mechanisms higher-value
uses will tend to out-compete lower-value
uses (with value being defined politically as
well as economically), depriving them of
water and leading to unregulated transfers
of water out of agriculture. A crucial sup-
port need of locally managed irrigation is
basin-level water allocation mechanisms for
both primary and derivative water, which
are based on defined water rights that pro-
vide security of tenure. The call for clear,
secure and transferable water rights has
often been made, but how to create property
rights to water that are just, equitable and
feasible (both technically and politically)
and how to make them stick is neither clear
nor straightforward. Nonetheless, several
principles can be defined.
Water rights form part of property
regimes, which define ownership and
consist of principles and rules to resolve
disputesoverproperty.Theymaybedefined
as ‘authorized demands to use (part of) a
flow of water, including certain privileges,
restrictions, obligations and sanctions’
(Beccar et al., 2002, p. 3). Ideally, water
rights delimit the amount of water a right-
holder is entitled to, defined either volumet-
rically or in terms of shares of available
supply, as well as the duties of right-holders
relative to one another and to society at
large, such as quality and quantity of return
flows. Water rights form the foundation
of water allocation mechanisms. An ideal
water allocation system is characterized
by flexibility in the allocation of water
supplies, security of tenure for established
water users, predictability of the outcome of
the allocation process, equitability and fair-
ness.Mechanismstoallocatewatermaytake
a variety of institutional forms, and include
marginal cost pricing, public (administra-
tive) allocation, water markets and user-
based allocation (Dinar et al., 1997). The
prevailing system of water rights signifi-
cantly influences the specific allocation
mechanisms available and the effectiveness
of their application. However, without
infrastructure in place to withdraw and
distribute water, water rights remain an
empty shell. Conversely the creation of
hydraulic property can lead to the de facto
creation of water rights (cf. Coward, 1986;
Chapter 11).
Due to the type of infrastructure
involved and the feasibility of transparent
and reliable measurements, surface water
may be subject to more effective allocation
than groundwater. Almost everywhere
in the developing world, groundwater is
treated as an apertinent right to privately
owned land, and where groundwater rights
significantly different from these have been
tried – as in Mexico – they have defied
enforcement. For surface water, three broad
waterrightssystemshavedevelopedhistori-
cally in different parts of the world based
on either the riparian or the appropriation
doctrines(SimpsonandRingskog,1997).All
threeare‘administered’systemsinthesense
that an authority (government or commu-
nity) plays an important role in defining,
allocating and enforcing rights. Other prop-
erty regimes for water are also conceivable,
such as a market-based system in which
water rights are awarded to the highest
bidder, but are much less common in
practice.
Under the riparian doctrine, a user has
the right to extract water from a river system
foruseonlandadjacenttotheriveraslongas
the water is returned to the river undimin-
ished in quantity or quality and in a manner
that does not impair downstream use. From
this stringent definition, it is clear that in
practice the pure riparian doctrine does not
exist, and that it is also not very suited to
conditions of water scarcity. Nonetheless,
this doctrine is used in various forms
throughout the world, especially in coun-
tries with humid climates, and generally
Irrigation Services in Water-scarce Basins 235
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regulatory administration.
Under the appropriation doctrine,
water is regarded as a good belonging to all
and held in trust by the State or a communal
authority. Water use concessions or licences
areissuedtousersbythestateorthecommu-
nal authority, which ensures their right to
divert or store and use a certain quantity of
water. Many variations on the appropriation
doctrine exist, the most common two being
prior appropriation and proportional appro-
priation. The most significant difference
between these two is how they treat water
shortages. Under prior appropriation, the
first rights issued on a river have priority or
seniority implying that rights issued later
are the first to be curtailed in times of short-
age(lastin,firstout).Undertheproportional
appropriation system, concessions (usually
time bound) are issued to either individual
users or organizations for the use of a maxi-
mum quantity of water, although the actual
quantity of water that may be used in any
year is adjusted to reflect water availability
within the river basin. Thus, all concession
holders share in any shortages or surpluses
of water proportionally. For this to work
well, an administrative water allocation
mechanism needs to be in place that can
determine annual water availability in a
timely and transparent manner. Surface
water rights in the basins studied in this
book are based on some variation of the
proportional appropriation doctrine, with
the exception of California, which has a mix
of riparian rights and prior appropriation.
The closure of river basins calls for a
reassessment of the usefulness of the appro-
priation doctrine, be it prior or proportional.
The prior appropriation system, while
providing security of tenure, is problematic
in water-scarce basins as it does not provide
for sharing shortages among right-holders,
nor does it allow for new entrants (Huffaker
et al., 2000). Furthermore, due to the senior-
ity principle, the actual transfer of water
rights is problematic, as all appropriators
more senior than the buyer will need to
approve the sale, while selling water may
alsobeinterpretedasproofofnon-beneficial
use, constituting grounds for revocation
of the water right (cf. Rosegrant and Bins-
wanger, 1994; Bolding et al., 1999; Haddad,
2000). The flexibility of the proportional
appropriation system would appear to per-
mit the application of various allocation
mechanisms, including market-based ones.
However, regulating large numbers of small
users is exceptionally difficult and places
strong demands on enforcement.
In the basins studied in this book – and
others in the developing world – existing
water rights systems and allocation mecha-
nismsarenotwelltailoredtodealwithbasin
closure. This is clearly the case in Turkey
and Mexico, whose water rights systems are
generally unable to prevent or to resolve
conflicts between new and existing claims,
or prevent the over-allocation of water. This
is even more so in stressed basins in poorer
countries in South Asia and Africa. In addi-
tion, most water rights systems primarily
deal with surface water, with much less
attention given to groundwater or derivative
water. Thus, in the case of California,
groundwater is only lightly regulated and
the permissive specification of rights to
groundwater has led to increasing problems
with aquifer overdraft. In the Gediz basin,
shallow groundwater is an open-access
resource, meaning that anyone with the
infrastructure to tap that water can do so.
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, groundwater
is in effect also an open-access resource,
although formally groundwater users are
required to obtain a pumping permit from
federal authorities indicating a maximum
extraction rate. This is by far the best that
any middle- or low-income country with a
substantial irrigated agriculture sector has
done to bring a modicum of order in private
appropriation of groundwater for irrigation.
The reform has helped register all ground-
water users; but restricting their with-
drawals to their permitted quotas has
proven to be nearly impossible.
In closing river basins with significant
groundwater extractions, surface irrigation
systems, both large and small, play an
increasinglyimportant–oftenthesole–role
ascheapandeffectivegroundwaterrecharge
systems. In effect, groundwater users pump
water previously paid for by farmers
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pensating these surface irrigators. As long as
this is conjunctive use by the same farmer
this is not a problem, but in areas where
groundwater levels have fallen sharply and
only the better off can afford to continue
pumping groundwater, this does become an
issue for poorer farmers only using surface
water. Both in Gediz and Lerma–Chapala,
therearestronghydrologiclinkagesbetween
surface water flows, surface irrigation and
groundwater recharge. For Lerma–Chapala,
Scott and Garcés-Restrepo (2001) found that
approximately 50% of canal water applied
to crops recharges the underlying aquifers
and subsequently becomes available for
pumping. Because of this recycling, half of
each unit of canal water provides subse-
quent additional benefit as groundwater. By
way of example, assuming marginal values
of Mex$1.80/m3 for canal water and
Mex$2.40/m3 for groundwater, with 50%
recharge the aggregate value of surface water
is Mex$3.00/m3. However, groundwater
users do not pay canal water users for the
recharge function they perform, while canal
water users do have to pay for the full
volume of water they receive, including
the 50% that goes to deep percolation.
The situation surrounding derivative
waters (agricultural return flows and
municipal/industrial wastewater) is even
less regulated. In all the basins studied,
quality standards exist for return flows and
wastewater, but access to this water for
productive purposes would appear to be a
free-for-all, with the exception of California.
In the delta of the Gediz basin and in the
Lerma–Chapala basin, derivative water is
becoming a critical source of water for farm-
ers. Although no allocation mechanisms
existforderivativewater,inMexico,farmers
do need to go through a fair amount of
trouble to establish a tenuous claim on
wastewater by reaching local agreements
with municipalities or WUAs (Buechler and
Scott, 2000). These claims are being threat-
ened by the construction of wastewater
treatment plants and the de facto realloca-
tion of treated water to other uses, such as
golf courses. In closing river basins, where
the better off have already captured primary
water sources and renegotiating water rights
is extremely complicated, derivative water
rapidly becomes the poor farmer’s last resort
and should be recognized as such.
Without secure water rights and clearly
defined water allocation mechanisms, indi-
vidual farmers and locally managed irriga-
tion systems in water-scarce basins face an
uncertain future. The hydrological inter-
actions between surface water, groundwater
and derivative water make it necessary to
arrive at a coherent and feasible system of
water rights and water allocation mecha-
nisms in water-scarce basins. Several issues
that such a coherent system of water rights
would need to deal with stand out, namely
surface–groundwater interactions, return
flows, water quantity and quality inter-
actions, provisions for basic human needs
and environmental flows, and lastly provi-
sions for new entrants. The new water rights
system and water allocation mechanisms in
South Africa appear to meet all these needs,
and could serve as an example for the
other countries studied in this book if
they can be implemented successfully. The
establishment, modification or clarification
of water rights systems requires action at
the national level (legislative and executive
branches of government), but ideally should
consist of a process in which all interests
have adequate representation. The support
services required bylocal irrigationmanage-
ment entities in this regard are legal advice
and representation as well as lobbying
capabilities at the basin and national level.
13.3.2 Water transfers and compensation
mechanisms
A second critical support need of locally
managed irrigation in water-scarce basins is
compensation mechanisms for water trans-
ferred out of agriculture. This is closely
tied to water rights and water allocation
mechanisms, but is sufficiently important
to warrant separate consideration. In recent
years, there has been an increase in interest
in the feasibility of establishing water
markets (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994;
Irrigation Services in Water-scarce Basins 237
249 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:36:26 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesLee and Jouravlev, 1998; Haddad, 2000). In
principle, water markets enable allocation
of water to high-value uses and fair
compensation of those who sell their water.
Especially in the case of inter-sectoral water
markets, e.g. between the urban and agri-
cultural sectors, several advantages are
apparent, including more efficient use of
water in agriculture and compensation
to farmers for the transfer of water out
of agriculture. Rosegrant and Binswanger
(1994) outline the following benefits of
well-designed water markets:
• Empowerment of water users by requir-
ing their consent to water reallocation
and compensation;
• Incentive for users to invest in water-
saving technology, if well-defined
rights are established;
• Incentive for efficient use and income
through sale by considering full oppor-
tunity costs of water;
• Greater flexibility in responding to
changes in the production environment
(crop prices, demand patterns and
comparative advantage).
While the economic virtues of efficiency
and productivity are invoked as beneficial
outcomes of water markets, the very real
obstacles to establishing inter-sectoral
water markets are often overlooked
(Haddad, 2000; Young, 1986). Chief among
these are issues of access to water and the
lack of infrastructure to enable physical
exchange and effective measurement of
water (Dinar et al., 1997; Perry et al., 1997;
Simpson and Ringskog, 1997). Market
transactions assume that effective means
exist for the exchange of commodities.
Groundwater may be transferred from
existing low-value uses to competing
high-value uses only within an aquifer, not
within a larger river basin unless consider-
able investment is made in infrastructure
for water conveyance. The same is true for
surface water, although the presence of
rivers makes transfers from upstream to
downstream uses feasible. Transferring
water in the opposite direction requires
substantial investments in infrastructure
and control mechanisms.
Much of the claims for the ‘success’ of
surface water markets, especially outside
of the USA, rest more on political and ideo-
logical beliefs than on rigorous empirical
studies (Kloezen, 1999). In the case of Chile,
Bauer (1997) convincingly demonstrates
that water markets are much thinner on the
ground and hence less effective in water
allocation than often assumed in policy
papers. For groundwater, the situation is
different, with active markets reported on in
South Asia (cf. Shah, 1993; van Koppen,
1998).Whilegroundwatermarketshavealso
had positive impacts on the poor (Shah,
1993), there is widespread concern that
surface water markets will result in the
concentration of water rights in the hands
of the few, at the expense of small farmers
(Bauer, 1997; Zwarteveen, 1997). The chal-
lenge this poses is to design regulated water
markets that are pro-poor, recognize the
social and environmental values of water,
and facilitate the resolution of inter-sectoral
conflicts through compensation.
If appropriately designed, water markets
may provide a good mechanism to compen-
sate farmers for water transferred out of
agriculture. Pre-conditions for the effective
operation of water markets include defined
water rights, demand in excess of supply,
legal frameworks that indicate how trades
should take place, physical infrastructure
for conveyance and measurement of water,
and provisions for the protection of third-
party interests (Perry et al., 1997; Simpson
and Ringskog, 1997; Lee and Jouravlev,
1998). In combination with the proportional
appropriation of water rights and adminis-
trativeallocation,sociallyjustwatermarkets
areconceivable.Suchasystemcouldconsist
of three tiers, namely a reserve for basic
human needs and the environment, a
reserveforproductivewaterforthepoorand
athirdtierconsistingofwaterforproductive
use and additional water for urban use and
the environment. Only the third tier would
enter the water market, after proportional
administrative allocation on an annual basis
has determined the water available for pro-
ductive use. Special provisions would need
to be made to enable the poor to lease their
productive water if they so decide, while
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250 A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:36:26 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degreesprotecting their ownership of the water right.
This system demands a strong regulatory
and administrative framework, but is theo-
retically conceivable in Turkey, Mexico and
South Africa, although water laws in all
three countries are notably vague on the
possibility of such market-based transfers.
Water rights transfers in the third tier
can take a variety of forms, depending on
factors such as the structure of the market,
legal and third-party considerations, the
characteristics of the water rights, trans-
action costs and above all, the needs of the
parties to the transaction. Three types of
transactions can be identified, namely sales,
lease contracts and option contracts (Lee
and Jouravlev, 1998). Sales consist of the
permanent transfer of title, including all
benefits, costs, risks and obligations associ-
ated with the water right. Sales are most
typical of inter-sectoral transfers, with irri-
gated agriculture being the dominant water
seller and urban users the principal buyers.
The leasing of water rights involves the sale
of water, but not of the water right. Leases
tend to be short term, consisting of the
temporary exchange of a quantity of water
for monetary or other remuneration, and are
frequently used for water transfers within
irrigation systems.
Option contracts are long-term agree-
ments to lease, but not to sell, a water right
when a given contingency arises, e.g. a
drought. Under option contracts, the receiv-
ing party holds an option to buy water at a
specified price under specified conditions
from the seller, who guarantees future deliv-
ery if the conditions apply. In exchange
for this guarantee, the holder of the option
also pays a premium to the granting party,
usually at the onset of the option contract.
Option contracts are most commonly used
to transfer water from irrigated agriculture
to non-agricultural uses such as the
environment during periods of low stream
flow (Landry, 1998). This means that water
users can continue to use their water during
yearsofnormalwateravailability,andhence
option contracts are a more attractive alter-
native than the outright sale of water rights
or long-term leases. Although option con-
tracts are quite complex and require clearly
established water rights, initial experiences
with them in Chile (Thobani, 1997) and
Colorado(Michelsen andYoung,1993)have
been quite positive. In our assessment, an
optioncontractarrangementmaybesuitable
to compensate farmers for agriculture-
to-urban and agriculture-to-environment
water transfers. Crucial to the design of
appropriate option contracts are:
• Definition of the contingency condi-
tions under which water will be
transferred;
• Duration of the contract and/or
conditions for its renegotiation prior
to expiration;
• Volumes to be ceded (by whom in the
case of multiple parties or states);
• Specification of compensation (both
monetary amount and process) for lost
income resulting from the water
transfer;
• Mechanisms to redress grievances on
the part of ceding, receiving or third
parties.
13.3.3 Increasing water productivity
The third critical support need for locally
managed irrigation is assistance in increas-
ing the productivity of water. While the
view that irrigation uses water inefficiently
may often be erroneous, to be credible part-
ners in basin management local irrigation
management organizations and farmers will
need to show that they are using water
productively. This can be measured in
terms of the biomass or income produced
per cubic metre of evapotranspiration.1
Both elements of water productivity are
important but place different demands on
the support needs for locally managed irri-
gation. Higher biomass production can be
Irrigation Services in Water-scarce Basins 239
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delivery practices, crop varietal improve-
ment and improved cultural practices (such
as mulching, crop planting dates, etc). The
breeding of new crop varieties, the intro-
duction of improved cultural practices and
similar actions require agricultural support
services, whereas improving water delivery
is the primary responsibility of the locally
managed irrigation entity. However, exter-
nal support remains important to improve
irrigation infrastructure and management
to enhance reliable water delivery and to
realize real water savings.
Improving the productivity of water in
economic terms is crucial for sustainable
locally managed irrigation. Perhaps one of
the biggest threats to locally managed irriga-
tion is the low profitability of agriculture
and the high costs of agricultural produc-
tion. Solving problems related to the levels
and collection of irrigation service fees as
wellasthequalityofirrigationservicedeliv-
ery is an internal responsibility of locally
managed irrigation entities, but the willing-
ness and ability of farmers to pay fees is
clearlyrelatedtocropmarketpricesandeco-
nomic returns to agricultural production.
Where appropriate, shifting to less-water-
consuming crops that provide a higher eco-
nomic return needs to be supported. The
efforts to do so in the Lerma–Chapala Basin,
with farmers and government agencies
working together to shift from low-value
grain crops to crops that use less water and
sell atahigher price, show howcomplicated
it is to achieve this for substantial areas.
Although increasing the profitability of
agriculture touches on much wider issues
than support needs for locally managed
irrigation, such as trade regimes and agri-
cultural subsidies in affluent countries,
it lies at the heart of sustainable locally
managed irrigation.
13.4 Poverty and Representation in River
Basin Management
The case studies in this book show that
ensuring the sustainability of locally
managed irrigation and meeting the water
needs of the poor in closing river basins is
a serious challenge to current institutional
arrangements. Although a service provision
perspective on water management high-
lights where changes are necessary in the
wider institutional environment to more
effectively support locally managed irriga-
tion, it is relatively silent on two critical
issues in closing river basins in low- and
middle-income countries, namely poverty
reduction and stakeholder representation.
Cross-cutting these two issues is the question
of how access to water and water manage-
ment decision making is gendered. A sus-
tainable livelihoods perspective, with its
emphasis on rights and entitlements and the
institutional arrangements through which
these are provided and reproduced, holds
more promise for defining pro-poor water
policies in water-scarce basins (cf. van
Koppen, 2000).
13.4.1 Productive water and pro-poor
water policy
Although river basin closure poses signifi-
cant challenges to the sustainability of
locally managed irrigation, generally this
affects people who already have access to
water for productive purposes. A character-
istic of many stressed river basins in devel-
oping countries is the large number of poor
people who do not have access to water for
productive purposes. The degree of water
deprivation in many river basins around the
world is well documented, with more than
1 billion people lacking access to water of
sufficient quality and quantity to meet
minimum standards of living, let alone for
productive purposes. The processes that
come into play as river basins mature can
have serious consequences for perpetuating
poverty.
In analogy to low prices for basic grains,
which hurt poor farmers but benefit the
poor urban population, the reallocation
of water from agriculture to urban supplies
may benefit the urban poor. Whether this is
the case depends on how the institutional
240 P. Wester et al.
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infrastructure development are targeted at
the poor. As many maturing river basins
exhibit a rapid pace of urbanization caused
byruralpoormovingtothecities,onbalance
the transfer of water out of agriculture
could benefit more poor people than are
hurt. Likewise, as agriculture matures
and consolidates, taking water out of
agriculture may be hurting the better off
rather than the poorest. If farmers invest to
improve the productivity – and profitability
– of water there may not be any major dam-
age to their livelihoods. Understanding how
these scenarios work out requires empirical
research.
However, other processes act in the
oppositedirection.Theserelatetothedevel-
opment of the physical means to abstract
and convey water and the distribution of
land and water rights. If water infrastructure
development and the allocation of land
and water rights is not specifically targeted
at poor women and men, the danger of
resource capture by the better off is ever
present. While freshwater supplies are
clearly limited, for most people water
scarcity is caused by political, technological
and economic barriers that limit their access
to water and by competition between water
use(r)s (Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1998).
Water scarcity is not only a naturally occur-
ring phenomena, but has also been created
through the development of water resources
inthepast,theselectiveentitlementofwater
rightsandincidentalandstructuralresource
capture by the better off (cf. Homer-Dixon,
1999; GWP, 2000). These processes make
it very difficult to increase and protect
the water security of the poor, especially in
closing river basins where the consumption
of water by one literally deprives another of
that water.
While the processes that come into
play as river basins close have multiple
and uncertain consequences for perpetuat-
ing poverty, it is increasingly recognized
that access to water for productive uses
is very important for the poor to build
sustainable livelihoods (van Koppen, 2000;
Schreiner and van Koppen, 2001). We main-
tain that pro-poor water allocation policies
can transform irrigation into a powerful
instrument for creating sustainable liveli-
hoods (cf. Hussain and Hanjra, 2004; Shah,
2000). The challenge this poses in water-
scarce basins is balancing the allocation
of productive water for poverty reduction
with allocations designed to meet the needs
of proven productive capacity (i.e. industry,
commercial agriculture, mining) and the
environment (cf. Perret, 2002). This may
make it necessary to redistribute water
rights in favour of the poor, but also
calls for a judicious use of water and
innovations in land and water management
technologies.
To craft pro-poor water policies, an
understanding of the processes that create
poverty is needed. While individuals expe-
riencepovertyand canworktheirwayoutof
poverty, there is also truth in the statement
that societies produce poverty through pro-
cesses of exclusion. Culturally embedded
notions of entitlements, ownership, access,
control and participation underlie the
concept of exclusion (Bhalla and Lapeyre,
1997, p. 417). The deprivation commonly
associated with exclusion is not only related
to a lack of economic resources but also
a lack of recognition and entitlements. As
pointed out by Sen, ‘economic resources
enable access not only to economic goods
and services but also to political goods
like freedom and the ability to influence
policies’ (1975; cited in Bhalla and Lapeyre,
1997, p. 418).
In this sense, access to water can be
viewed as a potential vehicle to achieve eco-
nomic and political rights. These are prereq-
uisites for full citizenship, which in turn
open opportunities for political partici-
pation. This interpretation brings out the
state’s role in exclusion. Through their
structures, procedures and legal frame-
works, governments can exclude some
groups from fully attaining their economic
rights, while including others. A case in
point is the systematic exclusion of women
in government irrigation programmes
throughout the world, convincingly docu-
mented in numerous case studies (for a
discussion of the literature, see Zwarteveen,
1994, and van Koppen, 1998).
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the poor have very little influence on the
ways in which governments and economies
allocate rights and resources in society. In
closing river basins, pro-poor water policies
that focus on redressing imbalances through
the reallocation of water rights will chal-
lenge the existing distribution of rights and
resources as there is no extra water to go
around. This creates the political dilemma
of confronting vested interests in society,
and requires that government has both
the organizational and political ability to
overcome resistance to redistribution. An
important first step is the formulation of
water legislation that sets out procedures for
the creation of a reserve of productive water
for the poor and how new institutions such
as river basin management entities can work
in a redistributive manner (cf. van Koppen,
2000).
Of the five basins reviewed in this book,
South Africa is the only country formally
placing emphasis on redressing imbalances
and achieving equity in water management.
In the Government of South Africa’s White
Paper on national water policy (DWAF,
1997), three components of equity are
defined: equity in access to water services
(drinking water and sanitation), equity in
access to water resources (water for produc-
tive purposes) and equity in the access to
benefits from the use of water resources
(allocative efficiency). However, even with
the commitment of the government, reallo-
cating water to new entrants is proving
very difficult (van Koppen et al., 2003).
A way forward could be to impose water
savingsoncommercialagricultureandother
productive uses, and then allocating these
savingstoawaterreserveforthepoor.Under
the system of compulsory water licensing
included in the 1998 National Water Act,
this is possible, but it will require deter-
mined resolve from the government to carry
it through (cf. Perret, 2002). Compulsory
water licensing is currently being pilot-
tested in one river basin, making it
premature to draw conclusions. New infra-
structure will also need to be developed, to
ensure that the water rights of the poor do
not remain paper rights.
13.4.2 Representation in river basin
management
An important challenge in river basin man-
agement is ensuring that all stakeholders
have a voice in basin governance. Although
frequently advocated as a key to achieving
effective water management, stakeholder
participation in river basin management is
not straightforward, and actually including
the poor and achieving substantive stake-
holder representation has proven elusive in
practice (Wester et al., 2003). The question
of how greater equity in water management
and representation in river basin manage-
ment can be achieved in highly stratified
societies with significant gender and social
inequalities remains. As poverty is an out-
come of how societies are structured, it is
evident that marginal groups are excluded
from decision making. A danger of the
emphasis on participation in river basin
management is that attention is drawn away
from the very real social and economic dif-
ferences between people and the need for
the redistribution of resources, entitlements
and opportunities. In the long term, mar-
ginal groups will only gain a voice in river
basin management when they are no longer
marginal. This entails fundamental changes
in the way societies are structured, such
that they no longer produce poverty but
wealth that is fairly distributed. As it is
unlikely that this will happen in the
near future, in the short run mechanisms
need to be devised that strengthen the
representation of marginal groups in river
basin management.
It is clear that the size of the population
in most river basins is such that it precludes
thedirectparticipationofallstakeholdersin
basin-level decision making. Thus, as deci-
sion making moves to the river basin level,
serious thought needs to be given to how
hard-won democratic rights in conventional
social and political domains are assured in
the river basin domain (cf. Barham, 2001).
As Green and Warner (2000) point out, inte-
grated water management and participation
pull in opposite directions. While the
complexity of integrated management of
sizeable river basins invites centralization
242 P. Wester et al.
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subsidiarity and small-scale operations,
engaging people to think creatively about
issues with which their lives are intimately
linked. Thus, in any basin ofsomesize, river
basin management would entail a layered
system of representation. The question
then becomes who gets to represent groups
of stakeholders in river basin management.
This question strikes at the heart of basin
governance, and revolves around which
type of democracy is implied, liberal or
social.
Liberal democratic theory is premised
on a notion of abstract individualism and
assumes that all people are equal in the
public sphere (Held, 1995; Luckham et al.,
2000). In water reforms informed by liberal
democracy, it is assumed that it is possible
for water management stakeholders to
bracket status differentials and power
inequalities and to deliberate ‘as if’ they
were equals in water management forums
suchasWUAsorriverbasincouncils.Social
democracy, on the other hand, departs from
social inequalities and attempts to increase
citizen involvement in the affairs of govern-
ment and expand the concept of citizenship
to cover economic and social rights as well
as political rights. Thus, it aims at a redistri-
bution of power and resources to enable
citizens to participate in the decisions that
affect their lives (Luckham et al., 2000). In
water reforms informed by social democ-
racy, water is seen as a basic human right
and a politically contested resource (Gleick,
1998; Mehta, 2000).
On the face of it, stakeholder platforms,
be they river basin councils, catchment
management agencies or watershed coun-
cils,democratizeriverbasinmanagementby
giving voice to a multiplicity of interested
actors. However, much depends on the
existing institutional arrangements from
which stakeholder platforms for river basin
management emerge, as many roles, rights
and certainly the technologies and physical
infrastructure for controlling water are
already in place. In river basins, water
management stakeholders may have differ-
ent levels and kinds of education, speak dif-
ferent languages, differ in access to politics
and hold different beliefs about how nature
and society function (cf. Edmunds and
Wollenberg, 2001). If this is not taken into
account when creating new rules, roles and
rights, the institutional outcome can easily
privilege those who are literate and have
access to the legal system. If done
unreflectively and without an emphasis on
the redistribution of power and resources,
new institutional arrangements for river
basin management will institutionalize
inequalityandpowerdifferentialsinsteadof
giving voice to marginal groups (Wester and
Warner, 2002). Without firm land and water
rights and livelihood security, there is very
little incentive for the poor to participate in
river basin management.
Having argued for social democracy in
river basin management, the issue of stake-
holderrepresentationremains.Therelation-
ship of the representatives participating in
riverbasinmanagementtotheirconstituents
isproblematic,especiallywhenthirdparties
are involved. It is a nostrum of development
work that third-party facilitators are needed
to help identify, mobilize, organize and
inform stakeholder groups. However, as
pointed out by Edmunds and Wollenberg
the relationship of a representative to his/
her constituency is perhaps most politically
charged when representatives of a group are
designated by outsiders or are accountable
to them, as is often the case in multi-
stakeholder negotiations. From the start,
outside conveners and facilitators influence
representation by the selection of stake-
holder groups, the people to represent each
group and how the expression of interests is
facilitated in the meeting. (2001, p. 240)
This points to the need for a broad and
inclusive process of invitation, consultation
and consolidation of interested stakeholders,
assumed to represent all interested parties.
Whereas stakeholder processes and repre-
sentation in river basin management are
important, they need to be twinned with a
focus on securing water entitlements for the
poor. This points to an important role for
government, both in drawing up and enforc-
ing water laws that explicitly safeguard cus-
tomary water rights and contain provisions
for reallocating water rights to the poor.
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Reflecting on the challenges facing small-
holder irrigation in water-scarce basins, it
becomes clear that where poverty is wide-
spread, river basin management needs to
have a strong developmental dimension.
However, where the extra water for pro-
ductive purposes that is needed for poverty
alleviation will come from is less clear.
If a country is rapidly industrializing and
diversifying its economy, perhaps this is
not an issue. However, most poor countries
are not creating alternative employment at
a sufficient rate to provide the rural poor
with attractive alternatives to agriculture. In
such cases trying to intensify smallholder
agriculture, which often requires irrigation,
is the only feasible strategy in the short
to medium term. Thus, central concerns
become the mechanisms in place to allocate
water rights, the regulatory entity responsi-
ble for water allocation, and how conflicts
about water rights and water distribution
are mediated. Finding the right mix
between the state, the market and the
empowerment of the marginal points to the
need to move beyond token consultation
towards partnerships, negotiations and con-
flict resolution. At the minimum, strategies
for river basin management should detail
mechanisms for redressing imbalances in
access to water for productive purposes and
establishing clear and secure water rights
for the poor.
While much can be learned from insti-
tutional arrangements for river basin man-
agement in affluent countries, it is crucial
to understand that these do not operate
in the conditions of low-income countries:
dominance ofsmallholder agriculture, weak
institutions, insufficient financial and
human resources, marked social inequity
and extreme poverty. While water develop-
ment and management can only partly
address these issues, they must explicitly
form the points of departure in the reform
of institutional arrangements for river basin
management in developing countries. This
chapter does not hold the answers to how
this should be done, but it does offer
elements of a strategy that could be followed
to address water deprivation in closing river
basins in developing countries. Such a strat-
egy consists of a fine balancing act between
allocating water for poverty reduction and
allocations designed to meet the needs of
proven productive capacity.
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Lerma–Chapala basin (Mexico) 220
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charging impacts 86–87
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
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South Africa 145–146
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water service providers in South
Africa 164
water use 27–28, 75, 76
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annual runoff, mean 149
appropriative rights 114, 236
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aquifer management councils 140
Aral Sea crisis 43
arid areas, precipitation 36
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authoritarian model 14
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banks see development banks
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CALFED process 119, 120
California Aqueduct (USA) 112
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capital investment 79, 82
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river basin organizations 78–80
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demographics 36–40
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
(South Africa) 149, 153, 154, 158,
163, 221
Department of Water Resources (California)
114–115
internal conflicts 119
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153–154
derivative water 11, 237




basin management 34, 46–48,
231–232
climate 35–36
informal water sector 40–43
institutional models of river basin
management 46–48




water resources management 44
development banks
Asian Development Bank guidelines
61
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
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Directorate of State Hydraulic Works
(Turkey) 198, 201, 202
disasters, protection against 25–26
discharge measurement 73
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legal framework 177–179
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drinking water 20, 77
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Endangered Species Act (US, 1973) 112
environment
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protection 25
environmental advocacy groups
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environmental regulation 202
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Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 177
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fees, collection 42, 84–85
finance, river basin organizations 81–82
financial productivity 77–78
fish, endangered/threatened species 117
fisheries 177
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France, water management 93–94
Authorized User Associations 93,
94–95, 96





sustainability 102–103, 104, 107
essential basin functions 100, 101
irrigation charges 100, 102–105
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see also Neste system (France)
functional responsibility charts 66–67
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basin water use 195–199
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legal issues 200–204, 205, 206–208
location 194
nature reserve 198–199
policies 200–204, 205, 206–208, 224
solutions to issues 208–213
water resources 195–200
General Directorate of Rural Services
(Turkey) 202, 206, 211, 222, 223
geographical information systems (GISs)
56, 72
governance 9, 10, 15
centralized 15
decentralized 15–16
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 212
natural resources 33




Central Valley (California) 219
depletion 27
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 173,
189–190
irrigation 175–176
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 195, 197,
198, 199, 201, 209, 222–223
irrigation 175–176













rights in Central Valley (California)
121
use regulation in Central Valley
(California) 114, 119
headwork construction in Vietnam 182
human needs for water 76, 77







Central Valley (California) 110–113
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
169–170, 171, 172–177
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 195
Olifants Basin (South Africa)
148–151
hydropower
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
174–175, 189
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 198
income 216, 217
indicators for river basins 61, 63, 64–65
benchmarking 67–68, 69–70
industrial growth 44–45
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 200
industrialists 13
industry
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
177
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 198,
199–200, 204, 207
Lerma–Chapala basin (Mexico) 131
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
157–158
payment for water 83
water service providers in South
Africa 163–164





basin level 58, 61–63, 64–65,
66–67
changing 57–58, 59–60
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information systems 53–57
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Central Valley (California) 113–117,
118, 119–121
decentralized in developing countries
36
demographic factors 37
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
177–184, 185–187, 188–190
effectiveness 5–6
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 200–204,
205, 206–208
management 228
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
151–158
resources 227
river basin development 24
stakeholder platforms 243
tasks 24–26
integrated management frameworks 2
complexity 243
gradual 90
integrated river basin management (IRBM)
2, 31–33
developing countries 34, 48
Murray–Darling River system
33–34
integrated river basin model 62–63, 66








charges 89, 100, 102–105
costs 83
decline in Taiwan 44–45
developing countries 38
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Neste system (France) 99
semi-arid areas 231




stakeholders in France 94–96







water-scarce river basins 231–244
see also locally controlled irrigation
system (LCIS)
irrigation boards, South Africa 156
irrigation management companies 180







Kuznets curve hypothesis 43, 44, 45
land rights 33
legislation/legal authority 14, 41,
225–226
Central Valley (California) 226
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
177–179, 221–222, 226
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 200–204,
205, 206–208, 208, 211, 226
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stakeholders 132–135
surface water allocation 137–140
urban water supply 130–131
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liberal democratic theory 243
local government, Olifants River basin
(South Africa) 155



















Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (Vietnam) 178–179,
180–181, 182
Ministry of Environment (Turkey)
201–202, 207, 210–211
municipal water supply, Gediz River basin
(Turkey) 197–198, 199–200
municipalities
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 202
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
155
Murray–Darling basin (Australia) 31,
33–34
National Water Act (1996, South Africa)
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policy issues 151–158, 224
regions 147–148
river basin management functions
158, 159–162, 163–164
water resources management 163
option contracts 239
organizations see river basin organizations
planning function 119, 229
discipline range 229
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 204, 210,
211
policies 6–7
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 222,
224
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 200–204,
205, 206–208, 212, 224
Lerma–Chapala basin (Mexico) 224
pro-poor 240–242
politics 223–225
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 207, 212,
224
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
164–165
river basin management 228
pollution 8, 25, 72
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 190




equity in payment for water 87
financial productivity of water 77–78
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 204
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
157, 167
river basin management 240–242
rural 102














water allocation control 105–107
private sector, Gediz River basin (Turkey)
212–213
privatization
engineering design and construction
companies 180
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
152–153
service providers 33, 228
problem-solving behaviour 110
property regimes 235
Provincial Agricultural and Rural
Development Service (Vietnam)
180
public agencies, Gediz River basin
(Turkey) 201










Olifants Basin (South Africa) 148
rainwater diversion/harvesting 39
record keeping 210
Regional Development Companies (SARs,
France) 95, 96, 100, 101
regional impacts of water use 1–2
regulation 228
remote sensing 72
data collection 62, 66
rent-seeking behaviour 14
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Gediz River basin (Turkey) 198
resources
development in Dong Nai River basin
(Vietnam) 188
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 208
management 228
redistribution 242, 243
river basin management 226–227
South Africa 166




Gediz River basin (Turkey) 206
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
149–150
riparian doctrine 235–236
riparian rights 37, 114
river basin(s)
adaptive institutions 27
basin-wide impacts of water use 1–2







development 22, 24, 25, 26–27
pathways 23, 27–28
progression 21–22
development phases 20–24, 24–25,
26–27




Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
184, 185–187, 188–190
essential 100, 101
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 204,
205, 206
institutional concerns 24
institutional essential tasks 24–26
maturation model 7
quantity constraints 216, 217
reallocation 8, 22, 25, 26, 27
size 215, 216, 217
utilization 22, 24–25, 27
river basin management (RBM) 3, 7–11,
12, 13–16, 33, 215, 216, 217–229
administrative model 33









dimensions 215, 216, 217–218
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 191
drivers 215, 216, 217–218
enabling conditions 11, 13–14,
223–227

























river basin organizations 4
charge assessment methods 83–84
charging impacts 86–87, 89
costs components 78–80




financial flows 89, 90, 91
financing systems 88–91
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riverine ports, Dong Nai River basin
(Vietnam) 189
rivers
cumulative uses of resources 1–2
hydrologic regime change 25
return flow 83
runoff, mean annual 149
Sacramento–San Joaquin Valley
(California, USA) 112









service providers 79, 81, 228
Central Valley (California) 115
privatization 33, 228
Shasta dam (California) 112
smallholders, irrigation 157
small-scale water user forums (SWUFs)
157
social analysis levels 46–47
social democracy 243
socioeconomic development level 43–45
South Africa
equity in water management 242
government agencies 153–155
water rights 237
see also Olifants River basin (South
Africa)
South African Development Trust 154
stakeholders 7, 10
data ownership 58
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
179–184
France 94–96
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 207
Lerma–Chapala basin (Mexico)
132–135
Murray–Darling River system 33
Olifants Basin (South Africa) 221
river basin management 242, 243
standard setting 228
State Planning Organization (Turkey) 202
State Water Project (California, USA) 112




Central Valley (California) 219
constrained availability 227
developed resources 110
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 189





Olifants Basin (South Africa) 149
sustainability
costs 102–103, 104, 107





see also water storage




tribal leaders, Olifants River basin (South
Africa) 154–155
tubewell owners 42
Turkey 193, 194, 226
see also Gediz River basin (Turkey)
urban water
supply in Lerma–Chapala basin
(Mexico) 130–131
use in Central Valley (California)
112–113
urbanization 44–45
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see also Dong Nai River basin
(Vietnam)
villages
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 202
groundwater cooperatives 197
wastewater 237

















human needs 76, 77
imports to Olifants River basin (South
Africa) 150
impounding of large bodies 25
loss 39–40
ownership 36
price rises 100, 102
reallocation 8, 22, 25, 26, 27
regulation in Central Valley
(California) 115–116
retail delivery services 119






water accounting framework 19, 20, 21
water productivity 38
water allocation 25
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
188–190
environmental needs 33
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 204, 205,
206, 209–210, 223
mechanisms 235–237
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
167
pricing in control 105–107
pro-poor policies 241
water balance
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
173–174
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
150–151
water boards (South Africa) 156
water budgets 62
water charges, collecting 42, 84–85
water control agency 116
water courts
Central Valley (California) 117
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
155
water demand 75–77
Central Valley (California, USA)
112–113
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
172–173
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 200
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
150, 151





Water Law (1992, France) 96
Water Law (1999, Vietnam) 177–179, 183
water law reserves, South Africa 152
water licensing
compulsory 242









water markets, inter-sectoral 238–239
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water quality 216, 217
assurance 119
Central Valley (California) 219
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 190,
191
enforcement of standards 25, 72, 119
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 200, 205,
206, 208–209, 211, 223
irrigation 16
monitoring 25








Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 188
enforcement of standards 72
events 66






Olifants River basin (South Africa)
163
need changes 72




reallocation 8, 22, 25, 26, 27
South Africa 166
Vietnam 182




Central Valley (California) 113–114,
121
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 191










water scarcity 7, 8, 26, 241
irrigation service provision 231–244
water sector organization 40–43
water security 241
water service providers (South Africa)
156, 163–164
Water Services Act (1996, South Africa)
152
water storage








Central Valley (California) 110–112
Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam) 170,
172, 177, 189
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 197–198,
199–200
Neste system (France) 98





water use 25, 75–77
basin-wide impacts 1–2
changing patterns 19




Dong Nai River basin (Vietnam)
177
Gediz River basin (Turkey)
198–199
evaporative 23
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Central Valley (California) 115, 219
charge impacts 89
fees 81–82
Gediz River basin (Turkey) 209–210
Neste system (France) 97–98
Olifants River basin (South Africa)
224
small 42
water users associations (WUAs) 13, 41
developing countries 231–232
Mexico 130, 133, 139–140




South Africa 153, 156, 164
water-harvesting devices 20, 21
wetlands, drying up 25
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